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    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
  DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
  
  
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 14-04976 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Daniel Crowley, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HEINY, Claude R., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant contests the Department of Defense’s (DoD) intent to deny his eligibility 
for a security clearance to work in the defense industry. His sister is a dual U.S. and 
Syrian citizen. His aunt and mother-in-law are citizens and residents of Syria. The 
foreign preference and foreign influence security concerns have been mitigated. 
Clearance is granted.  
 
History of the Case 
 
Acting under the relevant Executive Order and DoD Directive,1 on December 24, 
2014, the DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing foreign preference and 
foreign influence security concerns. DoD adjudicators could not find that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance.  
                                                          
1 Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD 
on September 1, 2006. 
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On January 7, 2015, Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing. On 
March 25, 2015, I was assigned the case. On April 22, 2015, the Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing for the hearing convened on 
May 5, 2015. I admitted Government’s Exhibits (Ex.) 1 and 2, without objection. 
Applicant testified at the hearing, as did his supervisor. The record was held open to 
allow Applicant to submit additional information. Additional material was received and 
admitted into the record without objection as Ex. A through J. On May 13, 2015, DOHA 
received the hearing transcript (Tr.). 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
Department Counsel requested administrative notice of facts concerning the 
Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) and provided supporting documents to show detail and 
context for those facts. Applicant did not object or agree to the administrative notice 
request.  
 
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for 
administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 
2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 
02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004)); McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)). The most common basis for administrative 
notice at ISCR proceedings, is to notice facts that are either well known or from 
government reports. See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) 
(listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). I marked the documents as Ex. 
Exhibit I. See the Syrian section of the Findings of Fact of this decision, infra, for the 
facts accepted for administrative notice. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In Applicant’s Answer to the SOR, he admitted all of the factual allegations in the 
SOR, and his admissions are incorporated herein. After a thorough review of the 
pleadings and exhibits, I make the following findings of fact. 
 
 Applicant is a 48-year-old information technology (IT) security analyst who has 
worked for a defense contractor since January 2013, and seeks to obtain a security 
clearance. Applicant’s supervisor, who has known him since 1998, when Applicant 
graduated from college, states Applicant is trustworthy, very objective, honest, and a 
family-oriented person. (Tr. 32–34) Applicant is hard working and has received a 
superior achievement award, a teamwork award, a certificate of appreciation, a 
technical achievement award, four performance awards, and has been the company’s 
employee of the month three times. (Ex. A – J) He has never compromised or 
mishandled IT, classified, or sensitive information. 
 
 Applicant was born in Syria to a Syrian father and a U.S. mother. His parents are 
deceased. He has lived in the United States for more than 28 years. At age eight 
months, his family moved to Saudi Arabia where his father was an economist. (Tr. 21) 
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While in kindergarten, his family moved to Beirut where his father worked for the United 
Nations. (Tr. 21) When the war in Lebanon started, the family moved to Syria where 
Applicant remained until he finished high school. In 1987, he then moved to the United 
States. (Tr. 21) 
 From August 1987 to December 1996, Applicant attended university in the United 
States. In December 1998, he obtained his bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering. 
(Ex. 1, Tr. 24) His wife, and two children, ages 6 and 11, are U.S. citizens living with 
him. His children are involved in soccer and football. (Tr. 37) He considers them the 
most important people in his life. (Tr. 26, 27) His mother’s relatives live in an adjacent, 
southern U.S. state. In April and May 2008, he visited Syria to attend his mother’s 
funeral. (Ex. 1, Tr. 30) For a week in October 2009, he visited Syria to attend his father’s 
funeral. (Ex. 1, Tr. 30) These are the only foreign travel trips listed on his Electronic 
Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). (Ex. 1) 
 
 Applicant’s sister, a high-school teacher who writes math and computer 
textbooks, is a dual U.S–Syrian citizen, living in Syria. (Tr. 28) His aunt, a retired 
English translator and his mother-in-law, a retired school teacher, are citizens and 
residents of Syria. (Ex. 2, Tr. 28) In January 2015, his father-in-law, a retired bank 
employee, died. (Tr. 20, 28, 31) His last in-person contact with his sister and aunt was 
three years ago when they visited him in the United States. He talks to or texts with his 
sister and aunt monthly. (Tr. 22) He contacts his mother-in-law yearly, on her birthday. 
(Tr. 50) His next previous in-person visit with his sister was in 2009, when he visited 
Syria following his father’s death. (Ex. 2)  
 
 If someone attempted to force Applicant to provide information by putting 
pressure on his aunt or sister, he would inform his company’s security officer. He would 
not provide information to a terrorist, for doing so would not help his relatives. (Tr. 26) 
He would not do wrong to help someone doing wrong. (Tr. 28) He does not believe any 
action on his part could help them and he does not believe action against them could 
influence him. (Tr. 58) 
 
 During an April 2014 Personal Subject Interview (PSI), Applicant stated he liked 
his Syrian heritage and his American heritage. (Tr. 51, 52) He did not prefer Syria over 
the United States, although the PSI states he “holds equal allegiances to Syria and the 
USA.” (Ex. 2) Although proud of his Syrian heritage, he is willing to renounce his Syrian 
citizenship. (Tr. 53) During the interview, he indicated he valued both his mother’s 
heritage as well as his father’s. He was not speaking about allegiance to a country, but 
about his heritage and the qualities he received from each parent. (SOR Answer) 
 
SYRIA 
 
 Since 1963, the Syrian Arab Republic has been ruled by an authoritarian regime. 
Syria has been in a state of emergency since 1963 and is currently in a full-scale civil 
war. The conflict has resulted in tens of thousands of death, many more wounded, 2.3 
million refugees, and 6.5 million internally displaced people. 
 
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 Syria is included on the Department of State’s List of State Sponsors of 
Terrorism due to the presence of several terrorist groups operating in Syria. The Syrian 
Government provides political and material support to Hezbollah and Palestinian 
terrorist groups. Several terrorist groups base their external leadership and maintain 
offices in Damascus. In addition, Syria permits Iran to transfer weapons and supplies 
through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria is one of the primary transit points for 
foreign fighters entering Iraq. 
 
 In May 2004, sanctions were implemented by executive order due to Syria’s 
active and passive support of terrorism in the Middle East. Exports of U.S. goods to 
Syria are prohibited except for food and medicine.  
 
 The Department of State’s Report on Human Rights Practices for 2007 indicates 
the Syrian Government’s human rights record has “worsened.” The U.S. intelligence 
community believes the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including nerve 
agents, and barrel bombs against the Syrian people on numerous occasions. In Syria 
the following human rights abuses occur: absence of right to change government, 
arbitrary and or unlawful deprivation of life, torture in prison, poor prison conditions, 
arbitrary arrests and detentions, absence of rule of law, severely restricted civil liberties, 
limited freedom of religion, government corruption, lack of transparency, and violence 
against women. Security forces frequently use torture against foreign citizens. The 
security situation throughout Syria will remain volatile and unpredictable for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
 The four major branches of Syrian security forces all devote resources to 
monitoring internal dissent and individual citizens, and operate outside the control of the 
legal system. Security personnel have placed foreign visitors under surveillance, 
monitored telephones, and search the hotel rooms and possession of foreign visitors.  
 
 Dual citizens and U.S. citizens whose fathers are of Syrian descent are required 
to complete military service or pay to be exempted.  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
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reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination of the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Foreign Preference, Guideline C 
 
 When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign 
country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or 
make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States. AG ¶ 9. 
 
AG ¶ 10 describes a condition that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in Applicant’s case:  
 
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than 
the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United 
States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship. 
 
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 Dual citizenship standing alone is not sufficient to warrant an adverse security 
clearance decision. ISCR Case No. 99-0454 at 5, 2000 WL 1805219 (App. Bd. Oct. 17, 
2000). Under Guideline C, “the issue is not whether an applicant is a dual national, but 
rather whether an applicant shows a preference for a foreign country through actions.” 
ISCR Case No. 98-0252 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 15, 1999). 
 
During Applicant’s April 2014 Personal Subject Interview, he stated he liked his 
Syrian heritage and his American heritage. He did not indicate he preferred Syria over 
the United States, although the PSI states he “holds equal allegiances to Syria and the 
USA.” Applicant’s statement about having “allegiance” to Syria was more an expression 
of sympathy or empathy towards his Syrian heritage and was not an expression of 
loyalty or allegiance to Syria. Although proud of his Syrian heritage, he is willing to 
renounce his Syrian citizenship. During the interview, he indicated he valued both his 
mother’s heritage as well as his father’s. He was not speaking about allegiance to a 
country, but about his heritage and the qualities he received from each parent.  
 
AG ¶ 11 provides a condition that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual 
citizenship. 
 
Although proud of his Syrian heritage, Applicant stated during his interview that 
he was willing to renounce his Syrian citizenship. AG ¶ 11(b) applies, and foreign 
preference concerns are mitigated. 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
 Two disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 7 of the guideline are potentially 
applicable:  
 
 (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
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foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. 
 
 Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).  
 
 Furthermore, “even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the 
United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national 
security.” ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 
2002). Finally, friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, 
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. Nevertheless, the nature of a 
nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record 
are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are 
vulnerable to government coercion.  
 
The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign 
country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or 
dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence 
operations against the United States. In considering the nature of the government, an 
administrative judge must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue. See 
generally ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006) (reversing decision to 
grant clearance where administrative judge did not consider terrorist activity in area 
where family members resided).  
 
 Applicant is a dual U.S. citizen from birth because his mother was a U.S. citizen 
and his father a Syrian citizen. He was born in Syria. His parents are deceased. He has 
lived in the United States for more than 28 years. He lived briefly in Syria before moving 
with his family at age eight months to Saudi Arabia. In kindergarten, his family moved to 
Beirut where his family stayed until the Lebanon civil war started. He then lived in Syria 
until he finished high school. In 1987, he then moved to the United States. He last 
visited Syria in 2009, following the death of his father. He attended university in the 
United States and obtained his bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering. Applicant’s 
immediate family and also his mother’s relatives reside in the United States. He 
considers his wife and children the most important people in his life. They are U.S. 
citizens living with him. 
 
 Applicant’s sister, a high-school teacher who writes math and computer 
textbooks, is a dual U.S–Syrian citizen living in Syria, His aunt is a retired English 
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translator and his mother-in-law is a retired school teacher. They are citizens and 
residents of Syria. He talks to or texts with his sister and aunt monthly. He contacts his 
mother-in-law yearly on her birthday. His relationship and contacts with his aunt and 
mother-in-law are minimal. 
 
 If someone attempted to obtain information from Applicant by putting pressure on 
his aunt or sister, he would inform his company’s security officer. He would not provide 
information to a terrorist for doing so would not help his relatives. He would not do 
wrong to help someone who is doing wrong. He does not believe he could be influenced 
by them.  
 
 Three mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 of the guideline are potentially 
applicable:  
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk of foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
 Security clearance adjudications are predicative judgments, where an applicant’s 
past history is the best indicator of future conduct. He has never compromised or 
mishandled classified or sensitive information. Applicant established that he has a 
history of safeguarding this nation’s secrets and there is no reason to doubt his ability to 
do so going forward.  
 
  Applicant came to the United States more than 28 years ago. His professional 
life is in the United States. Applicant has significant professional and personal ties to the 
United States. In light of Applicant’s close ties to the United States, it is unlikely that he 
would choose his sister, aunt, or mother-in-law in Syria over his connections to the 
United States. I find that he would resolve any potential conflict in favor of national 
security. Applicant’s family ties are not sufficient to raise an issue of a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion. Based on all these 
circumstances Applicant met his burden of persuasion and mitigated the foreign 
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influence concern. Mitigating condition AG ¶ 8(b) applies. Even if security concerns are 
not mitigated under 8(b), they are mitigated under the whole-person concept, infra. 
 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my 
comments under Guideline B and C in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in 
AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment. 
 
 Applicant has been in the United States for 28 years, much longer than he lived 
in Syria. His wife and children are U.S. citizens living with him. He was articulate, 
candid, sincere, and credible at the hearing. Applicant’s home is in the United States. 
Applicant has been successful in his work.  
 
 Applicant chose to come to the United States and pursue his career here. He 
could have returned to Syria at any time during the last 28 years, but did so only for 
short times following the deaths of his parents. He is firmly established in the United 
States with a stable family, social, and professional life. His life is focused here. He has 
loyalty to the United States. There is no evidence indicating that he may be manipulated 
or induced to help a foreign power or interest. His assets are located in the United 
States. There is no evidence any of Applicant’s relatives in Syria are involved with, or 
under scrutiny, or have interests antithetical to the United States. Although his sister, 
aunt, and mother-in-law are in Syria, I am convinced that he will resolve any issues in 
favor of the United States.  
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines B and 
C, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence and foreign 
preference. Accordingly, I conclude he has carried his burden of showing that it is 
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clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified 
information. 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Foreign Preference:  FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:   For Applicant 
  
 Paragraph 2, Foreign Influence:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a – 2.c:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.  
 
 
 
______________________ 
CLAUDE R. HEINY II 
     Administrative Judge