1The Government submitted six items in support of its case. 1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 14-06014 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se ______________ Decision ______________ LYNCH, Noreen A, Administrative Judge: On April 19, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns arising under Guideline H (Drug Involvement), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), implemented in September 2006. Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested an administrative determination. Department Counsel submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM), dated July 29, 2015.1 Applicant received the FORM on August 10, 2015, but did not submit a response to the FORM. I received the case assignment on October 9, 2015. Based on a review of the case file, submissions, and exhibits, I find Applicant failed to meet his burden regarding the security concerns raised. Security clearance is denied. 2 Findings of Fact In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations under Guideline H (Drug Involvement), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). Applicant is a 52-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He earned an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering and a graduate degree in 1995. Applicant is married and has two adult children. He has worked for his current employer since 1994. (Item 3) Applicant held a security clearance in 1986 and another in 2001. He completed his latest security clearance application on March 7, 2014. Drug Involvement From approximately 1994 until October 2013, Applicant used marijuana with varying frequency to include use after being granted a security clearance in August 2001. Specifically, the record provides that Applicant disclosed on his 2014 security clearance application (SCA) that he used marijuana from 1979 through October 2013. He used about four times over the preceding seven years. (Item 3) Applicant started using marijuana when he was about 16 years old in 1979 through 1986, when he stopped for a period of time when he was hired by a company and received his first security clearance. (Item 6) His most recent use was with his father. (Item 6) Personal Conduct Applicant used marijuana across a 20 year time period, until the age of 50. He associates with the person who he most recently used marijuana with – his father. He used marijuana despite holding a security clearance. As an adult during his career, he never disclosed the information on his 2001 security clearance application. He continued to use after receiving that clearance. He finally disclosed information on his 2014 security clearance application. (Item 4) He states that he stopped in 2013 and this behavior will not recur. (Item 2) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all 2 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995). 3 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988). 4 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995). 5 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information), and EO 10865 § 7. 6 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995). 7 Id. 3 available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. The United States Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .”2 The burden of proof is something less than a preponderance of evidence.3 The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.4 A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”5 “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”6 Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such information.7 The decision to deny an individual a security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance. 4 Analysis Guideline H, Drug Involvement AG ¶ 24 expresses the security concern pertaining to drug involvement: Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. (a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include: (1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and (2) inhalants and other similar substances. (b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction. AG ¶ 25 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying: (a) any drug abuse (see above definition); (b) testing positive for illegal drug use; (c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; (d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence; (e) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who, is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program; (f) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a duly qualified medical professional; (g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance; and (h) expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use. 5 Applicant admitted his use of illegal drugs (marijuana) from 1979 until 1986 and then from 1994 until October 2013. He used marijuana after being granted a security clearance. AG¶ 25(a), (c) and (g) apply. AG ¶ 26 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; (3) an appropriate period of abstinence; and (4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of clearance for any violation; (c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since ended; and (d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional. Applicant’s last claimed use of marijuana was in 2013. He states that he has not used any illegal drugs since that time. He states that this behavior will not recur. Given, his history, I have doubts as to his intentions to stop using marijuana. No mitigating conditions apply under the drug involvement concern. Guideline E, Personal Conduct AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. Under AG ¶ 16(a), a disqualifying conditions exists when there is “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel 6 questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities.” Under AG ¶ 16(c) a disqualifying condition exists by “credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole- person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information.” It was not until 2013 that Applicant acknowledged his use of marijuana spanning a 20 year period. His behavior and personal conduct are disqualifying as they raise questions about his judgment, reliability, truthfulness, and willingness to comply with the law. After considering the mitigating conditions outlined in AG ¶ 17, I conclude that none of them apply. Applicant did not make prompt or good-faith efforts to correct his falsification or concealment until 2013. He provided no information that indicates he was ill-advised. The intentional omissions occurred over a period of 20 years. The incidents are too recent and serious to be mitigated by the passage of time. I have serious doubts about his good judgment and reliability. He has not provided information in this record to show that he has met his burden of proof to mitigate the personal conduct concern. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors. Applicant is 52 years old. He has worked for the same company since 1994. He held a 7 security clearance during these years. He is an educated man. He is married and has children. Applicant failed to submit sufficient information or evidence to mitigate the security concerns raised in his case. He used marijuana until at least age 50. He has been entrusted with a security clearance during his career. He has lied to the Government concerning his use of marijuana for years. Applicant has not shown good judgment and honesty. He has disregarded rules and regulations over the years, including while holding a security clearance. He has not provided documentation to show drugs are no longer a problem. I have doubts given the record. Accordingly, Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns. Clearance is denied. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant Paragraph 2., Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. Clearance is denied. NOREEN A. LYNCH. Administrative Judge