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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 14-05259
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: David Hayes,  Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Catie Young, Esq.
                                                                            
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On November 21, 2014, the Department of Defense  (DOD) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns arising under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
(DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG), implemented in September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on July 18, 2015. A notice of
hearing was issued on August 13, 2015, scheduling the hearing for October 15, 2015.
Government Exhibits (GX) 1-2 were admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant
testified, and submitted Applicant Exhibit (AX) A-O, which were admitted without
objection. The transcript was received on October 23, 2015.  Based on a review of the
pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is
denied.
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Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to Iran. The request and the attached documents are included in the record as
HE I. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Facts, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the SOR allegations in ¶ 1.a-d with
explanations.
Applicant, who was born in Germany, is 43 years old. His father was a U.S.
military officer and the family traveled during Applicant’s youth. Applicant is a U.S.
citizen who received his undergraduate degree in the United States in 1994. He married
his wife, who is a naturalized U.S. citizen, in 2011. (GX 1)  He has two children who are
U.S. citizens. Applicant completed his first security clearance application in 2013. He
believes he has an interim clearance. Applicant has been employed with his current
employer, as an account executive, since 2013. (GX 1)
Applicant met his wife in 2008 while they both worked in the same company. (Tr.
26) His wife, who was born in Iran, came to the United States when she was four years
old with her family. Applicant’s wife has been a naturalized U.S. citizen since 2000. She
has no desire to return to Iran to live. She visited Iran in 2003 and in 2009, and has an
Iranian passport. She has no intention to renew her Iranian passport. (AX M and N; Tr.
31) She has no remaining immediate family in Iran. (AX I)
Applicant’s father-in-law is a dual citizen of the United States and Iran. Until
recently, he spent six months each year residing in Iran. Applicant’s father-in-law is a
mechanical engineer. Applicant met him in 2010, before marrying his daughter. He has
been an absent father from Applicant’s wife’s life. Applicant has seen him about 30-40
times over the past five years.  His father-in-law has a limited knowledge of English and
Applicant does not speak Farsi. They communicate through Applicant’s wife.
Applicant’s father-in-law has traveled to Iran over the past 25 years and lived in Iran for
about six months each year. He would then return to the United States. (AX C)
Applicant’s father-in-law is a businessman. He had two companies located in
Iran. (Tr. 88) He is of the Bahai faith. He is still legally married to his wife, but they are
estranged. It is believed that he was having an affair with a woman in Iran. He also had
a drug problem with opium. 
Applicant’s father-in-law was convicted of (1) Conspiracy to Violate the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, a federal felony, and (2) Money Laundering, a
felony. (AX A, D and E) He exported goods from the United States to Iran without first
obtaining a requisite license. In fact, he never applied for one. (AX B)  In June 2014, he
was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison. (AX A-D; GX 2) He was also put in a
drug rehabilitation program in prison and is now eligible for a halfway house. (Tr. 65)
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Applicant and his wife had no knowledge of his father-in-law’s illegal conduct
until the investigation and court proceedings. (Tr. 58) They also learned that he smoked
opium and had some in his home in the United States. Applicant’s wife sometimes
spoke to her father when he was in Iran. Applicant never had any communications with
him when he was in Iran. (Tr.88)
When Applicant’s father-in-law returned to the United States to face sentencing,
Applicant might see him once a month. (Tr. 60) His wife speaks to him on the phone
about once a week. Applicant’s father-in-law is now living in a halfway house until
December. After that he will be in home confinement and on probation for two years.
(Tr. 65) He will be living in the basement of his estranged wife’s home. (Tr. 66) His wife
still maintains contact with him.
Applicant still has some contact with his father-in-law. He acknowledged that he
had dinner with the entire family a few weeks ago. (Tr. 69) Applicant does not trust his
father-in-law and does not care to maintain any communications with him. However, he
stated that he could not deny his wife permission to visit with or talk with her father. (Tr.
69) Applicant’s wife would not maintain contact with him if he left the United States and
returned to Iran.  (Tr. 71)
Applicant’s mother-in-law is a naturalized U.S. citizen, who has lived in the
United States since 1990. She came to the United States with her husband, and three
daughters. She has some extended family members in the United States who served in
the U.S. military.  She has worked full time for the past 14 years in the beauty field. She
owns a home in the United States and has no plans to return to Iran to live. She also
has grandchildren who are U.S. citizens in the United States. She visited Iran for her
mother-in-law’s funeral in October 2014. She also wanted to visit her parents’ grave.
She has no immediate family in Iran. Her siblings also live in the United States and are
U.S. citizens. She considers herself a Persian American and holds both U.S. and
Iranian passports. (AX G) She is of the Baha’i faith. She has no connection to the
Iranian government. She has had family members who were arrested by the Iranian
government in the past.
Applicant’s two sisters-in-law are dual citizens of the United States and Iran.
They are both married to U.S. citizens and have children. (AX F) They live in the United
States. Applicant met them in 2010. They visited Iran in 2011 to attend a grandmother’s
funeral. (AX H) They have no plans to return to Iran. They do not know the nature of
Applicant’s work. They have no connections to the Iranian government. (AX G) Each
sister-in-law is employed, and each owns a home in the United States. (Tr. 47)
Applicant has never traveled to Iran. He and his wife own a home in the United
States. Applicant has no assets or property in Iran. (GX 2) He has significant assets in
the United States. He and his wife do not have any sympathy for the Iranian
government.
Applicant was adamant that in the event of any issue that might arise in the
future with respect to his father-in-law, he would immediately contact his Facility
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Security Officer. (Tr. 71) He would do nothing to help his father-in-law. In fact, he stated
that he would help put his father-in-law back in jail if his father-in-law would try to hurt
the United States or the family. (Tr. 75) He has no idea if his father-in-law will return to
Iran after the completion of his probation. (Tr. 97)
Applicant’s wife still loves her father. She does not fully trust him and she puts
her husband (Applicant) and her children first. However, she sees her father now that
he is back in the United States. Her father also sees his grandchildren.
Applicant submitted four letters of personal and professional reference. He is
described as approachable, helpful, and transparent. He has demonstrated consistent
performance and works hard. He is honest and is always willing to help others. He is
recognized as a top performer. (AX K)
A friend of 30 years described Applicant as patriotic and courageous. The friend
referred to the indictment of Applicant’s father-in-law and the embarrassment it has
caused him. He has been open about his father-in-law’s situation, but had no
knowledge of the facts before the court proceedings. (AX K 2)
Applicant’s father, who is a retired U.S. military officer, wrote a letter stating that
he has met Applicant’s father-in-law and the rest of his family. He stated that while he
believes Applicant’s father-in-law’s conviction was appropriate. He has observed
nothing in actions or behavior that would suggest that he would harm his family or the
United States. He states that in the past six years that he has known them, he knows
that they are honest people who have embraced the United States and all it has to
offer. (AX K 3)
Applicant ‘s work performance rating in 2014 is rated as exceeding standards.
(AX J) He is described as having great potential and in the short time that he has been
employed, he has been a leader on his team. 
Administrative Notice
Iran is a theocratic Islamic republic dominated by Shia Muslim clergy, with
ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar. Current U.S. concerns
about Iran are based on its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction; support for and involvement in international terrorism; support for violent
opposition to the Middle East peace process; and its human rights abuses, including
summary executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and restrictions on civil
liberties. Iran has provided guidance, training, and weapons to Shia political and militant
groups in Iraq. It also provides encouragement, training, funding, and weapons to anti-
Israeli terrorist groups in its efforts to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process. Iran’s
intelligence operations against the United States, including cyber-intelligence
capabilities, have dramatically increased in depth and complexity during the past few
years. Iran has aggressive programs for collecting U.S. dual-use technologies and
advanced materials development, especially in the area of nanotechnology.
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      1
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      2
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      3
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The current government of Iran is hostile to the United States. The United States
has designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. The United States broke diplomatic
relations with Iran in April 1980, prohibits most trade with Iran, and uses multilateral
sanctions and diplomatic pressure to contain the threat posed by Iran.
Iran does not recognize dual citizenship. Iranian-born, naturalized U.S. citizens
are considered solely Iranian citizens by the Iranian authorities, and they are subject to
surveillance, search, harassment, arrest, and imprisonment while traveling or residing in
Iran. A U.S. State Department consular information sheet advises that to enter Iran if
you are an Iranian-born citizen, regardless of any naturalization process, one must
present an Iranian passport. 
 Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. 
The U.S. Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts
alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a1
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  2 3
A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive      4
information), and EO 10865 § 7.
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      5
 Id.      6
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reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance4
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt5
about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be
resolved in favor of protecting such information.  The decision to deny an individual a6
security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The security concern under Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(a). A
disqualifying condition also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
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desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶
7(b). Finally, another disqualifying condition, “sharing living quarters with a person or
persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of
foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion” is applicable. AG ¶ 7(d)
Applicant’s father-in-law is a dual citizen of Iran and the United States. For the
past 25 years he has spent six months in the United States and six months in Iran. He
was convicted of two felonies in 2014 involving Iranian export and sanctions violations
and is now serving a sentence for the crimes. Applicant, his wife, his mother-in-law and
his sisters-in-law maintain contact with him. Applicant’s wife spoke to her father while
he was in Iran. Applicant lives with his spouse in the United States. However, under
either disqualifying condition, security concerns could arise in connection with the
potential that hostile forces might seek protected information from Applicant by
threatening harm to his wife and her family.  Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b),
and 7(d) are raised.
Since the Government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the
burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to
the government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to
those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-
0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the
nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human
rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members
are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family
member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known
to conduct intelligence operations against the United States.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
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Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG ¶ 8(b) can mitigate concerns when “there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”).
Applicant is a U.S. citizen and was raised in a military family. He married his wife
in 2011. She is a dual citizen of the United States and Iran. Her mother and two sisters
live in the United States but are also dual citizens of the United States and Iran.
Applicant’s father-in-law, a dual citizen of the United States and Iran, has lived for six
months in Iran and six months in the United States for the past 25 years. He was
recently convicted of two felonies involving Iran. He is now serving his sentence. He will
be staying on home confinement in Applicant’s mother-in-laws house. Applicant and his
wife have contact with his father-in-law. There is no other extended family in Iran. His
in-laws have no knowledge of Applicant’s work.  They have no connection to the Iranian
Government. Applicant has substantial interests in the United States. There is some
mitigation in this case with respect to Applicant’s mother-in-law and sister-in-law. He
and his spouse’s relationship with his father-in-law is more problematic. 
Applicant’s relationship with the United States is not questioned. However, his
wife and her family could create a potential conflict of interest. Applicant will not stop his
wife from maintaining contact with her father. His father-in-law has for 25 years been
living in Iran for six months of the year. There is no evidence, that terrorists, criminals,
or the Iranian government, or those conducting espionage have approached or
threatened Applicant’s father-in-law or other family members but since he has been
convicted of a felony involving Iran, it is not known what other forces may be at play.
Applicant’s father-in-law may return to Iran. No one in the family is certain what he
might do when he completes his probation and home confinement. 
Applicant spoke about his undivided loyalty to the United States. Applicant has
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in America, but he also has loyalty to
his wife.  He has established partial application of AG ¶ 8(b). 
Applicant has some contact with his father-in-law. Under AG ¶ 8(c) the contact is
not so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for
foreign influence or exploitation. There is no mitigation under 8(c). Applicant has not
met his burden of mitigating the security concerns under the foreign influence guideline.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
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participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.
Applicant is 43 years old. He is a U.S. citizen. His family is in the United States with
him. He has two children from his marriage to his wife who is a naturalized U.S. citizen.
Applicant’s parents are U.S. citizens. His financial assets are substantial. Applicant has
excellent references and a good job evaluation. There is no evidence that terrorists or
other foreign elements have specifically targeted Applicant.
 A Guideline B decision concerning Iran must take into consideration the
geopolitical situation and dangers there. Iran is a dangerous place. Iran supports
terrorists, who threaten the interests of the United States, and those who cooperate and
assist the United States. The Iranian government does not comply with the rule of law
or protect civil liberties. Iran aggressively seeks intelligence information from the United
States. Iran and the United States continue to have profound policy disputes.
Unresolved significant foreign influence security concerns from Applicant’s
father-in-law and his wife’s connection to her father warrant great weight. Applicant
acknowledged that while he does not care for his father-in-law, he knows his wife loves
her father and Applicant would not stop his wife from seeing her father. Applicant’s
father-in-law has spent many years living in Iran. He has been convicted of a crime
involving the violation of Iranian exports and sanctions regulations. He may or may not
return to Iran. He is living in Applicant’s mother-in-law’s home. Applicant and his
spouse’s connections to his father-in-law, make Applicant more vulnerable as a target
or coercion of lawless elements in Iran, including the Iranian government. Applicant has
not mitigated the foreign influence security concerns. He has not carried his heavy
burden. 
 For all these reasons, Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns under
foreign influence.  Clearance is denied.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-d: Against Applicant  
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied.
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge