DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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----------------------------------    )       ISCR Case No. 14-04690
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Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Jacob Ranish, Esq.
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 Decision
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WESLEY, Roger C., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I conclude that
Applicant mitigated security concerns regarding foreign influence and foreign
preference. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
Statement of Case
On November 7, 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated
Adjudications facility (CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, which
detailed reasons why DOD adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative
determination of eligibility for granting a security clearance. DOD recommended referral
to an administrative judge to determine whether a security clearance should be granted,
continued, denied, or revoked. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended,
DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
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Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the Adjudicative Guidelines
(AGs) implemented by DOD on September 1, 2006.  
Applicant responded to the SOR on December 31, 2014, and requested a
hearing. The case was assigned to me on May 17, 2015. The case was scheduled for
hearing on June 15, 2015. A hearing was held as scheduled. At hearing, the
Government's case consisted of two exhibits (GEs 1-2); Applicant relied on two
witnesses (including herself) and four exhibits. (AEs A-D) The transcript (Tr) was
received June 23, 2015.  
Besides its two exhibits, the Government requested administrative notice of facts
contained in five documents: Georgia, Quick Facts, U.S. Department of State (October
2014); Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 2-Europe Overview,  U.S.
Department of State (October 2014); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2013
- Republic of Georgia, U.S. Department of State (2014); Georgia: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service (June 2013); and U.S. Relations
with Georgia, U.S. Department of State (January 2014).
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for
administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 (App. Bd. April 12, 2007).
Administrative notice is appropriate for noticing facts or government reports that are well
known. See Stein, Administrative Law, Sec. 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006). 
Post Hearing Issues
Following the hearing, Applicant requested that administrative notice be taken of
certain facts with respect to the Republic of Georgia (Georgia). Applicant cited source
documents for the covered facts.  All of the documents cited for these facts come from
official U.S. Government publications and reputable major news outlets. These
documents are cited in Applicant’s administrative notice materials and are intended to
provide context for the facts recited in the administrative notice submission.
Department Counsel, while concerned about the citations to news outlets and
newspaper articles for administrative purposes, did not object to taking official notice of
the facts referenced in Applicant’s administrative notice document. Applicant’s request
for official notice of the facts in his administrative notice document is granted. His
administrative source document and the cited sources in the document are admitted  as
HE 2.  
Applicant also asked for consideration of President Obama’s joint news
conference with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in July 2009 covering the joint
report of the U.S.-Russian Biilateral Commission covering nuclear security. Department
Counsel did not object to the consideration of this submission. Coming from a non-
government source, though, it lacks the reliability of a U.S. publication. The publication,
accordingly, is admitted as an evidentiary exhibit and assigned  AE D.
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Besides his requests for official notice, Applicant requested post-hearing
admission of (a) a pertinent U.S. statute covering foreign travel of U.S. citizens and (b) a
sworn statement from Applicant stating she had been informed by the Georgian
Embassy that her Georgia passport has been deactivated because she is no longer a
citizen of the country. For good cause shown, Applicant’s post-hearing submissions
were admitted as AEs E and F.
Summary of Pleadings
Under Guideline B, Applicant allegedly (a) has a mother and father who are
citizens and residents of the Republic of Georgia; (b) has a brother who is a citizen and
resident of the republic of Georgia; and (c) maintains contact with friends that are
citizens and residents of the Republic of Georgia.
Under Guideline C, Applicant allegedly (a) has a valid foreign passport from the
Republic of Georgia and is not sure of its location and has not taken appropriate steps
to invalidate this passport; (b) has used her Georgia passport for travel outside the
United States; and (c) lived in the Republic of Georgia from December 2011 to June
2012.
In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all of the allegations with
explanations. She claimed to be in the process of renouncing her Georgian citizenship.
She claimed she used her Georgia passport for travel outside of the United States, but
only before she became a U.S. citizen.  And she claimed in her answer that she lived in
the Republic of Georgia between December 2011 and June 2012 due to marital
problems.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 30-year-old cleared American guard of a defense contractor who
seeks a security clearance. The allegations covered in the SOR and admitted by
Applicant are adopted as relevant and material findings.  Additional findings follow.  
 
Background
Applicant married in September 2006 to a U.S. citizen by birth and has no
children from this marriage. (GE 1; Tr. 50-53) Her parents, her husband’s parents, and
her brother attended the wedding in Georgia. (Tr. 50-51) She immigrated to the United
States in April 2007 and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September 2010. (GE 1;
Tr. 32-33) Applicant received a U.S. passport in October 2010. (GE 1) She attended
high school in Georgia between September 1990 and June 2001 and earned a high
school diploma. (GE 1; Tr. 49-50) She earned her bachelor’s degree in Georgia in  June
2006, and her master’s degree in law in the same country in January 2007. (GE 1; Tr.
50) While in school, she held an internship with the parliament for the Republic of
Georgia while living with her parents. (Tr. 53, 64) Since immigrating to the United
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States, she has taken limited education courses, but has not earned a degree or
diploma. (GE 1)
Since September 2013, Applicant has worked for her current employer.
Contemporaneous with her work for her primary employer, she has held a second job
as a home health aide since September 2012. (GE 1) Between August 2011 and
September 2012, she was unemployed. Before obtaining a job in February 2010 as
certified nurse’s aide, she experienced recurrent periods of unemployment in both the
United States and Georgia. (GE 1) Since they were married, Applicant and her husband
support each other financially. (Tr. 48)
Split preference issues
Prior to the hearing, Applicant possessed a valid Georgian passport and used it
on one occasion in 2007 to travel outside the United States.  (GEs 1-2; Tr. 77) Since
becoming a U.S. citizen, and acquiring a U.S. passport, she always used her U.S.
passport to travel outside of the United States. Asked about which passport she used to
travel to the Republic of Georgia and back in 2011-2012, she assured she used her
U.S. passport. (Tr. 76-77) 
 Between 2011 and 2012, Applicant lived in the Republic of Georgia. During her
time of residence in the country, she held dual citizenship with the United States and the
Republic of Georgia; she possessed her U.S. passport;  and she held a valid Georgian
passport in her name, if not in her possession. Applicant  spent close to six months in
Georgia, living with her mother, not working, and relying on her husband for financial
support. (GEs 1-2; Tr. 95) During her time in Georgia, Applicant never used her
Georgian passport to secure any special Georgian benefits. (Tr. 83) Applicant’s
assurances are credible and are accepted as accurate.
Although a naturalized U.S. citizen, Georgian (her native language) remains her
primary language, while English is her secondary language. (Tr. 95) She hopes to refine
her English language skills. (Tr. 95) Born in the former Soviet Union, Applicant speaks a
little Russian,  and when asked, affirmed that she does not believe its formation and
occupation of Georgia was “a good idea.” (Tr. 91) Since arriving in the United states,
Applicant has voted in U.S. elections and paid all of her federal and state taxes as a
joint filer with her husband. (Tr. 77-78)
Since her last use of her Georgian passport, Applicant has not been able to
locate the passport or verify its expiration date. (GE 2; Tr. 81-82) She believes the
passport (renewed in 2006) expires in 2016, which is the date she reported in her
security clearance application. (GE 1; Tr. 81-82, 97-98, 102) Past efforts to locate the
passport have been unsuccessful. (AEs A and D; Tr. 93-98) At one point, she thought
she might have lost it during a visit to Kazakhstan, but isn’t certain. (Tr. 93) Most likely,
she lost it in traveling and moving. (Tr. 44-46) 
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Afforded an opportunity after the hearing to locate her Georgian passport,
Applicant was unsuccessful. (AEs A and D) She has since been in touch with the
Georgian Embassy and was told that in view of her renouncement of her Georgian
citizenship, her Georgian passport had been deactivated. (AEs A and D; Tr. 99-101)
Applicant’s account is credible and accepted. Currently, Applicant has neither Georgian
citizenship nor a valid Georgian passport in her name. 
Foreign influence issues
Applicant’s mother holds Georgian citizenship. She immigrated to the United
States in 2008 on her Georgian passport, is sponsored by Applicant’s husband for a
green card, and resides in the United States as a permanent resident with a green card
(GE 2; Tr. 39, 74, 78) She is considering applying for American citizenship, but to date
has not done so. (Tr.89-90)  She works as a home health care aide and resides in a
neighboring state with a family. (Tr. 56) She last visited the Republic of Georgia in
December 2014, using her Georgian passport, and stayed with Appellant’s brother for
the duration of her visit. (Tr. 89,101) Applicant’s mother has shown no interest in
returning to Georgia to reside. (89-90) Since arriving in the United States, she has twice
traveled back to Georgia: in 2011, and most recently in 2014. (Tr. 88-89) Applicant sees
her mother once a year but maintains regular telephone contact with her daily. (Tr. 57)
While Applicant has no other family members in the United States  (GE 2; Tr. 84), she
stays in touch with her husband’s local  family members and friends. (Tr. 84)
Applicant’s father is a citizen and resident of Georgia. (GEs 1-2; Tr. 58) He is
separated from her mother and retired from government employment as a lawyer with
expertise in criminal law. (Tr. 60) For a number of years following his government
retirement in 1991, he worked as a security guard for construction companies until he
fully retired in 2005 or thereabouts. (GE 2; Tr. 60-61)  
Applicant and her father saw each other monthly when she lived in Georgia in
2011-2012. (GE 2; Tr. 41-42) She currently maintains monthly contact with her father by
telephone. (GE 1; Tr. 58-59) Applicant’s father has no affiliations or connections with the
Georgian government or military and opposed the Soviets before Georgia obtained its
independence. (Tr. 59)  Applicant’s only other immediate family member who is a citizen
and resident of Georgia is her brother. (GEs 1-2) He farms (albeit, he does not own the
farming business, just the land) and has no affiliations or connections with the Georgian
government or military. (GEs 1-2: Tr. 62-63) Her brother has a wife who does not work
and has two children. (Tr. 63) 
Historically, Applicant has provided little financial support to her brother. She did
assist him with a $100 support payment shortly after she arrived in the United states,
while he was out of work. (Tr. 66) She believes her mother helped her brother some in
his land purchase. (Tr. 66) Applicant maintains monthly telephone contact with her
brother, who has never visited the United States. (Tr. 43, 66)
In addition to her father and brother, Applicant has a number of aunts, uncles,
and cousins who are citizens and residents of the Republic of Georgia. (GE 2; Tr. 91)
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She rarely speaks to them and has not seen them since she returned from the country
in 2012. (Tr. 91) She also identified a friend and former neighbor who is a teacher and a
citizen and resident of Georgia. (GE 2) Appellant maintains monthly telephone contact
with this friend. None of her contacts in Georgia know that Applicant is undergoing
consideration for a national security position. ( GE 2)
Applicant considers herself a loyal U.S. citizen and retains no loyalties to her
birth country of Georgia. (Tr. 49) She characterizes the United States as her home. (Tr.
34)  She knows little about Georgia’s leaders and celebrates no Georgian holidays. (Tr.
35) By contrast, she celebrates U.S. holidays, votes in U.S. elections, and does not
disagree with U.S. foreign policies with other countries. (Tr. 36)  Since becoming a U.S.
citizen, she has received no benefits of citizenship with the Republic of Georgia and has
no property interests or inheritance expectancies in Georgia. (Tr. 36)
Georgian background information 
Georgia became a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921. The United States and the
Soviet Union had a super power rivalry after WW II and opposed Georgia’s status on
ideological grounds. (HE 2) In 1991, Georgia procured its independence from the Soviet
Union and established diplomatic relations with the United states in 1992. (Administrative
Notice and AE D) Georgia has since been supported by the United States in deepening
its Euro-Atlantic ties and strengthening its democratic institutions. (HE 2) 
In an effort to assist the Republic of Georgia following its war with Russia in 2008,
the Bush Administration pledged $1 billion to assist the country in its humanitarian and
economic recovery. Following the assistance package, Secretary Rice and her Georgian
counterpart, Grigol Vashadze, signed the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership
on January 9, 2009. (HE 2) The Charter has served to enhance the aspirations of both
countries for stronger economic, diplomatic, and strategic partnerships beneficial to both
countries. (HE 2) 
President Obama reiterated the importance of maintaining respect for Georgia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity during his first visit to Russia in 2009. (AE D) In his
joint press conference with President Medvedev in July 2009, both presidents stressed
the importance of their creation of a U.S.-Russian Presidential Commission to serve as a
new foundation for cooperation. (AE D) 
Recent developments show that Georgia has proven to be an important asset in
helping to move western energy resources from the Caspian Basin through two current
pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
(HE 2) Georgia’s goal of strengthening its Euro-Atlantic ties creates a considerable
challenge to Russia’s attempts “to redraw international borders and keep NATO out of its
former Soviet territory.” (HE 2) To be sure, Russia does not view Georgia as a sovereign
country but as a former satellite to check the advances of the emerging economic
alliance between Georgia and the United States. (HE 2) In recent statements, Secretary
of State Kerry pronounced continuing U.S. support for Georgia’s sovereignty and
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territorial integrity, and objection to Russia’s occupation, militarization, and
“borderization” of Georgian territory. (Administrative Notice and HE 2)
Still, stress points exist between Russia and Georgia that create geopolitical risks
for Georgia and the United States in reaching the full potential of their strategic
partnership. In 1992, the region of Abkhazia declared independence, igniting decades of
unrest. (Administrative Notice, supra) Russian troops proceeded to occupy the region,
triggering an interstate conflict that produced about 10,000 deaths and 200,000
displaced persons. (Id.)  Similar conflicts between the central Government and the region
of South Ossetia date to 1990. In August 2008, Russia launched a military incursion into
these contested regions to further cement its control and weaken the central Georgian
government. See Administrative Notice (Id.) and Georgia: Recent Developments and
U.S. Interests, supra, 17-35.
Georgia’s human rights record and counter-terrorism efforts
Georgia’s human rights record remains uneven and in some cases poor by
Western standards. See Administrative Notice, supra, and (Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices - Georgia, supra, at 1. The Department of State’s 2013 human rights
report details ongoing concerns about societal violence against religious minorities and
members of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community. (Id.) 
Additionally, in the aftermath of the October 2012 elections, members of the losing
political party were subjected to harassment, job loss, and arrests. Several thousand
armed Russian troops remain in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, and violence
has continued despite a cease-fire. 
From a positive perspective, the Republic of Georgia has cooperated with the
United States in counter-terrorism efforts. Despite these efforts, though, terrorist
incidents have continued. In September 2013, a diplomat was killed by an alleged
Islamic terrorist. The Georgian government’s lack of control over the Abkhazia and South
Ossetia regions limited its abilities to investigate and counter terrorism in these regions.
See Administrative Notice, supra, and Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Chapter 2-
Europe Overview, supra, at 9-10. In 2012, terrorist groups were active within Georgia,
having entered from Russia’s Dagestan and Chechnyan Republics. See Administrative
Notice, supra, at 2 and Georgia: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, supra, at 17-
25.
Concerned about American citizens traveling to and in the Republic of Georgia,
the U.S. Department of State has issued strong travel warnings. See Georgia, Quick
Facts, supra, at 3-4. U.S. Embassy personnel are restricted in travel to Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, even in the case of emergencies involving U.S. citizens.  These regions
are not under the control of the Georgian government following civil wars in the early
1990s, and tensions remain high between the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and the Georgian government. (Id.)
Endorsements
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Applicant maintains excellent personal relationships with friends and members of
her local church community.(AE C) They consider her to be mature, honest, and
committed to her care giving. She has impressed her parish membership with her
generosity. (AE C; Tr. 108-111, and 119) Her parish members credit her with excellent
care of members requiring physical assistance. (AE C; Tr. 108-111, and 119)
Policies
The AGs list guidelines to be used by administrative judges in the decision-
making process covering DOHA cases. These guidelines take into account factors that
could create a potential conflict of interest for the individual applicant, as well as
considerations that could affect the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to
protect classified information. These guidelines include "[c]onditions that could raise a
security concern and may be disqualifying” (disqualifying conditions), if any, and many of
the "[c]onditions that could mitigate security concerns.” These guidelines must be
considered before deciding whether or not a security clearance should be granted,
continued, or denied. The guidelines do not require administrative judges to place
exclusive reliance on the enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the
guidelines in reaching at a decision. Each of the guidelines is to be evaluated in the
context of the whole person in accordance with AG ¶ 2(c).
In addition to the relevant AGs, administrative judges must take into account the
pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and mitigation set forth in AG ¶ 2(a)
of the AGs, which are intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial,
commonsense decision based upon a careful consideration of the pertinent guidelines
within the context of the whole person. The adjudicative process is designed to examine
a sufficient period of an applicant’s life to enable predictive judgments about whether the
applicant is an acceptable security risk.  
When evaluating an applicant’s conduct, the relevant guidelines are to be
considered together with the following AG ¶ 2(a) factors: (1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral chances; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication
policy factors are pertinent herein:
 Foreign Preference
The Concern: When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate preference  for
a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide
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information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.  See
AG ¶  9.
Foreign Influence
The Concern: Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided  loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  See AG ¶ 6.
Burden of Proof
Under the Directive, a decision to grant or continue an applicant's request for
security clearance may be made only upon a threshold finding that to do so is clearly
consistent with the national interest.  Because the Directive requires administrative
judges to make a commonsense appraisal of the evidence accumulated in the record,
the ultimate determination of an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance depends, in
large part, on the relevance and materiality of that evidence. As with all adversarial
proceedings, the judge may draw only those inferences which have a reasonable and
logical basis from the evidence of record. Conversely, the judge cannot draw factual
inferences that are grounded on speculation or conjecture.
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) It must prove by substantial
evidence any controverted facts alleged in the SOR; and (2) it must demonstrate that the
facts proven have a material bearing to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or maintain a
security clearance. The required showing of material bearing, however, does not require
the Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the applicant has actually mishandled
or abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a security clearance.
Rather, consideration must take account of cognizable risks that an applicant may
deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted or
controverted facts, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant for the purpose of
establishing his or his security worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation or
mitigation of the Government's case.  Because Executive Order 10865 requires that all
security clearances be clearly consistent with the national interest, “security-clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” See Department of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).
Analysis
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Applicant is a well regarded home health aide who immigrated to the United
States in 2007 and acquired U.S. citizenship in September 2010. When she became a
U.S. citizen she acquired a U.S. passport. However, she retained her Georgian
citizenship and passport, which she later affirmed that she either lost or misplaced. She
has since renounced her Georgian citizenship and secured a confirmation from the
Georgian Embassy that her Georgian passport has been deactivated. Applicant
maintains monthly telephone contact with two immediate family members (her retired
father and brother), as well as a friend she met while residing in Georgia in 2011-2012.
Security concerns relate to foreign preference based on Applicant’s prior dual
citizenship status with Georgia and past possession of a Georgian passport, that she
never used since becoming a naturalized U.S. These concerns are initially established.
Foreign influence concerns relative to Applicant’s having immediate family members who
are citizens and residents of Georgia are initially established as well. 
Foreign Preference 
Dual citizenship concerns necessarily entail allegiance assessments and invite
critical considerations of acts indicating a preference for the interests of the foreign
country (Georgia) over the interests of the United States. By electing to retain her dual
Georgian citizenship before the issuance of the SOR, and failing to take more concerted
actions to recover or ascertain the whereabouts of her Georgian passport after becoming
a naturalized U.S. citizen with a U.S. passport for personal and business travel, she
satisfied some indicia of a split preference for Georgia and the United States
Until recently, Applicant has not been able to find her Georgian passport or have it
deactivated by the Georgian government. Applicant’s retaining her still unexpired
Georgian passport and citizenship in these circumstances represented some indicia of a
preference for Georgia that required affirmative steps by Applicant to refute or mitigate.  
Preference questions require predictive judgments about how an applicant can be
trusted in the future to honor his or her fiduciary responsibilities to the Government.
Applicant has worked in the United States for several years since becoming a U.S.
citizen and should be cognizant of the potential risks of working for a U.S. defense
contractor while contemporaneously holding dual citizenship and an unexpired foreign
passport. Her choices are understandable, considering her circumstances and presented
travel difficulties to Georgia to visit her father and brother without a Georgian passport
and Georgian citizenship. But Applicant’s choices also indicate reluctance to part with
her Georgian citizenship and passport and reflect some split preference for the United
States and Georgia.  
Because Applicant elected to retain her Georgian passport initially after becoming
a U.S. citizen while she still held dual U.S. citizenship and a U.S. passport, the
Government may apply certain provisions of disqualifying condition (DC) ¶ 10(a) of AG ¶
9, “exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a
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U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member.  This DC includes but
is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country; 
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other such           
         benefits from a foreign country; 
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements; 
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another     
          country;
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country; and
(7) voting in a foreign election. 
Specifically, DC ¶ 10(a)(1) applies to the established facts and circumstances
herein. By retaining her Georgia passport, Applicant was able to achieve potential travel
privileges and conveniences not available to other U.S. citizens. 
Since the issuance of the SOR, Applicant has renounced her Georgian citizenship
and secured the deactivation of her Georgian passport through the Georgian Embassy.
These actions reflect positively on Applicant’s efforts to demonstrate her loyalty and
exclusive commitment to the values and responsibilities of U.S. citizenship.
Because Applicant’s dual citizenship status is based on her parents’ citizenship
and birth in Georgia, she may claim the benefits of MC ¶ 11(a), “dual citizenship is based
solely on parent’s citizenship or birth in a foreign country.” Since she has procured the
deactivation of her Georgian passport, she may also claim the mitigation benefits of MC
¶ 11(e), “the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security
authority, or otherwise invalidated.” None of the other mitigating conditions apply to
Applicant’s situation. 
Whole-person precepts are certainly helpful to Applicant in surmounting the
Government’s preference concerns herein. The positive trust impressions she has forged
with her friends and colleagues who have worked with her in recent years, add support
to her claims of trust and loyalty to U.S. core values and her demonstrated loyalty and
preference for the United States.
Overall, Applicant is able to persuade that her current preference is solely with the
United States. Because she benefitted from so few Georgian privileges after becoming a
U.S. citizen, she manifested little preference for Georgia under the criteria established by
the Appeal Board. Applicant absolves herself of foreign preference concerns associated
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with the presented issue of whether she retains a preference or split preference for her
birth country (Georgia), over her adopted country (the United States). Favorable
conclusions are warrant with respect to allegations 2.a through 2.c of the SOR, covered
by Guideline C.
Foreign Influence 
Applicant and her family have solid roots in Georgia . Determined to make a new
life for herself in the United States after completing most of her college studies in
Georgia, she  immigrated to the United States and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
September  2010. While initially committed to retaining her Georgian citizenship and
Georgian passport, she has since renounced her citizenship of her birth country
(Georgia) and deactivated her Georgian passport. 
While her father and brother remain citizens and residents of Georgia, Applicant
has not seen either of them since her extended stay in Georgia in 2011-2012 and
maintains only monthly contact with them. Neither family member in Georgia has any
affiliations or connections with the Georgian government or military. Applicant’s mother is
a permanent green card resident of the United States with no manifest intention to return
to Georgia.
The Government urges security concerns over risks that Applicant’s family
members in Georgia could be subjected to pressures or compromise to enlist their help
in eliciting classified information from Applicant. Because Applicant no longer has dual
Georgian citizenship and a Georgian passport, she can no longer freely travel to
Georgia. And she possesses no special skills and experience that could conceivably
place herself and her Georgian family members in harm’s way. 
Before renouncing her Georgian citizenship and deactivating her Georgian
passport, both Applicant and her family members and friend residing in Georgia might be
subject to undue foreign influence and pressure by Georgian authorities to access
sensitive proprietary information in Applicant’s possession or control. As such, she
presented a potentially heightened security risk covered by disqualifying condition (DC) ¶
7(a), “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,”
of the AGs for foreign influence. 
While stress points do exist between Russia and Georgia that create geopolitical
risks for Georgia and the United States in reaching the full potential of their strategic
partnership, Georgia continues to be an ally of the United States in the war on terrorism.
True, Georgia’s human rights record remains uneven and in some cases poor by
Western standards. But everything considered, the risks of any pressure, coercion, or
foreign influence on any of Applicant’s family members and friend residing in Georgia
promise to be minimal and manageable.
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Because of the regular contacts Applicant maintains with her two family  members
and friend residing in Georgia (both her father and brother, consideration of DC ¶ 7(b),
“connection to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information,” has some application to Applicant’s situation.
The AGs governing collateral clearances do not dictate per se results or mandate
particular outcomes for applicants with relatives who are citizens/residents of foreign
countries in general.  What is considered to be an acceptable risk in one foreign country
may not be in another. While foreign influence cases must by practical necessity be
weighed on a case-by-case basis, guidelines are available for referencing in the supplied
materials and country information about Georgia. The AGs do take into account the
country’s demonstrated relations with the United States as an important consideration in
gauging whether the particular relatives with citizenship and residency elsewhere create
a heightened security risk. The geopolitical aims and policies of the particular foreign
regime involved do matter. 
Based on Applicant’s case-specific circumstances, MC ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the
persons or activities of these persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.
[United States],” is  fully available to Applicant under the facts of this case. With
Applicant having renounced her Georgian citizenship and deactivated her Georgian
passport, Applicant’s family members pose little cognizable risk that could subject her to
potential pressures, coercion, and influence from Georgian government and military
officials. 
MC ¶ 8(b), “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United
States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of
the U.S. interest,” is fully applicable. Applicant’s family ties to Georgia are significantly
weakened now that she no longer holds Georgian citizenship with an active Georgian
passport. Not to minimize her ties with her father and brother, Applicant can be expected
to resolve any potential conflicts of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. 
 MC ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create risk for foreign influence or
exploitation,” also applies to Applicant’s situation. MC ¶ 8(f), “the value or routine nature
of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to
result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure
the individual,” has some application. Applicant has no property or financial interests in
Georgia and no inheritance expectancy in that country that could expose her to potential
conflicts.
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Unavailable to Applicant is MC ¶ 8(e), “the individual has promptly complied with
existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats
from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country.” Applicant has had no
contracts or business interests in Georgia to report to her facility security officer or
cognizant U.S. officials. 
All told, Applicant’s family links and contacts in Georgia are modest and pose little
heightened risks of pressure, coercion, and  influence that could be brought to bear on
Applicant and her family members residing in Georgia. Remaining risks are clearly
manageable ones.
Whole-person assessment is available to minimize Applicant’s exposure to any
potential conflicts of interests with Georgian government officials. Her friends and
colleagues who have worked with her find her to be honest and trustworthy. Overall, any
potential security concerns attributable to Applicant's having family members residing in
Georgia are sufficiently mitigated to permit safe predictive judgments about Applicant's
ability to withstand any Georgian risks of undue influence. Favorable conclusions warrant
with respect to the allegations covered by Guideline B.
Formal Findings
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR in the context of the findings of fact,
conclusions, and the factors and conditions listed above, I make the following separate
formal findings with respect to Applicant's eligibility for a security clearance.
GUIDELINE B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparas. 1.a-1.c For Applicant
GUIDELINE C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparas. 2.a-2.c: For Applicant
Conclusions
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance.
Clearance is granted. 
                                          
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge 
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