1 
 
 
                                                              
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE    
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 14-01280 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Financial considerations, drug involvement, and personal conduct security concerns 
persist. As of August 2015, Applicant owed approximately $11,000 in past-due child support 
and $4,640 in undisputed collection debt. He abused cocaine on occasion between October 
2010 and late September 2013, and he repeatedly misrepresented the extent of his cocaine 
abuse during the investigation and adjudication of his security clearance eligibility. 
Clearance is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
 On December 15, 2014, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing the 
security concerns under Guideline F (financial considerations), Guideline H (drug 
Involvement), Guideline G (alcohol consumption), Guideline I (psychological conditions), 
and Guideline E (personal conduct), and explaining why it was unable to find it clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance eligibility. 
The DOD CAF took the action under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense 
 
 
 2 
(DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective 
within the DOD on September 1, 2006. 
 
On January 23, 2015, Applicant answered the SOR allegations and requested a 
decision based on the written record without a hearing. The case was subsequently 
converted to a hearing before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (DOHA). On July 21, 2015, the case was assigned to me to conduct a hearing 
to determine whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a 
security clearance for Applicant. On July 24, 2015, I scheduled the hearing for August 20, 
2015. 
 
At the hearing, nine Government exhibits (GEs 1-9) were admitted into evidence. I 
admitted GE 5 over Applicant’s objection. The medical records contained information 
related to guidelines H and G, and Applicant had signed a release for drug and alcohol 
treatment records. Thirteen Applicant exhibits (AEs A-M) were admitted into evidence 
without objection. A chart prepared by Department Counsel as a supplement to his oral 
closing argument was incorporated in the record as a hearing exhibit (HE 1), but not 
entered as an evidentiary exhibit. Applicant and his spouse testified, as reflected in a 
transcript (Tr.) received on August 28, 2015. At the close of the testimony, Department 
Counsel withdrew SOR ¶ 1.g.
1
 
 
At Applicant’s request, I held the record open until September 18, 2015, for post-
hearing submissions. On September 16, 2015, Applicant timely submitted six exhibits, 
which were admitted as AEs N-S. Department Counsel filed no objections by the 
September 28, 2015 deadline for comment. 
 
Summary of SOR Allegations 
 
  The SOR alleges under Guideline F that as of December 15, 2014, Applicant owed 
a $3,530 judgment from April 2011 (SOR ¶ 1.a), telephone debts in collection of $1,607 
(SOR ¶ 1.b) and $1,615 (SOR ¶ 1.c); child support arrearages of $2,384 (SOR ¶ 1.d) and 
$15,747.05 (SOR ¶ 1.e); and a $1,418 in utility debt in collection (SOR ¶ 1.f.) Under 
Guideline H, Applicant allegedly used cocaine with varying frequency until at least 
September 2013 (SOR ¶ 2.a); tested positive for cocaine in 2011 (SOR ¶ 2.b); was 
diagnosed with cocaine abuse in December 2011 (SOR ¶ 2.d); and failed to complete 
treatment for diagnosed cocaine dependence in October 2013 (SOR ¶ 2.c). Under 
Guideline G, Applicant allegedly was diagnosed with alcohol abuse in December 2011 
(SOR ¶ 3.b), and he failed to complete treatment for diagnosed alcohol abuse in October 
2013 (SOR ¶ 3.a). 
 
                                                 
1 
Applicant denied any knowledge of a $721 medical debt (SOR ¶ 1.g) allegedly in collection as of the date of 
the SOR. (Tr. 74.) The debt was not on Applicant’s credit reports (GEs 6, 7, 9), so the Government withdrew 
the allegation. (Tr. 134.) 
 
 
 3 
 Additionally, the SOR alleges under Guideline I that Applicant failed to complete 
recommended treatments for diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder and adjustment 
disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct in January 2014 (SOR ¶ 4.a) and 
for diagnosed major depressive disorder and panic attacks without agoraphobia in October 
2013 (SOR ¶ 4.b). Under Guideline E, Applicant allegedly falsified his October 21, 2013 
Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) by disclosing that he used 
cocaine occasionally from October 2010 to November 2011 when he had used cocaine to 
at least September 2013 (SOR ¶ 5.a); falsified material facts during his January 6, 2014 
subject interview in that he indicated that he used cocaine once between October 2011 
and June 2012 (SOR ¶ 5.b); and falsified material facts on his May 16, 2014 response to 
DOHA interrogatories when he stated that he used cocaine on one occasion, which 
occurred in September 2013 (SOR ¶ 5.c). 
 
 Applicant provided detailed responses to the SOR allegations, which he then 
clarified at his hearing. He admitted the judgment and child support debts, which were 
being repaid through garnishment, and denied any knowledge of the collection debts. 
Applicant admitted that he had used cocaine, but only through September 2011. He also 
admitted that he had tested positive for cocaine. Applicant denied that he abused cocaine 
or that he was dependent on cocaine, and explained that he did not attend his last session 
of treatment so was considered not in compliance. About the Guideline G allegations, 
Applicant denied that he ever had an alcohol problem. He had treatment for relapse 
prevention and not for alcohol dependence. Applicant disputed the mental health 
diagnoses alleged under Guideline I as “an over exaggeration of [his] actual diagnosis.” He 
attributed his treatment to the loss of his daughter’s mother and had changed therapists 
because he moved. Concerning the Guideline E allegations, Applicant denied any 
intentional falsification and explained that he was mistaken about the dates of his cocaine 
use. He asserted that his last drug use was in 2011 rather than in 2013.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
  After considering the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript, I make the following 
findings of fact: 
 
Applicant is a 35-year-old high school graduate. Applicant and his spouse met 
online in November 2013. (Tr. 121.) They began cohabiting in January 2014 (Tr. 119) and 
married in July 2015. (Tr. 38.) Applicant had a previous cohabitant relationship with an ex-
girlfriend from 2003 to 2013. Applicant has a 15-year-old daughter and a 12-year-old son 
from other women. His daughter’s mother died in February 2011. Applicant has a 
discordant relationship with his son’s mother. 
 
Applicant worked as a carpenter for his present employer, a defense contractor, 
from October 2005 to September 2006 and from June 2010 to June 2011, before returning 
to work full-time in January 2014. He has had his own business as a self-employed 
carpenter in the construction industry since 2011. (GEs 1, 4; Tr. 34-38.) 
 
 4 
Financial 
 
Applicant learned the carpentry trade on the job, starting as a framer for a 
construction company. He worked as a carpenter for a private business from late 2000 
(GEs 1, 2) or late 2001 (GE 3) until he was laid off in October or November 2004. In 
February 2002, Applicant was ordered by state X to pay child support for his daughter. In 
July 2003, Applicant was ordered by state Y to pay child support for his son. (GE 7.)  
 
Applicant was unemployed from November 2004 to March 2005. From March to 
September 2005, he worked in receiving for a home improvement company. He was 
terminated for “points” issues. (GEs 1-3, 8.) 
 
In mid-September 2005, Applicant committed to work for his current employer 
starting in October 2005. In application for a secret security clearance, Applicant completed 
and certified to the accuracy of an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing 
(e-QIP). In response to the financial record inquiries, Applicant indicated that his wages 
were being garnished at $117 every two weeks for child support to state X for his daughter 
and that he owed a hospital debt of approximately $2,000 from December 2004. (GE 3.) 
 
On May 10, 2006, Applicant was interviewed by an authorized investigator for the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). He explained that the $2,000 medical debt was 
for a diagnostic test (MRI) when he did not have insurance and that he fell behind six 
months in his child support by late 2004 because he lacked steady employment. Applicant 
maintained that he was paying his current child support on time and was repaying an 
arrearage. Applicant, who was living with his girlfriend, estimated a net household income 
of $1,233 after expenses, including $600 a month for child support. (GE 8.) 
 
Applicant worked for his current employer from October 2005 until he was laid off in 
September 2006. After a few months of unemployment, he worked as subcontractor for a 
local carpentry business from December 2006 to March 2007. Applicant was employed as 
a foreman for a private company from March 2007 until October 2008, when he was laid 
off. (GEs 1, 2.) Applicant’s driver’s license in state X was suspended from February 20, 
2007, to October 23, 2007, for noncompliance with his child support for his daughter. (AE 
K.) 
 
Applicant was rehired by his current employer in 2009. Applicant completed and 
certified to the accuracy of an e-QIP on September 17, 2009, indicating that he began work 
on March 30, 2009, and needed a DOD secret clearance. Applicant responded “Yes” to 
inquiries concerning any bills or debts turned over for collection in the last seven years; any 
accounts or credit cards suspended, charged off, or cancelled for failing to pay as agreed 
in the last seven years; any delinquency on alimony or child support payments in the last 
seven years; any debts over 180 days delinquent in the last seven years; and any debts 
currently over 90 days delinquent. Applicant listed unpaid consumer debts of $437, $180, 
and $745. He indicated that he was making child support payments at $152 per week to 
state X. (GE 2.) Applicant was granted a secret clearance around December 2009. 
 
 
 5 
Applicant’s driver license in state X was suspended from November 3, 2010, to 
March 23, 2011, for noncompliance with his child support for his daughter. (AE K.) In June 
2011, Applicant was laid off from his defense contractor job. He had no income apart from 
his business as a self-employed carpenter (GE 1), and his operator’s license was again 
suspended in October 18, 2011, for noncompliance with his child support obligation. (AE 
K.) 
 
Applicant had been without any work for a month when he was rehired by his 
defense contractor employer in October 2013. (GE 4.) On an October 21, 2013 e-QIP, 
Applicant responded affirmatively that he had been delinquent on child support payments 
in the last seven years, and disclosed that he was $500 past due in state X (SOR ¶ 1.d) 
and $2,000 past due in state Y (SOR ¶ 1.e). Applicant also answered “Yes” to whether any 
judgments had been entered against him in the last seven years. He listed a $3,230 unpaid 
judgment (SOR ¶ 1.a) from April 2011 against him and his ex-girlfriend, and indicated that 
his ex-girlfriend was repaying the debt. Applicant also listed collection debts of $1,607 
(SOR ¶ 1.b), $1,615 (SOR ¶ 1.c), and $1,418 (SOR ¶ f). (GE 1.) 
 
A check of Applicant’s credit on November 26, 2013, revealed that Applicant owed 
child support arrearages of $2,734 to state X and $13,297 to state Y. Additionally, he had 
made no progress toward repaying the collection debts identified in SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.c, and 
1.f. (GE 7.) 
 
On January 6, 2014, Applicant was interviewed by an authorized investigator for the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Applicant had not yet started working for his 
current employer. He indicated that he was paying $75 a week in child support ($65 in 
current support and $10 toward arrearages) to state Y for his son, whom he has not seen 
in three years, and $5 to $10 per week to state X in child support arrearage for his 
daughter, who was living with her maternal grandmother. Applicant disputed the reported 
arrearages of $2,734 to state X for his daughter and of $13,297 to state Y for his son. He 
claimed that he owed $500 in back child support for his daughter and $2,000 for his son. 
He maintained that his son’s mother was trying to receive child support payments from 
both state Y and also state Z, where his son now resides.
2
 About the financial judgment on 
his record, Applicant explained that he co-signed a lease for his ex-girlfriend, who moved 
out, and that $20 to $25 per week was being deducted from his ex-girlfriend’s wages to pay 
the debt. Applicant denied any knowledge of the collection debts on his credit record, which 
he had included on his e-QIP because they were on his credit record. (GE 4.) 
 
Child support enforcement records from state Y do not show any child support 
payments from Applicant in 2014 for his son before July 25, 2014, when the state began 
garnishing his wages at $75 a week. (AE L.) As of November 2014, Applicant reportedly 
owed $2,384 to state X and $15,627 to state Y in child support arrearages. Equifax had no 
record of any progress toward resolving the $1,607 debt from October 2012 (SOR ¶ 1.b), 
the $1,615 debt from April 2012 (SOR ¶ 1.c), or the $3,350 judgment from April 2011 (SOR 
¶ 1.a). Applicant was making $263 monthly payments on a $7,295 automobile loan opened 
                                                 
2 
State Y’s child support records show that the order was issued in state Y, and that Applicant was paying child 
support to state Z. (AE L.) 
 
 6 
in April 2014. (GE 6.) In March 2015, Applicant paid $288.54 to resolve a telephone debt 
not alleged in the SOR. (AE H.) 
 
On July 19, 2015, state Z acted to seize Applicant’s bank assets by a notice of levy 
against Applicant for unpaid child support totaling $11,580 for his son (SOR ¶ 1.e). (AE R.) 
Applicant indicates that he does not have the bank account subject to the levy. (AE N.) As 
of July 24, 2015, Applicant owed $949.30 in child support arrearage for his daughter. (AE 
K.) 
 
A check of Applicant’s credit in August 2015 showed no progress toward resolving 
the $1,418 utility services delinquency, which had been in collection since November 2014 
(SOR ¶ 1.f). He reportedly owed $15,226 in child support arrearage to state Y for his son. 
Applicant contests the balance in that his wages had been garnished since July 13, 2014, 
toward the debt. (AE L.) Applicant’s pay statement for the period ending July 19, 2014, 
confirms that his wages were attached at $75 a week for his child support. (AE H.) 
According to Applicant, he paid $2,025 to state Z in 2014. (AE H.) State Y’s records show 
payments of $1,725 to state Z in 2014. (AE L.) Applicant attributes the discrepancy to state 
Y not accounting for attachment of his federal income tax refund of $330 in February 2015 
paid to state Z for back child support. Applicant estimated a $10,647 balance in child 
support arrearage for his son as of August 2015. (AE H.) Levy documents showed the 
arrearage at $11,580 as of mid-July 2015. (AE R.) Applicant’s child support arrearage for 
his daughter in state X had been reduced to $924 as of August 2015. (GE 9.) Applicant 
anticipated that his child support arrearage for his daughter would be paid off sometime in 
early 2016. (AE H.) 
 
According to Equifax, Applicant paid only $61 of his $263 scheduled monthly 
payment on the April 2014 auto loan, which had a reported balance of $4,823.
3
 (GE 9.) 
Applicant’s ex-girlfriend was paying the judgment, which she indicates had an outstanding 
balance of $525 (SOR ¶ 1.a). (AE O.) As of August 20, 2015, Applicant had arranged to 
pay $25 a month each toward the $1,607 and $1,614 telephone debts (SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 
1.c) starting in September 2015. (AEs N, P, Q). Applicant arranged to repay the $1,418 
debt in SOR ¶ 1.f by a $250 down payment followed by monthly payments of $97.39 for 12 
months. (AE N.) 
 
 Applicant met his employer’s expectations for his work performance when rated in 
June 2014 and in June 2015. He displayed dedication on the job and worked well with 
team members. He received increases in his pay from $17.40 in June 2014 to $19.44 in 
January 2015, to $20.19 in July 2015. (AE M.) Applicant’s spouse works full time in the 
medical field. (Tr. 78, 116.) She earns approximately $29,000 a year. She has 13-year-old 
twin daughters for whom she receives $600 a month in child support. (Tr. 120-122.) 
Applicant’s spouse handles the household finances. She estimates they have between 
$200 and $400 in net income each month after paying their living expenses. They are not 
presently behind on any bills. (Tr. 122.) 
                                                 
3 
His credit report reflected another auto loan, reportedly opened in February 2015 for $12,995. The lease was 
not accepted for assignment (AE H), so Applicant is taking action to have the loan removed from his credit 
report. (Tr. 95-97.) 
 
 7 
Drug and Alcohol Involvement 
 
 Applicant first drank alcohol at age 15. From his late teens into his early 20s, he 
consumed alcohol on a daily basis. He attended counseling at the urging of his then 
girlfriend when he was in his mid-20s, for his alcohol and marijuana abuse. (GE 5.) 
Applicant now denies that he ever used marijuana. (Tr. 63.) 
 
 Applicant started using cocaine around October 2010. He was offered the drug at a 
bar and used it with the same people each time. (Tr. 83.) Applicant’s alcohol and cocaine 
abuse adversely affected his relationship with his daughter, who came to live with him and 
his then girlfriend following the death of her mother. Around October 2011, state X’s 
Department of Children and Families (DCF) became involved with Applicant and his 
daughter following a domestic dispute between Applicant’s cohabitant girlfriend and a 
neighbor. (Tr. 43.) Applicant failed a drug screen and was referred by the DCF for a 
substance abuse assessment on December 8, 2011. Applicant reported that he drank 
alcohol once a month, averaging 12 to 24 beers, with no alcohol within the past month. He 
reported to the clinician that he had used cocaine about three months previously after 
several years of no use. (GE 5.) Applicant was given provisional diagnoses of alcohol 
abuse and cocaine abuse, “R/O dependency on both.” Substance abuse education was 
recommended. (GEs 4, 5.) 
 
 After drug screens of December 8, 2011, and December 19, 2011, were positive for 
cocaine, Applicant admitted to his counselor that he had used cocaine within a week of the 
drug screens and that he drank alcohol weekly while playing pool. Applicant had been 
using cocaine once a week on the weekends while working out of state. (Tr. 45-46.) 
Applicant passed four urinalysis screens until March 12, 2012. He continued to use alcohol 
and cocaine, and he failed drug screens on March 19, 2012, April 5, 2012, and April 10, 
2012. He passed drug screens on April 16, 2012, and April 30, 2012, while in an intensive 
outpatient program, only to again fail drug screens on May 14, 2012, and May 17, 2012.
4
 
His counselor reports that Applicant began to recognize his problem with substances, and 
he passed two drug screens on May 21, 2012, and June 11, 2012. After the intensity of his 
treatment was lowered to outpatient groups, Applicant stopped attending groups and did 
not return calls from his clinician. He was discharged on June 14, 2012, for lack of 
attendance. His prognosis was assessed as fair, provided he resumed treatment. (GE 5.)  
 
 Applicant now denies any use of cocaine after his premature discharge from 
substance abuse treatment in 2012 (Tr. 50), but there is evidence implicating Applicant in 
the use of cocaine and alcohol to self-medicate symptoms of anxiety through at least 
September 21, 2013. (GEs 4, 5.) In mid-August 2013, his daughter’s grandmother reported 
to DCF that she found some cocaine in a container, which Applicant claims was a 
fabrication to get DCF involved. (Tr. 127.) DCF took custody of his daughter. Applicant 
tested negative for amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, opium, and PCP on September 5, 
                                                 
4 
Applicant now disputes the validity of the drug screens in 2012 (“I tried to argue those with them, because I 
thought they were false negatives . . . .”). (Tr. 49.) He provided no evidence to rebut the reasonable inference 
that he continued to abuse cocaine based on the report of drug screens that tested positive. 
  
 
 8 
2013, on admission into a program for anger management to start on September 10, 2013. 
(AE I.) However, he informed DOHA in May 2014 that he had used cocaine on September 
21, 2013. (GE 4.) 
 
 On October 7, 2013, Applicant was assessed for substance use at the same 
treatment facility where he had attended outpatient counseling from December 2011 to 
June 2012. Applicant claimed that the cocaine found by his daughter’s grandmother was 
from two years ago. He indicated that alcohol was his primary drug of choice, and that he 
was drinking only two beers a month, when he used to drink 30 beers a day. A drug screen 
on October 7, 2013, was positive for cocaine.
5
 (GE 5; AE I.) A drug screen of November 
12, 2013, was negative for all substances tested. (AE I.) On January 7, 2014, Applicant 
was discharged for failure to comply with recommended treatment. He had attended only 
four anger management sessions and none since November 11, 2013. Diagnosis at 
discharge was in part cocaine dependence and alcohol abuse. Applicant’s lack of personal 
investment in his treatment was seen as an indication of his ongoing high risk behavior 
associated with co-morbid disorders. (GE 5.) 
 
 On June 3, 2014, Applicant began counseling with an independent, licensed 
chemical dependency professional, partially for substance abuse relapse prevention. (AE 
A.) Applicant’s hair toxicology screen on June 19, 2014, was negative for all substances 
tested, i.e., cocaine, opiates, phencyclidine, amphetamines, and marijuana. (AE B.) 
Urinalysis tests conducted on June 21, 2014 (AE E), July 26, 2014 (AE D), and September 
3, 2014 (AE C) were negative for drugs of abuse, including cocaine. As of January 19, 
2015, Applicant was reporting to his therapist that he had not used any illicit substances in 
over two years. (AE A.) His therapist saw indicators of abstinence and early recovery in 
Applicant’s ability to maintain employment, his consistent attendance in weekly therapy, his 
increased ability to tolerate stressful situations, and his healthy relationship with his 
significant other (now spouse) and her children. (AE A.) 
 
 In July 2015, the frequency of Applicant’s therapy was reduced to one session every 
other week. On September 10, 2015, his therapist rendered a clinical diagnosis that 
included alcohol abuse disorder, presently in early remission. The therapist opined that 
Applicant’s history of cocaine abuse was in remission, as evidenced by random drug 
screens that were negative for cocaine. Applicant had kept all his appointments. The 
therapist considered him suitable for employment and no threat to his work environment. 
(AE S.) 
 
 Applicant had no alcohol in his residence as of his August 20, 2015 security 
clearance hearing. (Tr. 74-75.) He denied any consumption of alcohol since June 2012 (Tr. 
63), although his spouse testified that she has seen Applicant consume alcohol “maybe 
once or twice” since they met in November 2013. He drank one or two beers at a pool 
party. (Tr. 119.) When asked about his last contact with the persons involved in his cocaine 
                                                 
5 
On his intake into counseling on October 7, 2013, Applicant reported that he had not used any alcohol or 
illegal drugs. An instant urine drug screen was apparently negative for all substances, including cocaine. 
However, a hair analysis drug test of that same date was positive for cocaine, which would indicate recent 
cocaine use. 
 
 9 
use, Applicant responded, “I haven’t seen them in almost two years . . . Actually, no, it was 
three years.” (Tr. 83.) Applicant’s spouse testified that she has not seen Applicant 
consume any illegal drugs. (Tr. 119-120.) 
 
Psychological Conditions 
 
 Applicant had problems with anxiety and depression, especially after the death of 
his daughter’s mother in February 2011. (Tr. 58.) After DCF took custody of his daughter, 
Applicant was referred for anger management sessions. (GE 5.) In October 2013, he 
exhibited symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder. He was discharged from his anger 
management sessions prematurely for lack of involvement in January 2014. (GE 5.) 
According to Applicant, the clinicians wanted him to take alcohol and drug classes again. 
(Tr. 59-60.) 
 
 Applicant had panic attacks after he stopped using cocaine. (Tr. 64.) On June 3, 
2014, Applicant began therapy sessions for depression and anxiety, in addition to relapse 
prevention from substance abuse. His therapist rendered a clinical diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder reoccurring with mild to moderate symptoms without suicidal ideation, 
acute stress disorder, and alcohol abuse disorder. With the aid of continued counseling 
and pharmacological treatment, Applicant had significantly reduced his depression and 
anxiety by January 2015. (AE A, Tr. 65.) Applicant has been taking anti-depressant and 
anti-anxiety drugs for the past year. (Tr. 116.)  
 
  As of September 2015, Applicant had made significant progress toward managing 
his symptoms of depression and anxiety. He was able to exercise effective coping skills 
when in stressful situations and reported enjoying his work. The therapist is of the opinion 
that Applicant poses no threat to his work environment. She is aware that Applicant is 
under security review for his clearance. (AE S.) 
 
Personal Conduct 
 
 When Applicant initially presented for a substance use assessment at the referral of 
the DCF in December 2011, he indicated that he had last used cocaine three months ago, 
after several years of no use. After his drug screen tested positive for cocaine, Applicant 
admitted that he had used cocaine within the week preceding his evaluation. Applicant also 
admitted that he had used alcohol weekly rather than the one time a month initially 
reported. (GE 5.) 
 
 On his October 21, 2013 e-QIP, Applicant responded “Yes” to having illegally used a 
drug or a controlled substance in the last seven years. He indicated that he used cocaine 
“recreationally, occasionally” from October 2010 to November 2011 and that he did not 
want to use cocaine in the future. He also reported that he had successfully completed 
treatment for cocaine use from November 2011 to June 2012 at the referral of the DCF. He 
denied that he had ever been ordered, advised, or asked to seek counseling or treatment 
as a result of his use of alcohol. (GE 1.) 
 
 
 10 
 During his January 6, 2014 interview with the OPM investigator, Applicant indicated 
about his drug use that he used cocaine once sometime between October 2011 and June 
2012. He explained that he used one line of cocaine with a friend he met while working out 
of state; that he was drunk when he used the cocaine; and that on his return home, he 
failed a drug screen. Applicant denied any use of cocaine or alcohol since June 2012. (GE 
8.) 
 
 On April 25, 2014, DOHA sent Applicant interrogatories inquiring in part about the 
first and last dates of his cocaine use. In his response of May 16, 2014, Applicant provided 
the same date, September 21, 2013, for both his first and last uses. He listed “1” for the 
frequency of use. (GE 5.) 
 
 When he responded to the SOR on January 23, 2015, Applicant indicated that he 
discontinued his drug use in 2011 rather than in 2013. He was “mistaken about the dates 
and confused the years.” He estimated that he last used cocaine in September 2011. He 
asserted that he was being honest when he disclosed his drug use and explained that he 
listed his drug use on his October 2013 e-QIP “because it was asked and because it was a 
major change since his last clearance.” (Answer.) 
 
 At his security clearance hearing, Applicant denied any use of cocaine after 2011. 
He claimed he “didn’t remember the years.” (Tr. 52.) When confronted about his reported 
one-time use of cocaine, Applicant responded, “I mean you guys already knew I used it 
frequently in between then.” As to why he told the OPM investigator that he used cocaine 
only one time, he responded: 
 
I said one time to her because that’s part of my medical records. I mean, I 
didn’t think that really mattered. I used it. I was being honest by putting it 
down on the clearance [form] that, hey, yes, I went to treatment because of 
it. I didn’t know that you guys really wanted to know how many times I’ve 
used it. I mean it’s like— 
 
(Tr. 54-55.) As to whether he was counting on the government to obtain his medical 
records reporting his drug use, Applicant discrepantly responded that he did not expect the 
government to obtain his medical records “being as there was no need for it.”
6
 (Tr. 56.) He 
added that the information is “part of the stuff that shouldn’t even have anything to do with 
[his] clearance.” (Tr. 56.) Applicant had no explanation for the positive hair follicle drug 
screen of October 7, 2013. (Tr. 63.) Applicant subsequently admitted that he told the OPM 
investigator that he had used cocaine only one time because he was “nervous and scared” 
that his self-medicating with cocaine could cost him his livelihood. (Tr. 76-77.)  
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive 
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,  emphasizing 
                                                 
6 
Applicant did not authorize DOHA to obtain the records of his substance abuse treatment until August 6, 
2014. (GE 5.) 
 
 11 
that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 
U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, 
the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are required to be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines 
are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, 
these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative 
process. The administrative judge’s overall adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and 
commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious 
scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative 
judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, 
favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified 
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence 
to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant 
is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant 
has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. 
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. 
Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, 
rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive 
Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 
12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive 
information). 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
The security concern about financial considerations is articulated in AG ¶ 18: 
 
Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
 
 12 
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended is 
at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. 
 
 The Guideline F concerns are established by the judgment debt in SOR ¶ 1.a, the 
collection debts in SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.c, and 1.f, and the child support arrearages in SOR ¶ 1.d 
for his daughter and SOR ¶ 1.e for his son. Disqualifying conditions AG ¶ 19(a), “inability or 
unwillingness to satisfy debts,” and AG ¶ 19(c), “a history of not meeting financial 
obligations,” are implicated. 
 
The judgment was entered against Applicant and his ex-girlfriend in April 2011. The 
cell phone debts in SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.c are from 2012. The electric utility delinquency in 
SOR ¶ 1.f is from 2013. He has been behind in his child support since at least 2009. None 
of those debts had been resolved as of late December 2014, although Applicant had made 
some child support payments for his daughter in the past when he could. Applicant had 
made minimal efforts to address the child support arrearage for his son before his wages 
were garnished at $75 a week starting in July 2014. None of the delinquencies in the SOR 
were incurred after Applicant resumed working for his current employer in January 2014. 
Yet, it is difficult to apply mitigating condition AG ¶ 20(a), “the behavior happened so long 
ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and 
does not cast doubt on the individual’s current, reliability, or good judgment.” As of his 
hearing, he had made no payments toward the collection debts, and he owed $11,580 in 
child support for his son as of July 2015. 
 
Lack of income appears to be a significant factor in Applicant’s financial difficulties, 
although Applicant bears responsibility for some of his unemployment. After he was 
ordered to pay child support for his daughter in February 2002 and for his son in July 2003, 
Applicant was unemployed from November 2004 to March 2005. He began working for a 
home improvement retailer but was terminated six months later for “points” issues, which 
were not shown to be outside of his control. Applicant started working for his current 
employer the first time in October 2005. His layoff in September 2006 was unforeseen. 
Applicant worked as a subcontract carpenter and then as a foreman until another layoff in 
September 2008. Applicant was unemployed through at least March 2009, if not later that 
year, when he returned to work for his current employer. By then, he was seriously behind 
in his child support. He was laid off by the defense contractor in June 2011, and lacked a 
steady income until he was recalled to work in January 2014. There is a basis to apply AG 
¶ 20(b), which provides: 
 
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond 
the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, 
unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the 
individual acted responsibly under the circumstances. 
 
AG ¶ 20(b) requires that Applicant act responsibly to address his debts once he is in 
a position to do so. His evidence falls short in that regard. Applicant checked his credit to 
complete his October 2013 e-QIP, and he learned about the collection debts in SOR ¶¶ 
 
 13 
1.b, 1.c, and 1.f. He made no effort to address them until August 2015, when he arranged 
repayment plans. Efforts to address his substantial child support arrearage were sporadic 
before mid-2014. As of November 2014, Equifax was reporting $15,627 in past-due child 
support for his son. 
 
As of August 2015, Applicant owed a manageable $924 in child support arrearage 
for his daughter. At $25 per week being deducted from his pay, he credibly testified that the 
debt would be satisfied in 2016. Applicant showed some good faith by recently arranging 
repayment terms for the $4,640 in collection debt on his record. His former girlfriend 
indicates that she assumed responsibility for repaying the judgment in SOR ¶1.a, which 
had a balance of $525 as of mid-September 2015. Both AG ¶ 20(c) and ¶ 20(d) have some 
applicability in this case. They provide as follows: 
 
(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or 
there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under 
control, and 
 
(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or 
otherwise resolve debts. 
 
Even so, it would be premature to fully mitigate the financial considerations 
concerns without some payments toward the collection debts and with approximately 
$11,000 in child support arrearage owed for his son. In July 2015, state Z sought to seize 
money in a bank account that Applicant claims he does not have. That issue is not 
resolved. Applicant’s first payment of $25 on the debt in SOR ¶ 1.c was due on September 
11, 2015. He arranged for a September 18, 2015 due-date for his first $25 payment on the 
debt in SOR ¶ 1.b. About the debt in SOR ¶ 1.f, Applicant indicates that the creditor has 
agreed to repayment terms at a $250 lump sum down payment followed by $97.39 monthly 
payments for 12 months. While the terms of repayment appear to be affordable for 
Applicant, there is no evidence that any of those payments were made by the close of the 
evidentiary record. 
 
Guideline H, Drug Involvement 
 
The security concern for drug involvement is articulated in AG ¶ 24: 
 
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may 
impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or 
willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. 
 
Under AG ¶ 24(a), drugs are defined as “mood and behavior altering substances,” 
and include: 
 
 
 14 
(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in 
the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or 
cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and 
 
(2) inhalants and other similar substances. 
 
Under AG ¶ 24(b), drug abuse is defined as “the illegal use of a drug or use of a 
legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.” Disqualifying 
conditions AG ¶ 25(a), “any drug abuse,” and ¶ 25(b), “testing positive for illegal drug use,” 
apply. Applicant used cocaine at times between October 2010 and late September 2013. 
Applicant indicated on his October 2013 e-QIP that he first used cocaine in October 2010, 
even though he now claims that he did not use cocaine before the death of his daughter’s 
mother in February 2011. Even assuming he did not start using cocaine until February 
2011, he admitted at his hearing that he used cocaine once a week in the months leading 
up to his positive drug screen in December 2011. When he answered the SOR, he 
maintained that he was mistaken about his last cocaine use in that it occurred in 2011 and 
not in September 2013, as he had reported in response to DOHA interrogatories. Yet, he 
failed drug screens on March 19, 2012, April 5, 2012, April 10, 2012, May 14, 2012, May 
17, 2012, and October 7, 2013. He tested negative on other occasions, including on 
September 5, 2013, which would be consistent with his claim of occasional, recreational 
use. As for the October 7, 2013 drug screen, Applicant presented evidence showing that 
the instant urine screen was negative. However, the more accurate hair analysis test was 
positive for cocaine. 
 
Applicant was diagnosed with cocaine abuse when he was discharged from his 
counseling for substance abuse in June 2012 for lack of commitment. He was referred for 
anger management counseling in September 2013, but attended only four sessions. When 
discharged on January 7, 2014, for noncompliance, he was diagnosed in part with cocaine 
dependence. Not enough is known about the qualifications of the clinicians who rendered 
the diagnoses of cocaine abuse and more recently cocaine dependence to apply AG ¶ 
25(d), “diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical 
psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence.” To the extent that AG ¶ 
25(e), “evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker 
who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program,” can be considered, the 
medical record does not reference specific diagnostic criteria or evidence of cocaine use 
that would reasonably substantiate a diagnosis of dependency rather than abuse. 
 
Concerning factors in mitigation, his cocaine abuse was very recent as of his 
completion of his October 2013 e-QIP. As of his August 2015 hearing, it had been fewer 
than two years since Applicant last used cocaine. Under those circumstances, AG ¶ 26(a), 
“the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” does not apply in this case. 
 
Applicant has taken drug screens since November 2013, which have been negative 
for cocaine. His present therapist indicates that his cocaine abuse is in full remission, as 
 
 15 
evident by the random drug screens which tested negative for cocaine. (AE S.) With the 
aid of his counseling and pharmacological treatment, he appears to be managing his 
anxiety and depression without turning to cocaine to self-medicate as he had done 
previously. Applicant indicates that he is no longer associating with the persons who 
provided him cocaine in the past. He stated on his October 2013 e-QIP that he had no 
desire to use cocaine in the future. His spouse has never seen him use any illegal drug 
since they met in November 2013. Under AG ¶ 26(b), “a demonstrated intent not to abuse 
any drugs in the future,” can be shown by: 
 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; 
 
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; 
 
(3) an appropriate period of abstinence; or 
 
(4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of clearance for 
any violation. 
 
Applicant’s consistent participation in counseling with his present therapist since 
June 2014 weighs favorably when assessing whether he can be counted on to continue to 
abstain from cocaine. On the other hand, he has not been completely forthright with the 
Government about his cocaine use. While illegal drug use cannot be inferred on the basis 
of negative credibility, Applicant’s failure to provide a consistent, credible account of his 
cocaine abuse makes it difficult to find that he is fully rehabilitated. His present two years of 
abstinence is not sufficient to guarantee against recurrence of his cocaine abuse, 
especially given he had used cocaine during and after his treatment for substance abuse. 
The drug involvement concerns raised by his cocaine abuse are not yet fully mitigated. 
 
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption 
 
 The security concern for alcohol consumption is set out in AG ¶ 21: 
 
Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable 
judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an 
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness. 
 
 Applicant started drinking at age 15. Treatment records from Applicant’s counseling 
in 2012 indicate that he consumed alcohol on a daily basis from his late teens into his early 
20s, which led him to attend counseling at the urging of his then girlfriend. Although the 
evidentiary record is largely silent as to the extent of Applicant’s drinking over the years, his 
abuse of alcohol was adversely affecting his relationship with his daughter by 2011. After 
state X’s DCF became involved, he was referred to substance abuse treatment. At his 
initial intake evaluation on December 8, 2011, he was diagnosed provisionally with alcohol 
abuse. He initially reported that he was drinking once a month in quantity averaging 12 to 
24 beers. After failing a drug screen, he admitted that he drank alcohol once a week while 
playing pool. He continued to use alcohol to deal with symptoms of anxiety. During his 
 
 16 
OPM interview in January 2014, Applicant indicated that he was drunk when he abused 
cocaine. He denied any consumption of alcohol since his discharge from outpatient 
substance abuse treatment in June 2012. However, when re-evaluated at the facility in 
October 2013 following a drug screen positive for cocaine, Applicant indicated that alcohol 
was his primary drug of choice. He told clinicians then that he was drinking two beers a 
month when he used to drink 30 beers a day. Applicant was diagnosed with alcohol abuse. 
He did not follow up with recommended substance abuse treatment at the facility, but in 
June 2014, he began counseling with a private therapist licensed in chemical dependency. 
She diagnosed him in part with alcohol abuse. 
 
The evidence substantiates binge drinking as contemplated within AG ¶ 22(c) and a 
diagnosis of alcohol abuse as contemplated within 22(e): 
 
(c) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired 
judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol 
abuser or alcohol dependent; and 
 
(e) evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical 
social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment 
program. 
 
Concerning AG ¶ 22(f), “relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence 
and completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program,” Applicant was diagnosed with alcohol 
abuse in October 2013 after he had received substance abuse treatment. Available 
accounts of his alcohol consumption after 2012 do not indicate excessive drinking. 
However, as of September 2015, Applicant’s alcohol abuse disorder was in early 
remission, which would be consistent with more recent evidence of abuse than Applicant 
appears willing to admit.
7
 
 
 Given that his alcohol abuse problem was in early remission as of September 2015, 
AG ¶ 23(a), “so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened 
under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the 
individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” does not yet apply. 
However, Applicant’s ongoing therapy sessions since June 2014 with a good prognosis 
satisfy AG ¶ 23(b): 
 
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol 
abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and 
has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or responsible 
use (if an alcohol abuser). 
                                                 
7 
The diagnostic code of 305.00 for alcohol abuse disorder relied on by the therapist is not used in the current 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5
th
 Edition (DSM-5). The DSM-5 now combines the 
categories of substance abuse and substance dependence from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 4
th
 Edition (DSM-IV) into a single disorder measured on a continuum from mild to severe. 
Under the DSM-IV, a specifier of early remission indicated no criteria for dependence or abuse for at least one 
month but less than 12 months. 
 
 17 
In January 2014, Applicant told the OPM investigator that he had not used any 
alcohol since he was discharged from his substance abuse treatment in June 2012. At his 
hearing, he again denied any consumption of alcohol since June 2012 (Tr. 63), although 
his spouse testified that she has seen him consume alcohol “maybe once or twice” since 
they met in November 2013. He drank one or two beers at a pool party. (Tr. 119.) The 
discrepancy notwithstanding, there is no indication of any ongoing alcohol abuse. The 
security concerns raised by his past alcohol abuse are mitigated. 
 
Guideline I, Psychological Conditions 
  
 The concern about psychological conditions is articulated AG ¶ 27: 
 
Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment, 
reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required 
for there to be a concern under this guideline. A duly qualified mental health 
professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) employed by, or 
acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government, should be consulted 
when evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this 
guideline. No negative inference concerning the standards in this Guideline 
may be raised solely on the basis of seeking mental health counseling. 
 
Applicant’s issues with depression and anxiety led him to self-medicate with alcohol 
and cocaine in the past. Problems with anger stemming over the custody of his daughter 
led state X’s DCF to refer him for anger management sessions in 2013. He presented in 
October 2013 with symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder, and he was discharged from 
his counseling for anger management for noncompliance in January 2014. To the extent 
that disqualifying condition AG ¶ 28(c), “the individual has failed to follow treatment advice 
related to a diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g., failure to take 
prescribed medication,” is implicated, Applicant has mitigated those concerns by his private 
counseling and ongoing pharmacological medication management since June 2014 for 
diagnosed major depressive disorder reoccurring with mild to moderate symptoms without 
suicidal ideation and acute stress disorder. Applicant’s therapist reports that he had made 
significant progress towards managing his symptoms of depression and anxiety. She does 
not consider Applicant’s conditions to pose a threat to the work environment. Three 
mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 29 apply: 
 
(a) the identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the 
individual has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the 
treatment plan; 
 
(b) the individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program 
for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and the individual is currently 
receiving counseling or treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly 
qualified mental health professional; and 
 
(e) there is no indication of a current problem. 
 
 18 
 
AG ¶ 29(e) applies in that Applicant’s mental health issues have not been shown to impair 
his current judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness with regard to his handling of security 
matters. The psychological conditions security concerns are sufficiently mitigated. 
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
 The security concern about personal conduct is articulated in AG ¶ 15: 
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about 
an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified 
information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid 
answers during the security clearance process. 
 
The evidence establishes the SOR allegations that Applicant was not fully candid 
about the extent of his cocaine abuse on his October 2013 e-QIP, during his January 2014 
interview with the OPM investigator, or in response to DOHA interrogatories in May 2014. 
He indicated on his e-QIP that he used cocaine from October 2010 to November 2011. He 
told the OPM investigator that he used cocaine only one time, sometime before June 2012. 
In May 2014, he indicated that he last used cocaine in September 2013, but also that he 
used the drug one time. The evidence shows that he failed several drug screens in 2012 
and again tested positive for cocaine on October 7, 2013. Two disqualifying conditions 
under AG ¶ 16 apply because of his deliberate falsifications: 
 
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from 
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar 
form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, 
award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or 
trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; and 
 
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant 
facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical 
authority, or other official government representative. 
 
 None of the Guideline E mitigating conditions apply. The evidence shows that 
Applicant’s misrepresentations of his cocaine involvement extend beyond the three 
instances identified in the SOR. When he was evaluated for substance abuse treatment at 
the referral of state X’s DCF in December 2011, Applicant initially told clinicians that he had 
not used cocaine in three months. It was only after testing positive for cocaine that he 
revealed that he had used cocaine within a week of his intake evaluation. When he 
responded to the SOR, Applicant claimed that he had inaccurately recalled the date of his 
last use of cocaine. He maintained then and at his security clearance hearing that he had 
last used cocaine in 2011. At his hearing, he claimed that the positive drug screens in 2012 
and October 2013 were “false positives.” He later acknowledged that he had used cocaine 
a couple of times while he was in treatment for substance abuse, but he persisted in 
 
 19 
disavowing any cocaine use in 2013, despite his May 2014 admission that he used cocaine 
on September 21, 2013. Applicant did not make the prompt, good-faith effort to correct the 
record required under AG ¶ 17(a), “the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct 
the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts.” The 
recurrent nature of his deliberate falsifications also removes AG ¶ 17(c) from any serious 
consideration. AG ¶ 17(c) provides: 
 
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so 
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely 
to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment. 
 
Finally, Applicant has not demonstrated adequate reform. When asked why he 
indicated in May 2014 that he used cocaine only once, on September 21, 2013, Applicant 
responded that the Government already knew that he had used cocaine more frequently, 
from the information in the records of his substance abuse treatment. Applicant gave a 
similar reason for his failure to accurately disclose his cocaine abuse to the OPM 
investigator in January 2014. Yet, the evidence shows that Applicant did not sign a release 
for DOHA to obtain the substance abuse treatment records until August 2014. He testified 
that he saw no need for the Government to obtain his medical records as it was information 
that he believes should have nothing to do with his clearance eligibility. Applicant 
eventually admitted that he had not fully disclosed his drug use to the OPM investigator 
because he was “nervous and scared” that his self-medicating with cocaine could cost him 
his livelihood, but I am not persuaded that he has fully disclosed his cocaine use to the 
DOD.  He has not demonstrated the reform needed for mitigation under AG ¶ 17(d): 
 
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to 
change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, 
circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other 
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct and 
all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative 
process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances 
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the 
frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at 
the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) 
the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral 
changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, 
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence. 
 
 20 
My analyses under Guidelines F, H, G, I, and E are incorporated in the whole-
person assessment of Applicant’s security eligibility, but some factors warrant additional 
comment. Applicant’s work performance evaluations show that he is meeting his 
employer’s expectations. There is no evidence that his work has been negatively affected 
or compromised by drug or alcohol abuse, anxiety or depression, or financial problems. 
That being said, he raised significant doubts about his judgment and reliability by engaging 
in illegal drug use. The Government has ample reason to question his trustworthiness in 
light of his record of misrepresentations regarding his cocaine use.  
 
It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security 
clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or renewal of a security 
clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9
th
 Cir. 1990). After considering 
all the facts and circumstances, I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national 
interest to continue Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance at this time. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline F:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraph 1.a:  For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.d:  For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.e:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.f:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.g:  Withdrawn 
 
  Paragraph 2, Guideline H:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraphs 2.a-2.d: Against Applicant 
    
  Paragraph 3, Guideline G:  FOR APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraph 3.a-3.b: For Applicant 
 
  Paragraph 4, Guideline I:  FOR APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraphs 4.a-4.b: For Applicant 
 
  Paragraph 5, Guideline E:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraphs 5.a-5.c: Against Applicant 
 
 21 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
________________________ 
Elizabeth M. Matchinski 
Administrative Judge