The hearing was originally scheduled for September 8, 2015, but was postponed.      1
1
                                                             
                           
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 14-02396
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Bryan Olmos, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On March 28, 2015, the Department of Defense  (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns arising under Guideline C (Foreign
Preference) and Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960),
as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), implemented in September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on June 8, 2015. An amended
notice of hearing was issued on September 18, 2015, scheduling the hearing for
November 19, 2015.  Government Exhibits (GX) 1 and 2 were admitted into evidence1
without objection. Applicant testified, presented the testimony of her husband, and
submitted Applicant Exhibits (AX) A-C, which were admitted without objection. The
2
transcript was received on December 2, 2015.  Based on a review of the pleadings,
testimony, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Procedural Issue
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
regarding Iran. Applicant did not object, and the documents proffered in support of the
request were labeled Hearing Exhibit I and entered into the record.
Findings of Fact
In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the SOR allegations under
Guideline C and under Guideline B with explanations. 
Applicant was born in Iran in 1966. She received her undergraduate degree in
1995 from an Iranian university. In 2003, she came to the United States. She became a
naturalized citizen in 2009. She studied at an American community college for a time.
She is married to a U.S. citizen and has three stepchildren and one biological child.
She completed a security clearance application in 2013. She is an officer and a board
member of her husband’s company. (GX 1)
FOREIGN PREFERENCE
The SOR alleges under Guideline C that Applicant applied for and was issued an
Iranian passport in July 2012, after having become a naturalized citizen in 2009.
Applicant applied for an Iranian passport in 2012. She stated that she needed
the Iranian passport to “make a claim” on her family inheritance in Iran. (Tr. 42) The
passport allowed her to execute a power of attorney to her brother to manage the family
inheritance. (AX A) Applicant has now surrendered her foreign passport to the Facility
Security Officer (FSO) of her husband’s company. (Tr. 57) She never used the passport
to travel. She has not been to Iran since she became a citizen of the United States.
(Answer to SOR). She stated that she had to actively claim the inheritance because an
unclaimed inheritance would be confiscated by the Iranian government. Her last Iranian
passport expired in 2009 and she did not renew it. (Tr. 43) 
Applicant’s 2013 security clearance application notes that she considered herself
a dual citizen of Iran and the United States from 1966 to 2013. (GX 1) She has taken
no action to renounce her Iranian citizenship, although she mentioned in her 2014
interview that she would renounce her Iranian citizenship. (GX 2)
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
The SOR alleges under Guideline B (1.a-1.c) that Applicant’s brother, sister-in-
law, and niece are citizens and residents of Iran. It also alleges that Applicant co-owns
with her siblings an apartment in Iran valued at about $200,000. In addition, she co-
owns with her siblings land in Iran valued at about $200,000 to $300,000.
3
Applicant’s brother is the only immediate family member who lives in Iran. He was
sponsored by their mother (who was a U.S. citizen) about 18 years ago for a green card.
The process took about 12 years and when he was called for an interview the case was
closed because his mother had died. This occurred in 2007. (Tr. 9) In 2010,  Applicant,
who was now a U.S. citizen, sponsored her brother’s immigration petition. He, his wife,
and children started a new application in 2010, which is still in process. (AX C)
Applicant’s brother is married. His wife and children reside in Iran. He is the
owner of a shipping company. (GX 2) He speaks Farsi and does not speak English. (Tr.
36) Applicant visited him in 2006 and 2008. She stayed in his home when she was in
Iran.  She noted in her security clearance application that her last contact with him was
in 2013. She speaks to him on the telephone two or three times monthly. (GX 1)
Applicant acknowledges that she loves her brother and his family. Also her son engages
in video chats with his cousins. (Tr. 63)
Applicant’s niece is 14 years old. Applicant provided financial support to her so
that she could take English lessons. She paid for about ten months of lessons. Her
brother advised that the lessons were not “effective” and so Applicant stopped sending
money for them. (Tr. 39) She reports that she sent about $5,000  for the lessons.
Applicant’s other siblings are citizens and residents of the United States. They are
also dual citizens of Iran and United States. Applicant’s husband, who is a U.S. citizen
by birth, holds a security clearance. He testified that Applicant’s brother has been
consistently denied a visa to come to the United States. He did not provide an
explanation as to why. Applicant’s husband owns several companies. Applicant is
employed in one of them, where she has worked as an administrator since 2010.
Applicant’s father died in 2012. He owned an apartment and unimproved land in
Iran. When he died, Applicant and her siblings inherited the apartment and the land. Her
brother inherited two-thirds of the apartment by law. Applicant inherited her share of the
apartment which was valued at $200,000. In her 2014 interview, she listed the value of
the land as approximately $300,000. (GX 2) She also stated that she took her share and
helped her brother buy a new apartment in which she has a 20% share. (Tr. 59)
At the hearing, Applicant stated that she really does not have an interest in the
apartment because her brother’s name is on the title, and he is living in the apartment.
She believes she does not have a legal interest in the property since her brother’s name
is on the title. (AX B ) She explained that she just learned about the title a few days ago.
(Tr. 52) The land has not been sold. She would eventually dispose of any property or
assets from Iran. She could not legally do so now due to the sanctions on Iran. She will
contact her brother to resolve the situation. Applicant was adamant that she does not
need the money. (Tr. 63)
Applicant is involved in community affairs. She volunteers in her child’s school.
Applicant and her husband own substantial interests in the United States. She stated
that she and her husband have a net worth of $15 million dollars in U.S. real estate.
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ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE
Islamic Republic of Iran
In January 2012, the Director of National Intelligence assessed that the most
menacing foreign intelligence threats in the next two to three years will involve
espionage by China, Russia, and Iran, and that the foreign intelligence services of these
three countries will remain the top threats to the United States in the coming years. He
also assessed that Iran’s intelligence operations against the United States, including
cyber capabilities, have dramatically increased in recent years in depth and complexity.
In February 2014, the Director of National Intelligence assessed that Iran and
North Korea are unpredictable actors in the international arena. Their development of
cyber espionage or attack capabilities might be used in an attempt to either provoke or
destabilize the United States or its partners.
The U.S. Government does not have diplomatic relations with Iran. The United
States has long-standing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, sponsorship of
terrorism, and human rights record. The current Iranian government still has not
recognized Israel’s right to exist, has hindered the Middle East peace process by arming
militants, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and continues to
play a disruptive role in sustaining violence in the region, particularly in Syria.
Iran will continue to act assertively abroad in ways that run counter to U.S.
interests and worsen regional conflicts. Iranian officials almost certainly believe that their
support has been instrumental in sustaining Assad’s regime in Syria and will probably
continue support during 2016 to bolster the regime. In the broader Middle East, Iran will
continue to provide arms and other aid to Palestinian groups, Houthi rebels in Yemen,
and Shia militants in Bahrain to expand Iranian influence and to counter perceived
foreign threats.
In 2013, the U.S. Department of State reaffirmed it 1984 designation of Iran as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism, denoting the U.S. Government’s determination that Iran has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.
In March 2015, the U.S. Department of State renewed its commitment to the safe
return of Robert Levinson, who disappeared eight years ago while on a business trip to
Iran, and is one of the longest held American citizens in history.     
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      2
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      3
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      4
 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive      5
information), and EO 10865 § 7.
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      6
 Id.      7
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in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known
as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence
contained in the record. 
The U.S. Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts
alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a2
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  3 4
A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance5
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt6
about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be
resolved in favor of protecting such information.  The decision to deny an individual a7
security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is
6
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under AG ¶ 9 the security concern involving foreign preference arises, “[W]hen
an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the
United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member.  This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country;
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare,
or other such benefits from a foreign country;
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business
interests in another country;
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country; and
(7) voting in a foreign election;
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an
American citizen;
(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to
serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or government
in conflict with the national security interest; and
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than
the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United
States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship.
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Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2009. She applied for an Iranian
passport in 2012.  AG ¶ 10(a)(1) applies.
AG ¶ 11 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a
foreign country;
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship
occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual
was a minor;
(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security
authority.
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security
authority, or otherwise invalidated; and
(f) the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States
Government.
Applicant obtained an Iranian passport in 2012 because she needed identification
to give a power of attorney to her brother in Iran after the death of their father. This was
due to an inheritance issue. Applicant stated she surrendered her passport from Iran to
the FSO of her husband’s company before the hearing. She did not provide any
documentation to corroborate her statement.  At the time she had an Iranian passport
she did not have a security clearance or have any reason to understand the import of
such. No one advised her that this could be an issue. AG ¶ 11(e) applies. Applicant has
mitigated the security concerns under the foreign preference guideline.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern under Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
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A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(a). A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶ 7(b).
Applicant’s, brother, sister-in-law, and niece are citizens and residents of Iran.
Applicant maintains contact with them. She provided some financial support for her
niece.  Security concerns could arise in connection with the potential that hostile forces
might seek classified information from Applicant by threatening harm or offering benefits
to her relatives in Iran.  Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) are raised.
A disqualifying condition may also be raised by “a substantial business, financial,
or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated
business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.” AG ¶ 7(e) Although Applicant declared that the apartment and land
inherited from her father is titled in her brother’s name and she does not believe that she
will inherit that property, she has an interest in her father’s estate. She proceeded to
protect her interest by obtaining the Iranian passport. She had reported that the stake in
estate ranges from $200,000 to $500,000. There is some confusion as to the title in her
brother’s name, but the proper distribution is a matter of concern to Applicant. I conclude
this disqualifying condition is raised. 
Since the Government produced evidence to raise  disqualifying conditions in AG
¶¶ 7(a), (b) and (e), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the
burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to
the Government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to
those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or
duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a
family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is
known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or the foreign
country is associated with a risk of terrorism.
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Family ties with persons in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law,
automatically disqualifying under Guideline B. However, such ties raise a prima facie
security concern sufficient to require an applicant to present evidence of rebuttal,
extenuation or mitigation sufficient to meet the applicant’s burden of persuasion that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
applicant. Iran’s hostility to the United States, repressive government, and abysmal
human rights record place a “very heavy burden of persuasion” on Applicant to
demonstrate that her family members and financial interests in Iran do not pose a
security risk. See ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 4 (App. Bd. Aug 4, 2006).
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003).  Applicant’s brother wants to live in the United States, but as long as
he and his family live under the repressive and hostile government of Iran, Applicant
may be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of her brother and
his family and the interests of the United States. This mitigating condition is not
established.
Similarly, AG ¶ 8(b) can mitigate concerns when “there is no conflict of interest,
either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” Applicant has loyalties to the United
States. She is married to a U.S. citizen and has a family in the United States. She also
has loyalty to her brother and his family in Iran, and is still involved with the inheritance
issue. Her willingness to obtain the Iranian passport in 2012 to take some control of the
inheritance issue to give her brother a power of attorney undercuts the application of this
mitigating condition.
 AG ¶ 8(c) can mitigate if “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so
casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.” There is a rebuttable presumption that contacts with an
immediate family member in a foreign country are not casual.  ISCR Case No. 00-0484
at 5 (App. Bd. Feb, 1, 2002). Applicant has not rebutted the presumption. Applicant talks
with her brother and his family monthly, and they are in the process of resolving the
inheritance issue about her father’s estate. She is sponsoring him for entrance to the
United States. This mitigating condition is not established.
Security concerns based on foreign property also can be mitigated by showing”
the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such
that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used to effectively influence,
manipulate, or pressure the individual.” AG ¶ 8(f). While the value of Applicant’s
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inheritance pales in comparison with her financial wealth in the United States,
Applicant’s assets in Iran are still significant. I conclude this mitigating condition is not
established.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
 (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors. The
factors weighing towards approval of Applicant’s security clearance are noteworthy;
however, they are less substantial than the factors weighing against its approval. There
is no evidence that Applicant has engaged in criminal activity, abused alcohol or
committed any security violations. She is a naturalized U.S. citizen and is married to a
U.S. citizen. She and her family reside in the United States. She is involved in
community activity. She has significant wealth in the United States. These financial
components are important economic connections to the United States. Her loyalty to the
United States is not an issue. There is no evidence that terrorists or other foreign
elements have specifically targeted Applicant or her family. Nevertheless, her brother’s
Iranian citizenship and distribution of her father’s estate makes her vulnerable to
exploitation. 
A Guideline B decision concerning Iran must take into consideration the
geopolitical situation and dangers there. See ISCR Case No. 04-02630 at 3 (App. Bd.
May 23, 2007). Iran is a dangerous place. Iran supports terrorists who threaten the
interests of the United States, and those who cooperate and assist the United States.
Iran aggressively seeks intelligence information from the United States. The United
States and Iran have recently discussed agreement to lift economic sanctions against
Iran and for Iran to permit inspections for nuclear-weapon development in Iran.
Notwithstanding,  Iran and the United states continue to have profound policy disputes.
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Unresolved significant foreign influence security concerns from Applicant’s
brother and his family living in Iran warrant greater weight than her connections to the
United States. Applicant acknowledges her love for her brother and his family. She
communicates with her brother and his family. She stayed with her brother in Iran during
her visits before she became an American citizen.  Applicant’s connection to her brother
and the inheritance issue make Applicant more vulnerable as a target of coercion of
lawless elements in Iran, including the Iranian government. 
I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518 (1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude foreign preference
concerns are mitigated; however the Applicant has not carried her burden and foreign
influence concerns are not mitigated at the this time. Eligibility for access to classified
information is denied.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B : AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-e: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C : FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied.
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge