1 
 
                                                              
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE    
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 14-03621 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant has a record of criminal offenses from January 1998 to June 2014 that 
casts serious doubt about whether he can be relied on to comply with rules and regulations 
regarding the handling of classified information. Clearance is denied. 
 
 Statement of the Case  
 
On March 28, 2015, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility 
(DOD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing the security 
concerns under Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct), and 
explaining why it was unable to find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to 
grant him security clearance eligibility. The DOD CAF took the action under Executive 
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) 
effective within the DOD on September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant responded to the SOR allegations on April 24, 2015, and he requested a 
decision on the written record without a hearing. Department Counsel requested a hearing 
 
 
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before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). 
(Tr. 14-16.) On July 23, 2015, the case was assigned to me to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a 
security clearance for Applicant. I scheduled the hearing for August 20, 2015. 
 
I convened the hearing as scheduled. Seventeen Government Exhibits (GEs 1-17) 
and four Applicant Exhibits (AEs A-D) were admitted without any objections. Applicant 
testified, as reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on August 28, 2015. 
 
I held the record open until September 18, 2015, for Applicant to supplement the 
record. The deadline passed without any submissions, so the record closed on September 
18, 2015. 
 
Summary of SOR Allegations 
 
The SOR alleges under Guideline J and cross-alleges under Guideline E a history of 
criminal conduct by Applicant between January 1998 and June 2012 involving driving after 
suspension (SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.b, 1.e-1.g), larceny or theft (SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 1.h-1.l), possession of 
marijuana (SOR ¶ 1.l), and domestic assault (SOR ¶ 1.m). The SOR also alleges under 
Guidelines J and E an arrest in June 2010 on a warrant (SOR ¶ 1.d). Applicant admitted 
the allegations, but he also indicated that “these foolish mistakes of [his] ignorant troubled 
youth” would never compromise his pride for his job or the country.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
Applicant’s admissions to the alleged criminal charges and their dispositions are 
accepted and incorporated as findings of fact. After considering the pleadings, exhibits, 
and transcript, I make the following additional findings. 
 
Applicant is 36 years old. He earned his high school equivalency certification in 
1998. He has been married since June 2005, and he and his spouse have two children 
ages 5 and 8. Applicant also has a six-year-old daughter from another relationship and a 
19-year-old stepson. His daughter has always lived with her mother while Applicant’s 
stepson lived in Applicant’s home from approximately 2005 to 2010. Applicant had an 
inconsistent work history before his present employment. Except for some part-time work 
from April 2011 to August 2011, and seasonal work from March 2012 to August 2012, 
Applicant was unemployed from June 2009 until he started his present employment with a 
defense contractor in June 2013. (GEs 1, 17; Tr. 52-54.) 
 
Applicant has a long record of criminal involvement starting from his senior year of 
high school. In late January 1998, Applicant kicked in the door to his mother’s bedroom 
during an argument with her. On February 10, 1998, he pleaded nolo contendere to 
misdemeanor charges of simple assault (domestic) and malicious destruction of property 
(SOR ¶ 1.m). He was placed on one year of probation, and ordered to attend counseling 
and pay restitution and court costs. (GEs 2, 3.) He subsequently violated the conditions of 
his probation for assault and was sentenced to 90 days in jail. (GE 3; Tr. 55-56.) 
 
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In June 1999, Applicant pleaded nolo contendere to possessing alcoholic beverage 
as a minor. He was fined and ordered to pay court costs. (GE 4.) In late August 1999, 
Applicant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended. He 
pleaded nolo contendere in mid-September 1999 and was ordered to pay a fine and court 
costs. The court costs were not satisfied until February 2001. (GE 5.) He was charged in 
February 2001 with violating his 1998 probation for the simple assault when he drove his 
vehicle on a suspended license. (Tr. 31.) Applicant pleaded nolo contendere and was 
found to have violated his probation. (GE 6.) 
 
In July 2003, Applicant was charged with felony possession of a stolen motor 
vehicle or parts, and with misdemeanor possession of marijuana, first offense (SOR ¶ 1.l). 
Applicant took a friend’s car without his friend’s knowledge or permission and drove to a 
restaurant. Applicant was stopped on a report of a stolen car, and the police found 
marijuana in the vehicle. In mid-December 2003, Applicant pleaded nolo contendere to 
both charges. He was sentenced to four years of probation and to pay restitution for felony 
possession of a stolen motor vehicle. On the marijuana charge, he was sentenced to one 
year in jail, suspended; to one year of probation; to 50 hours of community service; and to 
obtain alcohol counseling.
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 (GEs 2, 7, 8, 17; Tr. 57-58.) Applicant later spent five months in 
jail for violating the terms of his probation for the felony vehicle theft. (GE 8; Tr. 77.) 
 
In September 2004, while Applicant was on probation for the felony possession of a 
motor vehicle, he had an argument with his then girlfriend after they had been out drinking 
with some friends. After harassing his girlfriend at her apartment, he drove off with her 
purse. (Tr. 59-60.) He was charged with one count each of criminal trespass, theft by 
unlawful taking, theft by deception, receiving stolen property, forgery, and issuing bad 
checks, and with two counts of harassment (SOR ¶ 1.k). (GE 2.)  Applicant does not deny 
harassing his ex-girlfriend on that occasion, although he believes “she just took it a little 
far.” Applicant does not recall what led to the forgery or bad check charges. (Tr. 58-60.) 
Applicant and his ex-girlfriend terminated their relationship, and he left the area shortly 
after the incident. He has never checked to see if there are still charges against him in that 
jurisdiction. (Tr. 59.) He told an authorized investigator for the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) in June 2013 that he paid a fine and was released. (GE 17.) 
 
In early February 2005, Applicant found a wallet in the locker room of a gym where 
he was playing basketball. He stole the cash and used the credit cards. (Tr. 61-62.) On 
March 7, 2005, he was charged in district court with one count of misdemeanor larceny 
(SOR ¶ 1.i). He pleaded nolo contendere to the charge on March 18, 2005, and he was 
                                                 
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Applicant has provided discrepant accounts as to whether the marijuana belonged to him. He told an OPM 
investigator in June 2013 that it was not his marijuana. (GE 17.) At his security clearance hearing, he initially 
testified that the marijuana belonged to him. (Tr. 57.) When asked about the discrepancy, Applicant 
responded, “It’s in the vehicle. I’ve never been much of a marijuana smoker. I took responsibility for it. It’s my 
charge.” (Tr. 61.) He admitted to the OPM investigator that he smoked marijuana every two weeks from 1994 
to November 2005. (GE 17.) He now admits to smoking marijuana occasionally until 2008. (Tr. 79.) While the 
Government did not allege drug involvement as an issue of security concern apart from the marijuana 
possession charge, Applicant’s use of marijuana after his arrest reflects ongoing disregard for the drug laws 
after his arrest. 
 
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sentenced to one year in jail, suspended, and placed on one year of probation. He was 
also ordered to pay restitution and court costs. (GE 10.) On March 21, 2005, Applicant was 
charged in superior court with three felony counts of fraudulent use of a credit card and 
with one misdemeanor count of larceny (SOR ¶ 1.h). He pleaded nolo contendere in 
superior court to all four counts. He was sentenced to three years in jail on one count of 
fraudulent use of a credit card, to serve 90 days with credit for time served, and placed on 
probation for 33 months. He was also ordered to perform 100 hours of community service, 
to attend substance abuse counseling, and to pay restitution. On each of the remaining 
charges, he was sentenced to one year in jail, suspended, placed on one year of 
probation, and ordered to pay restitution. (GEs 2, 11, 17.) His February 2005 criminal 
conduct was in violation of his probation for the July 2003 motor vehicle theft. 
 
In late October 2005, Applicant was charged with one count each of driving after his 
license had been suspended, reckless driving/eluding police, first offense, and obstructing 
an officer in the execution of duty (SOR ¶ 1.g). (GEs 2, 12.) According to Applicant, his 
license was suspended for financial reasons in that he failed to maintain a “SR-22” on his 
insurance (i.e., pay a financial responsibility fee required after a car accident in 1999). 
Applicant surmises that the eluding and obstructing the police charges stem from the fact 
that he turned a corner and pulled into a parking lot before stopping for the police. (Tr. 63-
65.) Applicant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges on February 9, 2006. He was fined 
for driving with a suspended license and reckless driving. For obstructing a police officer, 
he was given six months of probation. (GE 12.) 
 
Applicant was charged on February 22, 2010, May 3, 2010, and April 14, 2011, with 
misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (SOR ¶¶ 1.f, 1.e, 1.b), for failure to 
maintain the financial responsibility coverage on his insurance. He pleaded nolo 
contendere to each offense, although not to the May 2010 and April 2011 charges until 
June 18, 2014, after warrants had been issued against him (SOR ¶ 1.d for the May 2010 
offense) for failure to appear. Applicant was fined for each offense, but he did not lose his 
license. (GEs 2, 14, 15, 17; Tr. 67-68, 98-99.) As of June 2015, Applicant owed balances 
of $487 for the February 2010 charge (GE 13), $467 for the May 2010 charge (GE 14), and 
$589 for the April 2011 charge (GE 15). 
 
On June 24, 2010, Applicant was arrested and charged with one count each of 
larceny, credit card theft, credit card fraud, and auto teller fraud (SOR ¶ 1.c). (GE 2.) 
Applicant admits that he illegally used a debit card belonging to the mother of his six-year-
old daughter. He has no explanation for his behavior other than he did not have a job that 
he enjoyed which could provide a future for his family. (Tr. 69-70.) 
 
While driving home from work in June 2012, Applicant was stopped for speeding. 
He was arrested for driving with a suspended license (SOR ¶ 1.a) for failure to maintain the 
SR-22. He posted bail after spending a night in jail. Applicant’s license was reinstated 
before his court appearance, and the charge was dismissed with no fines or court costs 
assessed. (GEs 1, 17.) 
 
 
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On June 12, 2013, Applicant completed and certified to the accuracy of an 
Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) for his defense contractor 
employment. In response to the police record inquiries, Applicant listed his then most 
recent driving on a suspended license charge in June 2012, which he indicated was 
dismissed; the 2003 felony possession of a stolen motor vehicle and misdemeanor 
marijuana possession charges, for which he was on probation from December 2003 to 
December 2007; and the 2005 felony fraudulent use of credit card and misdemeanor 
larceny charges, for which he was incarcerated between March 2005 and May 2005 and 
served probation through January 2008. Applicant responded negatively to whether he had 
used any illegal drug in the last seven years. (GE 1.) 
 
On June 24, 2013, Applicant was interviewed by an OPM investigator. He provided 
details about his police record, including the 1998 simple assault that occurred beyond the 
seven-year scope of the e-QIP inquiry. Applicant claimed no recall of the June 2010 
larceny and auto teller fraud offense or the September 2004 theft and receiving stolen 
property charges involving his ex-girlfriend. Applicant explained that when he was young, 
he “did stupid stuff.” Applicant expressed intent of no future involvement in criminal activity. 
(GE 17.) 
 
Applicant and his spouse rented a new computer game system for her son as a 
Christmas gift in January 2013. He was unemployed at the time, and they fell behind in 
their $79 monthly payments. (Tr. 93.) Applicant was given an option to make payments or 
return the game system. Applicant chose not to return the game system. He did not want to 
take a gift back from his stepson. (Tr. 73-74, 83.) Applicant claims that personnel from the 
rental company came to his house and threatened him, but then gave him another month 
to make a payment. It became personal for him, and he reacted stubbornly. (Tr. 85.) On 
June 27, 2014, he was charged with one count of selling/concealing leased personal 
property. He pleaded nolo contendere to the charge on October 1, 2014. He was 
sentenced to one year in jail, suspended, placed on probation for one year, and ordered to 
pay restitution and court costs. He made a payment on December 4, 2014, but a bench 
warrant was issued on February 24, 2015, for failure to appear on January 30, 2015. (GE 
16.) He was at work and could not make the court date. (Tr. 95-96.) Applicant resumed 
payments in April 2015. He paid $160 around July 2015 and $30 in early August 2015. (Tr. 
74-75.) When Applicant chose not to return the game system, he did not consider the risk 
to his employment. (Tr. 82.) 
 
Applicant regrets his criminal conduct. He understands that it is relatively recent, but 
he intends to put it behind him and move forward. (Tr. 92.) He views his present job as the 
best job he has ever had. (Tr. 81.) 
 
Character References 
 
 Applicant has been a team leader at work since January 2014. (Tr. 90-91.) The 
operations manager of the department attests to Applicant’s good work ethic and 
dedication over the past two years. (AE A.) Applicant also presented character references 
from three friends. A former Marine, who has known Applicant since high school, considers 
 
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Applicant to be responsible and mature. (AE B.) This friend and his spouse (AE C) have 
benefitted personally from Applicant’s generosity with his time. Applicant helped the couple 
with a long distance move when their son was in the emergency room. Another friend, who 
has known Applicant for six years, had found Applicant to be “reliable, responsible, 
hardworking, and honest.” In his opinion, Applicant is driven to provide for his family. (AE 
D.) 
 
 It is unclear to what extent, if any, these character references know about 
Applicant’s criminal record. About his June 2014 arrest, which occurred about a year into 
his defense contractor employment, Applicant testified that he notified his security 
department after he was sentenced to probation for the offense. He admitted that his direct 
supervisor does not know about his criminal record, although he testified that he would 
inform his supervisor if asked. (Tr. 78-79.) He has not informed his operations manager 
about his criminal record history. (Tr. 91.) 
 
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive 
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, emphasizing 
that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 
U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, 
the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are required to be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines 
are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, 
these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative 
process. The administrative judge’s overall adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and 
commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious 
scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative 
judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, 
favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified 
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence 
to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant 
is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant 
has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. 
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
 
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reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. 
Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, 
rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive 
Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 
12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive 
information). 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct 
 
 The security concern about criminal conduct is articulated in AG ¶ 31: 
 
Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and 
trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or 
willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations. 
 
 The criminal conduct concerns are well established by Applicant’s record of criminal 
offenses. His January 1998 simple assault can be attributed to youthful poor judgment, but 
he violated his probation in August 1998 by driving on a suspended license. His criminal 
conduct includes serious felony theft of a motor vehicle and felony fraudulent use of credit 
cards. While he was on probation for the July 2003 theft of a motor vehicle, he was 
charged with theft of his ex-girlfriend’s purse in September 2004. In February 2005, he 
stole a person’s wallet from a gym locker room, and he fraudulently used the credit cards. 
He served five months in jail at one point for violating his probation. In June 2010, he was 
arrested for credit card theft and auto teller fraud. He admits that he used a debit card 
belonging to the mother of his daughter without her authorization. Applicant has four 
misdemeanor convictions on his record for driving a motor vehicle on a suspended license 
between October 2005 and April 2011. He continued to drive on occasion when his license 
was suspended, as evidenced by his latest arrest on the charge in June 2012. Three 
disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 31 are established by Applicant’s record of criminal 
conduct between January 1998 and June 2012: 
 
(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses; 
 
(c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the 
person was formally charged, formally prosecuted, or convicted; and 
 
(e) violation of parole or probation, for failure to complete a court-mandated 
rehabilitation program. 
 
 The evidence includes additional instances of criminal conduct not alleged in the 
SOR. He was caught operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in August 
 
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1998 and in February 2001. As of August 2015, Applicant was on probation for concealing 
leased personal property when he failed to return or make his rental payments for a 
computer game system in 2014. Offenses not alleged in the SOR cannot provide separate 
bases for disqualification, but they may be considered for other purposes.
2
 To the extent 
that AG ¶ 31(d), “individual is currently on parole or probation,” may be considered in light 
of Applicant’s probationary status as of his August 2015 security clearance hearing, the 
June 2014 concealment of leased property is primarily relevant to assessing Applicant’s 
reform. The June 2014 misdemeanor charge is relatively recent. Furthermore, court 
records show that as of June 2015, Applicant still owed $1,543 in court costs for the 
February 2010, May 2010, and April 2011 offenses involving driving a motor vehicle while 
his license was suspended. Considering Applicant’s long history of criminal conduct, it is 
simply too soon to conclude that future criminal conduct is unlikely to recur. I am unable to 
apply mitigating conditions AG ¶ 32(a) or AG ¶ 32(d), which provide as follows: 
 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it 
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and 
does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; and 
 
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to 
the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or 
restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or 
constructive community involvement. 
 
Applicant’s good work record with his current employer is some evidence of rehabilitation 
under AG ¶ 32(d), but it is not enough to mitigate the security concerns raised by his 
pattern of criminal conduct. 
 
 Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
The security concerns about personal conduct are articulated in AG ¶ 15: 
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about 
an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified 
information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid 
answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to 
cooperate with the security clearance process. 
 
                                                 
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The DOHA Appeal Board has long held that the administrative judge may consider non-alleged conduct to 
assess an applicant’s credibility; to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed 
circumstances; to consider whether an applicant has demonstrated successful rehabilitation; to decide 
whether a particular provision of the Adjudicative Guidelines is applicable; or to provide evidence for a whole 
person analysis under Section 6.3 of the Directive. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 03-20327 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 
2006); ISCR Case No. 09-07219 (App. Bd. Sep. 27, 2012). 
 
 
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 Applicant’s criminal offenses were cross-alleged under Guideline E SOR ¶ 2.a.
3
 The 
DOHA Appeal Board has held that security-related conduct can be alleged under more 
than one guideline, and in an appropriate case, be given independent weight under each. 
See ISCR Case No. 11-06672 (App. Bd. Jul. 2, 2012). Applicant’s theft of financial assets 
through the illegal use of another person’s credit or debit cards in September 2004, 
February 2005, and June 2010 raises serious doubts about his judgment generally under 
AG ¶ 15. His multiple theft offenses and recidivist driving on a suspended license establish 
“a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations” contemplated within AG ¶ 16(d), which provides: 
 
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other 
guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but 
which, when combined with all available information supports a whole-person 
assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack 
of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other 
characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard 
protected information. This includes but is not limited to consideration of: 
 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations. 
 
However, AG ¶ 16(d) does not strictly apply because his criminal behavior is already 
covered under Guideline J. 
 
There is no evidence that his criminal record is known to his operations manager or 
his direct supervisor. AG ¶ 16(e) is implicated where the personal conduct raises issues of 
vulnerability: 
 
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, 
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as 
(1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal, 
professional, or community standing. 
 
 In mitigation of vulnerability concerns, Applicant disclosed his felony offenses on his 
June 2013 e-QIP, and he provided details about his criminal conduct during his interview 
with the OPM investigator. His unrebutted testimony is that he informed security officials 
about his June 2014 concealment of personal property. AG ¶ 17(e), “the individual has 
taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress,” applies in that his criminal record is not likely to be a source of potential blackmail 
or other types of manipulation or coercion. 
 
 Applicant exercised poor judgment for more than ten years so as to remove AG ¶ 
17(c) from serious consideration. AG ¶ 17(c) provides: 
 
                                                 
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The evidence shows that Applicant responded negatively on his e-QIP to whether he had used any illegal 
drug, including marijuana in the last seven years, when he had in fact used marijuana as recently as 
November 2008. The SOR does not allege falsification as a basis for disqualification, however. 
 
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(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so 
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely 
to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment. 
 
 Applicant expressed regret for his criminal behavior. His dedication to his work with 
a defense contractor is objective evidence of a positive change in his conduct. AG ¶ 17(d) 
applies, but only in part: 
 
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to 
change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, 
circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other 
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. 
 
 While Applicant understandably did not want to take the computer game system 
from his stepson, he had an option. In lieu of returning the system, Applicant could have 
made payments, which he should have been able to afford after he started working for a 
defense contractor in June 2013. He acted unreasonably out of stubbornness, even when 
faced with threats of a criminal complaint that was eventually filed in June 2014. Even 
assuming Applicant completed his probation successfully for that offense, he had yet to 
satisfy in full court costs from driving on a suspended license offenses committed more 
than five years ago. His reform of the personal conduct concerns is incomplete. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct and 
all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 
2(a).
4
 In making the overall commonsense determination required under AG ¶ 2(c), I have 
to consider Applicant’s more than 14 year pattern of criminal conduct. His recidivist driving 
on a suspended license was because he could not afford to maintain financial 
responsibility coverage on his insurance. Even so, his probation violations make it 
especially difficult to find that he possesses the good judgment, trustworthiness, and 
reliability required of persons entrusted with sensitive and classified matters. It is well 
settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, 
there is a strong presumption against the grant or renewal of a security clearance. See 
Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9
th
 Cir. 1990.). For the reasons noted above, 
                                                 
4
The factors under AG ¶ 2(a) are as follows: 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the 
conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the 
conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other 
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for 
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence. 
 
 
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based on the facts before me and the adjudicative guidelines that I am required to 
consider, I am unable to conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to 
grant or continue security clearance eligibility for Applicant. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline J:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.m: Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:  Against Applicant 
   
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
_______________________ 
Elizabeth M. Matchinski 
Administrative Judge