DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)         ISCR Case No. 14-06315
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: John B. Glendon, Esq., Deputy Department Counsel
For Applicant: Mark S. Zaid, Esq.
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Decision
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MASON, Paul J., Administrative Judge:
On June 21, 2011, Applicant displayed a serious lapse in judgment when, without
authority, she copied and sent classified proprietary budget information to three of her
company supervisors. However, she has committed no other security violations or unethical
behavior in her military and civilian career that spans almost 40 years. Having weighed and
balanced all the circumstances, Applicant’s laudable character evidence outweighs the
seriousness of her misconduct. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
Statement of the Case
Applicant certified and signed her Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on August 6, 2013. She was interviewed by an investigator from the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on September 10, 2013. The interview summary
was not entered into evidence. On January 6, 2014, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons
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(SOR) detailing security concerns under personal conduct (Guideline E), criminal conduct
(Guideline J), and noncompliance with regulations pertaining to information technology
systems (Guideline M). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the adjudicative guidelines (AG),
implemented by DOD on September 1, 2006.
Applicant submitted her notarized answer to the SOR on January 28, 2015. DOHA
issued a notice of hearing on August 6, 2015, for a hearing on September 16, 2015. The
hearing was held as scheduled. At the hearing, the Government called one witness. Six
exhibits (GE 1-6) were admitted in evidence to support the Government’s case. Applicant
and three witnesses testified. Nine exhibits (AE A, B, D-J) were admitted in her behalf
without objection. Applicant’s four post-hearing exhibits (AE K-N), were admitted in
evidence without objection. DOHA received the transcript on September 24, 2015, and the
record closed on October 1, 2015. 
Rulings on Procedure and Evidence
I am taking administrative notice of 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 641 (HE 1).
I will also take administrative notice of AE C (information about carbon monoxide poisoning
and its effect on the body and mind), which has been remarked as HE 2.
Findings of Fact
The SOR alleges that on June 21, 2011, while working as a contractor employee for
X company supporting a government agency, Applicant, without authorization, sent
classified proprietary information to three of her X-company supervisors. Her conduct
constitutes questionable judgment under both the personal conduct (SOR ¶ 1.a) and the
criminal conduct guidelines (SOR ¶ 2.a). Her conduct also raises security concerns under
the guideline for noncompliance with rules and regulations pertaining to information
technology systems (SOR ¶ 3.a). In her answer to the SOR, Applicant qualified her
admission to SOR ¶ 1.a by noting that she was unaware the information was classified.
She denied SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 3.a. 
Applicant is 60 years old. She has been married since March 1984. She received a
bachelor’s degree in political science in May 1977, and a master’s degree in public
administration in June 1994. She served in the United States Air Force (U.S.A.F.) from May
1977 until her honorable discharge as a colonel in June 2007. She is currently in the Air
Force Reserve. Since February 2013, she has been employed as a senior analyst with a
defense contractor (Z company). Before her current employment, she was a policy analyst
promoted to a project manager for another contractor (X company) from June 2010 to
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February 2013. Applicant has held a security clearance since she began her military career
in May 1977. (GE 1 at 16; Tr. 156)
Identification of Hearing Witnesses 
Government’s witness
S/A - special agent from the inspector general’s (IG) office of Y federal agency.
Applicant’s Witnesses
Witness A - division chief of the science and technology office of Y agency in June
2011.
Witness B - former employee of Y agency who worked with Applicant from 2010 to
January 2015; currently operates his own company.
Witness C - chief of staff of Y agency; currently chief operating officer (CEO) of Z
company, Applicant’s current employer.
X Company - Applicant’s former employer when she copied and sent email in June
2011.
Z Company - Applicant’s current employer since February 2013.
In June 2011, Applicant, a contract employee (policy analyst) with X company, was
working with about 15 other contract and government employees in an office of science and
technology for Y federal agency. She was supervised by a senior government employee
whose title was division chief (witness A). Due to witness A’s heavy meeting schedule inside
and outside the office within Y federal agency, he sent an email invitation to Applicant and
other staff employees (he was unable to identify) indicating that they could add to his
computer calendar application. The next day Applicant viewed witness A’s calendar and saw
a meeting invitation that he had accepted. The meeting notice invitation had an attachment
containing classified proprietary budget information for an element of Y agency that had a
potential impact on Applicant’s company. Mistakenly believing she had authority to view the
attachment, she opened it, copied the classified budget information, cut-and pasted it in an
email, and sent it to three X company supervisors, thereby potentially giving X company an
unfair competitive advantage over other bidders on task orders (TO) of a contract that Y
agency had. The entire process took about 15 seconds. An investigation by a S/A of the IG
of Y agency followed and determined that Applicant committed a theft of information in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §641. (Tr. 126-131) 
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In support of its prima facie case, the Government called the S/A of the IG of Y federal
agency to testify about his investigation of Applicant. He explained that the investigation was
focused on a theft of government information (18 U.S.C. § 641) and whether X company
gained and unfair competitive advantage on a contract or contracts. He began his portion of
the investigation in May 2012, by reviewing the case file, then reviewing the computer
calendar of the witness A of the office of science and technology of Y agency. The calendar
contained an attachment with estimated classified proprietary budget information to a
meeting appointment invitation that witness A accepted. (Tr. 16-19, 37)
On June 20, 2011, the S/A learned that witness A sent invitation requests for Applicant
and certain other contract and government employees to have access to his computer
calendar. The computer calendar allowed persons to schedule meetings, accept meetings,
and attach documents that pertained to meetings scheduled. The purpose was to allow the
employees to add information to witness A’s calendar so he could keep track of progress
made on their activities. According to the S/A, the invitation did not allow them to remove
information or search his calendar. (GE 6 at 16; Tr. 20-22)
The S/A discovered that on June 21, 2011, Applicant opened and extracted the budget
information attachment to an appointment invitation on witness A’s calendar. She cut and
pasted the information to an email. He indicated that she indicated in about two sentences in
the email that the budget information related to upcoming TOs that X company was
negotiating on a contract that Y agency had. When asked how much time elapsed in the
copying, pasting, marking, and sending of the classified email, the S/A indicated about 15
seconds though he really did not know. According to the S/A’s interview with witness A,
Applicant did not have a need to access the budget calendar because her job responsibilities
did not involve budget and financial activities. The S/A noted in his May 2013 report that he
was unable to prove that X company management used the classified budget information to
gain an unfair advantage on the pertinent contracts, or that the information left the classified
system. (GE 5 at 2, ¶ 7.c; GE 5 at 3, ¶ 8.d; GE 6 at 11-13; Tr. 23-25, 39-41, 47-48, 65) 
Applicant was interviewed by an S/A of Y agency on October 4, 2012, about 16 months
after she sent the email. Though she signed a statement prepared by the S/A initially denying
that she sent the June 21, 2011 email, and admitting that she sent the email after the S/A
showed it her, the S/A acknowledged at the hearing that when he initially asked her whether
she had originally sent the email, she responded that she was not sure or did not recall.
According to the statement, when presented with the email, she admitted sending it, but
denied stealing the budget information. Under the circumstances of his criminal investigation
to determine whether Applicant stole government budgetary information and emailed it to her
X company supervisors, the S/A did not agree that her failure to recall was synonymous with
denying she sent the email. Further, he did not believe that her later admission to sending the
email was the same as recalling she sent the email to the three X company supervisors. The
S/A was directed to the third paragraph of Applicant’s October 2012 statement indicating that
 Currently, witness A is the senior operating officer for an office within the larger office of science and1
technology. (Tr. 124) 
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she knew it was wrong to provide the information to her three X company supervisors and that
she sent the information thinking it would benefit X company management. The S/A testified
that when he asked Applicant why she sent the information, she initially responded that she
was really not sure. She agreed with the S/A’s suggestion that wanting to please X company
while receiving personal benefit made sense as motives. If, however, Applicant did not believe
that she had committed a crime in copying and sending the email, the S/A acknowledged that
she may not have had the requisite state of mind to commit a crime. (GE 4 at 1, ¶ 4; GE 6 at
11-13; Tr. 48-50, 61-65)
The S/A testified that after Applicant sent the email in June 2011, she did participate
in one of the task orders related to an upcoming contract with Y agency, but did not use any
of the budgetary information contained in the email. (GE 6 at 13; Tr. 53-54)
On May 24, 2013, the S/A presented his findings to the inspector general (IG) of Y
agency who concluded that the theft of information (18 U.S.C. 641) allegation was
substantiated. On December 12, 2012, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)
determined that there was credible evidence supporting a charge of theft of information by
Applicant. The AUSA declined to prosecute the theft offense because damage to the
Government could not be determined and the offense “did not warrant prosecution.” (GE 5
at 7, ¶ 12; GE 5 at 7, ¶ 13) 
Applicant called three witnesses to testify. The testimony of witness A will be addressed
first because in June 2011, he was the division chief of the science and technology office when
Applicant sent the email.  He was the senior government employee who had daily contact and1
oversight of Applicant and about 15 other contract and government employees. (GE 5 at 3, ¶
8.d; GE 6 at 2-3; Tr. 126-132)
Witness A gave calendar access to Applicant and probably a couple of other contract
employees to help him manage and prepare his meeting schedule. He identified a June 20,
2011 email sent out to Applicant and other employees as a typical calendar invitation to give
his employees access to his day-to-day activities “so that they would understand what [witness
A] needed support with.” Though he is currently aware that access to his personal calendar
includes access to any attachments posted to that calendar, he was not aware in June 2011
that by accepting a calendar invitation with an attachment, the attachment would be posted to
 The division chief was not aware of the visibility of the posted attachments because his first use of the2
computer calendar application was in 2010, when he began employment at the science and technology office
at Y agency. (Tr. 124, 143) 
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the calendar and visible to others with access to his personal calendar.  He did not recall any2
written or verbal restrictions or warnings on the contract employees who had access to his
calendar. (GE 5 at 3, ¶ 8.d; GE 6 at 2-3; Tr. 126-132)
Witness A could not recall whether the budget information had markings indicating that
it was restricted to government employees. In his view, marking the information as government
proprietary  was a good practice in order to keep it out of the possession of contract
employees. Witness A conceded that he may not have properly marked the budget
information. With the help of the IG of Y agency in March 2012, witness A instituted a
restriction on the computer calendar meeting invitations to government employees with a need
to know in order to prevent a future recurrence of the June 2011 incident. (GE 5 at 4, ¶ 8.h; Tr.
132-140)
The first time witness A learned that Applicant sent classified budget information to her
three X company supervisors was in September 2012, when he was contacted by S/A of Y
agency. On receiving this information, he was stunned because her conduct was inconsistent
with her flawless security record and her expertise as an intelligence officer and strategic
thinker. He was aware that in June 2011, Applicant had a personal or family issue and he later
found out her mother passed away. In sum, witness A believed that Applicant’s transmission
of the email was a misuse of information that was not supposed to be furnished to her, and
was probably due to a mistake by a government employee or witness A in failing to mark the
information properly. (GE 5 at 4, ¶ 8.h; Tr. 132-148)
Applicant explained that witness A endorsed the idea of giving more access to his
computer calendar so he could coordinate his meetings and outside activities because he
expected the staff employees to operate the office when he was out of the office. When
Applicant accepted access to witness A’s calendar, she believed she would:
be able to add meetings to his calendar with his coordination and that if there
was something within the calendar that [Applicant] needed to be aware of
because it was part of the invitation that [Applicant] should and would be
obligated to review that as part of [her] review of his daily calendar. (Tr. 157)
Applicant indicated there were no written or verbal limitations on her when she accessed
anything in the calendar. There were no limitations within the computer calendar program that
limited access to the calendar. She believed that she had complete access to the calendar and
its contents. She believed that all contract and government employees of witness A’s work
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group had access to his calendar. She held that belief in November 14, 2014, when she
provided answers to the government’s interrogatories. (GE 2 at 3; Tr. 157-160, 182-183, 190)
On June 21, 2011, witness A was not present in the office when Applicant pulled up the
calendar to help prepare witness A for meetings. She saw this meeting invitation with an
unusual icon embedded in the message. Because she wanted to determine whether there was
something about the meeting she should know, she clicked on the icon and saw that it
contained a table with fiscal year (FY) budget information for 2012. She copied the budget
information, cut and pasted it in an email and sent it to three supervisors in X company. Not
knowing why she copied and sent the email was probably due to the minuscule amount of time
(about 15 seconds) to prepare and send the email. Thinking the budget information would
benefit her team, she sent the email containing the budget information without fully
comprehending the ramifications of her transmission. (Tr. 157-160, 182-183, 191, 198-199)
In the June 2011 time frame, Applicant recalled having difficulty maintaining attention
at work because of her mother’s medical condition. On June 21, 2011, she received a call
(about the same time that she sent the email) that her mother had only 48 hours to live. While
Applicant was upset over her mother’s illness and imminent death, it is no excuse for sending
the email to her supervisors. (Tr. 160-163) 
Applicant was notified of the IG investigation in October 2012. Between June 2011 and
October 2012, she had no further contact with the budget information. In January 2012,
Applicant and her husband experienced carbon monoxide poisoning because of a faulty home
furnace. She indicated that she was hospitalized for three days and sustained various mental
and physical problems which, according to the medical records, improved substantially in the
year. She has some lingering memory issues. (HE 2; AE J; Tr. 166-172)
Concerning Applicant’s interview with the S/A in October 2012, she did not recall the
June 21, 2011 email until he showed her the email. After she stated that she was not sure why
she sent the email, she informed the S/A that his suggested motives of wanting to please X
company while gaining personal benefit sounded reasonable. Even though she did not agree
with the S/A’s suggestions for her conduct, she did not want to give the impression that she
was withholding information or being dishonest in her responses during the interview with the
S/A. (Tr. 173-180)
Applicant indicated her conduct in the June 21, 2011 incident was a regrettable but
isolated incident in almost 40 years of having security clearance access. She does not believe
she will make this mistake again. Should she confront a similar situation in the future, she will
seek advice in determining whether she has authorized access, including a need to know. In
October and November 2012, she completed two courses on remedial ethics training.
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Applicant enjoys her work. She is an elder and a school teacher in her church. She enjoys
reading. (AE A, B; Tr. 181, 184-188)
Character Evidence
Witness B, a retired U.S.A.F. colonel, who owns his own company, testified that he met
Applicant in 2010, when she was working for X company and he was working for another
contractor. He hired her into a policy position to assist him in preparing projects on a daily
basis. In 2012, they went to different job locations, but continued to work on the same project
and communicated with each other about once a month. Witness B was not aware of the June
2011 email incident, but did know that Applicant’s mother was seriously ill during the month,
and her mother’s condition appeared to have an impact on Applicant’s attention at work. After
Applicant told him about her mother’s condition, he provided her more time to submit support
data for his projects. In the time witness B worked with Applicant, she has always followed
security rules and regulations. Witness B would recommend Applicant for a position of trust
because he believes her conduct was a mistake and unintentional. (AE H; Tr. 78-89)   
Witness C was employed by Y agency for 20 years. When he left the agency in 2004,
he was the agency’s deputy director for administration and chief of staff. After working for
another federal agency for about a year, he was hired by Applicant’s current employer (Z
company) in 2006, and is presently the chief executive officer (CEO). Witness C held several
security clearances while he was employed by two federal agencies, and those clearances are
still active. In early 2013, Z company was looking for a candidate with a policy and intelligence
background. During her employment interview, Applicant told witness C about the IG
investigation. Though Applicant was hired, witness C could not keep her because the open IG
investigation prevented her from working on any Y agency contracts. Z company is still
sponsoring Applicant. (Tr. 94-101, 108-110)
Witness C reviewed Applicant’s interrogatory answers dated November 14, 2014, and
recalled having discussions with her about the content of her answers in the exhibit. In June
2011, she was a senior staff person who was allowed access to information, including
information in the computer calendar, to improve her performance on behalf of her supervisor.
Based on witness C’s discussions with Applicant, there was some question in June 2011
whether the classified information (that Applicant copied and sent in an email) was
unauthorized. It was not until later that it was determined during the investigation that the
information should not have been “shared.” Though witness C believes Applicant should not
have copied and sent the email to her company, he believes witness A was in error by having
the attachment available on his calendar. Applicant’s access and transmission of the
attachment in June 2011 was a mistake in an otherwise outstanding career showing no
security incidents. Witness C still recommends Applicant for a position of trust. (GE 2 at 3-4;
AE I; Tr. 102-106, 108-111, 117-120)
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Applicant provided her vitae and her record of awards and medals received while on
active duty and in the Reserve. (AE A, B)
Applicant also furnished eight character statements. Reference D has known Applicant
since she began her employment with Z company in February 2013. Reference D believes
Applicant’s SOR action is an aberration to her historical compliance with security procedures.
The reference recommends Applicant for a security clearance. (AE D)
Reference E, a consultant, has known Applicant since 2005 when Applicant was in the
military and reference E worked for Y agency. Because he believes that Applicant made a
mistake that she will not repeat, reference E recommends Applicant for a position of trust. (AE
E)
Reference F, who met Applicant in 2003, under similar circumstances as Reference E,
does not have first-hand knowledge of the circumstances of the SOR, but believes her
mother’s serious illness had a negative impact on Applicant’s otherwise “normal attention to
duty.” Reference F recommends Applicant for a security clearance. (AE F)
Reference G is a program manager for Z company. Based on his recommendation, Z
company hired Applicant in February 2013, and they occupied the same work location for
about a year in Z company. In Reference G’s opinion, Applicant deserves security clearance
access because her poor judgment in the email incident will not be repeated. (AE G)
Reference K, a retired military officer and intelligence officer for Y agency since 2002,
has known Applicant since 2010, when she worked for X company. In his professional
association with Applicant, she has always complied with security rules and procedures. Her
June 2011 email incident was a mistake in judgment and does not preclude Reference K from
recommending her for a position of trust. (AE K)
Reference L, a vice president of a consulting company, has known Applicant since
2007. Applicant has always followed security rules and procedures. Reference L, who was one
of the supervisors who received the June 2011 email containing the classified proprietary
information, believes Applicant made a mistake in sending the email, rather than sending it for
personal gain. She recommends that Applicant be granted a security clearance. (AE L)
Reference M is a business manager for a consultant company. He has known Applicant
since 2010, when they worked together at a Y agency location. Though he has no first-hand
knowledge, he believes the SOR incident was a mistake in judgment in a career where she has
always complied with security rules. He recommends her for a security clearance. (AE M)
Reference N, a defense expert in intelligence for Y agency since 2009, has known
Applicant since 2011. She became his trusted advisor. Reference N has no knowledge of
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Applicant’s conduct in the SOR, but has never observed that conduct in the time he worked
with her. He recommends her for position of trust with the Government. (AE N)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant's suitability for a security clearance, the administrative
judge must consider the AG. Each guideline lists potentially disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an applicant's eligibility for access to
classified information.
The administrative judge's ultimate goal is to reach a fair and impartial decision that is
based on commonsense. The decision should also include a careful, thorough evaluation of
a number of variables known as the "whole-person concept" that brings together all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making
a decision. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on speculation or
conjecture. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant
may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to the potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14., the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.l5., the applicant is responsible
for presenting "witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts
admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . ." The applicant has the ultimate
burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.
Analysis
Personal Conduct
The security concern for personal conduct is set forth in AG ¶ 15:
AG ¶ 15. Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty,
or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about
an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified
information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid
answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate
with the security clearance process. 
The following potentially disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 16 are:
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AG ¶ 16(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination,
but which, when combined with all available information supports a whole-person
assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of
candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other
characteristics indicating the person may not properly safeguard protected
information. This includes but is not limited to consideration of: (1) untrustworthy
or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of
proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other
government protected information; (2) disruptive, violent, or other behavior in the
workplace; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of
significant misuse of Government or other employer’s time or resources; and 
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, that
creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as (1)
engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal,
professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another country, engaging
in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is legal in that country but
illegal in the United States and may serve as a basis for exploitation or pressure
by the foreign country or intelligence service or other group. 
On June 20, 2011, Applicant received an email from witness A informing her that she
and a few other contract and government employees on his staff could add to his computer
calendar. The purpose of the email was to let the staff know where he was and what events
he needed support with. On June 21, 2011, Applicant abused her authority when she copied
the contents of the classified proprietary meeting invitation attachment to witness A’s meeting
invitation. She compounded her misconduct by copying and pasting the information, then
sending the contents to three supervisors at X company, her employer. Her conduct, though
brief, falls within the ambit of AG ¶ 16(d)(4). However, AG ¶ 16(d) applies to conduct “not
explicitly covered under any other guideline.” Since Applicant’s alleged criminal conduct is
specifically covered under Guideline J (AG ¶¶ 30-32), and her unauthorized preparation and
transmission of the classified proprietary information is specifically addressed under Guideline
M (Use of Information Technology Systems, AG ¶¶ 39-41), the security implications of her
conduct will be discussed under those guidelines. I do not believe AG ¶ 16(e)(1) applies
because Applicant has been cooperative throughout the course of the security investigation.
Her inability in October 2012 (S/A interview) to immediately recall an email that she generated
16 months earlier in June 2011, does not create a vulnerability to coercion under
circumstances of this case. I conclude her responses to the government’s interrogatories in
November 2014 were based on the erroneous belief about the scope of her authority, and do
not create a vulnerability to coercion and duress. 
The mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17 that are potentially pertinent are: 
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(c) the offense was so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment; and
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to
change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate stressors,
circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable or other
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and 
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress. 
Though not minor, Applicant’s mishandling of classified proprietary information was an
isolated incident that was brief in duration, and occurred more than four years ago. There is
sufficient evidence from Applicant and witnesses B and C that shows her mother’s serious
illness clouded her judgment in June 2011. There is evidence showing that witness A may not
have placed the proper classified markings on the budget information attachment and was not
aware that attachments on the computer calendar were visible to staff employees. The
remedial action taken in March 2012 by the IG and witness A to prevent the June 2011 incident
from recurring, cannot be overlooked. I conclude that the incident was an exception in an
impressive military and civilian record. Though it has taken some time for Applicant to fully
comprehend that her June 2011 conduct was inappropriate and unauthorized, she laments the
poor judgment she exercised in June 2011. I am confident she understands that she will not
repeat similar behavior in the future. Assuming that Applicant’s personal conduct is found to
create vulnerability to coercion, the circumstances have changed. She never tried to conceal
her mishandling of the classified proprietary information. Once she saw the email in October
2012, she remembered generating it. She fully realizes her poor judgment and has credibly
explained the measures that she will institute to ensure she receives the necessary access
under a need to know. AG ¶¶ 17(c), 17(d), and 17(e) apply.
Criminal Conduct
The security concern for criminal conduct is set forth in AG ¶ 30:
Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and
trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or
willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.
AG ¶ 31 of the criminal conduct guideline lists two disqualifying conditions that may be
applicable to this case: 
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(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses; and 
(c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person
was formally prosecuted or convicted. 
Though the IG of Y agency and the AUSA determined that a theft of information
occurred, I disagree that the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 641 have been met. Theft is the taking
of a person’s property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of that property. After
weighing and balancing the October 2012 statement and the testimony of the S/A and
Applicant, I conclude that Applicant did not have the requisite intent to steal the classified
information when she copied and sent it to her three supervisors. There is no direct or
circumstantial evidence that she permanently deprived the Government of the proprietary
classified information. After her viewing of the information, cutting and pasting it in an email,
then sending the information in a time period of about 15 seconds in June 2011, Applicant
never saw the information again until October 2012, when she was interviewed by the S/A. In
sum, Applicant’s motive for sending the classified email was driven by her misunderstanding
of the scope of her authority over the contents of witness A’s computer calendar system, rather
than an intent to steal the information. On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 641 includes the
language “or knowingly converts to his use or use of another.” Even though the element of
knowledge is missing from the offense, Applicant’s exercise of control over classified
proprietary information without authorization is sufficient for come within the reach of AG ¶
31(c).
AG ¶ 32 lists two pertinent mitigating conditions that may be applicable in this case.
(a) so much time has passed since the criminal behavior happened, or it
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to the
passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job
training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive
community development.
Assuming that Applicant’s June 2011 actions in preparing and sending the classified
information constitutes criminal conduct, AG ¶¶ 32(a) and 32(d) apply to mitigate those actions
for the same reasons discussed under AG ¶¶ 17(c) and 17(d). Additionally, Applicant is active
in her church as an elder and teacher. 
 W hile the S/A testified that Applicant placed classified markings on the email, I am unable to determine why3
he would not corroborate that assertion in Applicant’s October 2012 statement to him. (Tr. 23)
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Use of Information Technology Systems 
The security concern for AG ¶ 39 is:
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to
information technology systems may raise security concerns about an
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the willingness or
ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information.
Information Technology Systems include all computer hardware, software,
firmware, and data used for the communication, transmission, processing,
manipulation, storage, or protection of information. 
The potentially applicable disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 40 are:
(a) illegal or unauthorized entry into any technology system or component
thereof;
(c) use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized access to
another system or to a compartmented area within the same system;
(d) downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on to or to any
unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology system; and
(e) unauthorized use of a government or other information technology system.
The June 20, 2011 email provided Applicant the ability to add information to witness A’s
calendar. Applicant abused her authority by copying and sending the email to her three
company supervisors. AG ¶¶ 40(a), 40(c), 40(d), and 40(e) apply.  3
The potentially mitigating condition under AG ¶ 41 is:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it happened
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.
As discussed under AG ¶¶ 17(c) and 17(d), Applicant’s June 2011 conduct is mitigated
by the passage of time coupled with the unusual circumstances of her mother’s serious illness.
The probability that the classified attachment was not properly marked (by a government
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employee or witness A) and witness A’s lack of understanding about the visibility of
attachments in his computer calendar to staff employees, must be considered. The fact that
a new policy was implemented in March 2012, restricting computer access to only government
employees, must also be weighed. Applicant presented credible testimony and documentation
demonstrating that her unauthorized use of technology systems is unlikely to recur. AG ¶ 41(a)
applies. 
Whole-Person Concept 
I have examined the evidence under the disqualifying and mitigating conditions in my
ultimate finding for Applicant under the guidelines for personal conduct, criminal conduct, and
technology systems. I have also weighed the circumstances within the context of nine variables
known as the whole-person concept. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the
administrative judge should consider the following factors:
AG ¶ 2(a) (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
(3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which the participation was
voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and, (9) the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be a commonsense judgment based on careful consideration of the guidelines
and the whole-person concept.
Applicant is 60 years old and has been married for 31 years. She has held a security
clearance since 1977. She was honorably discharged in 2007 from the U.S.A.F. following 30
years of distinguished service. Her job performance as a contract employee has been good
since her military discharge. She has earned a reputation for trustworthiness and good
judgment by current and former contractor and government coworkers. Though it has taken
some time for her to fully accept her misconduct, she realizes she did not have authority to do
what she did because she did not have a need to know. I am confident Applicant will not abuse
her authority in the future and will seek timely and sufficient authorization and advice before
she acts. Having carefully evaluated the disqualifying evidence with the mitigating evidence
in the context of the whole-person concept, Applicant has successfully mitigated the security
concerns arising from the guidelines for personal conduct, criminal conduct, and use of
information technology systems. 
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1 (Guideline E): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 2 (Guideline J): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 3 ( Information Technology Systems): FOR APPLICANT
Paragraph 3.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility
for access to classified information is granted. 
Paul J. Mason
Administrative Judge