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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Redacted] )  ISCR Case No. 15-01104 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Carroll J. Connelley, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines F (Financial 
Considerations), J (Criminal Conduct), and E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access 
to classified information is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on June 24, 2014. On 
August 22, 2015, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD 
CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under 
Guidelines F, J, and E. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines 
(AG) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.  
 
 Applicant answered the SOR on September 9, 2015, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on 
November 12, 2015, and the case was assigned to me on November 23, 2015. On 
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November 30, 2015, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified 
Applicant that the hearing was scheduled for December 16, 2015. I convened the 
hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 5 were admitted in evidence 
without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through 
D, which were admitted without objection. I kept the record open until January 15, 2016, 
to enable him to submit additional documentary evidence. I also gave Department 
Counsel additional time to submit additional evidence showing the basis for alleging that 
the child-support delinquency alleged in SOR ¶ 2.b was a criminal offense. DOHA 
received the transcript (Tr.) on December 24, 2015. 
 
On January 4, 2016, Department Counsel submitted GX 6, which was admitted 
without objection. On January 14, 2016, at Applicant’s request, I extended his deadline 
for submitting additional evidence to January 29, 2016. He timely submitted AX E. On 
February 9, 2016, he submitted AX F through I. Department Counsel did not object to 
the untimely submissions, and AX E through I were admitted.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.d, 1.f-1.h, 1.j-1.l, and 
2.a-2.d. He denied SOR ¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1.e, 1.i, and 2.e. He did not admit or deny SOR ¶ 
3.a, which cross-alleges SOR ¶¶ 2.a-2.e. His admissions in his answer and at the 
hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 38-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He served on active 
duty in the U.S. Navy from August 1996 to May 1998. He received an other-than-
honorable discharge for an unauthorized absence of more than 90 days. He worked as 
a technician at a tire store from May 2003 to July 2006. He worked for a defense 
contractor as a marine electrician from July 2006 to February 2010. He was laid off and 
was unemployed from February 2010 until July 2011, when he began his current job. 
His current position is a “master trades person,” responsible for ship electrical systems. 
He held a security clearance while in the Navy, but he does not have a current active 
clearance. (Tr. 7.) 
 
 Applicant married in April 2009 and divorced in April 2012. He has three children; 
two are 18 years old and one is 13 years old. He recently remarried on a date not 
reflected in the record. (Tr. 64.) 
 
 The debts alleged in the SOR are reflected in Applicant’s July 2014 and 
December 2014 credit bureau reports (CBRs). (GX 4 and 5.) The status of the debts is 
summarized below. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.a, repossession deficiency ($7,169). Applicant denied this debt. He 
borrowed money to purchase a vehicle in August 2007. His vehicle was repossessed in 
September 2009. When his vehicle was repossessed, he owed about $13,113. He was 
credited with $2,413 for unearned finance charges, and the vehicle was sold for $3,805, 
resulting in the deficiency of $7,169. (AX G; AX H.) In July 2010, a judgment was filed 
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against Applicant to enforce this debt. (GX 4 at 4.) His pay was garnished to satisfy the 
judgment. He presented documentation that about $7,365 had been collected by 
garnishment as of the date of the hearing. (AX C; AX D.) It is not clear whether the 
judgment is satisfied, because the record does not reflect the amount of interest and 
other charges that may have been added to the amount due. 
 
 SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.d, and 1.g, medical bills ($1,234; $651; and $220). Applicant 
admitted these debts. He testified that he made partial payments on “a couple of the 
medical bills,” but he did not know which bills he paid, and he had no documentation of 
payments. (Tr. 43.) They are unresolved. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.c, cell phone bill ($1,104). Applicant denied this debt. In his answer to 
the SOR and at the hearing, he stated that he informed the creditor that this account 
was opened fraudulently and that he never had an account with this provider. (Tr. 30.) 
He testified that he disputed the debt with the creditor, but he had no documentation of 
his dispute. He also testified that he had “flagged” his credit record, but his CBRs do not 
reflect a fraud alert. (Tr. 45-46.) The debt is unresolved. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.e, cell phone bill ($532). Applicant denied this debt. He testified that he 
has cell phone service with this provider and his account is current. (Tr. 31.) He 
submitted no documentary evidence to support his testimony.  
 
 SOR ¶ 1.f, telecommunications bill (Tr. 477). Applicant admitted this debt. In 
January 2016, he made an agreement with the creditor to pay it in three $160 
payments, beginning on January 22, 2016. (AX E.) His post-hearing submission on 
February 9, 2016, did not include evidence that he made the January payment.  
 
 SOR ¶ 1.h, judgment for furniture ($1,713). Applicant admitted this debt. He 
testified that he contacted this creditor and had made arrangements to resolve this debt. 
(Tr. 32.) He presented no documentary evidence to support his testimony.  
 
 SOR ¶ 1.i, judgment filed in September 2007 ($6,980). Applicant denied this 
debt. He testified that this debt was incurred in 2007, when he was evicted for 
nonpayment of rent. He testified that he met with the creditor once about three years 
ago and made an arrangement to settle this debt. (Tr. 32, 52-54.) He had no further 
contact with the creditor and does not know how to contact him, because the creditor’s 
place of business has closed. (Tr. 55.) He presented no documentary evidence to 
support his testimony. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.j, cell phone bill ($671). Applicant admitted this debt. He testified that 
he tried to contact this creditor but was unsuccessful. (Tr. 33.) After the hearing, he 
presented documentary evidence that the debt was deleted from his credit record. (AX 
I.) This account was opened in September 2011 and referred for collection in October 
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2013. Since less than seven years have passed since the debt was referred for 
collection, the evidence suggests that it was resolved.1  
 
 SOR ¶ 1.k, furniture bill ($2,389). Applicant admitted this debt. He testified that 
he has only one account with this creditor, and the furniture debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.h is 
included in this debt. He testified that he made an agreement to start making payments 
on the debt in 2016, but he presented no documentary evidence of a payment 
agreement. (Tr. 33, 50-53.)  
 
 SOR ¶ 1.l, electric bill ($241). Applicant admitted this debt. He submitted 
documentary evidence that he had agreed to make monthly $60 payments, beginning in 
February 2016, but he presented no evidence that any payments were made. (AX F.)   
 
 Applicant was arrested in June 2000 for contempt of court, arrested in June 2001 
for failing to comply with his child-support obligation, and arrested in February 2004 for 
contempt of court. Applicant admitted these arrests, alleged in SOR ¶¶ 2.a-2.c, and 
testified that they were the result past-due child-support payments. He testified that his 
child-support payments are current, but that he still has an arrearage of about $2,000 in 
child-support, on which he is making monthly payments. (Tr. 34-35, 62.) His CBRs do 
not reflect any child-support delinquencies.  
 
Applicant was arrested for driving on a suspended license in October 2013, 
convicted, and sentenced to ten days in jail. (GX 1 at 33-34.) His license had been 
suspended for failure to pay traffic fines totaling about $1,000. (Tr. 67-68.) He testified 
he was allowed to serve his jail sentence on weekends. However, he was working in 
another state, and he gave a friend the money to pay the fee for serving his jail time on 
weekends. However, his friend missed the deadline for paying the fee, Applicant was 
charged with failure to appear, and he was required to serve the jail sentence on ten 
consecutive days. (Tr. 35-36.) 
 
 Applicant’s take-home pay is about $2,400 per month. His current spouse is on 
active duty as a Navy petty officer second class, and they share expenses. Applicant 
testified that his spouse’s take-home pay is about $3,000 per month. (Tr. 69.) His rent is 
about $1,200. Because of the garnishment to satisfy the judgment in SOR ¶ 1.a, his 
child-support obligation, and payments on the child-support arrearage, his net monthly 
remainder is only about $300. He has about $400 in his checking account. He has no 
savings, because he exhausted his savings during the past Christmas season. (Tr. 64-
65.) 
 
                                                          
1 Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a credit report may not list accounts placed for collection or 
charged off that antedate the credit report by more than seven years, or until the statute of limitations has 
run, which is longer. The exceptions to this prohibition do not apply to this debt. 10 U.S.C. § 1681c.  
 
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Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the 
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
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and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 
01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
 The SOR alleges 12 delinquent debts totaling about $23,380 (SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.l).  
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18:  
 
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds. 
 
 This concern is broader than the possibility that an individual might knowingly 
compromise classified information in order to raise money. It encompasses concerns 
about an individual’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting 
classified information. An individual who is financially irresponsible may also be 
irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified 
information. See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). 
 
 The evidence indicates that the two debts for furniture, alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.h 
and 1.k, are probably the same debt. When the same conduct is alleged twice in the 
SOR under the same guideline, one of the duplicative allegations should be resolved in 
Applicant=s favor. See ISCR Case No. 03-04704 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2005) at 3 (same 
debt alleged twice). Accordingly, I will resolve SOR ¶ 1.h in favor of Applicant. 
  
 Applicant’s admissions and his CBRs establish two disqualifying conditions under 
this guideline: AG ¶ 19(a) (“inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts”) and AG ¶ 19(c) 
(“a history of not meeting financial obligations”). 
 
 The following mitigating conditions under this guideline are potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not 
cast doubt on the individual=s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; 
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AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were 
largely beyond the person=s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business 
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or 
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; 
 
AG ¶ 20(c): the person has received or is receiving counseling for the 
problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being 
resolved or is under control; 
 
AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue 
creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and 
 
AG ¶ 20(e): the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy 
of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides 
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides 
evidence of actions to resolve the issue. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(a) is not established. Applicant’s delinquent debts are numerous, recent, 
and were not incurred under circumstances making them unlikely to recur. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(b) is not fully established. Applicant’s unemployment from February 
2010 to July 2011 was a circumstance beyond his control. Applicant’s medical debts 
might have been due to circumstances beyond his control, but he provided no evidence 
of the circumstances under which they were incurred. Furthermore, the evidence shows 
that he has not acted responsibly. The judgment in SOR ¶ 1.a is being collected 
involuntarily by garnishment. He has made minimal effort to resolve his medical debts. 
He did not negotiate payment agreements for the debts alleged in SOR 1.f and 1.l until 
January 2016, after the hearing, when he realized that they were an impediment to 
obtaining a clearance.  
 
 AG ¶ 20(c) is not established. Applicant has not received financial counseling, 
and his financial situation is not under control. 
 
AG ¶ 20(d) is not fully established. “Good faith” within the meaning of this 
mitigating condition means acting in a way that shows reasonableness, prudence, 
honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation. ISCR Case No. 99-0201, 1999 WL 
1442346 at *4 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 1999). Applicant receives some credit for resolving the 
repossession deficiency alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a, but payment by involuntary garnishment, 
“is not the same as, or similar to, a good-faith initiation of repayment by the debtor.” 
ISCR Case No. 09-5700 (App. Bd. Feb. 24, 2011), citing ISCR Case No. 08-06058 
(App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2009).  
 
The debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.j was deleted from Applicant’s credit record and 
appears to have been resolved. In January 2016, after the hearing, he negotiated 
payment agreements for the debts alleged in SOR ¶1.f and 1.l, but no payments have 
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been made under those agreements. He presented no documentary evidence of 
payments or payment agreements for the debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.b-1.e, 1.g, and 1.k.  
 
 AG ¶ 20(e) is not established. Applicant claimed that he disputed the debt in 
SOR ¶ 1.c, but he provided no documentation of the dispute. 
 
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct 
 
The SOR alleges five misdemeanor arrests for contempt of court (SOR ¶¶ 2.a 
and 2.c), failure to comply with child-support obligations (SOR ¶ 2.b), driving on a 
suspended license (SOR ¶ 1.e), and failure to appear on a misdemeanor charge (SOR 
¶ 2.e). The concern raised by criminal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 30: “Criminal activity 
creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very 
nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules 
and regulations.”  
 
Applicant’s admissions and the documentary evidence presented at the hearing 
establish two disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 31(a) (“a single serious 
crime or multiple lesser offenses”) and AG ¶ 31(c) (“allegation or admission of criminal 
conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted, 
or convicted”). The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant:  
 
AG ¶ 32(a): so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior 
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; and  
 
AG ¶ 32(d): there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not 
limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, 
remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment 
record, or constructive community involvement.  
 
 AG ¶¶ 32(a) and 32(d) are not established. All the misdemeanors alleged under 
this guideline arose because of financial mismanagement: failure to pay child support, 
failure to pay traffic fines, and failure to pay court fees for weekend service of a jail 
sentence.  Applicant has not yet put his financial house in order. Thus, he has not 
established rehabilitation, and he has not shown that recurrence is unlikely. 
  
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 The SOR cross-alleges the criminal conduct alleged in SOR ¶¶ 2.a-2.e under this 
guideline. The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: “Conduct involving 
questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules 
and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and 
ability to protect classified information.” Applicant’s conduct establishes the following 
disqualifying conditions under this guideline: 
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AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue 
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other 
single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a 
whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information; and 
AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's 
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress, such as . . . engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the 
person's personal, professional, or community standing.  
 The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant: 
 
AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the 
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the 
individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained 
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to 
alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused 
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such 
behavior is unlikely to recur; and 
 
AG ¶ 17(e): the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. 
 
 AG ¶¶ 17(c), 17(d), and 17(e) are not established. Although Applicant’s offenses 
were minor and charged as misdemeanors, they were frequent and the result of 
financial irresponsibility. He has acknowledged his behavior, but he has not obtained 
financial counseling or taken specific steps to gain control of his financial problems. His 
financial problems continue to make him vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress.   
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process 
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
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(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines F, J, and E in my whole-
person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those 
guideline(s), but some warrant additional comment. 
 
 Applicant was candid and sincere at the hearing, but he lacks the financial 
discipline necessary to attain financial stability. His financial problems began around 
2007, before he was laid off. He has been employed continuously since July 2011, but 
he has made little headway with his delinquent debts.  
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines F, J, 
and E, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by his delinquent debts, 
criminal conduct, and personal conduct. Accordingly, I conclude he has not carried his 
burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him 
eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline F (Financial Considerations): AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:     For Applicant 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.b-1.g:    Against Applicant 
 
  Subparagraph 1.h:     For Applicant 
 
  Subparagraph 1.i:     Against Applicant 
 
  Subparagraph 1.j:     For Applicant 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.k-1.l:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline J (Criminal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a-2.e:    Against Applicant 
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 Paragraph 3, Guideline E (Personal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 3.a:     Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant 
Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information 
is denied. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge