KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The Board must consider not only whether there is record evidence supporting a
Judge’s findings, but also whether there is evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the
evidence supporting those findings, and whether the Judge’s findings reflect a reasonable
interpretation of the record evidence as a whole. The Judge did not discuss one credit report in
his findings on two debts.This credit report is significant record evidence that tends to contradict
the Judge’s statement that the “credit reports” did not show the debt in SOR allegation 1.f was
paid. Adverse decision remanded.
CASENO: 14-06592.a1
DATE: 04/20/2016
DATE: April 20, 2016
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 14-06592
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On May
9, 2015, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a decision
on the written record.  On February 3, 2016, after considering the record, Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Philip S. Howe denied Applicant’s request
for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision reflects
the record.  Specifically, Applicant claimed he paid the debts and the Judge failed to consider his
divorce.  Consistent with the following, we remand the decision.
The Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis
The Judge found for Applicant on four delinquent debts alleged in the SOR because of
Applicant’s unemployment and eventual payment of the debts. He found against Applicant on two
delinquent debts (SOR allegations 1.e and 1.f), totaling almost $4,000. He determined the credit
report dated October 7, 2014, showed the debt in allegation 1.e was unresolved and the “credit
reports” did not show the debt in allegation 1.f was paid. He concluded that Applicant’s
circumstances raised two concerns: “inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts”1 and “a history of
not meeting financial obligations[.]”2
Discussion
We construe Applicant’s appeal as challenging the Judge’s findings that the debts in SOR
allegations 1.e and 1.f are unpaid. When an administrative judge’s factual findings are challenged,
the Board must determine whether “[t]he Administrative Judge’s findings of fact are supported by
such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all
the contrary evidence in the same record.” Directive  ¶ E3.1.32.1. The Board must consider not only
whether there is record evidence supporting a Judge’s findings, but also whether there is evidence
that fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence supporting those findings, and whether the
Judge’s findings reflect a reasonable interpretation of the record evidence as a whole. 
In a credit report dated September 28, 2015, the comments section addressing the debt in
SOR allegation 1.e reflects “Consumer disputes - reinvestigation in progress[.] Paid charge off[.]”
The balance and past-due amount for that debt are listed as zero. The date of last payment on the
debt is listed as October 2014, which is also the month of the credit report cited in the Judge’s
finding that the debt was unresolved. Additionally, the credit report dated September 28, 2015,
1Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 19(a).
2Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 19(c).
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reflected the status of the debt in SOR allegation 1.f was “Pays account as agreed[,]” and listed the
past-due amount as zero. 
A Judge is not required to discuss each and every piece of record evidence in making a
decision, but the Judge cannot ignore, disregard, or fail to discuss significant record evidence that
a reasonable person could expect to be taken into account in reaching a fair and reasoned decision. 
See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 12-01500 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 25, 2015). In this case, the Judge did not
discuss the credit report dated September 28, 2015, in his findings on the debts in SOR allegations
1.e and 1.f. This credit report is significant record evidence that should have been discussed in 
reaching a decision on those allegations. It also tends to contradict the Judge’s statement that the
“credit reports” did not show the debt in SOR allegation 1.f was paid. The Board remands the case
to the Administrative Judge for consideration of the credit report dated September 28, 2015, in
regards to the debts in SOR allegations 1.e and 1.f.
Applicant raised other appeal issues, but it would be premature to address those other issues
at this time.
Conclusion
Applicant has demonstrated error that warrants remand. Pursuant to Directive ¶ E3.1.33.2.,
the Board remands the case to the Administrative Judge for the issuance of a new decision in
accordance with the instructions herein. 
Order
The Decision is REMANDED.  
See Dissenting Opinion         
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody       
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy          
James F. Duffy
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Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
DISSENTING OPINION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MICHAEL Y. RA’ANAN
The majority opinion is predicated on a reading of Applicant appeal brief that I do not share. 
Applicant wrote (in pertinent part) “It [the Judge’s decision] also doesn’t state the fact that I took
the more challenging approach to my situation.  Rather [than] filing for Bankruptcy I honored my
Debt and paid Everything.”  (text added in brackets for purposes of clarity.)
The majority’s decision relies on a reading of the cited language as a challenge to the Judge’s
findings of fact regarding the debts discussed in SOR allegations 1.e and 1.f., even though those
findings are never mentioned. By contrast, I read the clause as a challenge to the Judge’s overall
understanding and analysis of Applicant’s case in mitigation which is squarely raised by Applicant’s
language. 
The Appeal Board has often noted that an appealing party must raise assignments of error
by the Judge with specificity.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 14-03734 at 4 (App. Bd Feb. 18, 2016) “On
appeal, Applicant discusses Guideline E only peripherally, and does not assert error on the part of
the Judge with the requisite degree of specificity.”  See also, e.g. ISCR Case No. 14-00683 at 3
(App. Bd. Jan. 28, 2015).  “There is no presumption of error below, and the appealing party must
raise claims of error with specificity and identify how the Judge committed factual or legal error.”
Given our limited scope of review under the Directive, our case law regarding specificity and
the current concern for judicial economy, I conclude that the Judge’s decision should be affirmed.
Signed: Michael Ra’anan             
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
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