1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 14-04782
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ross Hyams, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concern posed by his mother, a
citizen and resident of Nigeria.  Clearance is granted.
Statement of the Case
On July 24, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a  Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B, foreign
influence. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG).
Applicant answered the SOR on August 5, 2015, admitting the allegation and
requesting a hearing, whereupon the case was assigned to me on December 1, 2015.
On February 4, 2016, a notice of hearing was issued scheduling the case for February
17, 2016. The hearing was conducted as scheduled. I admitted four Government
2
exhibits marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4, and I considered Applicant’s
testimony. Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of facts
about Nigeria contained in four documents marked as Hearing Exhibits (HE) I through
IV. Applicant did not object, and I granted Department Counsel’s request, taking
administrative notice of the facts set forth in these documents. The transcript was
received on February 25, 2016.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 29-year-old single man with two children, ages five and three. A
previous marriage ended in divorce several years ago. Since 2004, he has worked for a
defense contractor in the cybersecurity field. (Tr. 18) 
Applicant, whose mother was a Nigerian immigrant, was born in the United
States. When he turned five years old, his mother sent him to Nigeria to live with his
father. Applicant spent the next 12 years in Nigeria, finishing high school. When
Applicant turned 17, his father died. Applicant then returned to the United States,
attending college part-time here, and returning to Nigeria over the summers, to attend
college part-time there. (Tr. 32) He attended both the Nigerian college and the U.S.
college for six years, beginning in 2004. In 2010, he earned a bachelor’s degree in
computer science from the Nigerian college. (Tr. 18) 
In 1993, Applicant’s mother returned to Nigeria. She lives in her home town, a
rural village with a population of less than 1,000 people. (Tr. 23) Most of the people in
this village are farmers. (Tr. 23) Applicant’s mother is the proprietress of a non-profit,
primary school. (Tr. 25) Applicant talks to her once or twice per day and sends her
approximately $200 every other month. (Tr. 27-28) Applicant has not returned to Nigeria
to visit her since 2011. Applicant has no other relatives living in Nigeria with whom he
has a relationship.
Applicant has no property interests in Nigeria. He has approximately $2,000 in
savings deposited in a U.S. bank, and he earns approximately $82,000 per year. (Tr.
30-31)
Nigeria is a federal republic located in western Africa. The United States
considers its relationship with Nigeria to be among the most important in Africa. (HE I at
2) Nigerian diplomats have mediated conflicts throughout Africa. Nigeria ranks among
the top five troop contributors to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions. (HE I at
3)
Although Nigeria’s most recent election in 2011 was generally credible and
orderly, its commitment to the rule of law remains a work in progress. (HE I at 6)
Corruption at all levels of government is pervasive. (HE I at 8) Boko Haram, an Islamic
extremist, terrorist group is fomenting instability in northern Nigeria, attacking
predominantly Christian villages, planting car bombs near markets and government
facilities, and abducting young women, forcing them into sex slavery. (HE II at 4) In
3
parts of the predominantly Muslim north, Boko Haram operates with impunity, as
Nigeria’s central government lacks the resources to adequately confront them. The
central government’s inability to overcome this problem has lead to vigilantism, as
Christians groups have retaliated against Muslims suspected of collaborating with Boko
Haram. There is evidence that Boko Haram is seeking to internationalize its terrorism,
as it has reached out to other Islamic extremist groups worldwide. Applicant’s mother’s
village is in south west Nigeria, a predominantly Christian part of the country, more than
500 miles away from the region that has been plagued by terrorism. (Tr. 26)
Nigeria is participating in several multilateral counterterrorism efforts on the
military front, as well as the diplomatic and economic front, as it has sought to explore
ways to provide more economic and educational opportunities to the area where Boko
Haram thrives, which is among the country’s poorest. (HE II at 6) Nigeria is one of six
countries participating in President Obama’s Security Governance Initiative focusing on
management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional
level. (HE II at 3)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c),
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
“whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a
decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by department counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
4
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2)
the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency
of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the
time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is
voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and
other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for
the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation
or recurrence.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern under this guideline is set forth, as follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)
Nigeria is a U.S. ally. It is actively involved in the international community,
contributing more troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations than nearly every country in
the world. Nigeria is also a leader among West African nations, mediating conflicts and
participating in multilateral counterterrorism efforts. Conversely, Nigeria is plagued by
terrorism and ethnic conflict, much of which is generated by religious extremism and
grinding poverty. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that Boko Haram, its most
threatening terrorist organization, is seeking to export its terrorism by building ties with
other Islamic extremist groups. As a developing country, Nigeria lacks the resources to
enforce the rule of law in areas marred by terrorism and instability.
There is no record evidence that Nigeria is conducting espionage against the
United States. Although friendly countries can conduct espionage against the United
States as readily as hostile ones, it is unlikely that Nigeria, as a developing country
5
dependent upon the United States for aid and foreign investment, would jeopardize this
relationship by initiating an espionage program targeting the United States.
Nevertheless, Nigeria’s endemic problem with terrorism triggers the application of AG ¶
7(a), “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend,
or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates
a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion.” 
The most dangerous, unstable area of Nigeria is in the north. Applicant’s mother
lives in the southwest, a relatively stable part of Nigeria, more than 500 miles away from
where Boko Haram foments instability. Although Nigeria’s government is flawed and its
ability to adequately enforce the rule of law in its northern, predominantly Muslim area is
limited by lack of resources, the Nigerian government is neither complicit in promoting
terrorism, nor lukewarm in its commitment to fighting terrorism, as it actively cooperates
with the United States and the international community on counterterrorism issues.
Under these circumstances, the heightened risk of exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion generated by Applicant’s mother’s Nigerian
citizenship and residence is mitigated by AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships with
foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or
activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States.”  I conclude
that Applicant has mitigated the security concern.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge