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                             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 14-06547
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jeff Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Lance R. Gallardo, Esquire
May 24, 2016
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Decision
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CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP) on May 15, 2014.  On November 7, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline
B for Applicant.  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG), effective within the Department of Defense after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on November 30, 2015.  He
answered the SOR in writing through counsel (Answer) on December 9, 2015, and
requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge.  The Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals (DOHA) received the request soon thereafter, and I received the case
assignment on March 15, 2016.  DOHA issued a notice of hearing on March 16, 2016,
and I convened the hearing as scheduled on April 6, 2016.  The Government offered
Exhibits (GXs) 1 through 3, which were received without objection.  Applicant testified
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on his own behalf, as did a former supervisor, and submitted Exhibits (AppXs) A
through H, which were received without objection.  DOHA received the transcript of the
hearing (TR) on April 14, 2016.  The record closed on April 14, 2016.  Based upon a
review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in
Subparagraphs 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c. of the SOR, with explanations.  He denied the factual
allegations in Subparagraph 1.d. of the SOR.  He also provided additional information to
support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
Applicant left Pakistan in 1987 “to start . . . [his] doctoral education in . . .
England.”  (TR at page 29 line 1 to page 31 line 17.)  He “first entered [the] U.S. in 1991
on an Immigrant’s Visa,” and was “naturalized in 1999.”  (Id. and Encl 4 to Answer.)  His
net worth in the United States is about “$1.32 million,” with “no money, no value
whatsoever in Pakistan.”  (TR at page 40 line 17 to page 41 line 22, and AppX G.)
As to his close relatives, Applicant’s father is deceased but his mother is a citizen
and resident of the United States.  (TR at page 31 line 18 to page 33 line 14, and at
page 35 line 6 to page 37 line 3.)  His four brothers are also U.S. citizens and reside in
the United States.  (Id.)  As to his in-laws, his mother-in-law, a brother-in-law and a
sister-in-law are also citizens and residents of the United States.  (TR at page 31 line 18
to page 33 line 14, and at page 35 line 6 to page 37 line 3.)  The status of his remaining
sister, a brother-in-law, two sisters-in-law, and “host of relatives,” as alleged in the SOR,
is as follows:
1.a.  Applicant’s sister is a dual national with Canada, resides in Pakistan, and is
a retired housewife.  (TR at page 49 lines 7~18.)
1.b.  Applicant’s other brother-in-law is a citizen of and resides in Pakistan.  (TR
at page 49 line 19 to page 50 line 7.)  He is a retired engineer, who worked for “a semi-
private [gas] company.”  (Id.)
1.c.  Applicant’s other two sisters-in-law are citizens and residents of Pakistan.
(TR at page 50 line 8 to page 51 line 8.)  Both are teachers with no connection to the
Pakistani Government.  (Id.)
1.d.  Applicant denies that he maintains “contact with a host of relatives who are
citizens and residents of Pakistan.”  (TR at page 51 line 9 to page 53 line 10.)  The
relatives consist of an Aunt, an “eighty-some years old . . . retired school principal,” with
no connection with the Pakistani Government; her self-employed son, who is a
“dermatologist”; and two nephews, one of whom works “in a private textile firm, and the
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other one is a physician.”  (TR at page 51 line 9 to page 53 line 10.)  “None of his
relatives work for the government.”  (Id.)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG).  In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law.  Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process.  The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision.  According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.”  The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.  AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”  In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record.  Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .”  The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence.  This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours.  The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information.  Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
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applicant concerned.”  See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
Paragraph 6 of the adjudicative guidelines sets out the security concern relating
to Foreign Influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign interests, may be manipulated or induced
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that
is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by a
foreign interest.
Here, Paragraph 7(a) is arguably applicable: 7(a) “contacts with a foreign family
member . . . who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion”,  The Applicant’s sister and four of his in-laws are citizens and residents of
Pakistan.  This are clearly countered, however, by the first mitigating condition, as under
8(a) “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, . . . are such that it is unlikely
the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual . . . and the interests of the U.S.”  The Applicant has lived in the Unites
States since 1991, is a U.S. citizen, has only U.S. financial interests, and the majority of
his close relatives are citizens and residents of the United States.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances.  Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person
concept.
The Administrative Judge should also consider the nine adjudicative process
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
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for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
I have considered all of the evidence, including the potentially disqualifying and
mitigating conditions surrounding this case.  Those who know Applicant in the work
place speak most highly of him.  (TR at page 18 line 24 to page 27 line 11, and AppXs
A~F.)  Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.  For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his alleged Foreign
Influence.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a.~1.d. For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance.
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Richard A. Cefola
Administrative Judge