1 
 
                                                              
                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE    
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
   )    ISCR Case No. 14-05029 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Robert J. Kilmartin, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant is a dual citizen of Nigeria and of the United States. His four brothers 
and three sisters are resident citizens of his native Nigeria. His two sons and two 
daughters are Nigerian citizens but reside in the United States. Foreign influence 
concerns raised by these foreign ties are overcome by his years of service to the United 
States. The foreign preference concerns raised by his possession of a foreign passport 
are mitigated by his surrender of that passport and his application to renounce his 
Nigerian citizenship. Clearance is granted. 
  
Statement of the Case 
 
On January 10, 2015, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant. The SOR 
detailed the security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, and Guideline C, 
Foreign Preference, and explained why the DOD CAF could not find it clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. The 
DOD CAF took the action under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, 
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as 
 
 
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amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the 
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant responded to the SOR on February 13, 2015, and he requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (DOHA). On October 9, 2015, the case was assigned to me to consider 
whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him a security 
clearance. On February 25, 2015, I scheduled a hearing for March 21, 2016. 
 
At the hearing, two Government exhibits (GEs 1-2) and 12 Applicant exhibits 
(AEs A-K) were admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant testified, as 
reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on March 30, 2016. At the Government’s request, 
I agreed to take administrative notice of facts pertinent to the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, as set forth in the Government’s Administrative Notice request dated 
September 10, 2015.1 The request was included in the record, although not marked 
formally as an exhibit. Applicant disputed the relevance of the facts for administrative 
notice to his case, but he did not object to the facts for administrative notice.  
 
Applicant had been provided the Government’s Administrative Notice request 
before the hearing, but only the Internet addresses for the source information relied on 
by the Government. Given a recent Appeal Board decision requiring that source 
documents in a case involving administrative notice be included in the record,2 I held 
the record open after the hearing for the Government to provide the source 
documentation for its Administrative Notice request. Applicant was given a deadline of 
May 3, 2016, to respond to the Government’s Administrative Notice request, to propose 
any facts for administrative notice, and to submit additional documentary exhibits. 
 
On April 13, 2016, Department Counsel mailed extracts of the source documents 
relied on for its Administrative Notice request. On April 14, 2016, Applicant advised me 
                                                 
1 In its Administrative Notice request, the Government cited information gleaned from official reports or 
publications of the Congressional Research Service (CRS Report for Congress, Nigeria: Current Issues 
and U.S. Policy, dated July 18, 2012, and Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions, dated 
June 10, 2014); of the U.S. State Department (Fact Sheet U.S. Relations with Nigeria, dated December 9, 
2014; Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Chapter 2, Country Reports: Africa Overview; Nigeria 2014 
Human Rights Report); Quick Facts, Nigeria, dated January 28, 2015; and Nigeria Travel Warning, dated 
July 27, 2015; and on an unclassified statement for the record by the Director of National Intelligence 
(Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, dated January 9, 2014). After the hearing, Department Counsel provided extracts from the 
CRS and some State Department publications. I was not provided with the DNI’s unclassified statement 
or with the State Department’s Quick Facts or Travel Warning. I obtained copies of the Quick Facts and 
an updated Travel Warning, dated February 5, 2016, and incorporated them in the record. 
  
2On November 3, 2015, the DOHA Appeal Board remanded ADP Case No. 14-01655 for the 
incorporation in that record of the “official notice documents” for administrative notice, which, as in this 
case, were identified only by URL. Citing ISCR Case No. 02-24875 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2006), the Appeal 
Board stated in part: “[b]ecause of the dynamic nature of the Internet, a reference to a document’s URL in 
the case record would not necessarily be sufficient to preserve the matter for meaningful appellate 
review.” 
 
 
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that he had moved after resigning from his job with defense contractor on March 25, 
2016.3 On April 22, 2016, Applicant submitted a letter from the Nigerian Consulate, 
which was admitted as AE L without objection. Applicant received at his new address 
the information relied on by Government for its Administrative Notice request, but 
elected not to propose additional facts for administrative notice. The facts 
administratively noticed are set forth below. 
 
Summary of SOR Allegations 
 
The SOR alleged under Guideline B, foreign influence, that Applicant’s four 
brothers (SOR ¶ 1.a) and four sisters (SOR ¶ 1.b) are Nigerian resident citizens, and 
that Applicant’s two sons (SOR ¶ 1.c) and two daughters (SOR ¶ 1.d) are Nigerian 
citizens with U.S. residency. Under Guideline C, foreign preference, Applicant allegedly 
possesses a Nigerian passport valid from November 2012 to November 2017 (SOR ¶ 
2.a). Applicant provided a detailed answer in which he admitted the Guideline B 
allegations but denied that he could be influenced because of his family ties to Nigeria. 
About the Guideline C concern, Applicant indicated that he had denounced Nigerian 
citizenship when he took the oath of allegiance to the United States and that his 
possession of a valid Nigerian passport and claim of dual citizenship was a mistake 
based on misinformation. He indicated that he would be relinquishing his Nigerian 
passport “to the custody of the United States government . . . once a designated drop- 
off location is communicated to [him].” 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
After considering the pleadings, exhibits, transcript, and the facts pertaining to 
Nigeria for administrative notice, I make the following findings of fact. 
 
Applicant’s Personal Background 
 
 Applicant is a 58-year-old native of Nigeria. He has three brothers and four 
sisters who are Nigerian resident citizens and range in age from 31 to 56. They live in 
southwestern Nigeria. His parents are deceased. (GEs 1, 2.) The record contains no 
information about Applicant’s employment or activities between August 1976 when he 
graduated from high school and March 1990, when he began working as a visa clerk for 
the U.S. government in Nigeria. (AE F.) He was granted a confidential security 
clearance for his duties for the U.S. State Department, although he does not now recall 
the date. (GE 1.) 
 
In January 1995, Applicant married a Nigerian native citizen. Applicant and his 
spouse have two sons, now ages 30 and 25 and two daughters, now ages 33 and 23, 
                                                 
3Applicant advised me on April 14, 2016, that he had resigned and relocated to be with his family because 
of his daughter’s health issues. He had sought a job transfer with the defense contractor, but there are no 
openings currently in his new location. Applicant expressed intent to apply for positions which require a 
DOD security clearance. Given Applicant apparently held a clearance (Tr. 26), there is a basis to proceed 
to a final decision on his security clearance eligibility. 
 
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who were born and raised in Nigeria. Around August 2001, the older daughter came to 
the United States on a student visa for university studies. (GEs 1, 2.)  
 
For his hard work and dedication in support of the U.S. mission in Nigeria, 
Applicant earned awards and promotions to consular assistant and then visa specialist. 
In December 2006, Applicant resigned from his employment with the U.S. State 
Department in Nigeria after he was granted a special immigrant visa by the State 
Department with the strong recommendation of the U.S. mission in Nigeria. (AEs D, F, 
G, I; Tr. 46.) In mid-January 2007, Applicant, his spouse, and their children came to the 
United States. Applicant entered the United States on a Nigerian passport issued on 
May 28, 2002 and valid for five years. (GEs 1, 2.) In May 2007, the passport office in 
Nigeria renewed Applicant’s Nigerian passport for another five years. (GE 1.) 
 
 Applicant was unemployed during his first year in the United States. During his 
application for contract employment for the U.S. State Department, Applicant was 
interviewed on July 19, 2007, by an investigator for the State Department about his 
Nigerian family members. Applicant provided identification, address, and occupational 
information for his four brothers, his four sisters, and his three brothers-in-law, all 
resident citizens of Nigeria. Brother #1 was 38 and a self-employed photographer. 
Brother #2 was 33 and self-employed as a building materials supplier. Brother #3 was 
25 and unemployed. Brother #4 was 23 and a student. Sister #1 was 47 and a self-
employed trader. Sister #2 was 32 and a banker.4 Sister #3 was 27 and unemployed. 
Sister #4 was 22 and a student. Brother-in-laws #1 and #2 were 41 and 39, 
respectively. Both worked for the same bank in Nigeria but at different locations. 
Brother-in-law #3 was turning 29 within a week and was unemployed. Applicant advised 
that while his spouse was a citizen of Nigeria, she was a U.S. permanent resident. 
Applicant denied any foreign financial interests or activities on behalf of foreign entity. 
(GE 2.) 
 
Applicant was re-interviewed on September 20, 2007, about the visa and 
citizenship status of the elder of his daughters. Applicant indicated that his daughter had 
entered the United States on a student visa in September or October 2001, and that her 
student visa, reissued in December 2003, had expired in December 2005. Applicant 
provided proof of her current student enrollment at a university in the United States as 
of September 2006. He explained that she was arranging for a college internship to 
complete her degree, and that he filed for U.S. permanent residency for her in 
September 2007. (GE 2.) 
 
In December 2007, Applicant began working as a federal contract employee in 
visa processing for the State Department. He rented an apartment near his work while 
his family stayed behind in his previous locale with a warmer climate. (GE 1; Tr. 105.)  
  
Applicant took the oath of naturalization in the United States in mid-April 2012. 
Three days later, he was issued his U.S. passport. Applicant’s acquisition of U.S. 
citizenship did not automatically revoke his Nigerian citizenship, and in late November 
                                                 
4 Applicant testified at his hearing that this sister works as a bank teller. (Tr. 99-100.) 
 
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2012, Applicant was issued an Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) passport valid until November 29, 2017, by the Nigerian Consulate. (GE 1; 
AE L.) Applicant had heard from friends who experienced “a hard time at the airport” 
when entering Nigeria on a U.S. passport. (Tr. 69.)  Given the travel issues at airports in 
Nigeria, he obtained an ECOWAS passport “as a document of convenience.” (Tr. 52.) 
He assumed it was permissible because in his work at the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, he 
had seen dual nationals with both U.S. and Nigerian passports. (Tr. 69-70.)  
 
 In May 2014, Applicant’s then employer lost the contract to process visas. 
Applicant applied to work for the company that acquired the contract, and on May 30, 
2014, Applicant completed and certified to the accuracy of a Questionnaire for National 
Security Positions (QNSP). Applicant responded “Yes” to an inquiry about whether he 
had ever held dual citizenship and indicated that he held Nigerian citizenship from birth 
to present. He discrepantly responded “Yes” to whether he had taken any action to 
revoke his foreign citizenship and explained, “Was renounced at the time of U.S. 
citizenship oath ceremony.” Applicant disclosed that he held a Nigerian passport that 
was not scheduled to expire until November 29, 2017, although he denied any foreign 
travel on that passport. Applicant provided only Nigeria as the country of citizenship for 
his spouse, and yet also indicated that his spouse possesses a U.S. naturalization 
certificate. As for his children, they are U.S. resident aliens with Nigerian citizenship. He 
indicated that the elder of his two daughters has an approved 1-130 petition (petition for 
alien relative). Applicant provided identifying information for seven of his eight siblings, 
all resident citizens of Nigeria.5 He listed monthly contact by telephone with six of these 
siblings and quarterly contact by telephone with his 36-year-old sister. Applicant 
responded negatively to inquiries concerning foreign financial interests except for 
whether he had ever provided any financial support for a foreign national. Applicant 
disclosed that he provided $1,250 two or three times a year to his two youngest siblings, 
who were students. As for any foreign travel in the last seven years, Applicant listed one 
trip, which was to Nigeria in March 2010. (GE 1.) 
 
Applicant was hired by the federal contractor, and he started working for the 
company in June 2014 as a research analyst. (AE H.) On July 8, 2014, Applicant was 
interviewed by an authorized investigator for the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM). He expressed willingness to relinquish his ECOWS/Nigerian passport if 
necessary as a condition of his access. (Tr. 79.) With the issuance of the SOR in 
January 2015, Applicant learned about the potential security risk posed by his 
possession of a valid Nigerian passport. Applicant sought information from the Nigerian 
Consulate in March 2015 about surrendering his “ECOWAS passport.” (AE J.) Other 
than being advised that his inquiry had been received and would be forwarded, 
Applicant received no response despite repeated requests. (AE K; Tr. 54, 68.)  
 
In response to reported advice from DOHA, Applicant emailed his facility security 
officer (FSO) on March 3, 2016, about surrendering custody of his foreign passport to 
the FSO. She advised him that the company would not accept a surrendered passport, 
                                                 
5 Applicant did not include one brother, who is now 34 years of age. As of 2007, this brother was 
unemployed. (GE 2.) 
 
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as a matter of company policy, although she recommended that he contact the U.S. 
State Department or the Nigerian Embassy. (AE K.) Applicant did not want to just mail 
in his foreign passport to Nigerian authorities without knowing who would receive it and 
possibly not receiving any confirmation of its receipt. (Tr. 69-71, 85.) At his security 
clearance hearing, he expressed willingness to relinquish his ECOWAS/Nigerian 
passport. (Tr. 80.) 
 
After his hearing, Applicant applied to renounce his Nigerian citizenship, and he 
surrendered his ECOWAS passport issued by the Federal Government of Nigeria to the 
Nigerian Consulate. Nigerian consular officials cancelled Applicant’s passport and 
forwarded it to Nigeria. Applicant subsequently resigned from his employment with the 
federal contractor due to his daughter’s health issues. (AE L.) 
 
Applicant has no financial assets in Nigeria. (GE 1; Tr. 75.) Applicant has 
ongoing contact by telephone with his siblings in Nigeria, although he does not talk to all 
of them every month. It depends on which sibling calls or who he calls because he has 
not heard from his sibling. (Tr. 58-69.) Applicant has never corresponded with his 
siblings in Nigeria by email. (Tr. 61.) He has not traveled to Nigeria since becoming a 
U.S. citizen. (Tr. 69.) Applicant has not sent any financial support for brother #4 or sister 
#4 since 2014. (Tr. 76-77, 89.) They are no longer in school in Nigeria. (Tr. 78.) None of 
Applicant’s relatives in Nigeria has had any affiliation with the Nigerian government. (Tr. 
78-79.) Brother #3, who had been unemployed, now works as a laborer. Brother #4 
recently completed one year of National Youth Service after graduating from college. 
(Tr. 94-96.) Applicant last talked to his youngest brother in January 2016. (Tr. 97.) Sister 
#4 finished college around October 2015 and married in December 2015. Applicant last 
contacted her around the time of her wedding. Sister #4’s husband works for his church. 
(Tr. 98.) Applicant last spoke with sisters #1 and #2 and brother #1 sometime between 
October 2015 and January 2016. He did not have any contact with brother #2, brother 
#3, or sister #3 at that time or since then. (Tr. 100-101.) As of March 2016, Applicant’s 
siblings in Nigeria knew nothing about his employment in the United States. (Tr. 91.) 
 
Applicant’s two sons and his younger daughter are U.S. permanent residents 
with Nigerian citizenship. (Tr. 75, 92.) His older daughter’s paperwork for U.S. 
permanent residency is in process. (Tr. 92, 101.) Applicant’s spouse became a U.S. 
naturalized citizen in 2013. (Tr. 92.) 
 
Character and Work References 
 
 Former supervisors and co-workers familiar with Applicant’s service for the U.S. 
State Department in Nigeria attest to Applicant’s hard work and dedication, including 
during times of political disturbance. He demonstrated loyalty, trustworthiness, and a 
high degree of integrity in carrying out his duties, at times risking his own safety to 
report to the Embassy for work. (AEs D, F, G.) Applicant’s loyalty to the United States 
earned him the nickname of “Mr. America.” (AE F.) Applicant earned the respect of his 
then immigration chief at the U.S. Consulate for his expertise and dependability. He was 
successful in detecting deception in a post that regularly faced corruption and fraud. (AE 
 
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I.) Now retired from the U.S. State Department, she attests to Applicant’s pride on his 
U.S. naturalization. She believes that Applicant would not have obtained a Nigerian 
passport if he thought it would be a problem, and explained that Nigerians travel to 
Nigeria with a Nigerian passport to avoid the difficulties those Nigerians with U.S. 
passports face, including “shake-down” at customs for money. Citing Applicant’s 
consistent employment on behalf of U.S. interests and his personal sacrifice in being 
away from his family for eight years in the United States, she does not believe that 
Applicant has divided loyalties or that he can be coerced by foreign interests. (AE D.) 
 
 Applicant also demonstrated commitment, integrity, and excellence as a research 
analyst for the federal contractor that sponsored him for security clearance until his 
recent resignation for family issues. He was rated as a “valued performer” for his 
performance during his first year. (AE H.) In March 2015, his employer expressed its 
appreciation for his dedication and hard work. (AE A.) A co-worker witnessed 
Applicant’s pride and happiness on becoming a U.S. citizen. In his experience, 
Applicant could always be counted on to produce work of the best quality. (AE C.) 
 
Administrative Notice 
 
Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa. Despite its oil wealth, the country is 
highly underdeveloped and is mired in poverty. Poor governance and corruption have 
limited infrastructure development and social service delivery, hindering economic 
growth. Among Nigeria’s 250 ethnic groups, the mostly Muslim Hausa and Fulani are 
dominant in the northern two-thirds of the country. Twelve northern states have formally 
adopted Islamic sharia law to adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims. Southern 
Nigeria is predominantly Christian. 
 
Nigeria has experienced periods of political instability, with conflict along ethnic 
and geographic lines and dominated by military coups, since gaining its independence 
from Britain in October 1960. After 16 years of consecutive military rule, Nigeria 
transitioned in May 1999 to a civilian, democratic form of government, led by President 
Olusegun Obasanjo. With the inauguration of a civilian president, the U.S.-Nigerian 
relationship began to improve, as did cooperation on foreign policy goals such as 
regional peacekeeping. 
 
On April 16, 2011, Goodluck Jonathan, a Southern Christian, was elected to a 
four-year term in a presidential election generally considered to be credible and orderly 
by international observers, but election-related violence was higher than in previous 
years. The opposition candidate, a northern Muslim, unsuccessfully challenged the 
election. In 2015, Nigeria saw its first successful democratic transfer of power from a 
sitting president in the election of its current president Buhari. 
 
A militant sect, Boko Haram, continues to perpetrate killings and bomb attacks 
predominantly against soft targets in northern Nigeria but periodically throughout the 
country, and with increasing frequency since 2009. The sect claimed responsibility for 
three bombings in the capital Abuja in 2011, including of the United Nations 
 
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headquarters on August 26, 2011, which marked a major departure from its previously 
exclusive focus on domestic targets. Boko Haram was designated as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization by the U.S. State Department in November 2013. In 2014, Boko Haram 
expanded its attacks primarily in 10 northern states. Boko Haram has caused nearly 
5,000 deaths, many injuries, tens of thousands of displaced civilians, and significant 
destruction of property. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped more than 275 female 
students from a secondary school. Three northeastern states were under a state of 
emergency from May to November 2014, which gave the Nigerian government 
additional authority to prosecute a military campaign against Boko Haram. On October 
17, 2014, the Nigerian government announced it reached a cease-fire agreement with 
Boko Haram, but fighting continued. Northeastern Nigeria remains the epicenter of Boko 
Haram activities, but the group has taken responsibility for attacks in Jos, the Federal 
Capitol Territory, and Lagos. 
 
The most serious human rights abuses in Nigeria are committed by Boko Haram. 
In response to Boko Haram and to crime in general, security services in Nigeria have 
perpetrated extrajudicial killings and engaged in torture, rape, arbitrary detention, 
mistreatment of detainees, and destruction of property. Nigeria’s heavy-handed 
response to Boko Haram’s insurgent and terrorist operations has complicated U.S. 
efforts to pursue greater counterterrorism cooperation with the Nigerian government. 
Corruption and mismanagement in the Nigerian security sector have constrained the 
Nigerian government’s response. The country also suffers from widespread societal 
violence, including ethnic, regional, and religious violence. Other serious human rights 
abuses include denial of fair public trial; harsh and life threatening prison conditions; 
executive influence on the judiciary; arbitrary interference with privacy; and restrictions 
on some civil liberties. Impunity was widespread at all levels of government. The 
government has brought few persons to justice for abuses and corruption. Laws 
prohibiting discrimination, societal abuses, and trafficking in persons, have not been 
effectively enforced.6  
 
The U.S. State Department currently recommends that U.S. citizens avoid all 
travel to three states in the north of the country due to the risk of kidnappings, robberies, 
and other armed attacks. Boko Haram is known to descend on whole towns, robbing 
banks and businesses, attacking police and military installations, and setting fire to 
private homes. Attacks by Boko Haram and clashes with Nigerian government security 
forces increased in northern Nigeria in 2015. As of February 2016, the U.S. State 
Department was reporting that U.S.-Nigerian dual nationals are now required to have a 
valid Nigerian passport in order to depart the country. 
 
Nigeria is a member of several international organizations, including the United 
Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. 
Nigeria is an observer to the Organization of American States. Southern Nigeria’s 
economy, centered in Lagos, is among the fastest growing in the work, and presents a 
sharp contrast to northern Nigeria, where stagnation and endemic poverty prevail. The 
                                                 
6 On February 5, 2016, before Applicant’s hearing, the State Department updated its travel warning for 
Nigeria.  
 
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United States is the largest foreign investor in Nigeria with U.S. foreign direct 
investment concentrated largely in the petroleum/mining and wholesale trade sectors. 
Nigeria is eligible for preferential trade benefits under the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act. The United States seeks to improve the economic stability, security, 
and well-being of Nigeria by strengthening its democratic institutions, improving 
transparency and accountability and professionalizing its security forces. 
 
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive 
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,  
emphasizing that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy 
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a 
security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. 
In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative 
guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are 
required to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified 
information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overall adjudicative 
goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire 
process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-
person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable 
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government 
must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under 
Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other 
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven 
by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to 
obtain a favorable security decision. 
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in 
 
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terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B—Foreign Influence 
 
The security concerns about foreign influence are set out in AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
Applicant’s children have only Nigerian citizenship. His sons and younger 
daughter are U.S. permanent residents. Apparently, his older daughter’s application for 
U.S. residency is pending, even though she has been in the United States since 2001 
when she came on a student visa. When Applicant was interviewed by a State 
Department investigator in 2007, he indicated that his daughter’s student visa expired in 
December 2005, but he provided proof that she was still enrolled at a U.S. university. 
On his May 2014, he indicated about his daughter’s legal status, “has approved 1-130 
petition pending.” Some concerns arise about her legal status in the United States. 
However, there is there is no evidence that any of his children travel to Nigeria or have 
contact with family members in Nigeria. The risk of undue foreign influence because of 
his children’s Nigerian citizenship is minimized by the fact that they live in the United 
States. 
 
Applicant’s siblings are resident citizens of Nigeria. Applicant may reasonably be 
expected to have some contact with, and feelings of affection or obligation for, the 
family members that he left behind in Nigeria. Applicant has contact with his siblings by 
telephone monthly to less frequently, depending on the sibling and whether there is a 
special family occasion, such as a wedding, or events that have led him or his siblings 
to inquire about the well-being of family members. Before May 2014, Applicant also 
provided financial support averaging $1,250 annually to both his youngest brother and 
his youngest sister for their college studies in Nigeria. Two disqualifying conditions 
under AG ¶ 7 apply primarily because of Applicant’s ties to his siblings in Nigeria: 
 
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(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. 
 
The salient issue under AG ¶ 7(a) and ¶ 7(b) is whether there is substantial 
evidence of a “heightened risk” of foreign influence or exploitation because of the 
respective foreign tie, contact, or interest. The “heightened risk” denotes a risk greater 
than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign 
government or owning property in a foreign country, but it is nonetheless a relatively low 
standard. The nature and strength of the family ties or other foreign interests and the 
country involved (i.e., the nature of its government, its relationship with the United 
States, and its human rights record) are relevant in assessing whether there is a 
likelihood of vulnerability to coercion. Even friendly nations may have interests that are 
not completely aligned with the United States. As noted by the DOHA Appeal Board, 
“the United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified 
information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have 
access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests 
inimical to those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 
2004). The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign 
country has an authoritarian government; a family member is associated with, or 
dependent on, the foreign government; or the country is known to conduct intelligence 
operations against the United States. In considering the nature of the foreign 
government, the administrative judge must take into account any terrorist activity in the 
country at issue. See generally ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006).  
 
Concerning the nature of the Nigerian government, there is no evidence that 
intelligence operatives from Nigeria seek classified or economic information from U.S. 
businesses. Yet, with its negative human rights record and high levels of corruption and 
other crime, it is conceivable that anyone living in Nigeria might be targeted by 
governmental or non-governmental criminal elements in an attempt to gather 
information from the United States. While none of Applicant’s family members in Nigeria 
was shown to work for the Nigerian government, Applicant’s work in the past on behalf 
of the U.S. government in Nigeria makes it difficult to completely dismiss the risk of 
them being targeted. Nigeria is not known to sponsor terrorism, but terrorist elements in 
Nigeria, such as Boko Haram, have injured or killed thousands of Nigerians through 
multiple attacks against government, military, and civilian targets. Most of these attacks 
have occurred in the northern states rather than in southwest Nigeria, where his 
relatives reside. Nonetheless, Department Counsel produced substantial evidence of 
Applicant’s personal contacts and relationships with Nigerian resident citizens to raise 
the risk of coercion, pressure, or attempted exploitation. Applicant has telephone 
 
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contact on an ongoing basis with his siblings. Moreover, a sense of obligation for his 
family members in Nigeria is apparent in his financial support for his youngest siblings’ 
educations. Further inquiry is necessary about potential application of any mitigating 
conditions. 
 
AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that 
country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to 
choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government 
and the interests of the U.S.,” is difficult to satisfy. There is ongoing terrorist activity by 
extremist elements in Nigeria, and the country has a poor human rights record, which 
includes serious abuses committed by security forces. 
 
Applicant indicated on his May 2014 SF 86 that he had monthly contact with 
seven of his eight siblings and that he had quarterly telephone contact with sister # 3. 
As of March 2016, he had ongoing contact, although not every month with each sibling. 
Contact is around family occasions or other events that would generate reasonable 
concern about the well-being of family members. Applicant has not seen his family 
members in Nigeria since his last trip in 2010. Even if his contact with his siblings is 
relatively infrequent, it cannot reasonably be characterized as casual in light of his 
feelings of affection for his siblings. AG ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign 
citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk 
for foreign influence or exploitation,” does not apply. 
 
Applicant has not demonstrated a particular affinity for Nigeria, despite his 
retention of Nigerian citizenship after his naturalization in the United States. He provided 
meritorious service in consular affairs for the United States in Nigeria for 16 years 
before immigrating to the United States in January 2007. However, his sense of loyalty 
or obligation to his siblings in Nigeria is not so minimal to qualify for mitigation under the 
first component of AG ¶ 8(b), “there is no conflict of interest, either because the 
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or 
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” 
 
Key to the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis in this case is whether Applicant has established 
“deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” Applicant has lived in the 
United States permanently only since January 2007, while he spent 49 years in his 
native Nigeria. However, character references, including from a former immigration chief 
for the U.S. State Department in Nigeria, attest to Applicant demonstrating a 
commitment to the United States well before his emigration from Nigeria. Applicant 
earned the nickname “Mr. America” for his loyalty and commitment to his duties on 
behalf of the United States. Because of his meritorious service, Applicant was granted a 
special immigration visa by the United States. Since immigrating, Applicant has 
continued to contribute to U.S. interests by working on visa issues as a contractor 
employee from December 2007 to March 2016, at significant personal sacrifice to 
himself and his family in time spent apart. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 
 
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April 2012. His U.S. naturalization did not revoke his Nigerian citizenship, although in 
response to an SF 86 inquiry concerning whether he had taken any action to renounce 
his Nigerian citizenship, Applicant responded that his Nigerian citizenship “was 
renounced at the time of [the] U.S. citizenship oath ceremony.” Applicant made no effort 
to reconcile this statement with his acquisition of an ECOWAS passport from the 
Nigerian Consulate in November 2012. Even if he thought of himself solely as a citizen 
of the United States, he had to know that Nigeria considered him a citizen if it granted 
him a passport. Renewal and possession of a foreign passport raises some concerns 
about the strength of his ties to the United States, even if he renewed the passport for 
convenience, to avoid any problems traveling to Nigeria to see family members in the 
future. However, on learning that his foreign passport raises security issues, Applicant 
not only surrendered his foreign passport, but he also applied to renounce his Nigerian 
citizenship. He has no financial assets in Nigeria, and his ties to the United States 
appear to be permanent. I am persuaded that Applicant can be counted on to act in 
U.S. interests in the event of any undue foreign influence on his siblings in Nigeria. 
 
Guideline C—Foreign Preference 
 
The security concern relating to the guideline for foreign preference is articulated 
in AG ¶ 9: 
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to 
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of 
the United States. 
 
As of the close of the evidentiary record, Applicant held dual citizenship with his 
native Nigeria, and albeit relatively recently, of the United States by choice. Retention of 
foreign citizenship acquired from birth out of respect for one’s ethnic heritage, for 
example, is not disqualifying in the absence of an exercise of a right, privilege, or 
obligation of that citizenship. See AG ¶ 11(a), “dual citizenship is based solely on 
parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country.” Applicant became a naturalized U.S. 
citizen in April 2012, and shortly thereafter, his Nigerian passport expired. However, 
apparently while visiting his family in November 2012, he went to the Nigerian 
Consulate and obtained an ECOWAS passport. He has not traveled on that passport as 
a U.S. citizen. Even so, his possession of a valid foreign passport after his naturalization 
in the United States raises significant issues of foreign preference under AG ¶ 10(a): 
 
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after 
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family 
member. This includes but is not limited to: 
 
(1) possession of a current foreign passport. 
 
Dual citizenship is not encouraged by the United States because of the 
competing obligations that could arise. Applicant expressed willingness to relinquish his 
foreign passport when he was interviewed by an OPM investigator in July 2014. After 
 
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the SOR was issued, Applicant notified the Nigerian Consulate in March 2015 that he 
wanted to return his ECOWAS passport. Eventually, after conferring with DOHA, he 
tried unsuccessfully to surrender his foreign passport to his FSO in early March 2016. 
Sometime in April 2016, he relinquished his passport to the Nigerian Consulate and 
submitted his application to renounce his Nigerian citizenship. AG ¶ 11(b), “the 
individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship,” and AG ¶ 11(e), 
“the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or 
otherwise invalidated,” apply in mitigation of the foreign preference concerns. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct 
and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at 
AG ¶ 2(a).7 
 
Applicant showed that he could be counted on to act in U.S. interests when he 
was working in a difficult and very busy section of the U.S. Embassy and then 
Consulate in Nigeria. He risked his personal safety in times of crisis to report to work at 
the Embassy. He demonstrated a similar commitment to the U.S. government by 
working in visa processing in the United States for the past eight years.  
 
In weighing the whole-person factors in a foreign influence case, the Appeal 
Board has held that: 
 
Evidence of good character and personal integrity is relevant and material 
under the whole person concept. However, a finding that an applicant 
possesses good character and integrity does not preclude the government 
from considering whether the applicant's facts and circumstances still 
pose a security risk. Stated otherwise, the government need not prove that 
an applicant is a bad person before it can deny or revoke access to 
classified information. Even good people can pose a security risk because 
of facts and circumstances not under their control. See ISCR Case No. 
01-26893 (App. Bd. Oct. 16, 2002). 
 
There is nothing untoward about Applicant’s contacts with his siblings in Nigeria. 
While he understandably is concerned with their well-being, his relationship with his 
siblings does not appear to be especially close. His siblings have never visited him in 
                                                 
7 The factors under AG ¶ 2(a) are as follows: 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding 
the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the 
conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other 
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for 
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence. 
 
 15 
the United States, and he has not traveled to Nigeria since March 2010. Applicant 
shared no information about his federal contractor employment with his siblings in 
Nigeria. Applicant’s recent surrender of his foreign passport and his efforts to renounce 
his Nigerian citizenship show his willingness and ability to comply with security 
requirements. For the reasons stated above, I conclude that it is clearly consistent with 
the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:  FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline C:  FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraph 2.a:  For Applicant 
  
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
________________________ 
Elizabeth M. Matchinski 
Administrative Judge