KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The Judge found Applicant had 14 delinquent debts, including judgments, collection
accounts and medical accounts totaling approximately $32,000.  In reaching her adverse
decision, she specifically considered the “extremely negative circumstances” Applicant
referenced in his Appeal Brief including his contentious divorce, multiple illnesses, period of
unemployment and homelessness.  Adverse deicision affirmed.
CASE NO: 15-00650.a1
DATE: 06/27/2016
DATE: June 27, 2016 
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 15-00650
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On
August 8, 2015, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and Guideline E
(Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended)
(Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On April 11, 2016, after the hearing, Defense Office
of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Noreen A. Lynch denied Applicant’s
request for a security clearance.1  Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and
E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant argues that in reaching her adverse decision under Guideline F, the Judge “only
looked at the money that [he] made over a period of time and the debt but not the extremely negative
circumstance that [he] had to deal with.”  Applicant’s argument does not demonstrate that the
Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of
fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence
outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct.
12, 2007).
The Judge found Applicant had 14 delinquent debts, including judgments, collection
accounts and medical accounts totaling approximately $32,000.  In reaching her adverse decision,
she specifically considered the “extremely negative circumstances” Applicant referenced in his
Appeal Brief including his contentious divorce, multiple illnesses, period of unemployment and
homelessness.  Decision at 2, 5-7.  However, she noted that “he has not provided any documentation
that he has resolved his debts or even has the means to do so.” Id. at 6.
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
seriousness of the disqualifying circumstances and considered the possible application of relevant
conditions and factors.  She reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient to
overcome the government’s security concerns.  Decision at 5-7.  The Board does not review a case
de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
1The Judge found for Applicant under Guideline E.  That finding is not at issue on appeal.
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that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision is AFFIRMED.
Signed: James E. Moody   
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy     
James F. Duffy
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: Willian S. Fields    
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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