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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 ------------------ )  ISCR Case No. 15-03293 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Caroline Heintzelman, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HOWE, Philip S., Administrative Judge: 
 
On November 21, 2012, Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On June 12, 2015, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DODCAF) issued Applicant a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guidelines K (Handling Protected 
Information) and E (Personal Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense on September 
1, 2006.  
  
 
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 Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on June 29, 2015. He answered the 
SOR in writing on July1 12, 2015, and requested a hearing before an administrative 
judge. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) received the request 
shortly after July 14, 2015 when he mailed it to DOHA. Department Counsel was 
prepared to proceed on October 16, 2015, and I received the case assignment on 
October 29, 2015.  
 
DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on November 18, 2015, and I convened the 
hearing as scheduled on December 8, 2015. The Government offered Exhibits 1 
through 4, which were received without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, 
called two additional witnesses, and submitted Exhibits A and B, without objection. He 
also submitted his opening and closing statements, which I marked as Exhibits C and D.  
 
DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on December 16, 2015. Based 
upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his Answer to the SOR Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, 
1.c, 1.d and 1.f of the SOR, with explanations. He denied the factual allegations in ¶ 1.e 
of the SOR. He denied ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b of the SOR. He also provided additional 
information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.   
 
 Applicant is 70 years old. He is married and has five adult children. He is 
employed by a defense contractor as a manager. He has a master’s degree and has 
worked for the same defense contractor for 26 years. Applicant’s first security clearance 
was in May 1963 after he graduated from high school and worked a summer job as an 
aide at a government facility. He served as an officer in the U.S. military from 1969 to 
1989 and had a security clearance. He has held one while working for the defense 
contractor after his military retirement. Pending this case disposition, his clearance was 
suspended in January 2015. (Tr. 28-32, 57; Exhibits 1, 3 at page 12) 
 
 Applicant failed to comply with security requirements in June 2010 when he failed 
to properly secure a classified area. He received additional education for alarms, 
securing facilities, and security monitoring duties (Subparagraph 1.a). He admitted this 
allegation. His contention about the incident is stated in his Answer. He wrote that he 
has closed and alarmed this area for more than 25 years. He stated security is in place 
                                                          
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 His Answer and transmittal documents state the date on each as June 12, 2015. However, that is the 
date of the SOR, so it would be impossible for a six page Answer to be written and sent on the same day 
as the SOR; Applicant must have meant “July 12, 2015” as the date of his Answer. I use that logical date 
in this Decision. 
 
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all the time and the location of the room is deep inside the company’s building with 
constant security. But Applicant entered the room at 1413 hours and deactivated the 
alarm. He performed the work he intended and departed the room at 1630 hours, 
anticipating returning to the room so he did not reset the alarm. Applicant admitted 
“completely forgetting” to reset the alarm. The security infraction was reported to the 
company and an investigation was initiated. An administrative inquiry followed, a copy 
of which is included as Exhibit 4. It will be purged from the company files in June 2020. 
(Tr. 33-36; Exhibit 4 at page 1)  
 
 Applicant failed to comply with security requirements in March 2011 when he 
failed to properly secure a program area by failing to activate an intrusion detection 
system (Subparagraph 1.b). He admitted this incident, which involved his forgetting to 
set the alarm for a program area for a night. He claims that anyone entering this area 
needs a badge and a PIN number. It is his daily work area and he has been working 
there for 25 years. He also states any classified material in the room is locked in 
security containers nightly. Applicant wrote that investigations showed no classified 
information was compromised or released. He denies any written warning, suspension, 
reprimand, or disciplinary actions were taken. Applicant also states that since 2011 his 
company has used a security guard check and an indicator light system to make certain 
the areas are locked as required. An administrative inquiry was conducted on this 
incident. The security manager commented at the end of the report was that he spoke 
to Applicant about the incident and its seriousness. (Tr. 36-41; Exhibit 4 at pages 6 and 
7; Answer) 
 
 Applicant admitted he committed a security infraction in August 2012, which 
resulted in the possible compromise of classified information, when he sent a classified 
email containing improper markings that resulted in a data spill (Subparagraph 1.c). He 
received a verbal warning for this infraction. Applicant sent an email on a “closed, 
secure, classified email system, not on a public or unclassified company email system,” 
according to his Answer on Page 2. He claims it was reported to the company and 
government for investigation and that no classified information was compromised or 
released. Applicant testified it was late on a work day and he was tired when the 
incident occurred. He did not report it as he attempted to recall the message and wipe it 
from the system, calling it a mistake. (Tr. 41-46, 59; Exhibit 4 at pages 8, 14; Answer)  
 
 In March 2013 Applicant admitted he committed a security violation when he 
transmitted classified information on a secure network not approved for that information 
(Subparagraph 1.d). He sent an email to a customer who deemed the transmission was 
not made in the proper transmittal system. Applicant claimed the recipient was a “new 
guy” to the system, but did not provide any evidence to support his claims. Applicant 
told the government investigator he had sent the information four times using the same 
system and no one complained. He denied he transmitted classified information to 
unauthorized persons. When notified of the data spill, he failed to report the security 
 
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violation. He received a Corrective Action Memorandum (CAM) from his employer, 
which noted that there was a prior incident within the previous 12 months, being the 
August 2012 incident. (Tr. 46-54; Exhibits 2, 3, 4 at page 10; Answer) 
 
 In April 2013 Applicant admitted he committed a security violation when he 
submitted classified information over multiple secured networks not approved for such 
information (Subparagraph 1.e). There was a data spill. He received a CAM. Applicant 
denies prior knowledge of this incident being included in the CAM until he read about it 
in the SOR. This violation was discovered by government agents. The administrative 
inquiry cites the August 2012 and April 2013 incidents, naming the first as a “security 
infraction” and the second as a “security violation.” Applicant states the incidents set 
forth in Subparagraphs 1.d and 1.e were combined without specifics in this one 
memorandum. He claims no classified information was compromised although a “spill” 
occurred on a closed network. He lost his access to the system from mid-April to the 
beginning of June 2013. (Tr. 54-55, 88; Exhibits 2, 4 at page 12; Answer) 
 
 Applicant committed a security violation when he transmitted classified 
information in September 2014 on a network not approved for such information 
(Subparagraph 1.f). Applicant admits this incident, but claims it was a “Security 
Infraction” instead of a “Security Violation.” He states the network is secure at a level 
consistent with the information. (Tr. 40, 55; Exhibit 3 at page 10; Answer)  
 
 All of these incidents involving Applicant were violations of the requirements of 
the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) provisions for 
protection of classified information. Applicant attempts in his written opening statement 
to draw a distinction between “infractions” and “violations.” He contends no classified 
information was released to the public. (Exhibit 4) 
 
 Under the personal conduct guidelines, Applicant is alleged to have falsified 
material facts on his e-QIP on November 21, 2012, in Section 13A by failing to disclose 
the verbal reprimand given him in August 2012 as alleged in SOR Subparagraph 1.c. 
He denies deliberately falsifying his e-QIP. He argues that in the previous seven years 
he had not received a written warning or been officially reprimanded, suspended, or 
disciplined for misconduct. None of the incidents sited in Paragraph 1 met this 
requirement, he contends. He states he misunderstood the questions because he was 
never official reprimanded or warned. He states the verbal reprimand was “reeducation” 
and was not punitive. (Tr. 60; Exhibit 1; Answer) 
 
 In an interview on August 9, 2013, it is alleged Applicant deliberately provided 
false information to a U.S. Defense Department investigator regarding security 
infractions or violations in the previous seven years, He disclosed the March 2013 
incident, but not the other four incidents alleged in the SOR subparagraphs 1.a to 1.c, 
and 1. e. Applicant denies this allegation of falsification. He claims he disclosed the 
 
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incident in Subparagraph 1.d, but was unaware of the Subparagraph 1.e. incident 
because it was combined in the same CAM, as he explained in response to the 
allegation in Subparagraph 1.e. The CAM specifically refers to both the March 5, 2013 
and April 1, 2013 incidents. It also states, “Applicant received a verbal warning for a 
security violation that occurred in August 2012.” This CAM is dated April 15, 2013 and 
warns Applicant that further incidents could involve a review of additional “corrective 
action, up to and including discharge from the Company.” It is dated before Applicant’s 
interview with the government investigator in August 2013. (Tr. 53, 54; Exhibit 4) 
 
 Applicant was interviewed by the government investigator between August 9 and 
September 2, 2013. Applicant disputes the accuracy of the investigator’s summary as it 
pertains to his reports of his security violations. He wrote a seven page response to 
interrogatories sent him by DOHA about the security violations answers. He claims he 
thought the investigator was asking about incident since the November 21, 2012 
completion of the e-QIP, and not the seven previous years. He also contends previous 
emails to the same customers were sent over the same email system with the same 
program identifiers (PID). He blames a new member of the group receiving the emails, 
who was not familiar with the precedents and complained about alleged improper PID 
and not the content of the classified email. The company investigated and Applicant 
signed a CAM. (Tr. 58, 59; Exhibit 3)  
 
 Applicant’s interrogatories’ response continues to state that he thought Section 
13A referred only to security violations in the past seven years. The question in Section 
13A asks if Applicant had “received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, 
suspended, or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, such as a security violation.” 
The term “security violation” is used as one example of misconduct. Applicant 
incorrectly interpreted it to be the only type of workplace misconduct he needed to 
disclose, thereby not making full disclosure as required, but engaging in his own 
interpretation of Section 13A’s scope. (Tr. 60-63, 66; Exhibits 3, A) 
 
 Applicant referred to his Exhibit A at pages 12 and 13 to explain the difference 
between a “security violation” and a “security infraction.” He claims that the essential 
difference is that with a violation a “loss, compromise or suspected compromise of 
classified information” is involved. An infraction is “any other incident that is not in the 
best interest of security that does not involve the loss or compromise or suspected 
compromise of classified information.” They are to be documented so they can be 
reviewed by higher authority later. Applicant contends his security incidents did not 
compromise classified information. Applicant testified he did not receive a written 
warning, official reprimand, suspension, or discipline before he completed the e-QIIP in 
November 2012.  He and his first witness, his manager, stated only a company director 
can administer discipline. (Tr. 64- 67, 91-93; Exhibit A)  
 
 
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Applicant then discloses that the 2010 and 2011 security incidents were a failure 
to set an alarm for an office where he worked, claiming that the office was protected by 
overlapping security systems even if he did not set the alarm. He admits he was 
verbally advised how to prevent future errors, “but no written warning, suspension, 
reprimand, or disciplinary actions were taken.”  Again, Applicant applies his own 
interpretation to actions and events instead of making full disclosure and allowing the 
government to sort out the facts. (Exhibit 3 at pages 9 and 10) 
 
Applicant explains the August 16, 2012 incident as his “inadvertently manually” 
typing a PID into an unauthorized but secure network. He reported it and his actions 
were judged to be an “administrative infraction,” though he does not state who made the 
judgment. He claims no information was released to persons outside the company. 
(Exhibit 3 at page 10) 
 
Applicant’s interrogatory response goes on to address his latest incident on 
September 26, 2014, regarding a power point file alteration he was directed to perform. 
The error was corrected, he states. Again, Applicant insists he never received a written 
warning and not been officially reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined for these 
incidents or for any misconduct in the workplace in the past seven years. (Exhibit 3 at 
page 10) 
 
 Applicant had two character witnesses testify. One was his immediate superior 
for the past 24 years. He was aware of Applicant’s infractions and violations. He retired 
from the employing company in March 2014. He testified that all of Applicant’s incidents 
were “infractions,” except the March 2013 incident, which was a violation 
(Subparagraph 1.d). This witness gave Applicant a verbal warning for the August 2012 
incident. The witness stated the March 2011 incident did not result in a written 
reprimand or warning. He also stated the employing defense contractor held Applicant 
in high regard. (Tr. 76-88, 113)  
 
The other witness is a director of the company. He has known Applicant for about 
20 years. This witness also retired from the U.S. military. He stated Applicant needs a 
security clearance to perform his job. (Tr. 115-127) 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
 
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These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process (AG ¶ 2(a)). The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration 
of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information 
 
AG ¶ 33 expresses the security concern pertaining to handling protected 
information, “Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for 
 
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protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an individual's 
trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such 
information, and is a serious security concern.” 
 
AG ¶ 34 describes nine conditions that could raise a security concern and may 
be disqualifying. Four conditions may apply: 
 
(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other protected 
information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal 
or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at seminars, 
meetings, or conferences; 
 
(c) loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise 
handling classified reports, data, or other information on any unapproved 
equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or 
computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, handheld, 
"palm" or pocket device or other adjunct equipment; 
 
(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other 
sensitive information; and 
 
(h) negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by 
management.  
 
 Applicant committed six incidents of failing to comply with rules and regulations 
of the U.S. government and his employing defense contractor regarding the securing 
and proper transmitting of classified information. These incidents occurred in June 
2010, March 2011, August 2012, March 2013, and April 2013. These incidents involved 
not setting an alarm at the company office in 2010 and 2011. Then he transmitted 
classified information improperly in 2012, twice in 2013, and 2014. Applicant did not 
report the March 2013 incident to his superiors. He received a verbal warning in 
connection with the August 2012 incident. Then he received a CAM for the two 2013 
incidents.  
 
 Applicant committed these incidents negligently, particularly the transmittal 
incidents. He blamed tiredness and forgetfulness for the failures to properly set alarms. 
AG¶ 34 (a) and (c) are established.  
 
 Applicant could not follow the rules and regulations pertaining to protecting and 
transmitting classified information. He did not comply with alarm setting requirements. 
AG ¶ 34 (g) and (h) apply because the six incidents show Applicant would not comply 
with security requirements, even after receiving verbal warnings and the CAM for two 
incidents. These incidents, regardless of whether they are “violations” or “infractions,” 
 
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demonstrate a pattern of non-compliance by an experienced person who has worked a 
long time for a defense contractor. 
 
AG ¶ 35 provides three conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I 
conclude none of them apply: 
 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so 
infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to 
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security 
training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of 
security responsibilities; and 
 
(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training. 
 
 Applicant’s security incidents occurred six times over a four year period. Two 
occurred within a month of each other in 2013. These are not infrequent or occurring 
under unusual circumstances. They occurred in his normal work environment. His last 
violation was in September 2014 and his security clearance was suspended in January 
2015, so no further incidents have occurred. The one year elapsing since his clearance 
suspension, or even counting from September 2014, is not much time. AG ¶ 35 (a) is 
not established.  
 
 Applicant had six incidents in four years. He obviously did not respond favorably 
to counseling or remedial training. He argued definitions and types of disciplinary 
actions within his employing company rather than addressing the security issues. AG ¶ 
35 (b) is not established.  
 
 Applicant had a long history of working for this company. He also had military 
experience as an officer. He has had security clearances since sometime in the 1960s. 
He should have known how to handle these situations, but failed to do so. His training 
has been over his adult life .The incidents were not due to any improper or inadequate 
training. AG ¶ 35 (c) is not established.  
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct: 
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
 
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classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. 
 
The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or 
administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility: 
 
(b) refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of 
investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in 
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination. 
 
AG ¶ 16 describes seven conditions that could raise a security concern and may 
be disqualifying. Four conditions may apply: 
 
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from 
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or 
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment 
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance 
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; 
 
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning 
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent 
medical authority, or other official government representative; 
 
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any 
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse 
determination, but which, when combined with all available information 
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply 
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the 
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes 
but is not limited to consideration of: 
 
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client 
confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of 
sensitive corporate or other government protected information: and 
 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations. 
 
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, 
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such 
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's 
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another 
 
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country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is 
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a 
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence 
service or other group. 
 
 Applicant deliberately concealed security violations incidents in response to 
Section 13A of the e-QIP he completed in 2012. The full disclosure requirements in 
answering the e-QIP questions were set forth in the instructions, and Applicant 
confirmed the truthfulness of his answers when he signed the e-QIP. However, he did 
not report any of the three incidents that occurred before he signed the e-QIP. When 
questioned by the government investigator in August 2013 he disclosed only one 
security violation that occurred in March 2013. Applicant tried to justify his non-
disclosure on the e-QIP and to the investigator by using his personal definitions of what 
needed to be disclosed. He did not make full disclosure of the April 2013 incident, nor is 
there a record of the 2010, 2011, and August 2012 incidents. Therefore, AG ¶ 16 (a) 
and (b) are established.  
 
 Applicant engaged in behavior demonstrating he could not comply with his 
employer’s security requirements through his unauthorized release of protected 
information over several computer systems between 2012 and 2014. AG ¶ 16 (d) is 
established because of the pattern of rule violations.  
 
 Applicant’s personal conduct in concealing the full array of his security violations 
creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, and duress because the 
concealment and sophistry in which he engaged about his activities, if known, would 
affect his personal, professional, or community standing. AG ¶ 16 (e) is established.  
 
AG ¶ 17 provides seven conditions that could mitigate security concerns. None of 
them apply: 
 
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, 
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; 
 
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was 
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of 
authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual 
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made 
aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the 
individual cooperated fully and truthfully. 
 
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is 
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is 
 
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unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling 
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the 
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, 
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; 
 
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; 
 
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable 
reliability; and, 
 
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or 
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's 
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules 
and regulations. 
  
 Applicant continued to maintain, at the hearing, his nuancing and 
characterizations of his security incidents, intending to persuade that they did not meet 
the full disclosure requirements of the e-QIP. However, his arguments were not credible 
in view of the pattern of incidents, particularly as they increased over the years in 2013 
and 2014. Applicant should have made full disclosure, explained any characterization in 
the “Additional Comments” portion of the e-QIP, or discussed them with the investigator 
at the interview after he wrote his full disclosure in answering Section 13A of the e-QIP. 
Applicant is not authorized to decide what parts of what information he would disclose 
when the lead paragraph of the e-QIP put him on notice that it required him to “complete 
and truthfully” answer all questions. Therefore, no mitigating condition applies. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
 
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rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 AG ¶ 2(c) requires each case must be judged on its own merits.  Under AG ¶ 
2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance 
must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the 
guidelines and the whole person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is an experienced 
employee of a defense contractor who has had security clearances for nearly 40 years. 
He knew the security incidents should have been revealed on the e-QIP and then 
discussed with an investigator. Instead, he made his own decisions about what needed 
to be disclosed to the U.S. government, which were not complete and truthful, as 
required. He would have had ample opportunity to discuss the nuances of his security 
violations if he had disclosed them all and added additional comments at the end of the 
e-QIP. Furthermore, he did not make full disclosure to the government investigator so 
that his security incidents could be discussed and evaluated. While testifying, he took 
little responsibility for his behaviors or demonstrated remorse. 
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with serious questions or doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns arising from his Handling 
Protected Information and Personal Conduct security concerns.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline K:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.b:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.c:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.d:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.e:    Against Applicant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 Paragraph 2, Guideline E:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.b:    Against Applicant 
    
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
                                                     
_________________ 
PHILIP S. HOWE 
Administrative Judge