Consisting of the File of Relevant Material (FORM), Items 1-6.1
DoD acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20,2
1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD on
1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX )       ISCR Case No. 12-06955 
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Nicole A. Smith, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  I grant Applicant’s clearance.1
On 23 July 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) sent Applicant a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) raising security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence.2
Applicant timely answered the SOR, requesting a decision without hearing by the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). The record in this case closed 22
October 2015, when Applicant’s reply to the FORM was due. Applicant submitted no
additional evidence for consideration. DOHA assigned the case to me 1 December
2015.
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations. He is a 41-year-old software engineer
employed by a U.S. defense contractor since September 2007. He was previously
employed with another defense contractor between January 2001 and September 2007
(Item 3). This is a periodic reinvestigation of a clearance he has held since March 2003,
based on a background investigation completed in July 2002 (Item 5). He has
apparently held this clearance without incident since March 2003.
Applicant was born in Ethiopia in July 1974. He grew up there and was educated
there through high school, attending a religious school that offered both primary and
secondary education. He graduated from high school in 1993 (Item 4). 
Applicant immigrated to the U.S. in October 1994 (Item 4). As required by U.S.
immigration law, he immigrated to the U.S. on an Ethiopian passport, which has since
expired. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September 2001. He obtained his U.S.
passport in August 2003; it expired in August 2013 (Item 3).
Applicant’s parents and his two brothers (one older; one younger) were born in
Ethiopia. They are all naturalized U.S. citizens, residing in the U.S.
 Applicant traveled on his U.S. passport between 2003 and 2013. In January
2007, he traveled to Ethiopia with his older brother to sightsee and visit relatives. They
stayed in a hotel. In May 2007, he traveled to Yemen for a week with his father, to visit
his dying (now deceased) uncle. While there, he met the woman he later married. He
also met his future mother-in-law. This is the only time he has seen his mother-in-law.
Before he traveled to Yemen, he checked the U.S. Department of State travel list to
ensure there was no travel warning for Yemen (Item 4).
Finally, in December 2008, he rendezvoused with his parents and his girlfriend
(now wife) in Ethiopia. He was there for about a month, and stayed with his aunt. While
he was in Ethiopia, he went sightseeing with his girlfriend and announced their
engagement. 
Applicant’s fiancee immigrated to the U.S. on a fiancee visa in October 2009, and
they were married in February 2010. They have two children, a son born in October
2010 and a daughter born in April 2014. Applicant’s wife became a legal permanent
resident of the U.S. in January 2012, a status that does not expire until February 2024
(Answer). However, she became eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship in January 2015.
She has since applied, and, as of August 2015, was awaiting her biometrics and
interview appointments.
Applicant’s 70-year-old mother-in-law is a resident citizen of Yemen. He has
meet her once. He speaks to her by telephone annually; his wife speaks to her monthly.
The record does not reveal any employment, but Applicant claims that she has no
association with the Yemeni government. Her husband is deceased.
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
3
Applicant owns the home where his family lives. All his financial interests are in
the U.S. His fiscal year (FY) employment evaluations for 2013, 2014, and 2015 are
excellent (Item 2).
I have taken notice as requested by the Government in Item 6, particularly the
deterioration of the political situation in Yemen, civil war and terrorism-related violence
in the country, as well as the Department of State’s travel ban to Yemen. However, I
also note these pertinent facts about Yemen: The Republic of Yemen was formed in
1990. The country continues to struggle with issues over unification. The United States
and Yemen have a strong and growing partnership. Since 2011, the United States has
provided Yemen more than $600 million in assistance. Terrorism and civil unrest are
significant problems in Yemen. In January 2015, the Yemeni President and his
cabinet reportedly resigned amid the growing violence. In February 2015, the U.S.
Embassy in Sana’a suspended its operations and the embassy staff was temporarily
relocated due to an uncertain security situation and renewed violence.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guideline is Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does,
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the Government.3
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
AG¶6.4
AG¶7(a).5
AG¶7(c).6
AG¶7(e).7
AG¶7(f).8
4
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.4
Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Further,5
security concerns may arise through connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.  In6
addition, security concerns may be raised by a substantial business, financial, or
property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated
business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.  Finally, failure to report, where required, association with a foreign national7
may raise security concerns.8
Concerning potential mitigating factors, AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,”
largely mitigates the Applicant’s circumstances regarding his family members living in
Yemen.
While the ongoing risk of terrorist activity by rogue elements in Yemen raises
safety issues addressed by U.S. Government travel warnings, there is no evidence that
terrorist elements use violence as a means of obtaining protected information.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Yemeni Government or Yemeni companies are
active collectors of such information.
Applicant has casual and infrequent contact with his mother-in-law in
Yemen—annually by telephone. He met her once, in May 2007. Applicant’s wife has
monthly telephone contact with her mother, hardly overly solicitous.
5
Nothing about his mother-in-law’s previous or present occupations or activities
creates a heightened risk. She has no affiliation with the Yemeni government, or any
military, security, or intelligence responsibilities.
Yemen and the United States have a strong and growing partnership.
Nevertheless, terrorism and civil unrest remain problems. Still, the U.S. has provided
significant assistance to Yemen since 2011 to help address these problems.
Applicant has no foreign assets in Yemen to establish AG ¶7(e). Moreover, any
heightened risk of undue foreign influence may also be mitigated under AG ¶ 8(b),
where “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the
individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to his mother-in-law can be viewed as
“so minimal” for the same reasons that his contacts can be considered “casual and
infrequent,” notwithstanding his presumed ties of affection and obligation through his
wife. Further, his wife’s contacts with her mother are also largely casual and infrequent.
Moreover, there is no similar sense of loyalty to a foreign group, government, or
country. Finally, Applicant has persuaded me that he can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the United States, where he has resided since 1994 and
established firm roots. He started his family, has purchased property, has significant
assets, and established his home here. His children are U.S. citizens; his siblings are
naturalized U.S. citizens. His wife has applied for U.S. citizenship. They have no desire
to live in Yemen. Their lives are here, their assets are here, their friends and activities
are here.
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct
and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at
AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant has minimal family ties to Yemen that potentially raise concerns of
foreign influence. He is not likely to jeopardize himself, his spouse, or the employment
that he values. Applicant has demonstrated his reliability and trustworthiness to his
supervisors and co-workers.
While the Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline B
Applicant mitigated the security concerns. Applicant’s wife is a Yemeni citizen with legal
permanent resident status until at least February 2024. However, at of August 2015,
she has applied for U.S. citizenship and is waiting for the requisite appointments with
the Government. Applicant’s mother-in-law is a resident citizen of Yemen who has no
connection with the Yemeni Government. Applicant’s only other connection to Yemen is
the six days he spent in Yemen in May 2007 with his father to visit his dying uncle,
during which he met his wife. These factors, standing alone, are insufficient to raise any
heightened risk of influence. After all, Applicant’s cultural connections are to Ethiopia, a
country of no security concern alleged by the Government, and favorably vetted in
March 2003.
If the terrorism risk and civil disarray in Yemen are sufficient by themselves to
establish a heightened risk of influence, then Applicant is at risk of heightened risk of
influence. Nevertheless, it is improbable that such influence could be brought to bear on
a septuagenarian mother-in-law with no connection to the Yemeni Government. After
considering all the facts and circumstances, I find it is clearly consistent with the
6
national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Accordingly, I
resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
 Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-b: For Applicant
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.  
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge