DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of:                                            )
                                                                     )
---------------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 14-01465
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esq.,  Department Counsel
For Applicant: Christopher Graham, Esq.
______________
 Decision
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WESLEY, Roger C., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I conclude that
Applicant mitigated the security concerns regarding handling protected information and
personal conduct. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.  
 
History of Case
On February 20, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated
Adjudication Facility (CAF), issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing
why DOD adjudicators could not find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant and recommended referral to an
administrative judge to determine whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue whether clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked.
The actions were taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended, DOD Directive 5220.6,
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines (AG)s) implemented by DOD on
September 1, 2006. 
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Applicant responded to the SOR on April 1, 2015, and requested a hearing. The
case was assigned to me on January 19, 2016, and was scheduled for hearing on
February 3, 2016. A hearing was held on the scheduled date for the purpose of
considering whether it would be clearly consistent with the national interest to grant,
continue, deny, or revoke Applicant’s security clearance.  At hearing, the Government's
case consisted of five exhibits (GEs 1-5); Applicant relied on one witness (himself) and
three exhibits (AEs A-C). The transcript (R.T.) was received on February 11, 2016.
                                                                
Summary of Pleadings
Under Guideline K, Applicant allegedly (a) violated his employer’s corporate policy
and Chapter 5 of the National Industrial Security Policy Manual (NISPOM) by bringing
his uncleared wife into his employer’s closed storage space in October 2012 and (b)
transmitted an email containing classified information in 2006 over an unclassified
system. Under Guideline E, Applicant allegedly had multiple extra-marital affairs without
disclosing them to his wife. 
In his response to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations contained in
subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b with explanations. He claimed he self-reported the October
2012 incident covered in subparagraph 1.a. This incident involved Applicant’s bringing
his wife into his employer’s closed storage space without advance management approval
in accordance with the requirements of the NISPOM’s Chapter 5, which outlines the
rules and procedures for accessing closed areas. He claimed he logged his wife into the
employer’s abnormal hours log and visitor’s log and turned on the “red light” to apprise
anyone that an uncleared person was in the area. 
Applicant claimed he was confronted by a security guard as he was leaving the
area and completed a visitor’s log to reflect their time of departure as his wife was
escorted out of the area. Applicant claimed he was then instructed by the security guard
to correct his failure to annotate his arrival in the employers abnormal hours arrival log
before Applicant and his wife returned to the first floor where Applicant annotated their
departure time in the visitor’s log before departing the building. Applicant further claimed
he subsequently met with security personnel in October 2012 to review his actions in
entering and departing the building and drafted a written account of the events.
Additionally, Applicant claimed his actions constituted an isolated minimal incident that
resulted in directed  remedial training for him.
Addressing the allegations contained in subparagraph 1.b, Applicant claimed he
twice self-reported the 2006 incident, both during his pre-screening questioning
preceding a polygraph in October 2012, and again when he reviewed his security
clearance application with an investigator conducting his periodic review. He claimed he
immediately informed his company leadership of his code blue event and was told the
same day that team investigators determined that (a) no uncleared personnel had
attempted to gain access to the mail server prior to removal of his email and (b) no
classified information had been removed.
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In responding to the allegations in subparagraph 2.a of the SOR, Applicant
admitted the allegations with explanations. He claimed he self-reported his infidelities
(not affairs) on two occasions: in pre-screening questioning in October 2012, and when
he reviewed his security clearance application with an investigator conducting a periodic
review. Applicant claimed the cited infidelities occurred over 20 years ago (1988 and
1995), and he has acknowledged his infidelities generally to his wife who expressed no
interest in the details of his actions. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 55-year-old director of electronic systems for a defense contractor
who seeks a security clearance. The allegations covered in the SOR and admitted by
Applicant are adopted as relevant and material findings. Additional findings follow.
Applicant’s background
Applicant married in December 1985 and has three children from this marriage,
ages 20 and 22. (GE 1; Tr. 25-26) He earned a bachelor’s of science degree in
engineering in December 1983 and a master’s degree on operations research in May
1997. (GE 1; Tr. 22) 
Applicant was commissioned as an Air Force (AF) officer after completing his
university’s Reserve Officer’s Training Corps program (ROTC) in May 1984 and served
as an active duty AF officer between May 1984 and June 2005. He received an
honorable discharge in June 2005. (GEs 1 and 5) He claimed no post-discharge reserve
service in the Air Force. Applicant’s service awards included a Bronze Star for his
service while in a combat zone. (Tr. 23)
Since November 2010, Applicant has been employed by his current employer.
(GE 1) Between February 2009 and November 2010, he was employed as a senior
operations research analyst for another defense contractor. (GE 1) And between March
2005 and February 2009, he was employed as an operations research analyst. (GE 1;
Tr. 24-25) 
Applicant’s Handling of Protected Information
While working as an operations research analyst in 2006, Applicant had access to
sensitive compartmented information (SCI) with another government agency. (GE 2)
While working on a company project in the Spring of 2006, he inadvertently transmitted
an email to four or five team members (including his study lead, an AF GS-14) over an
unclassified system that contained two unclassified pieces of information that when
linked together to associate a code number with a region of the world transformed the
email into a emailed message that was collaterally secret. (AE B; Tr. 37-38) 
Applicant’s emailed information was caught immediately by his study lead who
proceeded to instruct Applicant and the other recipients to shut down their computers.
(Tr. 38) While the computers were shut down, company information technology (IT)
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specialists certified their findings. (GE 5; Tr. 38-39, 43 ) The company’s IT specialists, in
turn, sanitized the computers and checked to see if anyone outside the firewall had
gained or tried to penetrate the firewall. (Tr. 38-39) Conclusions were drawn by IT
specialists that no information in Applicant’s email was compromised. (Tr. 39-40)
By Applicant’s account of the 2006 incident in his September 2013 interview with
an agent of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), no one else had access to his
email, inside or outside the facility, and no one gained access to the emailed information.
(GE 5; Tr. 39-41) Applicant assured the OPM agent that nothing was compromised. (GE
5) As the result of his email transmission mistake, he was required to complete a 90-
minute security training program. (GE 5) He received no written reprimand or discipline
and was retained by his supervisors on his assigned job. (Tr. 39-41) 
In October 2012, Applicant accompanied his wife into his employer’s closed
storage space. His wife once held a NATO secret clearance, but since 1988 had been a
stay-at-home mother with no technical background. Without prior approvals, Applicant
and his wife entered the lobby of his employer by swiping his entry badge and proceeded
to the lobby desk. (GE 5) At the lobby desk, Applicant filled out a visitor’s log and
proceeded to the elevator with his wife. (GE 5) Applicant was not asked to fill out an
irregular hours log, did not do so, and was not challenged by any security officer. (GE 5;
Tr. 27) Neither Applicant nor his wife (without a visitor’s badge) were challenged by
security personnel. 
Once on the floor of his lab facility, Applicant opened the door to his facility,
checked the area, turned on the “red light” to alert others in the building of his presence,
and proceeded to show his wife the threat analysis laboratory. (GE 5; Tr. 28) His wife
observed but did not enter the area. Without entering his personal offices, she was able
to observe his displayed pictures. (GE 5; Tr. 29)
At no point was Applicant’s wife exposed to classified information or corporate
proprietary data. A security guard monitored applicant’s exit movements and informed
him that he was in possible violation of company procedures and policies, and
proceeded to take down personal information of Applicant’s wife. (GE 5; Tr. 29) As
Applicant completed the visitor’s log, the security guard escorted his wife out of the
building. (GE 5) Before Applicant departed the building, the security guard asked
Applicant to complete the irregular hours log.  (GE 5; Tr. 30) After dropping his wife off at
the airport, he returned to his work site and completed the irregular hours log. (GE 5) He
also informed his supervisor of his potential security violation and secured his office area
before departing the building. (GE 5)
In an ensuing pre-polygraph interview in October 2012 with an agent of the
National Security Agency (NSA), Applicant acknowledged his failure to follow company
procedures in escorting his wife to his secure work area. Based on his past military
experience, he did not think at the time that bringing his wife into a secure area
presented a security issue. (GE 5) 
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Applicant’s contractor program security officer (CPSO) in his report classified it as
an honest mistake by a new employee who was unfamiliar with his employer’s corporate
policy. (GE 5) Applicant reassured the OPM agent that he was unaware of the National
Industrial Security Policy Manual (NISPOM) and his employer’s corporate policy on
completing an irregular hours log before entering a secured area with a visitor. (Tr. 26-
27) In turn, he escorted his wife into the facility’s secured area in the mistaken belief that
he had inherent authority to do so. (Tr. 26-27)  
Based on multiple accounts of Applicant’s October 2012 spousal entry incident,
Applicant was neither suspended nor administered disciplinary action by his employer.
He was verbally counseled and instructed by his three supervisors to make sure the
incident is not repeated. (GE 5 and AE B) And he was asked to provide a written account
of the events, which he provided. (Tr. 30-31) Applicant’s supervisors told Applicant they
considered the incident involving his wife’s entry into a secured area to be an honest
mistake and a minor incident, but “not deliberate or negligent in nature.” (AE B; Tr. 32) 
Applicant’s supervisors distinguished deliberate violations from negligence
resulting from poor due diligence and characterized Applicant’s escorting his wife into a
closed area to represent neither of the above, but rather an honest mistake. His
supervisors stressed that he has owned up to his mistake and taken corrective action to
address it. (AE B) For his mistake in escorting his wife into his facility without meeting
visitor requirements, he received a verbal reprimand, but not a written reprimand. (AE B;
Tr. 62-63)
Still, reports of Applicant’s escorting incident with his wife produced an ensuing
investigation by the responsible federal agency (NSA). Following its investigation, the
agency suspended Applicant’s access to SCI. After initially declining an appeal,
Applicant asked for reconsideration in February 2013. (GE 2) 
Assessing the merits of the appeal, the deputy chief of Applicant’s agency (the
NSA) overturned Applicant’s denied SCI access in July 2013. (GE 3) After reviewing the
record in its entirety, the chief of his agency affirmed the deputy chief’s decision, treated
Applicant’s violations as mistakes, and restored his opportunity to continue processing.
(GE 4) Neither decision addressed Applicant’s eligibility to hold a collateral clearance.
Currently, Applicant is cleared through all four compartments of SCI: SI, TK,
Gamma, and HCS through a federal agency contract (Tr. 34), and has never been fully
briefed  on the NISPOM’s visitor policies or his company’s corporate visitor policies. (Tr.
30-31) He has received no written reprimands from his employer. He assured that he
was never briefed on NISPOM’s visitor policies when he joined his current employer’s
corporate staff. Following the incident, he was verbally instructed on the visitation
infraction by his supervisors, totally briefed on his employer’s visitor’s policy, and has
had no recurrent incidents since the 2012 visitation incident. (Tr. 62) 
Based on his own experiences associated with the 2012 visitation incident,
Applicant developed some Power Point slides for his team. (Tr. 64) His slides walked his
team through his employer’s corporate policy and Chapter 5 of the NISPOM covering
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visitation procedures. His slides were later incorporated in his employer’s operating
procedures. (AE B; Tr. 64-65)
Infidelity Issues
Between 1988 and 1995, Applicant engaged in multiple infidelities (12 to 18 in all)
of a sexual nature. (GE 5; Tr. 47-48) All of the women involved were consenting adults
over the age of 18 who were unknown to his wife. (Tr. 49) Applicant was never charged
with any offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and was never
reprimanded by his command. (Tr. 48)
Applicant discussed his infidelities with his wife in July 1995, but not his children
or the rest of his family members. (Tr. 57-58) After receiving an ultimatum from his wife
to cease or risk compromising their marriage, he enrolled in a joint course of marital
counseling with his pastor and associate pastor (who counseled his wife) in a concerted
effort to restore his wife’s trust. (Tr. 50-54) 
Based on the advice of his pastor and off-base former AF flight surgeon he
consulted, Applicant has generally avoided sharing any of the details of his indiscretions
with his wife. (Tr. 53-56) His pastor, an ordained Presbyterian minister and a licensed
clinical professional counselor (LCPC) who specializes in marriage and family therapy,
verified Applicant’s consultations with him (dates not specified) for the purpose of
addressing discord with his wife and infidelity in their marital relationship. (AE B) 
Applicant’s counseling sessions with his pastor consisted of home assignments
and demonstrated on-going commitments to the work of reconciling with his wife. His
pastor credited him with being transparent, forthcoming, and candid in his responses to
questions and confirmed his advice to Applicant not to disclose specific details about his
sexual infidelity to his wife. (AE B) 
In 2002, Applicant and his wife celebrated their 30  wedding anniversary.  (AE A)th
Although he  continues to struggle with guilt from his infidelities (especially when he sees
a certain female celebrity on television), he has steadfastly avoided any physical
infidelities since 1995. (Tr. 61) Informed generally of Applicant’s infidelities, Applicant’s
wife expressed no interest in knowing the details of Applicant’s indiscretions that
occurred over 20 years ago. (AE A; Tr. 61) 
Applicant’s indiscretions are fully known to his former supervisors and others who
have executed endorsement letters for Applicant. (AE B; Tr. 58) Although, Applicant has
not yet informed his newest supervisor of three months of his marital indiscretions. (Tr.
59) Further, he has not disclosed his infidelities to his children or the rest of his family
members.  (Tr. 57-58)
Endorsements
Past managers and supervisors expressed familiarity with Applicant’s past
security violations and fidelity issues and characterized his overall judgment and
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reliability as excellent in following security procedures. Both his current contractor CPSO
and previous supervisor of five years (November 2010 to April 2015) credit Applicant
with using exceptional caution and due diligence when handling classified information.
They cited his considerable contributions to his team’s security posture and express
confidence in his ability to continue to take corrective actions to avoid future mistakes in
safeguarding classified information. (AE B) 
 An assigned AF civilian and retired AF officer, who worked with Applicant
between 2003 and 2009, is familiar with Applicant’s linking two unclassified statements
that together made his 2006 texted email message classified, confirmed that no
classified information was compromised. She vouched for Applicant’s reliability and
trustworthiness and advised his leadership team that Applicant was expected to remain
on the contract. (AE B) She credited Applicant with accepting full responsibility for his
mistake and found his performance to consistently “exceed” or “far exceed” expectations.
(AE B) She assured that she has never had reason to question his ability or judgment,
and never questioned her professional trust in him on any level. 
Policies
The AGs for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (effective
September 2006) list Guidelines to be considered by administrative judges in the
decision making process covering DOHA cases. These Guidelines require the
administrative judge to consider all of the "Conditions that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying” (Disqualifying Conditions), if any, and all of the "Mitigating
Conditions," if any, before deciding whether or not a security clearance should be
granted, continued or denied. 
In addition to the relevant AGs, administrative judges must take into account the
pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and mitigation set forth in AG ¶ 2(a)
of the AGs, which are intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial
commonsense decision based upon a careful consideration of the pertinent guidelines
within the context of the whole person. 
The adjudicative process is designed to examine a sufficient period of an
applicant’s life to enable predictive judgments to be made about whether the applicant is
an acceptable security risk. The following AG ¶ 2(a) factors are pertinent: (1) the nature,
extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct,
to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4)
the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral chances; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication
policy factors are pertinent herein:
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Handling Protected Information
The Concern: Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations
for protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an individual’s
trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such
information, and is a serious security concern. 
Personal Conduct
The Concern: Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and
ability to protect classified information.  Of special interest is any failure to provide
truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.  AG, ¶ 15.
Burden of Proof
By virtue of the precepts framed by the Directive, a decision to grant or
continue an Applicant's request for security clearance may be made only upon a
threshold finding that to do so is clearly consistent with the national interest.
Because the Directive requires administrative judges to make a common sense
appraisal of the evidence accumulated in the record, the ultimate determination of
an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance depends, in large part, on the
relevance and materiality of that evidence. As with all adversary proceedings, the
Judge may draw only those inferences which have a reasonable and logical basis
from the evidence of record. 
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) it must prove any
controverted fact[s] alleged in the Statement of Reasons, and (2) it must
demonstrate that the facts proven have a material bearing to the applicant's
eligibility to obtain or maintain a security clearance.  The required showing of
material bearing, however, does not require the Government to affirmatively
demonstrate that the applicant has actually mishandled or abused classified
information before it can deny or revoke a security clearance. Rather,
consideration must take account of cognizable risks that an applicant may
deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing
admitted or controverted facts, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant for the
purpose of establishing his or her security worthiness through evidence of
refutation, extenuation or mitigation of the Government's case.
Analysis
Applicant is a well-regarded electronic systems director who committed two
security violations that draw security concern: one in 2006 and another in 2012.
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For each of these violations he received a verbal reprimand, but nothing in writing.
Both his supervisors and NSA officials characterized his actions as mistakes and
not intentional or negligence in nature. Also of security concern are admitted
Applicant infidelities (12 to 18 in all) over a 10-year period spanning 1985 and
1995. These acknowledged infidelities draw security concerns due to his failure to
disclose the details of his infidelities to his wife. 
Handling Protected Information
Applicant’s mistaken transmission of emailed classified information over an
unclassified system in 2006 and subsequent escorting of his wife in 2012 into a
secured space without completing a required irregular hours log in violation of his
company’s corporate policy and Chapter 5 of the NISPOM raise security concerns
under the handling of protected information guideline. Multiple disqualifying
conditions covered by Guideline K apply to Applicant’s situation based on the
developed facts. Potentially applicable are the following disqualifying conditions of
DC. ¶ 34: DC ¶ 34(a), “deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or protected
information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal or
business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at seminars, meetings, or
conferences;” DC ¶ 34(g), “any failure to comply with rules for the protection of
classified or other sensitive information;” and DC ¶ 34(h), “negligence or lax
security habits that persist despite counseling by management. “ 
Under his company’s corporate visitor’s policy, Chapter 5 of the NISPOM,
and the Directive’s security violation guideline in force, persons responsible for
safeguarding classified and protected information in their custody and control are
required to avoid transmission of classified information over unsecured systems
and comply with comply with security policies in place designed to protect
classified and sensitive information.  
Applicant’s governing corporate visitation policy in place required
employees escorting visitors into secured areas (in this case Applicant’s wife)
during irregular hours to complete both the visitors log and the irregular hours log
before proceeding to a secure area. While more general in scope, the NISPOM
provides baseline standards for the protection of classified information released or
disclosed to industry in connection with classified contracts under the NISP.
Originally issued in January 1995, the NISPOM was reissued in February 2006
pursuant to Executive Order 12829 and under the authority of DOD Directive
5220.22-M. Chapter 5, Sections 305 and 306 of the NISPOM cover restricted
areas that require authorized personnel to challenge all persons who may lack
appropriate access authority. Closed areas must receive supplemental protection
during non-working hours. (Ch. 5-306, supra)
The importance of safeguarding classified and protected information cannot
be overemphasized. Protecting the nation’s security interests against the risks of
foreign coercion and intimidation remains a core governmental responsibility that
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finds roots in our earliest Constitutional  history and enjoys the sustaining force of
the courts. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
Or put in geopolitical terms, national security policy implies a state of continuing
readiness to take the necessary steps to maintain our national independence. Cf.
H. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom 51 (1950, reprinted 1971).  
What is to be weighed in this case are the actions of Applicant in his
inadvertent transmitting of classified information in 2006 to four recipients over an
unsecured network system and later escorting his wife into a closed area in 2012
without completing the required irregular hours log in compliance with his
company’s corporate policy and the NISPOM. What is at stake in the ultimate
balancing process is a weighted assessment of whether Applicant’s mistakes are
fully reconcilable with his company’s corporate security policy, the NISPOM, and
the constraints of Guideline K.
To his credit, Applicant has exhibited remorse and renewed understanding
about the importance of safeguarding classified and other protected information in
his custody and control and complying with his employer’s visitation policies in
place. His acceptance of counseling from his supervisors following both incidents,
his ensuing development of training slides for his team members that address his
company’s corporate security policies, his meeting requirements for holding higher
level security clearances, his avoidance of any other security violations, his
contributions to his employer, and his exhibited renewed commitments to
protecting classified information all weigh heavily in Applicant’s favor. 
Based on Applicant’s overall track record to date in handling protected
information in his possession and control, his expressed remorse, and his lack of
any known recurrent violations in over four and a half five years, Applicant merits
significant mitigation consideration. His cited mistakes compel careful
consideration of all of the facts surrounding the two incidents in issue in 2006 and
2012. Considering the absence of any proven intent or negligence involved in the
incidents and the lack of risks of recurrence in the foreseeable future, safe
predictions of Applicant’s avoiding similar incidents in the foreseeable future can
be made at this time. Applicable to the facts of Applicant’s case is  MC ¶ 35(a), “so
much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual’s current liability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.
From a whole-person perspective, Applicant has established a good
relationship of trust with his direct supervisors over many years of close working
relationships. He has been credited by his supervisors and coworkers with
conscientious work ethics. His supervisors’ assessments of his judgment,
reliability, and trustworthiness reflect accurate, thorough, and complete work
assignments that met the expectations of his team leaders. These are qualities that
serve him well in fulfilling his fiducial responsibilities in protecting accessed
protected information.
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Taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding Applicant’s
recurrent mistaken actions in 2006 and 2012 and ensuing demonstration of
remorse and correction actions taken to avoid any recurrences, Applicant mitigated
the Government’s security concerns. Favorable conclusions warrant with respect
to the allegations covered by subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b of  Guideline K.
Personal Conduct Concerns
Security concerns are raised as well over Applicant’s failure to disclose all of
the details of 12 to 18 extra-marital infidelities or affairs he admitted to between
1985 and 1995. Because Applicant has not disclosed the details of his infidelities
to his wife, some application of DC ¶ 16(e), “personal conduct, or concealment of
information about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may
affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing . . . ,” is
warranted. 
Department Counsel cited to several Appeal Board cases covering non-
disclosed infidelities that could place the applicant at risk to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress. In ISCR Case No, 13-00255 at 2-3 (App. Bd. July 9,
2014), the Appeal Board confirmed the administrative judge’s finding that the
applicant’s wife was unaware of the applicant’s 2007 extra-marital affair.  Under
these circumstances, the Appeal Board concluded that the applicant remained
vulnerable to coercion and duress. This case is distinguishable from the facts in
Applicant’s case, where the cited infidelities are not only much older, but spousal
and supervisor disclosures are evident.
In ISCR Case No 09-01896 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Apr. 29, 2010), Applicant told
his current spouse about his 10-year affair while married to his former spouse, but
did not tell her of his other affairs while married to his former spouse. Nor did he
tell his former military or civilian  supervisors of his extra-marital sexual behavior.
Adverse inferences were drawn by the administrative judge and sustained by the
Appeal Board of Applicant’s continued risk of exposure to coercion or duress. By
contrast, Applicant generally disclosed his prior infidelities to his wife and
supervisors, omitting only the specific details of his indiscretions. 
In a still older case, the Appeal Board sustained a trial judge’s finding that
the applicant had not disclosed his extra-marital affairs to his wife. With these
facts, The Appeal Board sustained the trial judge’s finding that Applicant’s withheld
information from his wife about his infidelities exposed him to continued
vulnerability to coercion and duress. See ISCR Case No, 97-07524-5 (App. Bd.
December 4, 1998). This case, too, can be distinguished from the facts in
Applicant’s case, which include unchallenged general disclosures to his wife and
supervisors, which lacked only the specific details.
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Under the facts and circumstances of Applicant’s case, Applicant disclosed
his infidelities to his wife as far back as 1995 without disclosing the details of his
extra-marital indiscretions. After counseling with his pastor, an ordained
Presbyterian minister and LDPC, who specializes in marriage and family therapy,
Applicant accepted his counselor’s advice not to disclose specific details about his
sexual infidelity to his wife.  
Applicant and his wife have since celebrated their 30  wedding anniversaryth
and have strengthened their wedding vows. While he still struggles some with
lustful thoughts, he has remained loyal to his wife and has not engaged in any
sexual or physical affairs in over 20 years. MC ¶ 17(e), “the individual has taken
positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities, exploitation, manipulation, or
duress,” fully applies.
From a whole-person perspective, Applicant’s overall disclosure efforts with
his wife and supervisors are persuasive and are based not only on his own best
instincts, but the advice of his counselor, and wife. Applicant has compiled
meritorious performance records in both his military service and civilian
employments in the defense industry. 
Applicant’s past supervisors and CPSO who have worked with him and are
familiar with his work and past mistakes all credit him with excellent overall
judgment and reliability in following security procedures. Further,  both his
professional counselor and wife credit him with restored trust and renewed
commitment to his marriage vows. 
Considering all of the circumstances surrounding Applicant’s past marital
infidelities, expressed remorse, and steps he has taken to restore his wife’s trust in
his renewed marriage commitments, Applicant mitigated the Government’s security
concerns over his past marital infidelities. Favorable conclusions warrant with
respect to the allegations covered by subparagraph 2.a  of  Guideline E.
Formal Findings
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR in the context of the findings of fact,
conclusions, and the factors and conditions listed above, I make the following
separate formal findings with respect to Applicant's eligibility for a security
clearance.
GUIDELINE K:                                                     FOR APPLICANT
Subparas. 1.a-1.b:             For  APPLICANT
GUIDELINE E:                                                     FOR APPLICANT
subpara. 2.a:                                             For Applicant     
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Conclusions
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security
clearance. Clearance is granted.
                                  
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge