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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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[NAME REDACTED] )       ISCR Case No. 15-01537
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Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Douglas Velvel, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant held a Canadian passport in addition to a U.S. passport. However, he
has relinquished the foreign passport and it has been destroyed. Applicant also is a dual
citizen of the United States and Canada. He does not maintain his foreign citizenship to
preserve property or financial interests in Canada or to receive benefits from the
Canadian government. Security concerns about foreign preference are mitigated.
Further, available information is sufficient to mitigate the foreign influence security
concerns about Applicant’s ties to persons who are citizens and residents of Canada,
Taiwan, Serbia, and Croatia. His request for continued security clearance eligibility is
granted.
Statement of the Case
On June 11, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (EQIP) to obtain eligibility for a security clearance required for
  Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DOD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
 The adjudicative guidelines were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. These2
guidelines were published in the Federal Register and codified through 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).
 At Department Counsel’s request, a list of the Government’s exhibits is included as Hearing Exhibit (Hx.) 1.3
Also, Gx. 3 is Department Counsel’s request that I take administrative notice of facts pertaining to Taiwan. I
granted that request and have considered some of the information presented in Gx. 3 and its 12 references.
 Hx. 2 identifies Ax. B and includes Department Counsel’s waiver of objection as to admissibility.4
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his employment with a defense contractor. After reviewing the results of the ensuing
background investigation, adjudicators for the Department of Defense (DOD) could not
determine that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to continue Applicant’s
security clearance.  1
On September 17, 2015, DOD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging
facts which raise security concerns addressed under the adjudicative guidelines  for2
foreign influence (Guideline B) and foreign preference (Guideline C). Applicant timely
responded to the SOR (Answer) and requested a decision without a hearing.
Subsequently, the Government timely requested a hearing, as authorized by Section
E3.1.7 of the Directive.
The case was assigned to me on March 24, 2016, and I convened the requested
hearing on April 25, 2016. The parties appeared as scheduled. Department Counsel
presented Government Exhibits (Gx.) 1 - 3.  Applicant testified and presented3
Applicant’s Exhibit (Ax.) A. All exhibits were received without objection. I received a
transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on May 3, 2016. The record closed on May 13, 2016, after
I admitted Ax. B, which was submitted post-hearing and to which Department Counsel
did not object.4
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline B, the Government alleged that Applicant owns a home in
Canada worth about $136,000 (SOR 1.a); that his mother is a dual citizen of Canada
and Taiwan residing in Canada (SOR 1.b); that his sister is a dual citizen of Canada and
Taiwan residing in Taiwan (SOR 1.c); that his father-in-law is a citizen and resident if
Croatia (SOR 1.d); that his mother-in-law is a citizen and resident of Serbia (SOR 1.e);
that his wife is a dual citizen of Canada and Serbia (SOR 1.f); and that Applicant has a
retirement savings account in Canada worth about $53,000 (SOR 1.g). Applicant
admitted, with explanation, all of these allegations except for SOR 1.c. He denied that
allegation, explaining that his sister never obtained Canadian citizenship.
Under Guideline C, the Government alleged that in 2013, Applicant obtained a
Canadian passport that will expire in 2018 (SOR 2.a); that after becoming a U.S. citizen
in 2011, Applicant used his Canadian passport at least once (SOR 2.b); and that
Applicant is maintaining his Canadian citizenship to protect the retirement savings
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account referenced at SOR 1.g (SOR 2.c). Applicant admitted, with explanations, each
of these allegations. In addition to the facts established through Applicant’s admissions,
I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is 60 years old and works for a defense contractor in support of a
military aviation project. He was born in Taiwan, but moved to Canada with his parents
and older sister and her family while he was still a teenager. After finishing high school
in Canada, he received his college and post-graduate education there as well. Applicant
became a Canadian citizen in 1985. His understanding is that he ceased to be a
Taiwanese citizen at that time. He has not traveled to Asia in 30 years, and he has not
sought or received any benefits as a Taiwanese citizen since 1985. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 30
- 31, 44 - 52)
Applicant’s sister and her family did not stay in Canada very long and returned to
Taiwan. She is now 67 years old and is experiencing the early stages of dementia.
Applicant has infrequent contact with his sister, who has never worked for or been
associated with the Taiwanese government. (Gx. 1; Tr. 30 - 31)
Applicant has a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering. After working in
the aerospace industry in Canada starting in 1985, he moved to the United States to
take a job with a subcontractor to a major U.S. aerospace corporation in 1996. He left
that job for another U.S. job in 1999. He returned to his previous U.S. employer in 2007.
In September 2013, he accepted a position in Canada with another well-known
aerospace corporation; however, after less than a year he realized that he preferred
living and working in the United States, where he had become a naturalized citizen in
October 2011. In May 2014, he accepted his current position with a private company
that provides qualified manpower to work in support of military programs. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2;
Ax. A)
When Applicant returned to Canada for work in 2013, he needed a Canadian
work permit. To prove he was eligible, he obtained a Canadian passport that is valid
until 2018. Applicant used the Canadian passport only for purposes of obtaining his
work permit and when he re-entered Canada in 2013. He has since relinquished his
Canadian passport and it has been destroyed. (Gx. 2; Ax. B; Tr. 34, 40)
While Applicant was still living and working in Canada before 1996, he
contributed to a Canadian Retirement Savings Plan. Alternately described as a 401k
retirement account and a social security account, it is currently valued at about $53,000.
By virtue of reciprocity agreements between Canada and the U.S., Applicant’s U.S.
citizenship does not preclude him from receiving those funds at retirement. However,
Applicant has not closed or transferred the account to a U.S. fund because he believes
he will incur an onerous tax penalty if he does so before reaching retirement age. He is
not actively contributing to that account. (Answer; Gx. 2; Tr. 29, 52)
Applicant’s mother is a dual citizen of Taiwan and Canada. She is 86 years old
and lives in Canada in a house Applicant bought for her and his now-deceased father in
 The PRC does not recognize Taiwan, and insists there is only “one China.” In 1949, Taiwan was populated5
by refugees fleeing a civil war in China. That same year, Communists in mainland China established the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and a separate, independent government was established in Taiwan.
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about 1990. The house cost $136,000, but is now paid off and worth about $300,000.
Applicant’s name is on the deed so he can manage the property for his mother and
make decisions about it after she dies. Applicant would like for his mother to move into
a smaller home where elder care is available, but she refuses to move. She also does
not want to come to the United States as all of her friends and familiar surroundings are
in Canada. Applicant visits her periodically. He has only used his U.S. passport for
those trips. Applicant did not live in that house before coming to the United States. He
sold his home in Canada in 1993. Applicant does not have to be a Canadian citizen to
own or dispose of real property there, or to manage his mother’s estate when the time
comes. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 35)
Applicant has been married twice. His first marriage was to a Canadian citizen in
August 1982. They had two children, both now in their thirties. Applicant and his first
wife divorced in July 1992. He has no contact with his ex-wife and very little contact with
his children, all of whom still live in Canada. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2)
Applicant remarried in January 1998. His wife is a dual citizen of Serbia and
Canada. They have three teenage children, all of whom are natural-born U.S. citizens.
Applicant’s wife’s parents are both from the former Yugoslavia, but were separated in
the early 1990s due to the Balkan conflicts. He is a citizen and resident of Croatia. She
is a citizen and resident of Serbia. Applicant has very infrequent contact with either of
his wife’s parents. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2)
This is Applicant’s first application for a security clearance. However, his work
between 2007 and 2013 included large airframe applications for military in-flight
refueling platforms. Over the past 20 years, Applicant has established himself as a
highly-accomplished aerospace engineer in his work for several of the largest
aerospace corporations in North America. He is certified through U.S. federal
regulations for work involving material review board (MRB) universal product review
(UPR) matters. He also is a certified design approval engineer (DAE), a designated
design engineer (DDE), and a designated MRB mentor. (Ax. A; Tr. 32 - 33, 41)
Department Counsel did not present information about Canada, Serbia, or
Croatia. However, based on the information presented about Taiwan, I take
administrative notice of the following facts:
Taiwan is an island nation governed through a multi-part democracy. Since its
separation from the mainland Chinese government more than 65 years ago,  Taiwan5
has become an industrialized economic entity and a leading producer of high-
technology goods. In 1979, the U.S. formally recognized the PRC as the sole legal
government of China. However, the United States has maintained cultural, commercial,
 See Directive, 6.3.6
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).7
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and military relations with Taiwan. Maintaining strong relations with Taiwan is a major
U.S. goal. The United States does not officially support Taiwanese independence, but it
does support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and
the Asian Development Bank. The United States also is committed to helping Taiwan
maintain its defensive capabilities, and has sold the Taiwanese defensive military
equipment and weapons, including destroyers, anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel
submarines. Notwithstanding these close ties with the United States, Taiwan continues
to target the United States, among others, as part of its long-standing use of aggressive
economic and information espionage activities.
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,6
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the adjudicative
guidelines (AG). Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors listed in ¶ 2(a)
of the guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole-person” concept, those factors
are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information.
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to7
have access to classified information. The Government bears the initial burden of
producing admissible information on which it based the preliminary decision to deny or
revoke a security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, the Government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the Government meets its burden, it
then falls to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the Government’s case.
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.8
 See Egan; AG ¶ 2(b).9
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Because no one has a “right” to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy
burden of persuasion.  A person who has access to classified information enters into a8
fiduciary relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. Thus, the
Government has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the
requisite judgment, reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national
interests as his or her own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard
compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in
favor of the Government.9
Analysis
Foreign Influence
The Government’s information, along with Applicant’s admissions, is sufficient to
support the factual allegations under this guideline. The facts established reasonably
raise a security concern about possible foreign influence that is addressed, in relevant
part, at AG ¶ 6, as follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism. 
Applicant’s sister is a citizen and resident of Taiwan. Although the possibility
exists that Applicant and his mother have not been Taiwanese citizens when they
became Canadian citizens over 30 years ago, Applicant did not present information to
establish that fact. Applicant has ties of affection to citizens of Serbia and Croatia
through his wife, a dual citizen of Canada and Serbia, and her parents. Applicant also
owns a home in Canada, which he bought 20 years ago for his parents, and he has
about $53,000 in a Canadian retirement savings account.
Of the specific AG ¶ 7 disqualifying conditions, the following are pertinent to
these facts and circumstances:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
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foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.
As to security concerns about ties to persons who are citizens and residents of
Canada, Serbia, and Croatia, none of these disqualifying conditions apply. No
information was provided about those countries that shows the presence of Applicant’s
mother, wife, and in-laws either creates a heightened risk of coercion, or that
establishes a potential conflict of interest stemming from some unspecified desire to
help those foreign citizens.
As to security concerns about Applicant’s house and savings account in Canada,
AG ¶ 7(e) does not apply. Even if those financial interests are considered to be
significant, the fact that they are located in Canada has not been shown to create a
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation. The savings account was built over a
period of years and Applicant has not contributed to it in more than 20 years. He will not
access the account until he retires so he can avoid onerous tax penalties for early
withdrawal. The house in question is paid for and was purchased, not as an investment,
but as a place for his parents to live out their days. Any financial interest Applicant has
in that property is speculative.
Applicant’s sister’s citizenship and residence in Taiwan requires application of
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b). Taiwan is an aggressive collector of economic and industrial
information from the United States. Even though it is an open society, its activities in
pursuit of foreign intelligence creates a heightened risk that Applicant might be coerced
or manipulated through ties to his sister.
By contrast, available information supports application of the following AG ¶ 8
mitigating conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
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placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
As to AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c), Applicant does not visit his sister and has little contact
with her. She is older than he, and beginning to show signs of dementia. Applicant’s
sister returned to Taiwan from Canada more than 30 years ago and has lived a life
without employment by or association with the government of Taiwan. There is little
likelihood these circumstances will actually create a risk of foreign influence or coercion,
or that Applicant will be in a position of having to choose between his obligations toward
the U.S. and the interests of Taiwan.
AG ¶ 8(b) applies, because Applicant’s life is wholly divorced from his Taiwanese
origins. He moved with his family to Canada in the mid-seventies, became a citizen
there in 1985, finished his high school and college educations there, and raised a family
there. For the past 20 years, he has lived and worked in the United States. He has
established a career in the U.S. aerospace industry and raised a family here. He has
not returned to visit his sister in Taiwan in over 30 years, and he intends to retire in the
United States. On balance, available information shows that the security concerns about
this Applicant possibly being influenced by foreign connections and interests are
mitigated.
Foreign Preference
Available information shows that, as alleged in SOR 2.a and 2.b, Applicant
exercised his Canadian citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen when he obtained and
used a Canadian passport. It also was alleged that Applicant is maintaining his
Canadian citizenship to protect his retirement account, but the record does not support
this. The only reason Applicant still has an account in Canada is that he will incur a
large tax penalty if he accesses the account before retirement. There is no information
showing that he has to be a Canadian citizen to receive those funds. SOR 2.c is
resolved for Applicant. Nonetheless, the information provided in support of SOR 2.a and
2.b reasonably raises a security concern about foreign preference that is articulated at
AG ¶ 9, as follows:
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When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States. 
More specifically, the record requires application of the disqualifying condition at
AG ¶ 10(a)(1) (exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This
includes but is not limited to:. . . . (1) possession of a current foreign passport).
Applicant obtained a Canadian passport in order to obtain a Canadian work permit for a
short-lived job in Canada’s aerospace industry in 2013. He used the passport once for
that purpose and once to enter Canada when he moved to take the job
By contrast, the record also requires application of the mitigating position at AG ¶
11(e) (the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority,
or otherwise invalidated). Applicant’s FSO has destroyed the foreign passport. When
Applicant travels to Canada to see his mother, he uses his U.S. passport. The record
evidence as a whole on this issue shows that Applicant will not exercise his Canadian
citizenship in the future. I am confident he will continue to act in the best interests of the
United States. The security concern under the guideline is resolved for Applicant.
I also have evaluated this record in the context of the whole-person factors listed
in AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant has firmly established his personal life and professional career in
the United States over the past 20 years. Before coming to this country in 1996, ties to
Taiwan were already greatly attenuated by his life in Canada. It is unlikely that he could
be coerced by the Taiwanese government through his sister’s presence there, or that he
will again exercise his Canadian citizenship. A fair and commonsense assessment of
the record evidence as a whole suggests that the security concerns raised by the
Government’s information are resolved.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.g: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.c: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the foregoing, it is clearly consistent with the national interest for
Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a security
clearance is granted.
                                       
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge