Consisting of the transcript (Tr.), Government exhibit (GE) 1, hearing exhibits (HE) I-II, and Applicant exhibits1
A-G.
DoD acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20,2
1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD on
1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of:     )
    )
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX         )     ISCR Case No. 12-08736
    )
Applicant for Security Clearance     )
Appearances
For Government: Mary M. Foreman, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se   
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  I grant Applicant’s clearance.1
On 7 August 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued an SOR to
Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence.  Applicant2
timely answered the SOR, requesting a hearing before the Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals (DOHA). DOHA assigned the case to me 11 April 2016, and I convened a
hearing 12 May 2016. DOHA received the transcript 23 May 2016, and the record
closed.
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations. He is a 44-year-old quality assurance
tester employed by a defense contractor since March 2013. He has been employed in
related businesses since April 2001, first as a subcontractor to his current company,
now as a direct hire. He has not previously held an industrial clearance, but received
favorable trustworthiness determinations from another Government agency in
September 2001 and August 2011 (GE 1; Tr. 37).
Applicant was born and raised in India, and obtained his undergraduate degree
from a university in India in August 1996. He has been employed in the information
technology field since graduation.
Applicant immigrated to the U.S. on an employment visa in May 1998, and
became a naturalized U.S. citizen in May 2010. He obtained a U.S. passport in June
2010. India does not recognize dual citizenship. Its citizenship law permits voluntary
renunciation of citizenship, and states that voluntarily obtaining citizenship in another
country may be grounds for involuntary loss of Indian citizenship. Under U.S.
immigration law, Applicant was required to retain his Indian passport until his citizenship
status changed. Applicant’s most recent Indian passport was issued in August 2005, but
was cancelled by the Indian Embassy in June 2010 (GE 1).
Applicant married in December 2000 in India, and his wife immigrated to the U.S.
on a spouse visa. She became a legal permanent resident of the U.S. in April 2013 (AE
A). She has applied for U.S. citizenship, and has been scheduled for her initial interview
in May 2016 (AE B). Applicant and his wife have two children born in August 2003 and
August 2011, both U.S.-born citizens.
Applicant’s mother, father, sister, mother-in-law, and father-in-law are resident
citizens of India. Applicant’s mother and mother-in-law are housewives. He speaks to
his mother weekly and to his mother-in-law quarterly. Applicant’s father and father-in-
law are retired. His father retired in 2016 from his job as a marketing manager for a
fertilizer company. His father-in-law was also employed in the private sector, and retired
in 2007. Neither his father nor his father-in-law had any connection to the Indian
Government (TR. 36). He speaks to his father monthly and his father-in-law quarterly.
Applicant’s sister is a self-employed dentist; he also speaks to her monthly. None of
Applicant’s relatives live in the areas of India that have been most subject to terrorist
activity. Applicant has traveled to India with his family to visit relatives there in July
2009, August 2012, and August 2015, each time for about a month.
Applicant’s father owns agricultural land in India; Indian law prohibits Applicant
from inheriting the property because he is now a foreign national from India’s
perspective. Applicant has no financial interests in India. Applicant reported his foreign
relatives as required on his clearance application (GE 1).
3
India is a stable, multiparty, federal, democratic republic with a bicameral
parliament and a population of about 1.21 billion. The central government has broad
administrative powers in relation to its states. The Indian government generally respects
the rights of its citizens. Recent elections have been free and fair, despite scattered
instances of violence. India has a vibrant civil society, free press, and a robust
democratic political system. Yet, endemic government and police corruption, caste-
based discrimination, and domestic violence and other abuses against women and
children persist, despite criminal penalties for violations and government efforts to
implement programs designed to empower members of the lower castes. Police and
security forces often act with impunity, and serious abuses have been reported in
criminal investigations and efforts to suppress domestic terrorism. Separatist and
terrorist groups remain active in areas of conflict. Because of these threats to safety, the
U.S. State Department has advised U.S. citizens to practice good security when in
India, and to avoid travel to areas of domestic conflict and to the India-Pakistan border. 
 
India’s size, population, and strategic location give it a prominent voice in
international affairs. India remains a leader of the developing world and of the Non-
Aligned Movement. Long a member of the United Nations, the country has held a non-
permanent seat on the Security Council in 2011-2012, and seeks a permanent seat on
the Council. It has long participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and has
committed $1.3 billion to Afghan reconstruction efforts. The rapidly growing software
sector in India is boosting service exports and modernizing the country’s economy,
although excessive regulatory and bureaucratic structures and corruption present
obstacles to growth. The United States, India’s largest investment partner, strongly
supports the market reforms undertaken by India since 1991 and urges further
liberalization of trade and investment barriers. Foreign assistance was about $3 billion in
2006-2007, with the United States providing about $126 million in development
assistance.
Since 2000, India has been listed as actively engaged in economic intelligence
collection and industrial espionage directed at the United States, although there is no
evidence that India then or now tortures or abuses its citizens to extract economic
intelligence. The United States has also had longstanding economic issues with India
regarding protection of intellectual property rights and trade in dual-use technology.
Differences between the United States and India still exist over India’s nuclear weapons
programs, the slow pace of India’s economic reforms due to inadequate infrastructure,
cumbersome bureaucracy, corruption, labor market rigidity, and regulatory and foreign
investment controls, and India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Iran.
At the same time, these differences no longer dominate the United States’
attitude toward India. The United States recognizes India as key to strategic interests.
Since 2002, the United States and India have held increasingly substantive combined
exercises involving all military services. Both countries are committed to political
freedom protected by representative government, and share common interests in the
free flow of commerce, in fighting terrorism, and in creating a strategically stable Asia.
The Bush and Obama administrations have been committed to establishing a strong,
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
4
dynamic partnership with India. In June 2005, the two countries signed a ten-year
defense pact outlining planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-
way defense trade and increasing technology transfer opportunities. In July 2007, the
United States and India reached a historic milestone in their strategic partnership by
completing negotiations on a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. In
July 2009, the Obama Administration launched a “Strategic Dialogue” calling for
collaboration on energy, trade, education, and counterterrorism issues. Major U.S. arms
sales to India are underway. In 2009, India signed a $2.1 billion deal to purchase eight
surveillance aircraft from a U.S. manufacturer, setting a new record for the largest-ever
U.S. arms transfer to India. During a recent visit to India in June 2012, then-Secretary of
Defense Panetta cited the strong, strategic, increasingly collaborative, and transparent
relationship between the two countries as the foundation for a new defense strategy
guiding the U.S.’ military rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region. He called for already
strong mutual participation in military exercises to become more regular and complex.
As evidence of the U.S.’ commitment to providing the best defense technology possible
to India, Secretary Panetta pointed to work by the Obama Administration to reform
export controls. He called for India to modernize its own regulations in defense
procurement and nuclear liability legislation.
                                    
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guideline is Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does,
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.3
AG¶6.4
AG¶7(a).5
AG¶7(c).6
AG¶7(e).7
AG¶7(f).8
5
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.4
Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Further,5
security concerns may arise through connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.  In6
addition, security concerns may be raised by a substantial business, financial, or
property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated
business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.  Finally, failure to report, where required, association with a foreign national7
may raise security concerns.8
Concerning potential mitigating factors, AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships
with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or
activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,” largely mitigates the
Applicant’s circumstances regarding his family members living in India.
6
While the ongoing risk of terrorist activity by rogue elements in India raises safety
issues addressed by U.S. Government travel warnings, there is no evidence that
terrorist elements use violence as a means of obtaining protected information. Similarly,
the Indian government and companies are active collectors of such information, but
there is no evidence that they use coercive means or target ex-patriate citizens or
former citizens to obtain this information.
Applicant has ongoing contact with his parents, sister, and in-laws. Most of the
contact is by telephone, although Applicant has traveled to India about every three
years since July 2009 to visit his relatives. Although these contacts cannot be
considered casual and infrequent, the nature and extent of his contact with his relatives
abroad are what one might reasonably expect of any immigrant with a parent or in-laws
living in a distant country.
 
Nothing about his family members’ previous or present occupations or activities
creates a heightened risk. None of them has an affiliation with the Indian government, or
any military, security, or intelligence responsibilities. Applicant’s father and father-in-law,
both long retired, were employed in the private sector, with no direct connection to the
national government. His sister is a dentist. His mother and mother-in-law are life-long
housewives.
India and the United States have significantly improved their bilateral relations in
the past decade. They have held a series of substantive combined exercises involving
all military services since 2002. As evidence of the U.S.’ commitment to provide the best
defense technology possible to India, India signed in 2009 a $2.1 billion deal to
purchase eight surveillance aircraft from a U.S. manufacturer, setting a new record for
the largest-ever U.S. arms transfer to that country. The Obama administration
characterizes the relationship between the two nations as strong, strategic, increasingly
collaborative, and transparent. India has also been a reliable ally of the United States in
the fight against international terrorism. The country has taken steps since the Mumbai
attacks to make it more difficult for insurgents or terrorist groups to operate with
impunity. Human rights abuses in India largely involve harsh treatment of persons
suspected of terrorist activity. India is not known to coerce its law-abiding citizens. Yet
Indian-U.S. interests are not aligned on several issues involving Pakistan and other
countries. Indian scientists and chemical companies have been sanctioned by the
United States in the past for transferring nuclear weapons-related equipment and
technology to Iran. Furthermore, India and commercial entities in India have
aggressively targeted U.S. economic intelligence in the past, as recently as 2008,
although the Defense Department does not presently believe that India is exploiting
U.S. technology.
Applicant has no financial assets in India. All his assets are in the U.S. Thus,
Applicant is not subject to influence by Indian authorities.
A heightened risk of undue foreign influence may also be mitigated under AG ¶
8(b), where “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
7
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to his parents, sister, and in-laws
cannot be characterized as “so minimal” for the same reasons that his contacts cannot
be considered “casual and infrequent.” Yet, there is no similar sense of loyalty to a
foreign group, government, or country. Moreover, Applicant has persuaded me that he
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States, where
he has resided since 1998 and established firm roots. He started his family, has
significant assets, and established his home here. His children are U.S. citizens; his
wife and his older brother are naturalized U.S. citizens. Applicant and his children are
U.S. citizens; his wife has started the naturalization process. They have no desire to live
in India.
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct
and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at
AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant has family ties to India that potentially raise concerns of foreign
influence. He is not likely to jeopardize himself, his spouse, or the employment that he
values. Applicant has demonstrated his reliability and trustworthiness to another
Government agency through past trustworthiness determinations made under the same
set of circumstances. After considering all the facts and circumstances, I find it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance.
Accordingly, I resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraphs a-h: For Applicant
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.
 
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge