Item 3. He also submitted Item 4, his first SF-86 on Oct. 21, 2008.1
 Item 1.2
1
                                                                     
                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 14-04987
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Andre M. Corrales, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant falsified two security clearance applications concerning his illegal drug
involvement before and during the years he held a security clearance. Resulting
security concerns were not mitigated. Based on a review of the pleadings and exhibits,
eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Statement of the Case 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF-86) on May 9, 2013.1
On October 22, 2015, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility
(DoD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security
concerns under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement) and E (Personal Conduct).  The2
 Department Counsel’s File of Relevant Materials included only the first three pages of Applicant’s answer3
to the SOR and the forum selection/signature/notarization page as Item 2. Applicant provided a full copy of
his answer to the SOR with his response to the File of Relevant Materials. It has been fully considered and
will be cited as, “AE A,” below.     
 Department Counsel submitted eight Items in support of the SOR allegations. The FORM was improperly4
dated January 4, 2015, vice 2016.
 Item 3; AE A. Applicant moved to a state that has legalized recreational marijuana use under state law.5
 Item 2; AE A.6
2
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, that came into effect in the Department of
Defense on September 1, 2006. 
Applicant submitted his written answer to the SOR on November 13, 2015, and
requested that his case be decided by an administrative judge from the Defense Office
of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) on the written record without a hearing.  Department3
Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on January 4, 2016. A complete copy
of the File of Relevant Material (FORM)  was provided to Applicant, and he was4
afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation,
or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. 
Applicant signed the document acknowledging receipt of his copy of the FORM
on February 7, 2016. He submitted additional material within the succeeding 30 days,
and made no objection to consideration of any contents of the FORM other than to
comment on inaccuracies contained therein. Department Counsel had no objection to
Applicant’s FORM response, and it is admitted into the record as Applicant’s Exhibit
(AE) A. DOHA assigned the case to me on March 1, 2016.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 31 years old. He has worked as a software engineer for a defense
contractor since October 2008. He graduated from high school and entered college in
2003, earning a bachelor’s degree in May 2009. He has never married and has no
children. In his FORM response, he said that he recently relocated across the country
and purchased a house with his girlfriend.  5
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the truth of the seven allegations
concerning his drug involvement, and admitted the truth of the nine allegations
concerning his personal conduct.  Applicant’s admissions, including those contained in6
his July 18, 2015 answers to DOHA Interrogatories (Item 5), are incorporated into the
following findings of fact.
 Item 5; Item 6; AE A..7
 Item 2; Item 6; AE A.8
 Item 2; Item 6.9
 Item 6.10
 Item 5.11
 Item 2; Item 6; Item 7; Item 8; AE A.  The revocation was approved by the Deputy Chief of that agency’s12
Adjudications Division on Nov. 5, 2012.  It became final on Apr. 4, 2013, after Applicant did not appeal that
revocation decision.
3
Applicant said that he started using marijuana during the summer of 2003. From
then until March 2012, he smoked it with varying frequency that averaged about once or
twice per week.  He admitted that he used psychedelic mushrooms provided by friends7
on three separate occasions in 2007 and 2008.  On New Year’s Eve 2007, and again8
on a camping trip during the summer of 2010 or 2011, Applicant crushed Adderall pills,
that were prescribed for a friend, into powder and inhaled the drug for which he did not
have a prescription.  9
During a sworn security interview on August 1, 2012, Applicant said that he
purchased marijuana about three or four times per year since he started smoking it. He
said that he never sold or distributed it, but often shared marijuana with his friends in
social situations. He said that he stopped using marijuana after a March 2012 polygraph
examination because he decided it was not worth the stress of being confronted about it
again by security personnel. He also said that he would not use marijuana in the future
while holding a security clearance, but had not made a final decision as to whether he
would resume use in the future. He further told the investigator that, “to be one-hundred
percent honest, you should not believe me,” concerning whether he would continue
smoking marijuana while holding a clearance.  10
In his July 2, 2013 security interview, which he affirmed under oath on July 18,
2015, Applicant said that he may have purchased small amounts of marijuana on three
or four occasions between 2003 and 2008. He further said that from 2008 to March
2012 he purchased marijuana about four times per year. On other occasions, he used
marijuana provided for free by friends.11
Applicant first applied for a security clearance in October 2008, and was granted
a Top Secret clearance in February 2009. On May 12, 2009, he signed a “Personnel
Security Advisory” document, as required under the security policies of another
Government agency, for whom he was performing work under contract at the time. In
that document he acknowledged that, as a condition of receiving or retaining a security
clearance and eligibility for access to the agency’s information and facilities, improper
use of drugs was strictly prohibited. As a result of his subsequent illegal use of
marijuana and Adderall, that agency revoked Applicant’s clearance on October 26,
2012.  12
 Item 4; Item 6.13
Item 3; Item 5; AE A.14
 Item 2; Item 3; Item 5; AE A.15
4
Applicant answered, “No,” in response to the question in Section 24.a on his first
SF-86 in October 2008, which asked whether he had illegally used any controlled
substance in the last seven years. During his August 1, 2012 sworn security interview,
he said that he did not disclose his illegal drug use during the preceding five years on
that SF-86, or during his January 15, 2009 interview conducted by an investigator from
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), because he was worried that if he
disclosed this information it would cause his security processing to be immediately
terminated.  13
On May 9, 2013, after his previous clearance had been revoked, Applicant
submitted the SF-86 security clearance application that is currently under adjudication,
with his certification that all statements therein were true, complete, and correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief. He acknowledged that intentionally falsifying
information on that form was a Federal crime, and could result in denial of his clearance
and debarment from Federal service. Nevertheless, as he now admits, he intentionally
falsified his answers to four questions in Section 23 of that SF-86 concerning his history
of illegal drug activity. He responded, “No,” to the questions that asked: whether he had
illegally used any drugs during the past seven years; whether he had illegally purchased
any drugs during that period; whether he had ever illegally used or otherwise been
involved with a controlled substance while possessing a security clearance; and
whether he had intentionally misused prescription drugs during the past seven years.14
During his July 2, 2013 OPM interview, he said that he answered those questions
incorrectly because he had ‘compelling anecdotal evidence’ that if he had answered
them in the affirmative he would not have ever been granted a clearance, without which
he would not be able to work on the most meaningful and compelling work in his
company. He also declined to discuss the identity of the people with whom he used
drugs, or specifics concerning where they did so. He stated in his answer to the SOR,
“As much as I may be obliged to cooperate with the government, I am certainly much
more strongly obliged not to betray the trust developed over many years that these
people now have in me. . . To be blunt, no job is worth the bonds that I’ve developed
with these people.”15
Applicant’s responses to the SOR and FORM contain extensive commentary
describing his opinions about why the Government should not be concerned about his
history of drug abuse before and after being granted his previous clearance, or his
intentional falsification of two security clearance applications because he knew that
being honest would probably disqualify him from clearance eligibility. A sampling of his
statements is provided for illustration of these views:
 AE A.16
 Id.17
5
My behavior discussed above demonstrates the benign and
irreprehensible nature of the transgressions cited. It should be plainly
visible that the activities I’ve engaged in during my free time have had no
detrimental impact on my work, or on national security. So why, in this
case, are they cause for such concern when other commonplace
behaviors are tolerated? One is tempted to explore the possibility that the
inconsistent treatment of various minor offenses stems from the deep-
seated ideologies supported by politics, though that debate is outside the
scope of this discussion. In any case, since it is clear that minor
missteps committed by otherwise responsible people do not raise
concerns regarding trustworthiness, reliability, or willingness to
defend the nation’s interests, I must assert that Guideline H does not
apply in this situation. (Emphasis in original.)16
Regarding his statement to an investigator in August 2012, that he would not use
marijuana while holding a security clearance, but had not made a final decision as to
whether or not he will ever use marijuana in the future, Applicant stated:
I fail to see why I should be compelled to forsake such a harmless pastime
in an era where our nation is on the cusp of making this substance
accessible medically or even recreationally. Furthermore, it is not a
forgone conclusion that I will be in the service of the government
indefinitely. As such, what arguments could possibly persuade me to
make such a permanent and arbitrary decision? What I may or may not do
in the distant future, when the law may have changed or when my service
to the government has ended, is not within the government’s authority to
question. If I am forced to conclude that the government would simply
prefer not to work with people such as me, based on hypotheticals and
conjecture, then I must consider whether this is a government which
deserves the use of my talents. Again, I am loathe to believe that a
modern, progressive government such as ours would be capable of
such arbitrary decision making, though the [SOR allegation] gives
pause. Not only is [the allegation] incendiary in nature: it adds no value to
the arguments against me. (Emphasis in original)17
Concerning his SF-86 falsifications, he said that the Guideline E allegations were,
“almost entirely superfluous.” He explained, “I’ve found myself unable to believe that our
government would quibble over offenses as trivial as those described [under Guideline
H in the SOR],” and “it was my belief that the government would not dwell on an issue
that I (and the government, as I erroneously imagined) perceived to be so
 Id.18
 Id.19
 Id.20
 Id.21
6
inconsequential. Clearly this is not the case, and I am now cognizant of that fact.”  He18
concluded his response to the SOR with the following summary:
It is my firm belief that the evidence cited can be accurately distilled down
to two statements: 
I. I have recreationally and responsibly used drugs in the
context of a successful, productive, and well balanced life.
II. I have attempted to downplay these activities because I
know that these offenses are so minor that they should not
cast doubt on my reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment.
To paraphrase my rebuttal above, my activities as described in item I are
not a threat to national security and most certainly have not interfered with
my ability to do my job. My lack of candor as described in item II is, in this
case, tantamount to omitting a traffic violation from the investigation
process because such things are so trivial that no question of fitness could
possibly arise - who bothers to report a thing so inconsequential?  19
Applicant provided a heavily redacted copy of what he described to be a recent
company internal newsletter. In an article titled, “Ten Year Anniversary,” the actions by
Applicant and another employee to start up one of the company’s offices were
described as, “a cornerstone of our early success.” Applicant was described as
someone who, “has always been a critical player in [redacted] off-site work and
continues to lead commercial objectives.”20
Applicant also submitted a redacted copy of a string of emails on January 22,
2016, in which he informed his supervisor that he had received the FORM and intended
to respond to it. Applicant’s supervisor responded that they would do everything they
could to try to protect his work share in the event of catastrophe, and expressed that he
was, “happy to continue the fight.” Applicant described these comments as indicating
that the supervisor is not deterred in retaining his employment with the company,
“presumably due to his high regard for me.”21
Applicant also submitted a signed statement of intent as mitigation of security
concerns under Guideline H. He said, “I, [name], intend to not make any use of any
illegal drugs while holding a Security Clearance or while participating in any government
 Id.22
7
work. I understand that any violation will result in an automatic revocation of my
clearance.”22
Other than the internal corporate newsletter article and his supervisor’s email
comments discussed above, the record lacks mitigating evidence addressing the quality
of Applicant’s professional performance or his track record with respect to handling
sensitive information and observation of security procedures. No character witnesses
provided statements describing his judgment, trustworthiness, integrity, or reliability. I
was unable to evaluate his credibility, demeanor, or character in person since he
elected to have his case decided without a hearing.  
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about
theperson, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
8
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Eligibility decisions include consideration of the
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard
classified information, and entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as
to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Analysis
Guideline H, Drug Involvement
AG ¶ 24 expresses the security concern pertaining to drug involvement:
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions
about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may
impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person's ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and
include: 
(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds
identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of
1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis,
depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and
(2) inhalants and other similar substances;
(b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a
manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
AG ¶ 25 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. The four DCs that were raised by the SOR allegations and supported by
the evidence in this case are: 
(a) any drug abuse (see above definition);
(c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture,
purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of illegal drug paraphernalia;
(g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance; and
(h) expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and
convincingly commit to discontinue drug use. 
9
Applicant admittedly used marijuana with varying frequency from about 2003 to
March 2012. In 2007, and again in 2010 or 2011, he used a friend’s prescribed Adderall
without it having been prescribed for him. He illegally used marijuana numerous times,
and Adderall once, while holding a security clearance after February 2009. He
purchased marijuana on more than 15 occasions throughout his eight years of regular
use. He said that he would not use illegal drugs while holding a security clearance or
performing work on Federal contracts, but persistently refused to commit to discontinue
any future illegal drug use. These facts support application of the foregoing DCs,
shifting the burden to Applicant to prove mitigation of resulting security concerns.
AG ¶ 26 provides four conditions that could mitigate the security concerns arising
from Applicant’s drug involvement:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
(b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as: 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; 
(3) an appropriate period of abstinence;
(4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of
clearance for any violation; 
(c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness
during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since ended;
and
(d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program,
including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare requirements,
without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional. 
Applicant’s marijuana abuse continued more than eight years. During that time
he also illegally used psychedelic mushrooms and prescription Adderall several times.
He only stopped abusing drugs in March 2012, after his attempts to conceal the abuse
were revealed and his employment became jeopardized. This behavior was relatively
recent, given its duration, and Applicant’s expressed attitude toward his past conduct
precludes a finding that it is unlikely to recur. In any event, it casts doubt on Applicant’s
current reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment. Mitigation under AG ¶ 26(a) was not
established.
10
Applicant consistently refused to express an intent not to abuse any drugs in the
future, saying only that he would agree not to do so while holding a security clearance
or doing Government work. His signed statement of intent is to the same effect. His
period of abstinence since March 2012 is a start, but not persuasive when compared to
more than eight years of regular drug use without regard to criminal laws and, after
2009, workplace policies prohibiting such conduct. Applicant failed to establish
significant mitigation under AG ¶ 26(b).
Neither AG ¶¶ 20(c) nor (d) were raised by Applicant’s circumstances or the
evidence in this case. He was never prescribed Adderall, and he was neither
recommended for nor involved in any drug treatment program. 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that raise security concerns and may be
disqualifying. Four of those DCs are raised by the allegations and supported by the
evidence in this case:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative;
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as . . . engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s
personal, professional, or community standing . . .; and
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to
the employer as a condition of employment.
11
Applicant admitted that he illegally purchased and used drugs on numerous
occasions from 2003 until March 2012. He affirmatively certified, on two SF-86s
submitted in October 2008 and May 2013, that he had not used any illegal drugs within
the past seven years. He falsely denied illegal drug use during his January 15, 2009,
security interview with an OPM investigator. He also falsely denied having abused
prescription drugs, having abused drugs while holding a security clearance, and illegally
purchasing drugs on his 2013 SF-86. 
Applicant admitted during subsequent interviews that he intentionally failed to
disclose his drug abuse because he thought that it would disqualify him from obtaining a
security clearance. However, he refused to disclose the names of those with whom he
abused drugs or the circumstances under which they did so, professing bonds of loyalty
to his fellow drug abusers that outweighed any duty he felt to be honest or to cooperate
with the Government from whom he seeks access to classified information. These
intentionally deceptive acts demonstrated questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
lack of candor, and unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. 
Applicant’s multiple attempts to conceal his drug involvement created
vulnerability to exploitation or duress since he knew it would adversely affect his
professional standing. His refusal to implicate drug-using friends indicates his
recognition of such vulnerability. He also signed a written commitment on May 12, 2009,
as a condition of employment while working for another Government agency,
acknowledging that drug abuse was prohibited. He regularly violated that commitment
over the following three years, and accordingly suffered revocation of his clearance. 
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate personal conduct security
concerns. Four MCs have potential applicability under the facts in this case:
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
Applicant did not make a prompt or good-faith correction of his false denials
concerning his drug abuse. He did not admit his 2008 and 2009 falsifications until
12
confronted with a polygraph examination in March 2012. After having lost his prior
security clearance as a result of that conduct, he again falsely denied his history of drug
abuse in response to four separate questions on his 2013 SF-86 because he knew it
was likely to raise significant security concerns. He claims that his drug abuse was so
trivial and unimportant that it should not matter that he both engaged in it and
subsequently lied about it under oath. These actions do not constitute minor offenses
when considering the recency, frequency, and circumstances under which they
occurred. His willingness to engage in prohibited activity and then attempt to conceal
potentially damaging information makes him vulnerable to exploitation or duress. He
continues to deny the significance of his behavior, and has not obtained counseling or
otherwise demonstrated that such conduct is unlikely to recur. Thus, Applicant failed to
meet his burden to establish significant mitigation under any of these conditions.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is an accountable
adult, who is responsible for the conduct that underlies the security concerns expressed
in the SOR. His repeated drug abuse while holding a security clearance and his
deliberate attempts to conceal his drug abuse from the Government demonstrated
untrustworthiness, unreliability, and bad judgment.  
Applicant offered insufficient evidence of counseling, rehabilitation, improved
judgment, or responsible conduct in other areas of his life to offset resulting security
concerns. The potential for being subjected to pressure, coercion, or duress remains
largely undiminished, and he has not demonstrated a basis from which to reasonably
conclude that he should be trusted to honestly disclose facts that could adversely affect
national security in the future. 
13
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with substantial doubt as to Applicant’s
present eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He did not meet his burden to
mitigate the security concerns arising from his drug involvement and personal conduct.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.g: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a through 2.i: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge