Consisting of the transcript (Tr.), Government exhibits (GE) 1-4, hearing exhibit (HE) I-II, and Applicant1
exhibits (AE) A-V. AE Q was admitted for the sole purpose of identifying AE A-P for the record and resolving
their admissibility.
DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February2
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG)
effective within the DoD on 1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
XXXXXXXXXXXX )       ISCR Case No. 14-06965
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Candace L. Garcia Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Jacob T. Ranish, Esquire        
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  I grant Applicant’s clearance.1
On 8 June 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) sent Applicant a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence.2
Applicant timely answered the SOR, requesting a hearing before the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). DOHA assigned the case to me 17 September 2015
and I convened a hearing 04 November 2015. DOHA received the transcript 16
November 2015, and the record closed.
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted that her father, sister, brother, mother-in-law, and father-in law
(SOR 1.a) are resident citizens of India; that her brother is a major in the Indian army
(SOR 1.b); and that she has $9,000 in a joint bank account in India (SOR 1.c). She is a
38-year-old software engineer employed by a defense contractor since May 2014. She
has been employed in similar positions since April 2002, except for a brief
unemployment July-August 2013. She has not previously held an industrial clearance,
however it appears that she has received a favorable public trust determination (Tr. 31).
Her husband has held a clearance for about a year (Tr. 62).
Applicant was born and raised in India, until December 2000, when she and her
husband married in India, and she returned with him to the U.S. to live. She became a
legal permanent resident of the U.S. in 2008, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
April 2011. She obtained her U.S. passport in June 2011. As required by U.S.
immigration law, she maintained a valid Indian passport until just before her
naturalization. Her most recent Indian passport was issued in December 2000 and
expired in December 2010. She returned her Indian passport to the Indian Embassy
when she became a U.S. citizen, where the passport was formally cancelled and
returned to her. Her husband also became a naturalized U.S. citizen. They have two
children together, both born in the U.S. (AE T).
India does not recognize dual citizenship. Its citizenship law permits voluntary
renunciation of citizenship, and states that voluntarily obtaining citizenship in another
country may be grounds for involuntary loss of Indian citizenship. However, it does not
appear that this loss is automatic upon obtaining another citizenship. Nevertheless,
Applicant renounced her Indian citizenship (Tr. 29).
Applicant’s father, sister, brother, and parents-in-law are resident citizens of
India. Applicant’s father is a retired school teacher. She speaks to him about monthly.
Her sister is a physics professor at a state university. They speak about every other
month. Her brother is a major in the Indian army, although she does not know his job
title. They also speak about every other month. Applicant’s conversations with her
relatives in India revolve around small talk: respective health and well-being; children’s
activities.
Applicant’s father-in-law is a retired accountant with a semi-private company (Tr.
55). Her mother-in-law is a homemaker. Except as noted above, none of Applicant’s
Indian relatives have any connection to the Indian government or its military. None of
them live in areas known to be subject to terrorist activity.
Applicant and her husband own two homes in the U.S.worth about $275,000,
have about $185,000 in savings, have about $70,000 in automobiles and household
goods, and have stocks and other investment accounts worth about $540,000 (AE R,
S). She and her husband each make about $97,000 annually (Tr. 32). Applicant and her
husband also share a bank account in India, that they have used in the past for travel
3
expenses when they visit India, rather than carry cash. The account currently has about
$10,000-12,000 in it (Tr. 62), amounting to less than 1% of their assets. Applicant and
her husband are willing to close the account, but must be in India to do so. They last
traveled to India to visit relatives in December 2011.
Applicant reported her foreign relatives as required on her May 2014 clearance
application (GE 1), and her September 2013 application for trustworthiness
determination. She discussed her contacts with her foreign relations extensively during
a subject interviews in July 2014 (GE 3), and December 2013 (GE 4). (AE A).
India is a stable multiparty federal, democratic republic with a bicameral
parliament and a population of about 1.21 billion. The central government has broad
administrative powers in relation to its states. The Indian government generally respects
the rights of its citizens. Recent elections have been free and fair, despite scattered
instances of violence. India has a vibrant civil society, free press, and a robust
democratic political system. Yet, endemic government and police corruption, caste-
based discrimination, and domestic violence and other abuses against women and
children persist, despite criminal penalties for violations and government efforts to
implement programs designed to empower members of the lower castes. Police and
security forces often act with impunity, and serious abuses have been reported in
criminal investigations and efforts to suppress domestic terrorism. Separatist and
terrorist groups remain active in areas of conflict. Because of these threats to safety, the
U.S. State Department has advised U.S. citizens to practice good security when in
India, and to avoid travel to areas of domestic conflict and to the India-Pakistan border. 
 
India’s size, population, and strategic location give it a prominent voice in
international affairs. India remains a leader of the developing world and of the Non-
Aligned Movement. Long a member of the United Nations, the country has a non-
permanent seat on the Security Council in 2011-2012, and seeks a permanent seat on
the Council. It has long participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and has
committed $1.3 billion to Afghan reconstruction efforts. The rapidly growing software
sector in India is boosting service exports and modernizing the country’s economy,
although excessive regulatory and bureaucratic structures and corruption present
obstacles to growth. The United States, India’s largest investment partner, strongly
supports the market reforms undertaken by India since 1991 and urges further
liberalization of trade and investment barriers. Foreign assistance was about $3 billion in
2006-2007, with the United States providing about $126 million in development
assistance.
Since 2000, India has been listed as actively engaged in economic intelligence
collection and industrial espionage directed at the United States, although there is no
evidence that India then or now tortures or abuses its citizens to extract economic
intelligence. The United States has also had longstanding economic issues with India
regarding protection of intellectual property rights and trade in dual-use technology.
Differences between the United States and India still exist over India’s nuclear weapons
programs, the slow pace of India’s economic reforms due to inadequate infrastructure,
4
cumbersome bureaucracy, corruption, labor market rigidity, and regulatory and foreign
investment controls, and India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Iran.
At the same time, these differences no longer dominate the United States’
attitude toward India. The United States recognizes India as key to strategic interests.
Since 2002, the United States and India have held increasingly substantive combined
exercises involving all military services. Both countries are committed to political
freedom protected by representative government, and share common interests in the
free flow of commerce, in fighting terrorism, and in creating a strategically stable Asia.
The Bush and Obama administrations have been committed to establishing a strong,
dynamic partnership with India. In June 2005, the two countries signed a ten-year
defense pact outlining planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-
way defense trade and increasing technology transfer opportunities. In July 2007, the
United States and India reached a historic milestone in their strategic partnership by
completing negotiations on a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
In July 2009, the Obama Administration launched a “Strategic Dialogue” calling
for collaboration on energy, trade, education, and counter-terrorism issues. Major U.S.
arms sales to India are underway. In 2009, India signed a $2.1 billion deal to purchase
eight surveillance aircraft from a U.S. manufacturer, setting a new record for the largest-
ever U.S. arms transfer to India. During a recent visit to India in June 2012, Secretary of
Defense Panetta cited the strong, strategic, increasingly collaborative, and transparent
relationship between the two countries as the foundation for a new defense strategy
guiding the U.S.’ military rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region. He called for already
strong mutual participation in military exercises to become more regular and complex.
As evidence of the U.S.’ commitment to providing the best defense technology possible
to India, Secretary Panetta pointed to work by the Obama Administration to reform
export controls. He called for India to modernize its own regulations in defense
procurement and nuclear liability legislation.
 
Applicant has been recognized for her work record (AE U). Her work and
character references, both past and present, consider her honest and trustworthy, and
recommend her for her clearance (AE V). Applicant is also aware of her security
obligations to report any suspicious foreign contacts to her security office.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guideline is Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
AG ¶ 6.4
AG ¶ 7 (a).5
AG ¶ 7 (c).6
5
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does,
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.3
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information4
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Further,5
security concerns may arise through connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.  In6
addition, security concerns may be raised by a substantial business, financial, or
property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated
AG ¶ 7 (e).7
AG ¶ 7 (f).8
6
business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.  Finally, failure to report, where required, association with a foreign national7
may raise security concerns.8
Concerning potential mitigating factors, AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships
with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or
activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,” largely mitigates the
Applicant’s circumstances regarding India.
While the ongoing risk of terrorist activity by rogue elements in India raises safety
issues addressed by U.S. Government travel warnings, there is no evidence that
terrorist elements use violence as a means of obtaining protected information, or that
any of Applicant’s relatives live in areas subject to terrorist activity. Similarly, the Indian
government and companies are active collectors of such information, but there is no
evidence that they use coercive means or target ex-patriate citizens or former citizens to
obtain this information.
Applicant has ongoing contact with her and her spouse’s family members in
India. Most of the contact is by telephone; Applicant and her family last traveled to India
in December 2011. The nature and extent of her contact with her relatives abroad are
what one might reasonably expect of any immigrant with a parent or in-laws living in a
distant country. Still, almost by definition, the contacts cannot be considered “casual
and infrequent.”
 
Aside from her brother, nothing about Applicant’s family members’ previous or
present occupations or activities creates a heightened risk. None of them has an
affiliation with the Indian government, or any military, security, or intelligence
responsibilities. Applicant’s father, sister, and father-in-law were employed in the private
or semi-private sector. Her mother-in-law is a housewife. Applicant’s brother is in the
Indian military, but their contacts do not appear to go beyond discussions of family
affairs.
India and the United States have significantly improved their bilateral relations in
the past decade. They have held a series of substantive combined exercises involving
all military services since 2002. As evidence of the U.S.’ commitment to provide the best
defense technology possible to India, India signed in 2009 a $2.1 billion deal to
purchase eight surveillance aircraft from a U.S. manufacturer, setting a new record for
the largest-ever U.S. arms transfer to that country. The Obama administration
characterizes the relationship between the two nations as strong, strategic, increasingly
collaborative, and transparent. India has also been a reliable ally of the United States in
7
the fight against international terrorism. The country has taken steps since the Mumbai
attacks to make it more difficult for insurgents or terrorist groups to operate with
impunity. Human rights abuses in India largely involve harsh treatment of persons
suspected of terrorist activity. India is not known to coerce its law-abiding citizens. Yet
Indian-U.S. interests are not aligned on several issues involving Pakistan and other
countries. Indian scientists and chemical companies have been sanctioned by the
United States in the past for transferring nuclear weapons-related equipment and
technology to Iran. Furthermore, India and commercial entities in India have
aggressively targeted U.S. economic intelligence in the past, as recently as 2008,
although the Defense Department does not presently believe that India is exploiting
U.S. technology.
Applicant’s Indian bank account, which she is willing to close the next time she is
in India does not establish AG ¶ 7(e). The bank account constitutes barely 1% of her
and her spouse’s overall net worth. Nearly de minimus, this is not a substantial property
interest in a foreign country that could present a heightened risk of foreign influence.
Thus, the bank account is also mitigated under the first prong of AG ¶ 8(f), “the value or
routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they
are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence,
manipulate, or pressure the individual.”
A heightened risk of undue foreign influence may also be mitigated under AG ¶
8(b), where “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to her relatives cannot be
characterized as “so minimal” for the same reasons that her contacts cannot be
considered “casual and infrequent.” Still, there is no similar sense of loyalty to a foreign
group, government, or country. Overall, Applicant has persuaded me that she can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States, where she has
resided since 2000 and established firm roots.
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct
and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at
AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant has family and financial ties to India that potentially raise concerns
of foreign influence. Applicant has also minimized the risk somewhat by not discussing
her work with her relatives in India. They are unaware that she is applying for a DOD
clearance. She is not likely to jeopardize herself, her spouse, or the employment that
she needs to provide better opportunities for herself and her spouse. Moreover,
Applicant’s spouse has held a clearance for a year without apparent incident,
presumably on the same facts. Applicant has demonstrated her reliability and
trustworthiness to her co-workers. After considering all the facts and circumstances, I
find it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a
security clearance. Accordingly, I resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
8
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraphs a-c: For Applicant
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.
 
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge