Item 3.1
Item 1.2
1
                                                                     
                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 15-00174
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Carroll J. Connelley, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant immigrated to the United States for graduate education and held a
tenured position at a U.S. university for many years. He left that position for a two-year
teaching position at a university in Hong Kong, and recently agreed to remain there for
two more years. He failed to mitigate resulting security concerns. Based upon a review
of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
Statement of the Case 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 86) on December 6,
2012.  On June 8, 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Statement of1
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence).  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding2
Item 2.3
The Government submitted six Items in support of the SOR allegations. 4
Department Counsel submitted six documents in support of his request for administrative notice, comprising5
the relevant portions of official U.S. Government publications that he cited as authority for the noticed facts.
W ebsite addresses for complete copies of those documents were also provided.
Item 3; Item 4; AE A. 6
Item 2; AE A.7
Item 4; Item 5.8
2
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information effective within the
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on August 25, 2015, and requested that
his case be decided by an administrative judge on the written record without a hearing.3
Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on November 23, 2015.
A complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM)  was provided to Applicant,4
and he was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation,
extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. Applicant received
his copy of the FORM on January 6, 2016. He did not object to consideration of the
Items in the FORM or to Department Counsel’s administrative notice request; but he did
submit additional evidence within the time allotted, to which Department Counsel had no
objection. I received the case assignment on March 23, 2016. Items 1 through 5 in the
FORM are admitted into evidence. Item 6 is Department Counsel’s request for
administrative notice of facts concerning the People’s Republic of China and the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. That request is granted, and the facts stated on
pages 3 through 9 of Item 6 are incorporated into the following findings of fact by
reference.  Applicant’s response to the FORM is admitted into evidence as Exhibit (AE)5
A. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 77-year-old consultant to a defense agency, where he has worked
part-time, on and off, over the past 15 years. He has held various U.S. security
clearances in connection with his consulting work for several different Government
agencies since about 1990. He has been married since 1969, and has two adult
children.  Applicant admitted all of the factual allegations set forth in the SOR, with6
explanations.  Applicant’s admissions, including those made in two interrogatory7
responses,  are incorporated in the following findings.8
Item 3; Item 4.9
Item 3; Item 4; AE A.10
Item 2; Item 4; AE A.11
Item 6. Applicant did not object to the Administrative Notice request or dispute any facts set forth therein.12
3
Applicant was born and raised in India. He came to the United States in 1962 to
pursue postgraduate studies, earning his master’s degree in 1964 and his Ph.D. degree
in 1968. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1971. His wife and two children are
also U.S. citizens and residents.9
Applicant worked for more than 40 years as a tenured professor at a medium-
sized urban private research university. In late 2012, he accepted a lump-sum
retirement buyout offer from the university to leave that position. A longtime friend and
professional associate of his, who is the president of a public research university in
Hong Kong, offered Applicant a two-year highly paid position as a professor at his
school. Applicant accepted the offer in order to be able to continue an academic lifestyle
under the umbrella and infrastructure of a university.   10
Applicant started work at the university in Hong Kong in January 2013, teaching
primarily students from China, but also exchange students from around the world. As
part of his professorial duties, he has traveled to and attended academic conferences
throughout China, and numerous other foreign countries including Norway, Italy,
Turkey, India, England, Canada, Russia, Azerbaijan, South Africa, and Iran. Applicant
accepted an offer to extend his teaching position at the Hong Kong university for an
additional two years, and intends to reside with his wife and work there as a state
employee until at least December 2017. Most of his assets are in the United States, but
he has a Hong Kong bank account that he opened in January 2013 for deposit of his
university compensation (totaling about $30,000 per month) and disbursement of local
living expenses.11
Applicant submitted neither good-character references, nor corroborating
evidence concerning the quality of his professional performance, the level of
responsibility his duties entail, or his track record with respect to handling sensitive
information and observation of security procedures. I was unable to evaluate his
credibility, demeanor, or character in person since he elected to have his case decided
without a hearing. 
I took administrative notice of the facts set forth in Department Counsel’s request
concerning the People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region., which are incorporated herein by reference as noted above.  Of particular12
significance are the poor human rights situation; China’s position as the most active,
aggressive, and persistent country conducting economic and military espionage against
the United States; and the fact that Hong Kong’s partial retention autonomy, after the
4
British ceded sovereignty to China in 1997, does not extend to foreign and defense
affairs.   
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
5
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel persuasively argued that substantial evidence in this
case established three of them: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation. 
China has significant economic and military espionage programs, and
political/military interests, in direct opposition to U.S. interests. Accordingly, Applicant’s
voluntary and significant financial, personal, and professional academic connections to
people and institutions in that country have more potential to generate a heightened risk
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶¶
7(a) and (e), than would similar connections to many other countries.
Applicant accepted a buyout from the U.S. university where he taught for many
years in order to accept a position in a government-owned university in China where a
friend and colleague serves as its president. After his initial two-year employment, he
6
accepted another two-year offer to continue the arrangement. His work at this university
involves teaching and collaboration in Hong Kong and other institutions throughout the
People’s Republic of China. The Hong Kong government pays him the equivalent of
about $30,000 per month for his services there. 
These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising all three of
the aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s contacts, relationships, and
financial connections with China through his voluntary and recently renewed
employment and residence there, shift a heavy burden to him to prove mitigation under
applicable Appeal Board precedent. 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a), (b), and (e) security concerns are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.  
Considered in light of the significant economic and military espionage engaged in
by China, Applicant did not demonstrate that it is unlikely he could be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual or government
and those of the U.S. due to his ongoing employment and academic relationships there.
His communication, collaboration, and contacts with his Chinese employers and
colleagues are neither casual nor infrequent, and he recently renewed those
connections for another two years. Accordingly, he failed to establish the mitigating
conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c).
The evidence also fails to establish significant mitigation under AG ¶¶ 8(b) or 8(f).
Applicant immigrated to the United States from India to pursue a graduate education,
7
then pursued a successful U.S. academic career for more than 40 years. He voluntarily
left his tenured position at a U.S. research university to accept employment at a public
university in Hong Kong, where his friend is the president, and recently agreed to
extend that lucrative arrangement for at least two additional years. He reports that the
university pays him the equivalent of about $30,000 per month, and his duties involve
professional collaboration at institutions throughout China. These are not insignificant or
minimal considerations. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct is not in
question here. He is a mature, talented, and experienced individual, who is seeking to
continue providing services to a DoD agency under changed employment
circumstances.
However, the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress deriving
from Applicant’s residence and employment in Hong Kong remains unmitigated. Placing
Applicant in a position wherein it is foreseeable that he could be forced to choose
between the security interests of the United States and the interests of his ongoing
employment, professional standing, collegial relationships, and family resident in China,
is the harm to be avoided under Appeal Board precedent. He failed to show that such
potential is diminished to any reasonable extent.
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He failed to meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign influence considerations.
8
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.e: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge