1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 15-01444 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Pamela Benson, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se ______________ Decision ______________ LOUGHRAN, Edward W., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the personal conduct and financial considerations security concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On September 26, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines E (personal conduct) and F (financial considerations). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006. Applicant responded to the SOR on November 3, 2015, and elected to have the case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. The Government’s written case was submitted on January 27, 2016. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. Applicant 2 received the FORM on February 5, 2016. As of April 5, 2016, he had not responded. The case was assigned to me on May 10, 2016. The Government exhibits included in the FORM are admitted in evidence. Findings of Fact Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has worked for his current employer since 1998. He served on active duty in the U.S. military from 1985 until he was honorably discharged in 1996. He seeks to retain a security clearance. He attended college for a period without earning a degree. He has been divorced since 1991. He has an adult child.1 The SOR alleges five delinquent debts totaling $33,394. All of the debts alleged in the SOR are listed on a September 2014 credit report, a September 2015 credit report, or both credit reports. Applicant did not deny owing the debts. He stated that he became lazy, did not pay his bills on time, and lived beyond his means. He also admitted that he did not respond to collection letters.2 Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86) in September 2014. He answered “No” to all the financial questions under Section 26, including the following: In the past seven (7) years, you defaulted on any type of loan? (Include financial obligations for which you were the sole debtor, as well as those for which you were a cosignor or guarantor). In the past seven (7) years, you had bills or debts turned over to a collection agency? (Include financial obligations for which you were the sole debtor, as well as those for which you were a cosignor or guarantor). In the past seven (7) years, you have been over 120 days delinquent on any debt not previously entered? (Include financial obligations for which you were the sole debtor, as well as those for which you were a cosignor or guarantor). You are currently over 120 days delinquent on any debt? (Include financial obligations for which you were the sole debtor, as well as those for which you were a cosignor or guarantor).3 Applicant discussed his finances when he was interviewed for his background investigation in October 2014. He admitted that he had four accounts that were in collection. Those four accounts are alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1.d, and 1.e. He stated 1 Items 1, 2, 5. 2 Items 1, 3-5. 3 Item 2. 3 that he had recently applied for a loan through a credit union, which he would use to pay the debts. He stated that he did not report his delinquent debts on the SF 86 because he missed the question.4 Applicant did not pay any of the debts alleged in the SOR. The $1,030 debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.b became delinquent after Applicant’s background interview. In his response to the SOR, he wrote that he was “in the process of selecting a debt management program which will bring all [his] debts to an eventual resolved situation.”5 Applicant denied intentionally falsifying the SF 86. He stated that he completed the SF 86 “while also performing normal work functions, so [he] apparently did not understand (due to [his] multi-tasking while completing the questionnaire) the complete specifics of some of the questions.” He stated that he was aware that a credit report was going to be obtained as part of the investigation, so he had nothing to gain by falsifying the financial questions.6 Having considered all the evidence, I am convinced by substantial evidence7 that Applicant intentionally falsified the SF 86 when he failed to report his delinquent debts. Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 4 Item 5. 5 Items 1, 3-5. 6 Item 1. 7 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” ISCR Case No. 10-09035 at 5 (App. Bd. Jun. 13, 2014) (citing Directive ¶¶ E3.1.14; E3.1.32.1). “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994); ISCR Case No. 04-07187 at 5 (App. Bd. Nov. 17, 2006). 4 The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline F, Financial Considerations The security concern for financial considerations is set out in AG ¶ 18: Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 19. The following are potentially applicable in this case: (a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; and (c) a history of not meeting financial obligations. 5 Applicant was unable or unwilling to pay his debts. The evidence is sufficient to raise AG ¶¶ 19(a) and 19(b) as disqualifying conditions. Conditions that could mitigate the financial considerations security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 20. The following are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; (c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; (d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and (e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue. Applicant attributed his financial problems to being lazy and living beyond his means. He has known that his finances were an issue since his background interview in October 2014, but he has not paid any of the debts alleged in the SOR. One of the debts became delinquent after the interview. In his response to the SOR, he wrote that he was “in the process of selecting a debt management program which will bring all [his] debts to an eventual resolved situation.” The Appeal Board has held that “intentions to pay off debts in the future are not a substitute for a track record of debt repayment or other responsible approaches.” See ISCR Case No. 11-14570 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 23, 2013) (quoting ISCR Case No. 08-08440 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 11, 2009)). There are no applicable mitigating conditions. Guideline E, Personal Conduct The security concern for personal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15, as follows: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 6 and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. The following disqualifying condition is potentially applicable: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities. Applicant intentionally falsified his SF 86 when he failed to report his delinquent debts. AG ¶ 16(a) is applicable. AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following are potentially applicable: (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; and (f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability. 7 Having determined that Applicant intentionally provided false information on the SF 86, I have also determined that his explanations that the omission was unintentional were also false. It would be inconsistent to find that conduct mitigated.8 Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines E and F in this whole-person analysis. 8 See ISCR Case 03-22819 at 4 (App. Bd. Mar. 20, 2006), in which the Appeal Board reversed the Administrative Judge’s decision to grant Applicant’s security clearance: Once the Administrative Judge found that Applicant deliberately falsified a security clearance application in September 2002, the Judge could not render a favorable security clearance decision without articulating a rational basis for why it would be clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant despite the falsification. Here, the Judge gives reasons as to why he considers the falsification mitigated under a “whole person” analysis, namely that Applicant has matured, has held a position of responsibility, recognizes how important it is to be candid in relation to matters relating to her security clearance, and has changed her behavior so that there is little likelihood of recurrence. However, the Judge’s conclusion runs contrary to the Judge’s rejection of Applicant’s explanations for the security clearance application falsification. At the hearing (after earlier admitting the falsification in her March 2003 written statement to a security investigator), Applicant testified that she had not intentionally falsified her application. Given the Judge's rejection of this explanation as not being credible, it follows that the Judge could not have concluded Applicant now recognizes the importance of candor and has changed her behavior. 8 I considered Applicant’s honorable military service. However, he has unresolved financial problems and he intentionally provided false information about his finances on his SF 86. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. I conclude Applicant did not mitigate the personal conduct and financial considerations security concerns. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline F: Against Applicant Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline E: Against Applicant Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to continue Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. ________________________ Edward W. Loughran Administrative Judge