Consisting of the transcript (Tr.), Government exhibits (GE) 1-3, and hearing exhibits (HE) I-II.1
DoD acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20,2
1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD on
1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of:     )
    )
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX     )     ISCR Case No. 15-01212
    )
Applicant for Security Clearance     )
Appearances
For Government: Alison P. O’Connell, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se   
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  I grant Applicant’s clearance.1
On 27 August 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign
Influence.  Applicant timely answered the SOR, requesting a hearing before the2
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). DOHA assigned the case to me 7
June 2016, and I convened a hearing 7 September 2016. DOHA received the transcript
15 September 2016, and the record closed.
His clearance was suspended from November 1997 to 2001, while he was treated for depression (GE 1; Tr.3
27-28).
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegation. He is a 47-year-old senior strategic
technical engineer employed by a defense contractor since May 2015. He has been
continually employed in similar positions since he retired from the military in December
2006. He was briefly unemployed from April 2014 to May 2015 (GE 3; Tr. 27). He has
been married since February 1988, and has several adult children, along with an
adopted step-child, with his wife. His wife is a naturalized U.S. citizen, born in Germany.
Applicant and his wife own a house in Germany worth nearly $700,000. Applicant
reported this foreign interest, his foreign travel, and his affair with a foreign national on
his November 2011 clearance application (GE 1).
Applicant enlisted in the United States (U.S.) military in July 1986, at age 17, and
served honorably on active duty for over 20 years, retiring in paygrade E-7 in December
2006. His father was career military. Applicant seeks to retain the clearance he has
held, as needed,  since shortly after enlisting—including the industrial clearance he has3
held since December 2007 (GE 1).
From May 2008 to October 2014, Applicant engaged in an extra-marital affair
with a Ukranian citizen. They met at a salsa party while they were both deployed
overseas, he as the chief operations manager for a Government contractor, she as an
employee of another U.S. Government agency (AGA), with whom she held a clearance
(Answer).
Applicant and his paramour were co-located until December 2008, when
Applicant undertook other overseas assignments for his company. They maintained
daily telephone contact until May 2009, when she went to work for the same company,
and they were both assigned to the same contract in a different country. She left the
company in August 2011 and returned to Ukraine until early 2012, when she returned to
work for AGA. Except for that brief hiatus, she has been employed with AGA for the last
17 years (GE 3). When Applicant and his paramour were not co-located, they
maintained regular communication by telephone and computer. Their relationship ended
in October 2014, from growing apart. Applicant ended the relationship (Tr. 23, 36).
During the time Applicant and his paramour were together, they often traveled
together, including many short trips to Ukraine between March 2010 and October 2012,
during which he met her parents. Applicant notified his company, including security
officials, of his foreign contact in early 2010. He later informed his wife. Applicant
acknowledged that his infidelity caused stress in his marriage, but he and his wife
During his June 2014 subject interview (GE 3), Applicant reported that he asked his wife for a divorce, but4
she refused. However, he testified (Tr. 38-39) that he never asked her for a divorce.
3
remain together (Tr. 24-25). He has given conflicting information about whether the
question of divorce ever arose.4
The United States established diplomatic relations with Ukraine in 1991, following
its independence from the Soviet Union. The United States attaches great importance to
the success of Ukraine's transition to a modern democratic state with a flourishing
market economy. U.S. policy is centered on realizing and strengthening a democratic,
prosperous, and secure Ukraine more closely integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic
structures. The U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership highlights the importance
of the bilateral relationship and outlines enhanced cooperation in the areas of defense,
security, economics and trade, energy security, democracy, and cultural exchanges. It
also emphasizes the continued commitment of the United States to support enhanced
engagement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Ukraine. To
fulfill one of the key tenets of the charter, the two countries have established the
Strategic Partnership Commission.
Ukraine is a republic with a political system composed of three branches of
government. In February 2014, the parliament voted to remove President Yanukovych
from office after he fled the country. This followed three months of massive anti-
government protests on Kyiv’s central square (the Maidan) over his decision to
postpone signing political and trade agreements with the EU, in favor of closer ties with
Russia, as well as his violent responses to the protests. Later in February 2014,
Russian armed forces intervened militarily in Crimea, which Russia occupied and
purported to “annex” in March 2014. Additional unrest and civilian deaths occurred
when pro-Russian protesters in eastern and southern Ukraine seeking more autonomy
from the national government, clashed with government forces. In May 2014, President
Poroshenko was elected, which signaled a strong democratic mandate for change in
Ukraine.
 
The Russian occupation of Crimea has displaced more than 18,000 Crimeans
and caused numerous human rights abuses. Russia has been accused of orchestrating
attacks by Ukrainian separatists. Ukraine has also been cited for abuse of persons in
custody, harsh prison conditions and a corrupt judiciary, societal violence against
women, children, and ethnic minorities, and human trafficking. 
Despite attempts to cease hostilities and establish peace through political dialog,
the government’s efforts have been largely rejected and the situation in Ukraine remains
precarious. Violent clashes between Russia-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces
continue in eastern regions of the country. In addition, Russian military forces continue
to occupy the Crimean Peninsula, supply weapons and material support to the
separatists, and are present on the eastern border of Ukraine. 
4
In December 2015, the State Department issued a warning to U.S. citizens to
defer all travel to Crimea and the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Separatist groups have threatened, detained or kidnapped persons, including U.S.
citizens, and violent clashes have caused over 9,000 deaths. There are reports of
abuse against local populations that oppose separatist goals. 
The United States has stood by Ukraine as Russia has sought to stymie its new
democratic government. The leaders of the past who controlled Ukraine for decades are
fighting back using their control of the media, state owned enterprises, Rada
(parliament) deputies, the courts and the political machinery, while holding old loyalties
and threats over the heads of decision-makers to block change.
Since the start of the crisis, the United States has committed over $760 million in
assistance to Ukraine, in addition to two, $1 billion loan guarantees. U.S. advisors serve
in almost a dozen Ukrainian ministries and localities and help deliver services, eliminate
fraud and abuse, improve tax collection, and modernize Ukraine’s institutions.
 
Since November 2015, the United States has noted that Ukraine has largely
stabilized its currency and is rebuilding its reserves; seen some modest growth in the
economy; approved a 2016 budget in-line with IMF requirements; passed civil service
reform to create competition and transparency; stood up an independent Anti-
Corruption Bureau and Special Prosecutor; and, has begun to decentralize power and
budget authority to local communities to improve services and policing for its citizens.15
The Ukrainian government has not been known for targeting U.S. citizens for human
rights abuses or intelligence collection.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guideline is Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does, 
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).5
AG¶6.6
AG¶7(a).7
AG¶7(c).8
AG¶7(e).9
AG¶7(f).10
5
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.5
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.6
Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots or current citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Further,7
security concerns may arise through connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.  In8
addition, security concerns may be raised by a substantial business, financial, or
property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated
business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.  Finally, failure to report, where required, association with a foreign national9
may raise security concerns.10
6
Concerning potential mitigating factors, AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships
with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or
activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,” largely mitigates the
Applicant’s circumstances regarding his former Ukranian paramour.
Applicant has had no contact with his paramour since October 2014, when he
ended their relationship. He had no other contacts with Ukraine. While Applicant’s
contacts with his paramour over the six-plus years of their affair cannot be considered
casual and infrequent during the course of the affair, that contact ended nearly two
years ago, with apparently no lingering aftereffects. This includes the fact that he and
his wife are still married.
The record contains little information about the paramour’s connections to
Ukraine. However, she was vetted by AGA, and has been employed by it for 17 years.
Moreover, Applicant’s conduct demonstrates that he understands his security
obligations completely, and acted on that knowledge. He reported his involvement with
a foreign national to his company and its security officers without apparent adverse
action. He reported that involvement on his most recent clearance application.
 
Ukraine and the U.S. have significant bilateral relations since Ukraine obtained its
independence in 1991. U.S. policies have focused on encouraging Ukraine’s democratic
growth, strengthening its ties to western Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures, and
helping Ukraine fend off Russian efforts to keep Ukraine in the Russian sphere of
influence. Moreover, Ukraine is not known to be a significant collector of protected U.S.
information.
A heightened risk of undue foreign influence may also be mitigated under AG ¶
8(b), where “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to his former paramour is presently
non-existent. Furthermore, there is no sense of loyalty to a foreign group, government,
or country. Moreover, Applicant has persuaded me that he can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the United States, in whose service he has been
employed since July 1986.
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct
and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at
AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant’s connections to Ukraine ended in October 2014. It cannot be said
that he demonstrated any signs of being subject to foreign influence during his
affair—which he fully disclosed to the relevant parties. He can hardly be considered to
be subject to foreign influence now that that affair has ended. After considering all the
7
facts and circumstances, I find it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Accordingly, I resolve Guideline B for
Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.
 
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge