DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 15-03450
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Catie Young, Esquire
September 12, 2016
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Decision
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CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted her Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP) on March 7, 2013.  On November 25, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guidelines
B and F for Applicant.  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
adjudicative guidelines (AG), effective within the Department of Defense after
September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing through counsel on March 2, 2016, and
requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge.  The Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals (DOHA) received the request soon thereafter, and I received the case
assignment on August 9, 2016.  DOHA issued a notice of hearing on August 9, 2016,
and I convened the hearing as scheduled on August 22, 2016.  The Government offered
Exhibits (GXs) 1 through 4, which were received without objection.  Applicant testified
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on her own behalf, as did two witnesses: her mother and a friend.  She also submitted
Exhibits (AppXs) A through M, which were received without objection.  DOHA received
the transcript of the hearing (TR) on August 30, 2016.  The record closed on August 22,
2016.  Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for
access to classified information is granted.
Findings of Fact
In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in
Paragraph 1 of the SOR, with explanations.  She denied the factual allegations in
Paragraph 2 of the SOR.  She also provided additional information to support her
request for eligibility for a security clearance.
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
Applicant is a 38-year-old native-born American, of Iranian ancestry.  (GX 1 at
page 5, and TR at page 70 lines 7~11, and at page 86 line 8 to page 87 line 19.)  She is
a “Federal Contractor,” who has worked for her current employer since March of 2013. 
(TR at page 55 lines 3~16, and Item 1 at page 17.)  All of her financial interests are 
connected with the United States.  (AppX H.)  Applicant has had a “whirlwind”
relationship with an active duty Navy lieutenant commander since January of 2016.  (TR
at page 88 line 23 to page 90 line 13, and AppX I at page 2.)  He is a graduate of the
U.S. Naval Academy, and in his letter of support avers that he plans “on getting married
to . . . [Applicant] in the near future.”  (Id.)
1.a.  Applicant’s Iranian-born mother immigrated to the United States in April of
1975, more than 40 years ago.  (TR at page 31 lines 9~18.)  She became an American
citizen in 1989.  (TR at page 33 line 18 to page 34 line 3.)  Her second husband,
Applicant’s father, passed away in May of 1999.  (TR at page 32 line 13 to page 33 line
6.)  Applicant’s mother is a dual national with Iran, and last visited Iran “a little over five
years” ago to attend a wedding.  (TR at page 34 line 8 to page 35 line 11.)  She is a
“retired . . . Sales Associate,” having worked for a department store, and was also a real
estate agent.  (TR at page 40 line 24 to page 41 line 5.)  Her current husband is 93
years old, an American of Swedish ancestry.  (TR at page 43 lines 2~10, and at page
44 lines 2~7.)
1.b. and 1.c.  Applicant has a brother, and two half-brothers, all of Iranian
ancestry.  (GX 1 at pages 31, 34, and 36.)  The oldest is a 48 year-old half-brother.  He
is a dual national with Iran, as their mother applied for Iranian citizenship on his behalf
when he was a child, although he was born in the United States.  (TR at page 52 lines
14~23, and GX 1 at page 34.)  He lives in the United States, and is the manager of a
super market.  (TR at page 53 lines 1~5, GX 1 at pages 34~35, and AppX F.)
The younger half-brother is a citizen and resident of Iran.  (GX 1 at page 36.)  He
is a medical doctor in private practice.  (TR at page 92 lines 5~25, and GX 1 at page
37.)  Applicant has contact with him is about “once a year,” and she last spoke to him
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about “three years ago.”  (TR at page 92 line 2 to page 93 line 5.)  He has no
connection with he Iranian government.
Her full biological brother is the youngest of Applicant’s siblings.  (GX 1 at page
31.)  He is a native born American.  Like her other American born half-brother, he
became an Iranian citizen through the actions of his mother, when he was a child.  (TR
at page 52 lines 14~23.)  He lives in the United State, where, as a businessman, he
owns bars (where alcohol is served.)  (TR at page 77 line 3 to page 78 line 5.)  In his
letter of support, he describes his sister “as American as Apple Pie,” a trait which she
consistently exhibited at her hearing.  (AppX E, and TR at page 86 line 11 to page 87
line 19.)
1.d.  Applicant has a cousin who is a citizen and resident of Iran.  (TR at page 94
lines 13~22.)  Her husband is a businessman who owns textile companies.  (TR at page
94 line 24 to page 95 line 6.)  Applicant sees this cousin “every five years or so,” when
she and her family visits the United States.  (TR at page 95 lines 1~8.)  She describes
her relationship with her cousin as “casual” to “non-existent.”  (TR at page 96 lines
14~17.)
1.e.  Applicant admits that she met a citizen and resident of China, when she
visited China about “13 years ago.”  (TR at page 101 line 18 to page 102 line 3.)  She
denies that she maintains “contact with him.”  (TR at page 102 lines 9~16.)  She has
deleted him from her “Face Book” account.  (TR at page 104 lines 3~9, and AppX D.) 
There is no evidence that he has any connection with the Chinese government.
Through GXs 4 and 5, I have been asked to take administrative notice, in part, of
the following facts regarding Iran and China:
The U.S. Government does not have diplomatic relations with Iran.  The United
States has long-standing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, sponsorship of
terrorism, and human rights abuses.  The U.S. Government prohibits nearly all trade
and investment with Iran by U.S. persons.  Iran continues to act assertively abroad in
ways that run counter to U.S. interests and worsens regional conflicts.  The Iranian
government does not recognize dual nationality and will treat U.S.-Iranian dual nationals
solely as Iranian citizens subject to Iranian laws.  (GX 4.)
China has been identified as one of the two most aggressive collectors of U.S.
economic information and technology.  (The other one being Russia.)  China’s
intelligence services, as well as private companies and other entities, frequently seek to
exploit persons with family ties to China who can use their insider access to corporate
networks to steal secrets using removable media devices or e-mail.  Human rights
abuses are also noted.  (GX 5.)
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Guideline F - Financial Consideration
2.a.  Applicant admits that initially, she did not file her Federal income tax return
for tax year 2011.  She does excuse her lack of action, but couches it in the following
terms:
I am not good at doing my own taxes.  And so, at that point in time, I was
doing my own business and I didn’t know how to do business taxes. 
When you’re running your own business, how do you equate - - how do
you do a tax for an independent business?  Who knows?  You know, so,
in a sense, I’m at fault for not finding a CPA sooner.  So, it took me a bit of
time to find a CPA.  But, in reality, I knew I didn’t owe any money.  And I
was under the impression that as long as you don’t owe money, you’re
okay.  You know, once you owe money, you’re in the doghouse.  (TR at
page 64 lines 6~15.)
Applicant filed her 2011 tax return in January of 2014, and received a refund of
$223, as evidenced by her Internal Revenue Service Form 1040.  (AppX G at page 4.) 
Applicant is current with her income tax filings.  (TR at page 113 line 10 to page 116 line
19.)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG).  In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law.  Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process.  The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision.  According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.”  The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.  AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”  In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record.  Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
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Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .”  The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence.  This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours.  The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information.  Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
Paragraph 6 of the adjudicative guidelines sets out the security concern relating
to Foreign Influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign interests, may be manipulated or induced
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that
is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by a
foreign interest.
Here, Paragraph 7(a) is arguably applicable: “contacts with a foreign family
member . . . who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion.”  One of Applicant’s half-brothers and a cousin are citizens and residents of
Iran.  Her mother and two other siblings are dual nationals with Iran.  This is clearly
countered, however, by the first mitigating condition, as under 8(a) “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, . . . are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual . . .
and the interests of the U.S.”  The Applicant is a native-born American.  Her mother has
lived in the United States continuously since 1975, and her two native-born siblings
have little connection to Iran, other than their dual nationality orchestrated by their
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mother when they were children.  She has little connection with her Iranian half-brother,
perhaps once a year; and less with her Iranian cousin, perhaps once every five years. 
She has virtually no connection with the citizen and resident of China, with whom she
has severed internet relations.  Foreign Influence is found for Applicant.
Guideline F - Financial Considerations
The security concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations is set
out in Paragraph 18:
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts,
and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of
judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of
which can raise questions about an individual=s reliability,
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.  An
individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to
engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
The guideline notes a condition that could raise security concerns.  Under
Subparagraph 19(g) “failure to file annual Federal, state . . . income tax returns
as required” may raise security concerns.  Applicant failed to file her 2011
Federal income tax return in a timely fashion.  However, I find a countervailing
Mitigating Condition that is applicable here.  Under Subparagraph 20 (d), it may
also be mitigating where “the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay
overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.”  Applicant filed her delinquent
income tax return more than two years ago, and is current with the Federal taxing
authority.  Financial Considerations is found for Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate
an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the
Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances.  Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate
determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an
overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the
guidelines and the whole-person concept.
The Administrative Judge should also consider the nine adjudicative
process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or
absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;
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(7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of
continuation or recurrence.
I have considered all of the evidence, including the potentially disqualifying
and mitigating conditions surrounding this case.  Those who know Applicant in
the work place speak most highly of her.  (TR at page 20 line 9 to page 29 line
14, and AppX I.)  Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or
doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.  For all
these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from
her alleged Foreign Influence and Financial Considerations.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the
SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a.~1.e. For Applicant
Paragraph 1, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a. For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a
security clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Richard A. Cefola
Administrative Judge
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