DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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[NAME REDACTED] )       ISCR Case No. 15-06345
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Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Chris Morin, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant mitigated the security concerns raised by his use and possession of a
Russian passport after he became a U.S. citizen. However, security concerns remain
about his mother and sister, who are citizens and residents of Russia. Applicant’s
request for a security clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case
On November 24, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (EQIP) to obtain eligibility for a security clearance required for
his employment with a defense contractor. After reviewing the results of the ensuing
background investigation, adjudicators for the Department of Defense (DOD) could not
determine that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to continue Applicant’s
security clearance.  1
On February 16, 2016, DOD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts
which raise security concerns addressed under the adjudicative guidelines  for foreign2
  Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DOD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
 The adjudicative guidelines were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. These2
guidelines were published in the Federal Register and codified through 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006). 
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influence (Guideline B) and foreign preference (Guideline C). Applicant timely
responded to the SOR (Answer) and requested a decision without a hearing.
Subsequently, the Government timely requested a hearing, as authorized by Section
E3.1.7 of the Directive.
The case was assigned to me on May 18, 2016, and I convened the requested
hearing on June 28, 2016. The parties appeared as scheduled. Department Counsel
presented Government Exhibits (Gx.) 1 and 2. Department Counsel also submitted a
memorandum and 18 attachments in support of a request that I take administrative
notice of certain information about Russia germane to this adjudication. I granted
Department Counsel’s request, and have included it as Hearing Exhibit (Hx.) 4.3
Applicant testified and presented, as a post-hearing submission, Applicant’s Exhibit
(Ax.) A.  All exhibits were received without objection. I received a transcript of the4
hearing (Tr.) on July 14, 2016.
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline C, the Government alleged that Applicant possesses a Russian
passport issued to him in September 2013 and valid until September 2023 (SOR 1.a);
that Applicant applied for his Russian passport in 2013, after becoming a U.S. citizen in
2003 (SOR 1.b); and that, as a U.S. citizen, Applicant used his Russian passport for
travel to Russia in April 2012 and November 2014 (SOR 1.c).
Under Guideline B, the Government alleged that Applicant’s mother (SOR 2.a)
and sister (SOR 2.b) are citizens of, and reside in, Russia. Applicant admitted, with
explanations, each of the SOR allegations. In addition to the facts established through
Applicant’s admissions, I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is 56 years old and employed as a scientist by a defense contractor.
He started in that position in August 2013. Before that, Applicant was the chief scientist
in a small engineering consulting company he and an associate owned from 2000 until
2013. From 1993 until 2000, Applicant worked as a scientist at a large U.S. Government
facility managed by a private federal contractor who employed Applicant. Since 1993,
Applicant has worked in support of government programs, but this is his first request for
a security clearance.(Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 24 - 25, 29)
Applicant was born, raised, and educated in Russia. He earned master’s and
doctoral degrees from Russian universities in 1983 and 1987, respectively. Thereafter,
he worked in a Russian academic and scientific research institution until immigrating
with his wife and son to the United States in 1993. Applicant received his green card in
1997 and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 2002. Applicant’s wife of 32 years and
their 30-year-old son are also Russian-born naturalized U.S. citizens. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr.
32 - 33)
Under Russian law, Applicant is still a Russian citizen, despite his U.S.
naturalization. Applicant is willing to renounce his Russian citizenship, but the process is
expensive and difficult. Also, Applicant believes renouncing his Russian citizenship
would attract unwanted attention from the Russian government. (Gx. 2; Tr. 26)
 Tr. 20 - 23.3
 Ax. A is an email, dated June 29, 2016, from a senior security specialist at Applicant’s place of employment4
verifying that Applicant had surrendered his Russian passport prior to the hearing. 
2
When Applicant immigrated to the United States, he had a Russian passport. He
used and renewed that passport before he became a U.S. citizen. After he was
naturalized in 2002, Applicant continued to possess and use a valid Russian passport.
He used the passport twice – in 2012 and 2014 – as a U.S. citizen. Applicant stated that
Russia requires persons with Russian citizenship to use a Russian passport to obtain
the required visas to enter the country. Applicant was advised when he was hired for his
current job that he might have to relinquish his Russian passport because he requires a
security clearance for his work. In April 2016, he turned over his passport to his
employer’s security officer. (Answer; Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Ax. A; Tr. 26 - 28)
Applicant’s mother is 79 years old. She is a retired nurse living in Russia. His
mother lives with his sister, a 46-year-old technician at a vision clinic, and her family. No
one in Applicant’s family has any ties to the Russian government. Applicant speaks by
telephone to his mother about once every three months. He speaks with his sister about
once every six weeks. Applicant’s mother visited him in the United States in 2000. His
sister came to see him in 2003 and 2007. Applicant visited them in November 2014 in
order to say good-bye to his mother in view of the likelihood he would no longer have a
Russian passport that would gain him entry to Russia. He does not plan to return to
Russia at any time. (Answer; Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 28, 33 - 38)
Applicant does not have any financial or property interests outside the United
States. He voted in one election while still living in Russia, and only because it was
illegal to not vote at the time. In the United States, he owns his house and has between
$400,000 and $500,000 in retirement savings here. He attends church where he lives,
and his son is completing studies and residency in the United State to become a
physician here. (Tr. 41 - 45)
Based on the information provided about the Russian government in Hx. 4, I take
administrative notice of the following facts:
Russia is one of the most active participants in espionage against the United
States and its interests, aggressively targeting and collecting military, economic, and
technology information. Over the past decade, Russia has exhibited an increased
willingness to engage in cyber activity such as government-supported hacking of U.S.
Government and private industry information systems. Its human intelligence activities
also reflect a long-term effort to further its geopolitical and military interests, which are
directly at odds with those of the United States. Russia also has an abysmal human
rights record, characterized by extra-judicial killings, discrimination against minority
ethnic, religious, and social groups, government reprisals against critics of the Russian
president, and across-the-board denial of basic civil liberties. Finally, Russia is plagued
in many of its regions by international terrorist activities, including, but not limited to,
attacks and atrocities by ISIS or ISIS-inspired actors. 
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,5
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the adjudicative
guidelines (AG). Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors listed in ¶ 2(a)
 See Directive, 6.3.5
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of the guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole-person” concept, those factors
are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information.
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to6
have access to classified information. The Government bears the initial burden of
producing admissible information on which it based the preliminary decision to deny or
revoke a security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, the Government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the Government meets its burden, it
then falls to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a “right” to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy
burden of persuasion.  A person who has access to classified information enters into a7
fiduciary relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. Thus, the
Government has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the
requisite judgment, reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national
interests as his or her own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard
compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in
favor of the Government.8
Analysis
Foreign Preference
Despite being naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 2002, Applicant is still viewed under
Russian law as a Russian citizen. As alleged in SOR 1.a - 1.c, in 2012 and 2014
Applicant exercised his Russian citizenship when he renewed and used a Russian
passport. These facts raise a security concern about foreign preference that is
articulated at AG ¶ 9, as follows:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States. 
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).6
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.7
 See Egan; AG ¶ 2(b).8
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More specifically, the record requires application of the disqualifying condition at 
AG ¶ 10(a)(1) (exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This
includes but is not limited to:. . . . (1) possession of a current foreign passport). 
Applicant obtained a Russian passport to comply with Russian laws and
regulations governing travel by Russian citizens. By contrast, the record also requires
application of the mitigating position at AG ¶¶ 11(b) (the individual has expressed a
willingness to renounce dual citizenship); and 11(e) (the passport has been destroyed,
surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated). Applicant
stated in his EQIP, during an interview with a Government investigator, in response to
the SOR, and in his testimony, that he is willing to renounce his Russian citizenship. He
also observed, prudently, that it might attract undesired attention from the Russian
authorities were he to actually go through the renunciation process. Additionally, in April
2016, Applicant surrendered his Russian passport to his company’s security officer. 
Applicant was credible in his assertion that he does not intend to return to Russia
and that he no longer needs or wants his Russian passport. Further, his passport did
not confer on him any other benefits of citizenship and he did not seek to use his foreign
citizenship in any way other than was presented by Russian regulations governing its
citizenship and entry into that country. The security concern under the guideline is
resolved for Applicant.
Foreign Influence
The Government’s information, along with Applicant’s admissions, is sufficient to
support the factual allegations under this guideline. The facts established reasonably
raise a security concern about possible foreign influence that is addressed, in relevant
part, at AG ¶ 6, as follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism. 
Applicant’s elderly mother, a retired nurse, lives with Applicant’s younger sister
and her family. Their presence in Russia, a country known to abuse its citizenry to serve
its purposes, presents a heightened risk that they could be used to pressure or coerce
Applicant to compromise information entrusted to him.
Of the specific disqualifying conditions listed under this guideline, AG ¶ 7(a)
(contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion)
applies to these facts and circumstances.
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I have also considered the following AG ¶ 8 mitigating conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
As to AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c), Applicant did not establish that his relationships with
his mother and sister are not close. Applicant speaks regularly with his mother and
sister, and there is a rebuttable presumption that Applicant’s relationships with them are
close. Also to be considered is the oppressive nature of the Russian government and its
aggressive actions in opposition to U.S. interests. Applicant did not establish that the
presence of his relatives, given the heightened risk presented by these facts, would not
conflict with his responsibility to protect classified information. AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c) do
not apply.
As to AG ¶ 8(b), I have considered that Applicant has established his life in the
United States. His wife and son are also naturalized U.S. citizens, and his son has been
educated here and is finishing his medical residency. Applicant has owned his homes
here wherever he has resided, and he has substantial retirement savings. He has
worked in sensitive U.S. Government programs without a clearance, but little else is
known about Applicant’s personal and professional life. He provided no character
references or other information from which to conclude he has deep and longstanding
relationships in the United States that would effectively counterbalance the heightened
risk presented by his close relationships in Russia. AG ¶¶ 8(b) does not apply. On
balance, available information shows that the security concerns about this Applicant
possibly being influenced by foreign connections and interests are not mitigated.
I also have evaluated this record in the context of the whole-person factors listed
in AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant has firmly established his personal life and professional career in
the United States over the past 20 years. However, as I noted in my analysis of the
foreign influence concerns, Applicant’s information about those aspects of his
background was not sufficient to resolve the Government’s doubts about his ability to
safeguard classified information if the Russian government tried to leverage his
personal relationships in Russia. Because protection of national security is the principal
focus in these adjudications, any remaining doubts are resolved against the granting of
access to classified or sensitive information.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
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Paragraph 1, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.b: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the foregoing, it is clearly consistent with the national interest for
Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a security
clearance is granted.
                                       
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge
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