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                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 15-08893
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
September 7, 2016
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Decision
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GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was born and raised in Syria. His father, sister, uncle, and extended
family members are all resident citizens of Syria, and he contributes to the financial
support of his father, sister, and uncle. In 2011 he was visiting his family in Syria and
obtained a Syrian passport, despite becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1994. He has
since destroyed his Syrian passport. He mitigated the security concerns under Foreign
Preference, but failed to mitigate the Foreign Influence security concerns. Based upon a
review of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is
denied. 
Statement of the Case 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 86) on December 3,
2014. On January 26, 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference).The action was taken under Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960),
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as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
effective within the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR on February 15, 2016 (Answer), and requested a
hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on April 11, 2016.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on
April 11, 2016, scheduling the hearing for May 12, 2016. The hearing was convened as
scheduled. The Government offered Hearing Exhibit (HE) I and II; and Exhibits (GE) 1
and 2, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf and
offered three exhibits marked Applicant Exhibit (AE) A through C. AE A through AE C
were admitted without objection from Department Counsel. The record was left open for
receipt of additional documentation. On June 6, 2016, Applicant presented five exhibits,
marked as AE D through AE H. Department Counsel had no objections to AE D through
AE H, and they were admitted. The record then closed. DOHA received the transcript of
the hearing (Tr.) on May 25, 2016. 
Procedural Ruling
Department Counsel requested administrative notice of facts concerning Syria.
(Tr. 15-16.) Department Counsel provided supporting documents to show detail and
context for these facts in the Administrative Notice request. Applicant did not object to
me taking administrative notice of all of the facts in those of the documents, set out
below. (Tr. 15-16.)
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for
administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12,
2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No.
02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004) and McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)). Usually administrative notice in ISCR
proceedings is accorded to facts that are either well known or from government reports.
See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types
of facts for administrative notice). 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor, where he has
worked for more than 13 years. He is single and has no children. Applicant admitted all
of the factual allegations set forth in the SOR, with explanations. Applicant’s admissions
are incorporated in the following findings. (Answer; GE 1; Tr. 22, 29, 55.)
Applicant was born and raised in Syria. He left Syria in 1985, at the age of 19, to
join four of his brothers who had previously relocated to the United States. He also
wanted to attend college in the United States. He graduated from an American
1In his post-hearing documentation Applicant indicated he had decreased his contact with his father to monthly
phone calls. (AE D.)
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university with a bachelor’s degree in 1988. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
1994. (GE 1; Tr. 22, 28.) 
Applicant is the youngest of eight children. His mother is deceased. His father is
97 years old, retired from a wholesale produce business, and lives in Syria with
Applicant’s only sister, a 65-year-old pharmacist. His father and sister are Syrian
citizens. His father is bed ridden and does not leave their residence. His sister has two
children, a 27-year-old niece who works as a private pharmacist, and a 23-year-old
nephew who is studying pharmacy in a private college. They are not nor have ever been
affiliated with the government or military in Syria. Applicant communicates with them
once every week or two, to inquire about his father’s health.1 They never discuss politics
for fear that their conversations might be monitored. Applicant’s foreign family members
are not aware of the nature of Applicant’s work. Applicant sends them approximately
$2,000 per year in financial support. They receive no benefits from  the government of
Syria. All of Applicant’s brothers are U.S. citizens and residents. Applicant testified he
has 27 immediate family members in the United States, all but one are U.S. citizens.
(GE 1; GE 2; AE C; Tr. 40, 57-59.)
Applicant also has extended family members in Syria. His paternal uncle is 85
years old. He is a retired truck driver and is in poor health. Applicant sends him
approximately $100 per month, through his sister, for financial support. Applicant talks
to his uncle by phone approximately once per month. Applicant also has maternal
uncles and cousins, but has no contact with them outside of social networking
applications. (GE 2; AE C; Tr. 36, 38, 60.)
From 2008 to 2014, Applicant had a joint bank account with his sister in Syria. It
was closed in 2014. Currently, there is no functioning banking system in Syria. Applicant
either gives money directly to his sister when she visits the United States, or he gives it
to someone that is traveling to Lebanon and his sister receives  it there. Applicant’s
sister, who was sponsored by her U.S. citizen son, was recently approved for
permanent residency status in the United States and is in the process of moving to the
United States. (GE 2; Tr. 48-50, 61-63.)
Applicant last visited his family in Syria in 2011. The civil war in Syria had just
started and militia members were visible on the streets. During that visit, Applicant was
stopped by a militia member as part of a random identification check. He only had a
U.S. passport to present. As a result, he was forced to pay a bribe. After that incident,
and while still in Syria, Applicant made a “hasty decision” to obtain a Syrian passport for
protection. (Tr. 25.) It was issued two days later. The Syrian passport was valid from
November 2011 to November 2017. He has never used the Syrian passport and has not
returned to Syria since that trip. He feels it is too dangerous to travel to Syria. On June
5, 2016, he presented documentation showing that he has destroyed his Syrian
passport. (GE 2; AE B; AE C; AE D; AE H; Tr. 42-43.)
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Applicant testified he has no property or retirement benefits in Syria. He has
never voted in Syria. He has voted in every U.S. election since becoming a U.S. citizen.
Further, he has assets totaling $1.8 million in the United States. He testified he is deeply
rooted in the United States. He supports charities here. He has retirement accounts and
multiple brokerage accounts in the United States. When he travels internationally, it is to
Latin American countries to pursue  his passion for tango dancing. (Tr. 46-51.)
Applicant is a valued employee. His performance reviews reflect he either meets
or exceeds expectations in all of his objectives. His manger indicated Applicant is a high
performer and a valued team member. His coworkers recognize him for diligently
following procedures and the law. He is known to have excellent moral character. (AE
A; AE E; AE F; AE G.) 
I took administrative notice of the facts set forth in Department Counsel’s request
concerning Syria, which are incorporated herein by reference. Of particular significance
are the poor human rights situation including the regime’s use of chemical weapons; the
civil war between the Socialist Ba’ath Party and the Syrian opposition; the foreign
combatant present in Syria including Iranian elements, Hezballah fighters, Islamic
extremists, and al Qaida-linked elements; and the Islamic State control of large amounts
of territory in the north and east of Syria. The U.S. Department of State warns citizens
against traveling to Syria. Syria is designated by the U.S. Department of State as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
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Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Preference is set out in
AG ¶ 9:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under
AG ¶ 10. The following is potentially applicable in this case:  
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport.
Applicant is a dual citizen of the United States and Syria. He chose to exercise
his Syrian citizenship when he obtained a Syrian passport in 2011. The evidence is
sufficient to raise the above disqualifying conditions.
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Conditions that could mitigate foreign preference security concerns are described
under AG ¶ 11. One is applicable:
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated.
Applicant obtained his Syrian passport while in Syria in 2011 at the start of the
Syrian civil war as a security precaution, after being questioned by Syrian militia. He has
never used it, and has since destroyed it.  AG ¶ 11(e) provides mitigation.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel persuasively argued that substantial evidence in this
case established two of them: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Syria has significant internal conflict and terrorism threats that operate openly
and are contrary to U.S. interests. Accordingly, Applicant’s substantial and close family
connections in that country have more potential to generate a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶ 7(a).
Applicant’s father, sister, uncle, and extended family members are resident
citizens of Syria. His father, sister, and uncle are financially dependent on him. He has
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an entirely legitimate, serious interest in the welfare of his family members in Syria,
creating the potential for conflict of interest under AG ¶ 7(b). 
These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising both of the
aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s contacts, relationships, and
connections with Syria through his relatives, who are citizens and residing there, shift a
heavy burden to him to prove mitigation under applicable Appeal Board precedent. 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Considered in light of the substantial anti-western insurgent and terrorism threats
in the region, Applicant did not demonstrate that it is unlikely he could be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual or government
and those of the U.S. due to his family ties there. He has  legitimate and appropriately
close relationships with family members now living in Syria, and a strong interest in
protecting his family members there. His communication and contact with his father,
sister, and uncle are neither casual nor infrequent, as he regularly communicates with
them. Accordingly, he failed to establish the mitigating conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a)
and 8(c).
The evidence also fails to establish sufficient mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant provided some evidence of longstanding relationships and loyalty in the
United States. He testified that he has $1.8 million in assets in the United States. He
has been here since he was 19 years old and has strong ties to his community,
extended family members in the U.S., and loyalty to his chosen nation. He performs well
at work. These are factors that weigh in Applicant’s favor. However, his ties to his sister,
father, and uncle are equally as strong. He is in frequent contact with them and supports
them financially. In this instance, Applicant failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that
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he would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. Applicant failed to
establish full mitigation.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct is not in
question here. He is a mature and experienced individual, who is seeking to continue
providing  excellent services to a Government contractor with the enhanced capabilities
of a security clearance. His letters of recommendation and performance evaluations
contain complimentary opinions concerning his dedication, integrity, and good
character.
However, the inherent potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress
deriving from the presence of Applicant’s family members in Syria remains unmitigated
at the present time. Placing Applicant in a position wherein it is foreseeable that he
could be forced to choose between the security interests of the United States and the
interests of his family is the harm to be avoided under Appeal Board precedent. He
failed to show that such potential is diminished to any reasonable extent. While his
father and uncle are in failing health and his sister is approved for permanent resident
status in the United States, they are all currently in Syria and represent a significant risk.
His willingness and desire to serve a Government contractor is commendable, but does
not justify placing him or his relatives at risk of exploitation due to his access to
classified information. His connections to the United States do not outweigh the
heightened risks and potential conflicts under these circumstances. 
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Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He failed to meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign influence considerations.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
Jennifer I. Goldstein
Administrative Judge