DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 15-04446
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
October 19, 2016
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Decision
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LOKEY ANDERSON, Darlene D., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP) on May 8, 2014.  (Government Exhibit 1.)  On December 9, 2015, the
Department of Defense (DoD), pursuant to Executive Order 10865 and Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992 (as amended), issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant, which detailed reasons why the DoD
could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether
clearance should be denied or revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR on January 4, 2016, and he requested a hearing
before a Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge.  This case was
assigned to this Administrative Judge on April 11, 2016.  A notice of hearing was issued
on May 9, 2016, scheduling the hearing by video-teleconference for June 6, 2016.  At
the hearing the Government presented seven exhibits, referred to as Government
Exhibits 1 through 7, which were admitted without objection.  The Applicant presented
five exhibits, referred to as Applicant’s Exhibits A through E, which were admitted
without objection.  He also testified on his own behalf.  The record remained open until
close of business on June 13, 2016, to allow the Applicant to submit additional
documentary evidence.  He submitted supplementary Exhibits 1 through 4, which were
admitted without objection.  The official transcript (Tr.) was received on June 14, 2016. 
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to
classified information is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
concerning the current political condition in South Korea.  (Tr. pp. 21-22.)  Applicant had
no objection.  (Tr. p. 22.)  The request and the attached documents were admitted into
evidence and included in the record. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the
Findings of Fact, below. 
REQUEST TO AMEND STATEMENT OF REASONS
On February 23, 2016, Department Counsel requested in writing that the SOR be
amended to include one allegation under paragraph 3, Guideline E, Personal Conduct. 
Applicant had no objection to the requested amendment.  (See Applicant’s Response
dated March 19, 2016.)  The amendment, now allegation 3.(a) reads as follows, “You
were administratively separated from the U.S. Army due to a pattern of misconduct”.    
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is 30 years old, and is married.  He has two years of college and is
working towards his Bachelor’s degree.   He is employed for a defense contractor as an
Electronic Technician.  He is seeking to obtain a security clearance in connection with
this employment.
The Government opposes Applicant's request for a security clearance, on the
basis of allegations set forth in the Statement of Reasons (SOR).  The following findings
of fact are entered as to each paragraph and guideline in the SOR:
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence).  The Government alleges in this
paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has foreign contacts
that could create the potential for foreign influence, which could result in the
compromise of classified information.
Applicant admits each of the allegations set forth in the SOR under this guideline,
except 1.c.  He was born in 1986, in South Korea, to an American father and a South
Korean mother.  Following Applicant’s fathers first tour in the military, after the Vietnam
War, he got out of the military, and moved to South Korea where he met Applicant’s
mother.  Applicant was raised for the most part at two American Army bases, until he
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was 17 years old.  He attended an international school, and in October 2004, at the age
of 17, he joined the United States Army.
Applicant explained that in 2004, he joined the Army to be able to provide
financial assistance to his family and ill father.  Since then, until November 2015, he has
provided financial support to his mother and father in Korea.   While supporting his
family, they raised enough money to purchase land to build a house in June 2011. 
Applicant admits that he is co-owner of the property because he contributed to the cost. 
On paper, however, the property is in his mother’s name.  Applicant is not listed as an
owner because he is prohibited from buying and purchasing land as an American citizen
with his visa status.  (Tr. p. 46.)  Upon inheritance, the property will go to Applicant’s
wife.  The house is valued at about $130,000.  Applicant also owns a car in South Korea
that he purchased in May 2015.  (Tr. p. 47.)  He also has a South Korean driver’s
license.  Applicant maintains a bank account in South Korea.  He uses it to buy clothes
on the Korean market, or to allow  his wife to transfer money to him for emergency
purposes if needed.          
Applicant is married to a Korean citizen, who is currently a resident of Korea. 
She is 33 years old and works as a nurse.  She has one sister in South Korea who
works as a manicurist.  The sister’s husband is a boxing coach.  Applicant’s in-laws are
also residents and citizens of South Korea.  His wife’s mother is a housewife.  Her
father works in the construction business.  Applicant’s wife in South Korea contacts her
parents everyday.  
Applicant’s mother is also a citizen and resident of South Korea.  (Applicant’s
Exhibit D.)  She is a retired restaurant owner.  Applicant lived with his mother from the
time he got out of the Army in 2006 until November 2015, when he got married. 
Applicant maintains contact with his mother on a weekly basis by telephone and in
person electronically.  (Tr. p. 32. ) Applicant has told his mother that he is applying for a
security clearance.  Applicant’s mother has extended family in South Korea that include
three brothers and one sister who are citizens and residents of South Korea.  His
mother maintains regular contact with them.            
Applicant’s father, is a United States citizen who resides in South Korea. 
(Applicant’s Exhibit C.)  Following his military service, he taught at a University in Korea,
and worked as an educational counselor at an American Army base in Korea.  (Tr. p.
36.)  He has never held any jobs affiliated with the South Korean government.  He is
currently 100% disabled from the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, collects social
security, and resides with Applicant’s mother in South Korea.  They have been married
for 34 years.  Applicant has informed his father that he is applying for a security
clearance.  Applicant explained that his wife and both of his parents are his official legal
dependents.  (Applicant’s Exhibit E.) 
Applicant has a few friends that he grew up with in South Korea who are now
Republic of Korea soldiers.  He no longer maintains contact with them.    
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Applicant began working for his current employer in 2010.  He has never held a
security clearance.  Applicant’s assets in the United States are limited.  He testified that
he has two bank accounts in the United States.  He has $1.00 in his checking account,
and $300 in his savings account.  
I have taken administrative notice of the current political conditions in South
Korea.  These include the fact South Korea is a highly developed, stable democratic
republic with powers shared between the president and the legislature.  South Korea
has a history of collecting protected United States information.  It has targeted the
United States with intelligence gathering programs and has centered its collection
efforts on computer systems, aerospace technologies and nuclear technologies, and its
activities have included stealing information from computerized data bases maintained
by United States government agencies.  South Korea is one of seven countries most
actively engaged in foreign economic collection and industrial espionage against the
United States.  
Paragraph 2 (Guideline F - Financial Considerations)  The Government alleges that
Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he is financially overextended and at risk of
having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.      
Applicant denies the allegation set forth in the SOR under this guideline.  Credit
report of the Applicant dated May 31, 2014; April 14, 2015; and February 18, 2016,
which includes information from all three credit reporting agencies, indicate that
Applicant was indebted to the creditor listed in the SOR.  (Government Exhibits 3, 4,
and 5.)          
Applicant became indebted to a credit union for a delinquent credit card account
that was charged off in the approximate amount of $12,624.  Applicant testified that he
used the credit card for cash advances in the amount of about $9,000 to help his family
purchase the land, and to buy groceries for himself.  He stated that this was his first
credit card, and he did not understand how to pay credit card bills at the time.  He
acknowledges that he was young and dumb, and could not afford the payments
because he was paying for a car he had purchased.  The account was eventually
closed due to the delinquencies.  About two years ago, Applicant contacted the creditor
and paid off the debt in full.  A letter from the creditor dated June 2, 2016, confirms this
payment.  (Applicant’s Post-Hearing Exhibit A.)        
Paragraph 3 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct).  The Government alleges that the
Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance because he engaged in conduct which
shows dishonesty, questionable judgment, unreliability and/or untrustworthiness.
Applicant admits the allegation set forth in the SOR under this guideline. 
Applicant joined the United States Army in October 2004 at the age of 17.  After
finishing boot camp and advanced training, he was stationed at a base in South Korea. 
His enlistment period was to extend for 30 months.  He only served 16 or 17 months
before he was discharged.  In June 2006, he was administratively separated from the
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United States Army due to a pattern of misconduct.  Applicant committed two significant
offenses.  His first offense was for drinking under age.  On his own time after work,
Applicant went drinking with local Korean friends.  His NCO smelled alcohol on him and
wrote him up.  Applicant’s second offense involved him showing up late for PT
formations on at least six to ten occasions.  Applicant stated that he would be late
anywhere from 5 to 10 minutes to 1 to 2 hours.  Applicant was issued an Article 15, and
was penalized with 14 days of extra duty and 14 days of lost pay.  
In 2005, Applicant underwent a sleep study and it was determined that he did not
have sleep apnea.  For the past nine years, Applicant has been legally fighting this
issue.  He has already been considered 40% disabled based upon his hearing, ankles
and shoulder.  In November 2015, it was officially determined that Applicant had sleep
apnea while in the Army.  (Applicant’s Exhibit A.) Applicant is currently waiting for his
disability determination based upon his sleep apnea.  He is also appealing the nature of
the separation based upon this diagnosis to have it changed from a discharge
honorably under general conditions to an honorable discharge.
 POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudication policies divided into
"Disqualifying Factors" and "Mitigating Factors."  The following Disqualifying Factors
and Mitigating Factors are found to be applicable in this case: 
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
6.  The Concern.  Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. 
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.
Conditions that could raise a security concern:
7.(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion; 
7.(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create
a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
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information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing information;
7.(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship
status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion; and 
7.(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or
in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
None.
Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
18.  The Concern.  Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to
abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.  An individual who
is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate
funds. 
Conditions that could raise a security concern:
19.(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; and
19.(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations. 
Condition that could mitigate security concerns:
20.(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or
otherwise resolve debts.
Guideline E (Personal Conduct)
15.  The Concern.  Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified
information.  Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers
during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security
clearance process.
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Condition that could raise a security concern:
16.(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not
sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which,
when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with
rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
None.
In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 18-19,  in
evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, the Administrative Judge should
consider the following general factors:
a.  the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
b. the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation;
c.  the frequency and recency of the conduct;
d.  the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
e.  the extent to which participation is voluntary;
f.  the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral
changes;
g.  the motivation for the conduct; 
h. the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
 i.  the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
The eligibility criteria established in the DoD Directive identify personal
characteristics and conduct, which are reasonably related to the ultimate question,
posed in Section 2 of Executive Order 10865, of whether it is “clearly consistent with the
national interest” to grant an applicant’s request for access to classified information.
The DoD Directive states, “The adjudicative process is an examination of a
sufficient period of a person’s life to make an affirmative determination that the person is
an acceptable security risk.  Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated
upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines.  The adjudicative
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process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person
concept.  Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable
and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination.” The Administrative
Judge can draw only those inferences or conclusions that have reasonable and logical
basis in the evidence of record.  The Judge cannot draw inferences or conclusions
based on evidence that is speculative or conjectural in nature.  Finally, as emphasized
by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order
adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and
shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
CONCLUSIONS
In the defense industry, the security of classified industrial secrets is entrusted to
civilian workers who must be counted upon to safeguard such sensitive information
twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week.  The Government is therefore
appropriately concerned when available information indicates that an applicant for
clearance may have foreign contacts, instances of financial irresponsibility, and poor
personal conduct which demonstrates poor judgment or unreliability.
It is the Government’s responsibility to present substantial evidence to support
the finding of a nexus, or rational connection, between the applicant’s conduct and the
holding of a security clearance.  If such a case has been established, the burden then
shifts to the applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation or mitigation,
which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government’s case.  The applicant
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant him or her a security clearance.
In this case the Government has met its initial burden of proving that Applicant
has significant foreign contacts (Guideline B), an instance of financial irresponsibility
(Guideline F), and poor personal conduct (Guideline E.)  This evidence indicates poor
judgment, unreliability and untrustworthiness on the part of Applicant.  Because of the
scope and nature of Applicant's conduct, I conclude there is a nexus or connection with
his security clearance eligibility.
The evidence presented shows that Applicant’s foreign contacts are significant. 
His family, including his mother, father and wife, resides in South Korea.  Applicant has
spent the majority of his life in Korea.  His parents are both residents of South Korea. 
His mother is also a citizen of South Korea.  His new wife is a citizen and a resident of
South Korea.  Applicant has a bank account and car in South Korea, and has provided
financial support for his family there until last year.  He has helped his family to
purchase a home in South Korea.  He has lived in the home with his mother for many
years until recently.  His close connection to South Korea raises significant security
concerns about his desire in the future to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing protected information or his parent’s desire to continue retaining financial
support from their son.  
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Under Guideline B, (Foreign Influence), Disqualifying Conditions 7.(a) contact
with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other
person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
7.(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information; 7.(d) sharing living quarters with a person or
persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of
foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 7.(e) a substantial
business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or
foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of
foreign influence or exploitation apply.  None of the mitigating conditions are applicable.
In regard to Applicant’s finances, Applicant has provided documentation showing
that he has paid the delinquent credit card debt.  Most troubling, however, is the fact
that Applicant used this credit card to cash advance money he gave to his mother to
purchase land in South Korea.  This does not show the requisite good judgment or
reliability that is necessary in order to be eligible for access to classified information. 
However, under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) Applicant has shown mitigation. 
Disqualifying Conditions 19.(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; and 19.(c) a
history of not meeting financial obligations, apply.  But, in this case, Mitigating Condition
20.(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise
resolve debts also applies.  Accordingly, Guideline F is found for the Applicant.
Applicant’s personal conduct continues to show immaturity and irresponsibility. 
His misconduct while serving in the military involving underage alcohol abuse and
repeated issues of being late for formation shows unreliability and untrustworthiness.  It
is questionable at this point, as to whether sleep apnea played a significant role in his
situation, but I don’t believe it is to blame for everything.  There are many people with
sleep apnea who are able to follow rules and regulations, even considering their medical
conditions.  Here, Under Guideline E (Personal Conduct), Disqualifying Conditions
16.(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not
sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which,
when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with
rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information applies.  None of the mitigating conditions are
convincingly applicable.
 
I have also considered the “whole-person concept” in evaluating Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.  Under the particular facts of this case, the
totality of the conduct set forth above, when viewed under all of the guidelines as a
whole, supports a whole-person assessment of poor judgement, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, an unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, and/or other
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characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard classified
information.
 
 Under the particular circumstances of this case, Applicant has not met his burden
of proving that he is worthy of a security clearance.  Considering all of the evidence,
Applicant has not introduced persuasive evidence in rebuttal, explanation, or mitigation
that is sufficient to overcome the Government's case. 
I have considered all of the evidence presented.  It does not mitigate the impact
of his foreign contacts and his poor personal conduct, and the effect, that it can have on
his ability to safeguard classified information.  On balance, it is concluded that Applicant
has failed to overcome the Government's case opposing his request for a security
clearance.  Accordingly, the evidence supports a finding against Applicant as to the
factual and conclusionary allegations expressed in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the SOR. 
Paragraph 2 is found for the Applicant.  
    FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as
required by Paragraph E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1:  Against Applicant.
    Subpara.    1.a. Against Applicant.
Subpara.    1.b. Against Applicant.
Subpara.    1.c. Against Applicant.
Subpara.    1.d. Against Applicant.
Paragraph 2:  For Applicant.
    Subpara.    2.a. For Applicant.
Paragraph 3:  Against Applicant.
    Subpara.    3.a. Against Applicant.
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
  Darlene Lokey Anderson
Administrative Judge
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