1 
 
 
   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
       DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
   )  ISCR Case No. 15-04494 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance  ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
___________ 
 
Decision 
___________ 
 
HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant’s statement of reasons (SOR) includes 22 allegations of delinquent 
debts. Circumstances beyond his control damaged his finances. He made sufficient 
progress to mitigate financial considerations security concerns. Eligibility for access to 
classified information is granted.       
  
Statement of the Case 
  
On June 21, 2012, Applicant completed and signed his Electronic Questionnaire 
for National Security Positions (e-QIP) or security clearance application (SCA). 
(Government Exhibit (GE) 1) On December 7, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued an SOR to Applicant pursuant to 
Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within 
Industry; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance 
Review Program (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility 
for Access to Classified Information (AG), which became effective on September 1, 
2006. 
 
The SOR detailed reasons why the DOD CAF did not find under the Directive that 
it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance 
for him, and recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a 
clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. (Hearing Exhibit (HE) 2) 
   
 
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Specifically, the SOR set forth security concerns arising under Guideline F (financial 
considerations). 
 
On January 2, 2016, Applicant responded to the SOR, and he requested a 
hearing. On March 31, 2016, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On June 18, 
2016, the case was assigned to me. On August 9, 2016, the Defense Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing, setting the hearing for September 1, 
2016. (HE 1) The hearing was conducted as scheduled.   
  
During the hearing, Department Counsel offered 6 exhibits; Applicant offered 24 
exhibits; and all proffered exhibits were admitted without objection. (Tr. 13-15; 
Government Exhibits (GE) 1-6; Applicant Exhibits (AE) A-X) On September 12, 2016, 
DOHA received a copy of the transcript of the hearing.  
 
Findings of Fact1 
 
 In Applicant’s SOR response, he admitted the SOR allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 
1.b, 1.c, 1.g, 1.h, 1.i, 1.k, 1.l, 1.m, 1.n, 1.o, 1.p, 1.q, 1.u, and 1.v. He denied the other 
SOR allegations. He also provided extenuating and mitigating information. Applicant’s 
admissions are accepted as findings of fact.  
 
Applicant is a 38-year-old graphics designer, and he has worked for his employer 
since 2000. (Tr. 5-7; GE 1) In 1996, he graduated from high school. (Tr. 5) In 2000, he 
received a bachelor’s degree in sports administration. (Tr. 6) In 2006, he married, and 
he has five children, who are ages 4, 5, 6, 8, and 18. (Tr. 7) He did not serve in the 
military. (GE 1) He does not have a criminal record; he does not abuse illegal drugs; 
and there is no evidence of security violations. (GE 1)  
 
Financial Considerations 
 
 In 2007, Applicant’s spouse lost her employment, and he had medical bills with 
the birth of each of his children. (Tr. 17) In 2005, Applicant purchased a one-bedroom 
condominium. (Tr. 18) After their first children were born, they moved into a house, and 
they rented the condominium because they were unable to sell it. (Tr. 18) The rent was 
insufficient to pay the mortgage loan and condominium fees. (Tr. 18) The tenant passed 
away in the condominium, and the condominium mortgage loan went into foreclosure. 
(Tr. 18)  
 
A year ago, Applicant obtained a second job to raise more income to address his 
debts. (Tr. 19) He works five days a week on one job, and seven days a week on the 
other job delivering packages. (Tr. 20-21) Applicant’s spouse was unable to work 
outside their home because of the needs of their children; however, recently she began 
a 10-hour per week, part-time job delivering items. (Tr. 19, 21-22) Applicant is careful 
                                            
1Some details have been excluded to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific information is 
available in the cited exhibits.  
   
 
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about expenses, and he uses a budget. (Tr. 22) For one year, Applicant utilized a 
commercial debt consolidation payment plan to help pay and resolve his delinquent 
debts. (Tr. 27) Applicant’s taxes are current. (Tr. 46) Applicant and his spouse’s current 
monthly income including their part-time employment is about $8,000. (Tr. 23-24, 29-30)  
 
The status of the SOR debts is as follows: 
  
SOR ¶ 1.a alleges a medical judgment entered in 2014 for $222. On December 
28, 2015, Applicant paid $320 and resolved this debt. (Tr. 30; AE A) 
 
SOR ¶ 1.b alleges a 2012 homeowner’s association judgment for $3,608. 
Applicant negotiated a payment plan, and he made the first $67 payment on September 
1, 2016. (Tr. 30-31; AE B) 
 
SOR ¶¶ 1.c through 1.g and 1.t allege six delinquent medical debts for $173, 
$198, $540, $112, $271, and $541. On December 31, 2015, he settled and paid the 
debt for $173 for $173. (Tr. 31; AE C) On August 2, 2016, he settled and paid the $198 
debt for $160. (Tr. 31-32; AE D) On August 23, 2016, Applicant established a $15 
monthly payment plan to address the debt for $540. (Tr. 32; AE E) On July 29, 2016, he 
settled and paid the $112 debt for $106. (Tr. 32; AE F) On December 31, 2015, he 
settled and paid the $271 debt for $281. (Tr. 32-33; AE H) Applicant was unable to 
locate the creditor for the debt in SOR ¶ 1.t for $541, and it is not listed on his current 
credit report. (Tr. 36-37) In sum, four of his medical debts are paid and resolved; one 
medical debt is in a payment plan; and one medical debt cannot be located. 
 
SOR ¶ 1.h alleges a charged-off bank debt for $869. On August 19, 2016, 
Applicant established a $36 monthly payment plan to address the debt for $869. (Tr. 32-
33; AE I) 
 
SOR ¶ 1.i alleges a collection-bank debt for $2,684. On February 27, 2015, 
Applicant established a $198 monthly payment plan to address the debt for $2,684. (Tr. 
33; AE I) As of July 27, 2016, he had made 18 payments to address a debt with a 
$4,473 balance on February 27, 2015. (AE I) 
 
SOR ¶¶ 1.j, 1.r, and 1.s allege three mortgage loan accounts delinquent in the 
amounts of $31,664; $23,585 with a balance of $39,421; and $15,771 with a balance of 
$141,821. Applicant’s condominium had two mortgages loans from the same lender. 
(Tr. 39; GE 2; AE J) Applicant was unable to sell the condominium because the decline 
in real estate prices caused the property to be worth less than the amounts of the two 
mortgages. In 2009, Applicant hired a company to attempt a settlement of the debt or 
renegotiate the mortgage and paid the company $800. (Tr. 33-34; AE J) In 2010, a 
mortgage lender foreclosed on Applicant’s condominium, and the purchaser’s 
successful bid was $50,001. (AE J) The foreclosure documentation did not detail the 
resolution of the mortgages in SOR ¶¶ 1.j, 1.r, and 1.s. (AE J) Applicant provided 
correspondence from the original lender and the collection agent (named in SOR ¶ 1.j) 
seeking payment. (AE J) The original lender was required to pay $2 billion through a 
   
 
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federal settlement to those who borrowed funds for mortgages. (AE J) Applicant did not 
provide any documentation showing the benefits of the settlement were applied to his 
account. On December 12, 2013, the lender wrote seeking a payoff of the debt in the 
amount of $62,188. (AE J) On August 25, 2014, the lender wrote acknowledging 
correspondence from Applicant indicating Applicant believed the debt was no longer 
owed. (Tr. 33-36, 40; AE J; AE R) The file does not contain a current detailed 
explanation for the amount or status of the debt. The lenders in SOR ¶¶ 1.j, 1.r, and 1.s 
are not listed in Applicant’s July 22, 2016 credit reports. (Tr. 35; AE X)  
 
SOR ¶¶ 1.k to 1.p allege six delinquent student loan debts for $157 (loan amount 
is $7,447), $34 (loan amount is $2,099), $61 (loan amount is $3,674), $50 (loan amount 
is $2,910), $50 (loan amount is $2,910), and $91 (loan amount is $5,474). Applicant’s 
student loans are now combined, and his monthly payment is $84. (Tr. 36, 39, 41; AE 
P) His July 22, 2016 credit reports show either that his student loans are deferred (his 
spouse is attending college classes) or that they are in in “pays as agreed” status. (AE 
X) 
 
SOR ¶ 1.q alleges a charged-off bank account for $1,002. In February 2015, he 
began making $24 monthly payments, and in February 2016, he increased the monthly 
payment to $39. (Tr. 36; AE Q) In July 2016, the balance owed was $468. (AE Q) 
 
SOR ¶ 1.u alleges a public storage collection account in the amount of $348. On 
August 8, 2015, he settled and paid the $348 debt for $265. (Tr. 37; AE U)  
 
SOR ¶ 1.v alleges a telecommunications collection account in the amount of 
$271. On December 31, 2015, he settled and paid the $271 debt for $281. (Tr. 37-38; 
AE V)  
 
In sum, Applicant’s SOR alleges 22 delinquent accounts; he paid seven debts 
(SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1.d, 1.f, 1.g, 1.u, and 1.v); he has 11 debts in payment plans (SOR ¶¶ 
1.b, 1.e, 1.h, 1.i, 1.k-1.p, 1.q); three alleged mortgage debts are disputed (SOR ¶¶ 1.j, 
1.r, and 1.s); and he was unable to locate one debt (SOR ¶ 1.t).  
 
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the 
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security 
emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. 
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the 
authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine 
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. 
at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.  
 
   
 
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Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules 
of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are 
applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.  
 
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be 
a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. 
Thus, nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest that it is based, in whole 
or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, 
or patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the 
President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. 
  
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). 
 
Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it 
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security 
clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of 
disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 
02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
  
   
 
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Analysis 
 
Financial Considerations 
 
AG ¶ 18 articulates the security concern for financial problems:  
 
Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds.  
 
AG ¶ 19 provides two disqualifying conditions that could raise a security concern 
and may be disqualifying in this case: “(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;” and 
“(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations.” The Government established the 
disqualifying conditions in AG ¶¶ 19(a) and 19(c) requiring additional inquiry about the 
possible applicability of mitigating conditions.  
 
Five mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 20 are potentially applicable: 
  
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred 
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast 
doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment;  
 
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely 
beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business 
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or 
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;  
 
(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem 
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is 
under control; 
 
(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or 
otherwise resolve debts;2 and  
                                            
2The Appeal Board has previously explained what constitutes a “good faith” effort to repay 
overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts:  
 
In order to qualify for application of [the “good faith” mitigating condition], an applicant 
must present evidence showing either a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or 
some other good-faith action aimed at resolving the applicant’s debts. The Directive does 
not define the term “good-faith.” However, the Board has indicated that the concept of 
good-faith “requires a showing that a person acts in a way that shows reasonableness, 
   
 
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(e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the 
past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides 
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides 
evidence of actions to resolve the issue. 
 
The Appeal Board concisely explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving the 
applicability of mitigating conditions as follows:  
 
Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance 
eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance 
of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government 
presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the 
applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The 
standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in 
Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for 
access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national 
security.” Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b).  
 
ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013).  
 
AG ¶¶ 20(a), 20(c), and 20(d) apply. Applicant’s delinquent debts were caused 
by his spouse’s loss of her employment, and family medical expenses with the birth of 
his children. In 2005, Applicant purchased a one-bedroom condominium. After their first 
children were born, they moved into a house, and they rented the condominium 
because they were unable to sell it. The rent was insufficient to pay the mortgage loans 
and condominium fees. His tenant passed away in the condominium, and the 
condominium mortgage loan went into foreclosure. Applicant was unable to sell the 
condominium because the decline in real estate prices caused the property to be worth 
less than the amounts owed on the two mortgages. 
 
Applicant acted responsibly to address his delinquent debts. A year ago, 
Applicant obtained a second job to raise more income to address his debts. His spouse 
recently obtained a part-time job. Applicant is careful about expenses, and he uses a 
budget. For one year, Applicant utilized a commercial debt consolidation plan to help 
pay and resolve his delinquent debts. His taxes are current. Applicant’s SOR alleges 22 
delinquent accounts; he paid 7 debts; and he has 11 debts in payment plans.  
 
AG ¶ 20(e) applies to the three alleged mortgage loans in SOR ¶¶ 1.j, 1.r, and 
1.s, and to the medical debt in SOR ¶ 1.t. Applicant’s condominium was foreclosed in 
                                                                                                                                            
prudence, honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation.” Accordingly, an applicant must 
do more than merely show that he or she relied on a legally available option (such as 
bankruptcy) in order to claim the benefit of [the “good faith” mitigating condition]. 
 
(internal citation and footnote omitted) ISCR Case No. 02-30304 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2004) (quoting 
ISCR Case No. 99-9020 at 5-6 (App. Bd. June 4, 2001)).   
   
 
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2010, and there is no evidence the lender or collection agent has sought a deficiency 
judgment to enforce the debt. Applicant’s mortgage lender made a settlement of $2 
billion with the federal government and most of settlement amount was supposed to be 
paid to debtors. The mortgage loans and medical debt are not listed on Applicant’s July 
22, 2016 credit reports. Applicant worked with the mortgage lender to resolve the debt 
before the foreclosure. He argued to the lender that the debt was resolved, and the 
lender has not pursued collection of the debt.3  
 
Applicant did not cite the statute of limitations as his rationale for not arranging a 
payment plan for his mortgage debt. Recently, the DOHA Appeal Board reinforced its 
position on statutes of limitations not mitigating financial considerations concerns 
stating: 
 
In this case, the Judge noted that Applicant explained that he did not owe 
any of the alleged debts because they had either been deleted from his 
credit report or soon would be deleted, and he also relied on a state 
statute of limitations to absolve himself of debts. The Appeal Board has 
long recognized that debts remain relevant for security clearance 
purposes even if they are no longer enforceable due to the running of the 
statute of limitations or cannot be legally listed on a credit report due to the 
passage of time. See e.g., ISCR Case No. 03-04779 at 4 (App. Bd. Jul. 
20, 2005) and ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 6 (App. Bd. Oct 26, 2006).4 We 
also have held that reliance on a state’s statute of limitations does not 
constitute a good-faith effort to resolve financial difficulties and is of limited 
mitigative value. ADP Case No. 06-18900 at 5 (App. Bd. Jun. 6, 2008) 
(citing ISCR Case No. 03-04779 at 4 (App. Bd. Jul. 20, 2005) and ISCR 
Case No. 01-09691 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2003)). 
 
                                            
3 The state statute of limitations on written contracts is five years under Va. Code § 8.01-246(2) 
for the state where Applicant’s condominium is located. The creditor’s decision not to enforce the 
mortgage debt by obtaining a judgment may be because it is collection-barred by the state statute of 
limitations or it may be due to a myriad of other reasons such as the federal debt settlement, inability to 
locate supporting documentation, or the belief that Applicant could not afford payments. A creditor’s 
decision not to enforce a debt because of a state statute of limitations is not necessarily mitigating. See 
ISCR Case No. 08-01122 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 9, 2009); ISCR Case No. 07-08049 at 5 (App. Bd. Jul. 22, 
2008); ADP Case No. 07-13041 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 19, 2008); ISCR Case No. 07-11814 at 2 (App. Bd. 
Dec. 29, 2008) ADP Case No. 06-14616 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 18, 2007) (stating, “reliance upon legal 
defenses such as the statute of limitations does not necessarily demonstrate prudence, honesty, and 
reliability; therefore, such reliance is of diminished probative value in resolving trustworthiness concerns 
arising out of financial problems. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006).”). 
See also ISCR Case No. 12-04806 at 3-6 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2014) (denying government appeal and 
approving application of anti-deficiency statute to mitigate mortgage debts). Applicant’s condominium is 
not in a state with an anti-deficiency statute. 
 
4Compare ISCR Case No. 12-04806 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2014). In that case, Applicant corroborated 
efforts to settle debts that were in “charged-off” status. Also, that Applicant had received financial 
counseling. Ultimately, the Board affirmed the Judge’s favorable decision. 
   
 
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ISCR Case No. 15-01208 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 26, 2016). There is substantial evidence 
that the disputed debts are resolved. Should these debts resurface, I believe Applicant 
will act in good faith to resolve them.  
 
Based on Applicant’s credible and sincere promise to pay his debts and his track 
record of paying his debts, future new delinquent debt “is unlikely to recur and does not 
cast doubt on [Applicant’s] current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” and 
“there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control.” His 
payments of his debts showed good faith. He has sufficient income to keep his debts in 
current status and to continue making progress paying his remaining debts. I am 
confident that Applicant will conscientiously endeavor to maintain his financial 
responsibility. His efforts are sufficient to mitigate financial considerations security 
concerns.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my 
comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 
2(a) were addressed under Guideline F, but some warrant additional comment.  
 
Applicant is a 38-year-old graphics designer, where he has worked for his 
employer since 2000. In 2000, he received a bachelor’s degree in sports administration. 
In 2006, he married, and he has five children. He does not have a criminal record; he 
does not abuse illegal drugs; and there is no evidence of security violations. He is 
sufficiently mature to conscientiously comply with his security responsibilities.    
 
Applicant’s delinquent debts were caused by his spouse’s unemployment, the 
necessity for his spouse to care for their children, medical debts, and the decline in real 
estate values, resulting in the foreclosure of his condominium. All of Applicant’s SOR 
debts are now paid, are in current payment plans, or have been disputed and resolved. 
   
 
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He is communicating with his creditors and assures he intends to pay his debts. He 
understands the conduct required to retain his security clearance. The Appeal Board 
has addressed a key element in the whole-person analysis in financial cases stating: 
  
. . . the concept of meaningful track record necessarily includes evidence 
of actual debt reduction through payment of debts. However, an applicant 
is not required, as a matter of law, to establish that he has paid off each 
and every debt listed in the SOR. All that is required is that an applicant 
demonstrate that he has . . . established a plan to resolve his financial 
problems and taken significant actions to implement that plan. The Judge 
can reasonably consider the entirety of an applicant’s financial situation 
and his actions in evaluating the extent to which that applicant’s plan for 
the reduction of his outstanding indebtedness is credible and realistic. See 
Directive ¶ E2.2(a) (Available, reliable information about the person, past 
and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching 
a determination.) There is no requirement that a plan provide for payments 
on all outstanding debts simultaneously. Rather, a reasonable plan (and 
concomitant conduct) may provide for the payment of such debts one at a 
time. Likewise, there is no requirement that the first debts actually paid in 
furtherance of a reasonable debt plan be the ones listed in the SOR.  
 
ISCR Case No. 07-06482 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 21, 2008) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). Applicant has established a “meaningful track record” of debt 
re-payment, and I am confident he will maintain his financial responsibility.5 
 
I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Exec. Or. 10865, the 
Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole 
person. Financial considerations concerns are mitigated. 
 
  
                                            
5The Government has the option of following-up with more questions about Applicant’s finances. 
The Government can re-validate Applicant’s financial status at any time through credit reports, 
investigation, and interrogatories. Approval of a clearance now does not bar the Government from 
subsequently revoking it, if warranted. “The Government has the right to reconsider the security 
significance of past conduct or circumstances in light of more recent conduct having negative security 
significance.” ISCR Case No. 10-06943 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 17, 2012). An administrative judge does not 
have “authority to grant an interim, conditional, or probationary clearance.” ISCR Case No. 10-06943 at 4 
(App. Bd. Feb. 17, 2012) (citing ISCR Case No. 10-03646 at 2 (App. Bd. Dec. 28, 2011)). See also ISCR 
Case No. 04-03907 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 18, 2006) (stating, “The Board has no authority to grant 
[a]pplicant a conditional or probationary security clearance to allow her the opportunity to have a security 
clearance while she works on her financial problems.”). This footnote does not imply that this decision to 
grant Applicant’s security clearance is conditional. 
   
 
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Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
  
Paragraph 1, Guideline F:    FOR APPLICANT  
 
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.v:   For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with national security to grant or continue Applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
_________________________ 
MARK HARVEY 
Administrative Judge