DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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---------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 14-06870
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: David F. Hayes, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
November 22, 2016
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DECISION
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ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP), on December 13, 2012. (Item 2.) On August 7, 2015, the Department of
Defense issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under
Guideline E (Personal Conduct) concerning Applicant. (Item 1.) The action was taken
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on September 4, 2015 (Answer), and
requested a decision by an administrative judge without a hearing. (Item 1.) Department
Counsel submitted the Government’s written case (FORM) to Applicant on December 6,
2015. The FORM contained four documents. Applicant acknowledged receipt of the
FORM on January 7, 2016. He was given 30 days from receipt of the FORM to submit
any additional documentation. Applicant did not submit additional information. The case
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was assigned to me on March 28, 2016. Based upon a review of the pleadings and
exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 34 and single. He is employed by a defense contractor and seeks to
obtain a security clearance in connection with his employment.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct)
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he has engaged in conduct that shows poor judgment and
trustworthiness on his part, and that he also made false statements to the Department
of Defense during the clearance screening process. Applicant admitted both allegations
under this paragraph. Those admissions are findings of fact.
1.a. In January 2012 Applicant began working for a Defense contractor in an IT
position. He had jobs in this field on and off since 2006. He was fired from this job in
February 2012 for falsifying documentation concerning his job, specifically his hand-
written watch log. His employer stated, “In addition to delivering fraudulent logs to the
government, [Applicant] also did not do a majority of the work conveyed in the log.”
Applicant was subsequently discharged from this job for “gross misconduct.” (Item 4.)
Applicant stated in his Answer that he falsified the logs due to the press of other
work. He also stated that he was not the only one to falsify the log. “It was a common
occurrence for my co-workers [to] falsify the log and receive a verbal warning and
thought I would receive the same.” (Item 1.)
Applicant appealed his discharge to his state’s Department of Labor, Licensing
and Regulation. A hearing was held on April 27, 2012. Applicant attended the hearing. A
written decision was issued on May 12, 2012, confirming that Applicant’s discharge was
appropriate and for gross misconduct. (Item 4.)
1.b. Applicant was interviewed by an authorized investigator for the Department
of Defense on January 16, 2013. During that interview Applicant lied about the reasons
behind his dismissal in February 2012, saying that it was due to a conflict between
Applicant and the site lead. Applicant subsequently confirmed in writing and under oath
on July 10, 2015, that the report of investigation accurately reflected the information that
he provided in his interview. (Item 3.)  1
It is noted that Applicant also falsified his e-QIP concerning the reasons behind his dismissal. He said that1
his dismissal was due to, “Previous conflict with primary contractor.” (Item 2, Section 13A.) Department
Counsel elected not to allege this falsification. It will only be considered in deciding whether Applicant has
mitigated the allegations, and under the “whole-person” concept.
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Policies
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. When evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider
the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each
guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions, which are to be used as appropriate in evaluating an applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision. In addition, the administrative judge may also rely on
his or her own common sense, as well as knowledge of the law, human nature, and the
ways of the world, in making a reasoned decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Security clearance decisions include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a
certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk
of compromise of classified information.
 
Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any
determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
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applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Paragraph 1 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct)
The security concern relating to Personal Conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty or
unwillingness to comply with rules or regulations can raise questions about
an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified
information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid
answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to
cooperate with the security clearance process.
I have examined the disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 16 and especially
considered the following:  
(b) deliberately providing false and misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative;
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse
determination, but which, when combined with all available information
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes
but is not limited to consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client
confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized
release of sensitive corporate or other government protected
information;
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the
workplace;
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other
employer’s time or resources; and
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(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s
personal, professional, or community standing.
Applicant was terminated from a defense job in 2012 because he had
consistently falsified his work time logs. Applicant well knew why he had been fired, yet
less than a year later he actively deceived a Government investigator regarding the
reasons for his dismissal. All of the stated disqualifying conditions apply to the facts of
this case.
I have reviewed the mitigating conditions and find none of them apply to the facts
of this case. The conduct that Applicant engaged in at his former employer was
extremely serious, and could have adversely affected the national security. He
subsequently lied about the reasons behind his dismissal at least twice. There is
insufficient evidence that Applicant currently shows good judgment or is trustworthy and
reliable. Paragraph 1 is found against Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the relevant circumstances. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination
of whether to grant eligibi li ty for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person
concept. The administrative judge must consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.      
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The discussion under
Guideline E, above, applies here as well. Applicant failed to mitigate the security
concerns related to the serious misstatements on his work log that led to his
termination, as well as his falsifications to the Government regarding that dismissal.
Under AG ¶ 2(a)(1) and (2), Applicant’s conduct was knowing and extremely
serious under both allegations. I cannot find that there have been permanent behavioral
changes under AG ¶ 2(a)(6). Accordingly, I also cannot find that there is little to no
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potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress (AG ¶ 2(a)(8)); or that there is
little to no likelihood of continuation or recurrence (AG ¶ 2(a)(9)). 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibi lity and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from his
untrustworthy conduct, and related falsifications to the Government. Accordingly, the
evidence supports denying his request for a security clearance.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge
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