KEYWORD: Guideline B
DIGEST: The Directive presumes there is a nexus, or rational connection, between proved
circumstances under any of its guidelines and an applicant’s security eligibility Direct or
objective evidence of nexus is not required. In a Guideline B case, Department Counsel is not
required to prove a threat of espionage.  We have consistently held that factors such as the failure
of foreign authorities to contact an applicant’s relatives in the past do not provide a meaningful
measure of whether an applicant’s circumstances pose a security risk.  In this case, the Judge
considered Applicant’s prior involvement with a foreign defense establishment, including his
having served in the military and/or having held a foreign security clearance.  This was
appropriate for him to consider. Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 14-04937.a1
DATE: 12/15/2016
DATE: December 15, 2016
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 14-04937
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Steven A. Cash, Esq. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On
December 16, 2014, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for
that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing. 
On September 20, 2016, after the hearing, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
Administrative Judge Francisco Mendez denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance. 
Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse conclusion was
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Consistent with the following, we affirm.
The Judge’s Findings of Fact
Israel and the U.S. have a strong relationship, which includes cooperation and support on
matters of defense.  There have been at least three cases, however, of U.S. Government employees
disclosing classified information to Israel or acting as agents for that country.  U.S. officials are
concerned about industrial espionage from Israel, although Israel denies that it engages in such
practices.  
Applicant moved to Israel from the Soviet Union when he was in his teens.  He lived
continuously in Israel for 20 years, coming to the U.S. in the late 2000s with his wife and child. 
Since moving here, Applicant and his wife have had two additional children.  He became a
naturalized citizen about five years after immigrating to the U.S.  Applicant is willing to relinquish
his Israeli citizenship.  Applicant’s wife is also a naturalized citizen.  
While living in Israel, Applicant served three years in the military, in compliance with Israeli
law.  Afterward he served in the military reserves.  Applicant voluntarily disclosed his Israeli
military service as well as other foreign connections and contacts.  In the 2000s, Applicant worked
for a multinational corporation, which included contract work for an Israeli agency.  Applicant held
the equivalent of a security clearance while working for this company.
Applicant’s parents and in-laws are retired.  Applicant has frequent contact with his parents. 
His mother-in-law in seeking permanent resident status in the U.S.  Applicant has a sibling in Israel
who works for a company with an office in that country.  Applicant states that none of his relatives
or in-laws have connections with the Israeli government or intelligence services.  He has an Israeli
bank account with about $1,500 in it.  He was unable to gain access to the account when he last tried
to access it and he now considers it to be lost.  The Judge found credible Applicant’s statement that
he no longer has an interest in it.
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Applicant has a retirement account in Israel, the equivalent of a 401(k) plan.  His former
employers in Israel contributed money to it and he will be eligible for a monthly pension of about
$200 to $300 when he reaches retirement age.  Applicant owns real estate in the U.S. worth about
$1,000,000, and his retirement account in this country has about $120,000.  His wife owns a
business in the U.S.  He credibly testified that he intends to continue living in the U.S. and to retire
here.
The Judge’s Analysis
The Judge stated that not all espionage concerns arise from hostile powers and cited to his
finding about Israel’s possible industrial espionage against the U.S.  He concluded that Applicant’s
familial and other connections within Israel, when read in light of the official notice documents
contained in the record, raise a heightened risk of foreign influence.  The Judge concluded that
Applicant had mitigated concerns arising from the Israeli bank account and his dual-national spouse. 
However, he entered adverse findings regarding Applicant’s other Israeli relatives.  He stated that
these family connections, viewed in light of Applicant’s having served in the Israeli military, worked
as a cleared Israeli government contractor, and having recently possessed an Israeli security
clearance, outweigh the favorable evidence contained in the record.    
Discussion
Applicant challenges the Judge’s conclusion that his Israeli connections pose a heightened
risk of foreign influence.  He states that the Judge made no finding that Israel generally engages in
exploitation, pressure, coercion, etc.  He also denies that Applicant’s circumstances could expose
him to a conflict of interest.  
The Directive presumes there is a nexus, or rational connection, between proved
circumstances under any of its guidelines and an applicant’s security eligibility.  See, e.g., ISCR
Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016).  Direct or objective evidence of nexus is not
required.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 12-00084 at 3 (App. Bd. May 22, 2014).  In a Guideline B case,
Department Counsel is not required to prove a threat of espionage.  We have consistently held that
factors such as the failure of foreign authorities to contact an applicant’s relatives in the past do not
provide a meaningful measure of whether an applicant’s circumstances pose a security risk.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 14-03112 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Nov. 3, 2015).  In this case, the Judge considered
Applicant’s prior involvement with a foreign defense establishment, including his having served in
the military and/or having held a foreign security clearance.  This was appropriate for him to
consider.  See Id at 4.  That is, there is a rational connection between service in a foreign military
and access to a foreign country’s national secrets (which imposes a fiduciary relationship with that
country) and susceptibility  to pressure or persuasion to aid that foreign country at the expense of
the U.S. In this case we find no reason to disturb the presumption of nexus. 
The Judge’s findings about matters (alleged in the SOR or not) concerning Applicant’s
family ties in Israel and with Israelis, his expectation of an (admittedly small) pension from his
Israeli retirement account, his service in the Israeli military, his work for an Israeli contractor, and
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his having held an Israeli security clearance were all proper for the Judge to consider in the analysis
of Applicant’s case in mitigation of a potential heightened risk or conflict of interest, his credibility,
and the whole person analysis.  Of course, the Judge expressly noted the limitation on considering
matters not alleged in the SOR as separate bases for disqualification.
Applicant challenges the Judge’s application of the whole-person concept, noting that much
of the evidence in the record is favorable.  However, a whole-person analysis requires a Judge to
examine an applicant’s security concerns in light of the entirety of the evidence.  Directive ¶ 6.3. 
See also ISCR Case No. 15-00424 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016).  We find no reason to conclude
that the Judge failed to do so.  That he extended greater weight to evidence pointing to a risk of
coercion or to a conflict of interest is not a reason to believe that the Judge weighed the adverse
evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Indeed, the Judge’s analysis
explicitly, and properly, acknowledged his duty to resolve close cases in favor of the U.S.  See 
Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b):  “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.”
The Directive imposes upon applicants the responsibility to mitigate the concerns raised by
the Government’s evidence.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  This burden of persuasion requires the applicant
to show that a favorable decision is “clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.” 
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Given the evidence cited above, we find
no reason to disturb the Judge’s whole-person analysis or his conclusion that Applicant had failed
to meet his burden of persuasion.  The Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a
satisfactory explanation for the decision.  The decision is sustainable on this record.
Order
The Decision is AFFIRMED.   
Signed: Michael Ra’anan              
Michael  Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                  
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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Signed: William S. Fields                
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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