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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE                                                  
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS                               
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 15-05497 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Caroline Heintzelman, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Eric Eisen, Esq. 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
  
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
DAM, Shari, Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns related to his personal and 
financial connections to India. 
 
History of Case 
 
On October 13, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaires for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On February 22, 2016, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The 
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information 
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines effective within the 
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.   
 
 
 
 
 
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  Applicant answered the SOR in writing on March 8, 2016, and requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge. On May 19, 2016, the Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) assigned the case to me. It issued a Notice of Hearing 
on September 14, 2016, setting the hearing for September 28, 2016. On that date, 
Department Counsel introduced Government Exhibits (GE) 1, 2, and 3 into evidence 
without objection. Applicant testified and introduced Exhibits (AE) A, B, and C into 
evidence without objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on October 6, 
2016. 
 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to India. The request and the attached documents pertinent to 
India are included in the record as Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1, along with 10 attachments. 
The documents were admitted. (Tr. 9.) Applicant submitted a document for 
administrative notice that was marked as HE 2, and was admitted into evidence. The 
facts administratively noticed are limited to matters of general knowledge pertinent to 
India, and not subject to reasonable dispute. The facts administratively noticed are set 
out in the Findings of Fact, below.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted the factual allegations contained in SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.i,  
and provided explanations. Those admissions are incorporated into these findings of 
fact.   
 
 Applicant is 50 years old. He was born in India. He graduated from an Indian 
university in July 1990 with a bachelor’s degree, and in January 1991 he obtained a 
master’s degree. He immigrated to the United States in August 1991. In December 
1994 he earned a master’s degree from a U.S. college. In December 2006 he became a 
U.S. citizen. (GE 1.)  
 
 From July 2004 to July 2008, Applicant was self-employed as a consultant. He 
then worked as a manager for a private company until June 2012, when he resumed his 
consulting business and obtained a contract with a company that had some Federal 
contracts. He continued as a consultant with that company until December 2014, when     
he became an employee for the company. He held a public trust clearance for about 
three years while working for the Federal contractor. (Tr. 35, 37, 49, 73-75; GE 1.) He 
said that no one in his family is aware that he has applied for a security clearance. (Tr. 
50.) 
 
 In 1995 Applicant married his wife in India. She was born there and earned a 
master’s degree from an Indian university. She subsequently immigrated to the United 
 
 
 
 
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States to be with Applicant. She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in December 2008. 
Their two children, ages 15 and 17, were born in the United States. (GE 1.)  
 
 Both of Applicant’s parents were born and resided in India. His father was an 
economics professor at an Indian university. He died in March 2015. (Tr. 57.) His 
mother is 74 years old and is a resident citizen of India. She is a homemaker. (GE 1.)  
 
 Applicant is the youngest of three children, all born in India. Both sisters are 
citizens and residents of India. They are homemakers. He communicates with his 
sisters once every two or three months. One of his brothers-in-law is an assistant 
professor at an Indian university and the other brother-in-law is a bank manager in 
India. Two nephews reside in the United States. One nephew and one niece are 
resident citizens of India. One sister visited Applicant in the United States. (Tr. 57-59.) 
 
 Applicant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law were born in India and reside there. 
His father-in-law is a retired civil engineer and worked for a local government. They 
have visited the United States a couple times. He does not provide any support for 
them. His wife speaks to them once every two weeks. Her siblings are permanent 
residents of the United States. (Tr. 48, 59-61.) 
 
 Applicant traveled to India about seven times since arriving in the United States 
in 1995. He went there to care for his parents, and in 2015 for his father’s funeral. He 
visited in 1997, 2001, 2003, 2006, twice in 2014, and 2015. He stayed with his parents 
during those visits. (Tr. 38, 51-52.)  
 
 Applicant’s mother owns her home in India. Applicant sends her between $500 
and $800 once every two or three months to help pay living expenses. He thinks he 
sent about $8,000 last year. She has a pension but it is not sufficient to pay all of her 
expenses. He speaks to her frequently. She has visited him in the United States three 
times, the last time being in 2015. He sent money to help his sick father before he died. 
He has no immediate plans to return to India, but may go in the future to visit his 
mother. (Tr. 39, 53-56, 63.)  
 
 In 2006 Applicant purchased a $150,000 piece of property in India as an 
investment, which he hopes will fund his children’s college costs. In 2007 his wife 
purchased a $40,000 piece of property in India as an investment. (Tr. 31-35.) At the 
time he completed his October 2014 e-QIP, he estimated the value of his property at 
$450,000 and his wife’s property at $120,000. (GE 1.) Applicant borrowed $20,000 from 
a friend in India in order to purchase one of the properties. He paid the loan in full in 
April 2016. (Tr. 61.) He has a bank account in India related to the properties. (Tr. 67) He 
said that the Indian properties have a combined current estimated value of about 
$300,000. When Applicant travels to India he checks the status and condition of the 
properties. (Tr. 65, 69, 97; AE C.)  
 
 
 
 
 
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 Applicant owns a home in the United States. He also has U.S. bank accounts 
and a 401(k). The estimated net value of his assets in the United States is about 
$160,000. (Tr. 72.) 
 
  Applicant submitted character letters. A consulting project director wrote a letter 
of appreciation in March 2011 commenting on Applicant’s diligence and good work. 
Applicant received praise for a project he completed in 1999 for a city college. (AE E.) 
 
 At the hearing, Applicant sincerely expressed pride in his U.S. citizenship. He 
testified that neither he nor his family intend to reside in India in the future. (Tr. 41.)  
 
India 
 
I take administrative notice of the following facts: According to its constitution, 
India is a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. It is a multiparty, federal, 
parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament and a population of approximately 
1.1 billion.  
 
The Indian government generally respects the rights of its citizens, but numerous 
serious problems remain. Police and security forces have engaged in extrajudicial 
killings of persons in custody, disappearances, torture, and rape. A lack of 
accountability permeated the government and security forces, creating an atmosphere 
in which human rights violations went unpunished. A number of violent attacks were 
committed in recent years by separatist and terrorist groups. In November 2008, 
terrorists coordinated an attack at a hotel in Mumbai frequented by westerners.    
 
The United States recognizes India as key to its strategic interests and has 
sought to strengthen diplomatic and economic relationships. The two countries are the 
world’s largest democracies, both committed to political freedom protected by 
representative government, and share common interests in the free flow of commerce, 
in fighting terrorism, and in creating a strategically stable Asia. However, differences 
over India’s nuclear weapons program and pace of economic reform exist. There are 
also concerns about India’s relations with Iran, including its increasing cooperation with 
the Iranian military. 
 
There have been cases involving the illegal export, or attempted illegal export, of 
U.S. restricted, dual–use technology to India, including technology and equipment that 
were determined to present an unacceptable risk of diversion to programs for the 
development of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Foreign 
government and private entities, including intelligence organizations and security 
services, have capitalized on private-sector acquisitions of U.S. technology. In March 
2008, an American businessman pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally export 
technology to entities in India.  
 
The United States views India as a growing world power with which it shares 
common strategic interests. There is a strong partnership between the two countries 
 
 
 
 
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and they are expected to continue addressing differences and shaping a dynamic and 
collaborative future. The U.S. and India seek to elevate the strategic partnership further 
to include cooperation in counter-terrorism, defense, education, and joint democracy 
promotion.  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶¶ 2(b) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of 
variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider 
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
According to Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to 
establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an 
“applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, 
extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, 
and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance 
decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG & 6:       
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign county in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 describes three conditions that could raise a security concern and be 
potentially disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;1  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation. 
Applicant’s mother, sisters, and in-laws are citizens and residents of India. One 
of his friends is also a citizen and resident of India. Applicant regularly sends his mother 
money. He and his wife own two properties there, worth about $300,000that he has 
estimated to be worth from about $300,000 to about $570,000. He has an Indian bank 
account that he uses for managing the properties. India is the world’s largest 
                                            
1The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of 
law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country and an 
applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign 
influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-
02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
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democracy, works closely with the United States on many matters, shares common 
strategic interests, and generally respects the rights of its citizens. But it also continues 
to have some human rights issues, has been victimized by terrorist attacks, and has a 
history of seeking restricted dual-use technology, which has been illegally exported to 
India from the United States. This creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. It also creates a potential conflict of 
interest. AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b) and (e) have been raised by the evidence. 
 
 After the Government produced substantial evidence of those disqualifying 
conditions, the burden shifted to Applicant to rebut their security significance or 
otherwise prove mitigation. Four mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially 
applicable to the disqualifying conditions raised in this case: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.;   
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;  
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; and 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that Applicant and his 
family members are vulnerable to coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress 
is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family 
member is associated with or dependent upon that government, the country is known to 
conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or there is a serious problem 
in the country with crime or terrorism. Although India has a close, friendly relationship 
with the United States, there is evidence that India illegally targets U.S. technology, 
which raises a security concern about Applicant’s relationship with his mother, sisters, 
in-laws, and friend. Hence, AG ¶ 8(a) has limited application.   
 
 
 
 
 
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Applicant produced some evidence to establish AG ¶ 8(b). He has lived in the 
United States since 1991. He attended a U.S. university, and has worked for U.S. 
companies. He became a naturalized citizen in December 2006. His wife became a 
naturalized citizen in December 2008. Their two children were born in the United States. 
He owns property and has financial accounts in the United States. He received praise 
from colleagues for his work performance. He considers himself to be a citizen of the 
United States and no longer a citizen of India. Based on those connections to the United 
States, there is some indication that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest. 
 
AG ¶ 8(c) does not have application to the security concerns raised as a result of 
Applicant’s contacts with his mother, sisters, in-laws, or friend residing in India because 
those contacts are sufficiently frequent and not casual. His communications have been 
consistent over the years, including regular transfers of money for support. He has 
visited his family in India at least seven times since 1995, and may return in the future. 
  
The evidence does not establish mitigation under AG ¶ 8(f). Applicant sends his 
mother about $8,000 a year to help pay her expenses. He previously sent money to his 
father before he died. He borrowed $20,000 from his Indian friend to help purchase a 
property in India. He and his wife have assets in India that are substantially more 
valuable than their assets in the United States. These facts raise significant potential for 
conflicts of interest, and demonstrate his ongoing susceptibility to influence, pressure, or 
manipulation.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility 
for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The Appeal Board 
requires the whole-person analysis address “evidence of an applicant’s personal 
loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family’s ties to the U.S. relative to his 
[or her] ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.; and many others 
 
 
 
 
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raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 5, 
2007).   
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Although this case pertains to Guideline 
B, the security concerns do not arise from any questionable conduct by Applicant, but 
rather from circumstances that warrant further analysis. 
 
Applicant is a 50-year-old man, who was born in India and has lived in the United 
States for about 25 years. He has been a naturalized U.S. citizen since 2006. His 
spouse has been a naturalized U.S. citizen since 2008. His children were born in the 
United States. He graduated from a U.S. university and has worked for U.S. companies 
for many years. He has some assets in the United States. He expressed loyalty to the 
United States. Those are facts that weigh in favor of granting Applicant a security 
clearance.  
 
However, Applicant’s ties to India outweigh those factors. Over the past 25 years, 
Applicant has maintained strong connections to India through his family and finances. 
He has communicated regularly with family members over the years, as well as a friend. 
He financially supports his mother. While his ongoing financial assistance for his mother 
and frequent contacts with other family members commendably demonstrate devotion 
and affection for his family, those actions raise security concerns and potential conflicts 
of interest that are not easily mitigated. In addition, he has borrowed money from a 
friend in order to purchase a property in India. He and his wife own properties in India, 
which have an estimated value greater than their total U.S. assets. When he visits India 
he checks on his properties. 
 
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all pertinent facts 
and circumstances, in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant did not 
mitigate the security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. Overall, the record 
evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability 
for a security clearance.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.i:            Against Applicant 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
                                             
         
_________________ 
SHARI DAM 
Administrative Judge