DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 15-08862
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: John Griffith, Esquire
December 14, 2016
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Decision
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CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP) on February 19, 2015.  On June 10, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline
B for Applicant.  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG), effective within the Department of Defense after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on July 7, 2016.  He answered the
SOR in writing on July 12, 2016, and requested a hearing before an Administrative
Judge.  The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) received the request
soon thereafter, and I received the case assignment on September 8, 2016.  DOHA
issued a notice of hearing on September 12, 2016, and I convened the hearing as
scheduled on September 28, 2016.  The Government offered Exhibits (GXs) 1 through
3, which were received without objection.  Applicant testified on his own behalf and
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submitted Exhibits (AppXs) A through P, which were received without objection.  DOHA
received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on October 7, 2016.  I granted Applicant’s
request to keep the record open until October 28, 2016, to submit additional matters. 
He submitted nothing further.  The record closed on October 28, 2016.  Based upon a
review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to Pakistan.  The request was granted.  The request, and the
attached documents, were not admitted into evidence, but were included in the record. 
The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in
Subparagraphs 1.a.~1.d., and 1.f of the SOR, with explanations.  He denied the factual
allegations in Subparagraph 1.e of the SOR.  He also provided additional information to
support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
Applicant is a 68-year-old “Corporate Engineer.”  (TR at page 22 lines 21~25,
and GX 1 at page 5.)  He came to the United States in 1982, and became a naturalized
U.S. citizen in 1987, nearly 30 years ago, as did his wife and daughter.  (TR at page 22
lines 3~17.)  Their son was born in the United States.  (Id.)  He owns a home, and holds
“two U.S. Patents.”  (TR at page 33 line 10 to page 34 line 21, see also AppX E.)
1.a.  Applicant’s brother is a citizen of Pakistan, but lives in Saudi Arabia.  He
works for a “concrete company.”  (TR at page 30 lines 8~10.)  He contacts his brother “
a couple of times a year when the Eid . . . [occurs] - - Eid is like Christmas . . . when you
slaughter the goat for Abraham.”  (TR at page 27 line 18 to page 28 line 1.)  He also
calls him another couple of times a year, just to keep in touch.  (Id, and TR at page 29
lines 1~11.)
1.b.  Applicant’s sister is a citizen and resident of Pakistan.  She is “a housewife.” 
(TR at page 30 lines 10~11.)  Like with his brother, Applicant’s contacts with her are
limited to Eid, and to keep in touch, about 3~4 times a year.  (TR at page 27 line 18 to
page 28 line 1, and TR at page 29 lines 1~11.)
1.c.  Applicant’s five brothers-in-law are citizens and residents of Pakistan.  (TR
at page 37 line 22 to page 38 line 9.)  He has limited contact with three of them who
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“are architects,” and no connection with the other two.  (TR at page 41 line 7 to page 42
line 19.)
1.d.  Applicant’s sister-in-law is now a citizen and resident of the United States. 
(TR at page 38 lines 2~4.)
None of Applicant’s before mentioned siblings or in-laws have any connection
with any foreign government.
1.e.  Applicant’s daughter is a citizen and resident of the United States.  (TR at
page 26 lines 6~10.)
1.f.  In 1979, about 38 years ago, Applicant was employed for four months by the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.  (TR at page 17 line 17 to page 19 line 5.)  He
“was responsible for [the] Electronics Lab. . . . basically all . . . [he] did was fix
computers - - broken computer systems.”  (Id.)  He left as he saw “no future” in it, as he
“wanted to be an Electronics Design Engineer.”  (TR at page 17 line 17 to page 19 line
5.)
I take administrative notice of the following facts.  On May 1, 2011, U.S. Special
Forces personnel raided a large al-Qa’ida compound located in Pakistan and shot and
killed al-Qa’ida leader Osama bin Laden.  The U.S. Department of State has concluded
that, in 2012, Pakistan continued to experience terrorist violence, including sectarian
attacks.  The Pakistani military undertook operations against groups that conducted
attacks within Pakistan.  The State Department warns U.S. citizens to defer all non-
essential travel to Pakistan, as the presence of several foreign and indigenous terrorist
groups pose a potential danger to U.S. citizens throughout Pakistan. Finally, major
human rights problems in Pakistan include extrajudicial killings, torture and
disappearances committed by security forces, as well as by militant, terrorist and
extremist groups, affecting thousands of civilians in all areas of the country.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG).  In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law.  Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process.  The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision.  According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.”  The administrative judge must consider all available,
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reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.  AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”  In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record.  Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .”  The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence.  This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours.  The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information.  Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
Paragraph 6 of the adjudicative guidelines sets out the security concern relating
to Foreign Influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign interests, may be manipulated or induced
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that
is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by a
foreign interest.
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Here, Paragraphs 7(a) and 7(b) are arguably applicable: 7(a) “contacts with a
foreign family member . . . who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that
contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion”; and 7(b) “connections to a foreign person . . that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person . . . by
providing that information.”  The Applicant’s two siblings and six in-laws are citizens of
Pakistan.  These are clearly countered, however, by the first and second mitigating
conditions, as 8(a) “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, . . . government
. . . are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to
choose between the interests of a foreign individual . . . and the interests of the U.S.”;
and 8(b) “there is no conflict of interest [as] the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”  The Applicant has lived in
the Unites States since 1982, and has been a U.S. citizen since 1987, for nearly 30
years.  He has had little contact with his siblings or in-laws, at most four times a year
with his siblings.  Furthermore, I find the Applicant cannot be coerced by the
government of Pakistan or any other government vis-a-vis his siblings and in-laws. 
Also, his four month employment with Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission, fixing
computers, was more than 37 years ago.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances.  Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person
concept.
The Administrative Judge should also consider the nine adjudicative process
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
The record shows that the Applicant understands his responsibility to the United
States.  He is highly regarded by those who know Applicant in the work place.  (AppX
K.)
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I have considered all of the evidence, including the potentially disqualifying and
mitigating conditions surrounding this case.  Overall, the record evidence leaves me
without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security
clearance.  For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns
arising from his alleged Foreign Influence.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a.~1.f. For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Richard A. Cefola
Administrative Judge
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