DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
    DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
In the matter of: )
)
)  ISCR Case No. 15-02906
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina L. Marine, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On October 22, 2015, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications
Facility (DOD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant listing security
concerns arising under Guideline C (Foreign Preference) and Guideline B (Foreign
Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative
guidelines (AG), implemented in September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a review on the written record
in lieu of a hearing.  Department Counsel submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM),
dated March 25, 2016. Applicant received the FORM on April 4, 2016. Applicant
submitted a timely response to the FORM. The case was assigned to me on December
2, 2016. Based on the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified
information is denied. 
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    01/18/2017
Procedural Issue
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
regarding Colombia. Applicant did not object, and the documents proffered in support of
the request were labeled Hearing Exhibit I and entered into the record.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the SOR allegations under
Guideline C and under Guideline B with explanations. (Item 1)
Applicant was born in Colombia in 1984. He received his undergraduate and
graduate degree in the United States. In 2014, Applicant received his doctorate. He
automatically became a naturalized U.S. citizen when his parents became naturalized
U.S. citizens in 2001. He is married to a Colombian citizen, who is a dual citizen with
the United States. He completed a security clearance application in 2014.  He is an1
electrical engineer with his employer. (Item 3) He has never held a security clearance.
FOREIGN PREFERENCE
The SOR (Item 1) alleges under Guideline C that Applicant possesses a valid
Colombian passport that was issued in July 2008 and expires in July 2018. (SOR 2.a)
Applicant possesses a Colombian passport. When he traveled to Colombia in
2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2014, he visited family and friends using his
Colombian passport. He maintains the Colombian passport for ease of travel to
Colombia.  
Applicant’s 2014 security clearance application notes that he considered himself
a dual citizen of Colombia and the United States. When asked if he would renounce his
Colombian citizenship, he stated that he would. (Item 4) He understands that if he
would travel to Colombia, he would need a Colombian passport. He has made no plans
to renounce his Colombian citizenship or surrender his passport. 
In his response to the FORM, Applicant states that he is unwilling to surrender
the Colombian passport. He plans to stay in the United States, but is not willing to
sacrifice his Colombian passport at this time because he wants to participate in family
trips and celebrations in Colombia.
 Applicant also loves his challenging work in the United States and plans to
spend the rest of his life in the United States. He loves his life here, noting that he has
spent 28 of his 31 years living in the United States, and professes his allegiance to the
United States.
In that application, Applicant disclosed that while a student, he twice decrypted a neighbor’s wifi key.      1
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FOREIGN INFLUENCE
The SOR alleges under Guideline B (1.a-1.b) that Applicant’s mother-in-law,
father-in-law and sister are citizens and residents of Colombia. It also alleges that his
wife owns  property in Colombia. Applicant stated that this property has no effect on his
financial status. (Item 4)
Applicant’s mother-in-law is a citizen and resident of Colombia. She is a retired
civil secretary who worked in the payroll department for the Colombian National Police.
Applicant noted that she was not involved in police cases or investigations. He noted
that his father-in-law is a citizen and resident of Colombia, but provided no additional
information. Applicant stated in his answer to the FORM, that he is not interested in a
relationship with his wife’s family, only his wife. He acknowledged direct communication
with his in-laws for special occasions. However, in his security clearance application, he
listed contact with his father-in-law by phone and email on a weekly basis. (Item 3)
Applicant stated that they do not know the nature of his work.
 
Applicant’s spouse is a dual citizen of the United States and Colombia. She works
at home. She has no affiliation with the Colombian government. She lives with Applicant
in the United States. Applicant noted that his wife “keeps a boundary on what she
mentions to her parents and sisters regarding Applicant’s work and life in the United
States.”
Applicant’s spouse is co-owner with her two sisters of an inherited property from
her parents. The value of the property is about $45,000 total and wife’s share would be
about $15,000 . Applicant believes that this is not a large amount of money. This is the
only property in Colombia that she co-owns. Applicant and his wife stay in the apartment
when they visit Colombia. (Item 4)
Applicant’s sister-in-law is a lawyer for a large city in Colombia. Her work is not
military or intelligence related. He made a correction to the personal interview in the file
that she has moved from Argentina to Colombia. (Response to FORM)
Applicant has no ties to the Colombian government. He has not served in the
Colombian military. He has no financial interests in Colombia. He does not maintain
contact with any other relatives in Colombia. He noted that Colombia has radicalized
groups but his parents-in-law and sister-in-law are typical hard-working Colombians.
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE
Colombia
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty republic. Its last presidential election was
considered by observers to be free and fair. There have been significantly fewer
instances of security forces acting independently of civilian control than in past years.
However, impunity and an inefficient justice system subject to intimidation limits
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Colombia’s ability to prosecute individuals accused of human rights abuses. The
availability of drug-trafficking revenue often exacerbates corruption.
The United States has long enjoyed favorable relations with Colombia. The
United States provides substantial support to the Colombian government’s counter-
narcotics efforts, and encourages the government’s efforts to strengthen its democratic
institutions in order to promote security, stability, and prosperity in the region. Although
the government’s respect for human rights continues to improve, serious problems
remain, including unlawful and extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances,
insubordinate military personnel who collaborate with criminal groups, and mistreatment
of detainees. Illegal armed groups and terrorists groups commit the majority of human
rights violations-including political killings and kidnappings, forced disappearances,
torture, and other serious human rights abuses.
Violence by narco-terrorist groups and other criminal elements continues to affect
all parts of the country. Citizens of the United States and other countries continue to be
victims of threats, kidnapping, and other criminal acts. The United States has designated
three Colombian groups - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the
National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
- as foreign terrorist organizations. The U.S. State Department has advised travelers
(U.S. citizens) about the dangers of travel to Colombia, and specifically the potential for
violence by terrorists groups and armed criminal gangs in all parts of the country. 
Any person born in Colombia may be considered a Colombian citizen, even if
never documented as such, and dual U.S.-Colombian citizens are required to present a
Colombian passport to enter and exit Colombia.
     Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known
as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence
contained in the record. 
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The U.S. Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts
alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a2
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  3 4
A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance5
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt6
about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be
resolved in favor of protecting such information.  The decision to deny an individual a7
security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under AG ¶ 9 the security concern involving foreign preference arises, “[W]hen
an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the
United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      2
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      3
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      4
 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive      5
information), and EO 10865 § 7.
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      6
 Id.      7
5
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member.  This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country;
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare,
or other such benefits from a foreign country;
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business
interests in another country;
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country; and
(7) voting in a foreign election;
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an
American citizen;
(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to
serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or government
in conflict with the national security interest; and
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than
the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United
States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship.
Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2001. He used his Colombian
passport when he has visited Colombia during the past years as recently as 2014. He
continues to possess his Colombian passport. He also has a U.S. passport.  AG ¶
10(a)(1) and 10(b)  apply.
AG ¶ 11 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a
foreign country;
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
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(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship
occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual
was a minor;
(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security
authority.
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security
authority, or otherwise invalidated; and
(f) the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States
Government.
Applicant possesses a valid Colombian passport, which he uses for ease of travel
to Colombia to see family and friend. Applicant did not have a security clearance or have
any reason to believe use of his Colombian passport raised a security concern. No one
advised him that this could be an issue.  I considered AG ¶ 11(a and b ), but after being
advised of the security concern regarding a clearance holder having a valid foreign
passport, Applicant refused to surrender, destroy, or otherwise invalidate the foreign
passport. In his response to the FORM, Applicant stated that now he refuses to
relinquish the Colombian passport. Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns
under the foreign preference guideline.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern under Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(a). A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶ 7(b). Finally, “sharing living
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quarters with a person, or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if the relationship
creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion”
can be a disqualifying condition. AG ¶ 7(d) 
Applicant’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, and his wife’s sisters are citizens and
residents of Colombia. Applicant maintains some contact with them. Applicant’s wife
lives with him in the United States. Applicant’s wife, who is a dual Colombian citizen,
maintains some contact with her siblings. Applicant has traveled with his wife many
times over the years to Colombia and stays with family. Security concerns could arise in
connection with the potential that hostile forces might seek classified information from
Applicant by threatening harm or offering benefits to Applicant or his spouse’s relatives
in Colombia.  Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) are raised.
Since the Government produced evidence to raise disqualifying conditions in AG ¶¶
7(a), 7(b) and 7(d), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of
proving a mitigating condition, and the Government does not have the initial burden of
disproving mitigating conditions.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22,
2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to
those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or
duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a
family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is
known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or the foreign
country is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Family ties with persons in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law,
automatically disqualifying under Guideline B. However, such ties raise a prima facie
security concern to require an applicant to present evidence of rebuttal, extenuation or
mitigation sufficient to meet the applicant’s burden of persuasion that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
applicant. Colombia is a country with strong, and cooperative ties with the United States.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
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as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003).  Applicant’s parent-in-law, and sister-in-law have no connection to
the Colombian government. Colombia is a republic, with strong and cooperative ties with
the United States, especially in the area of counter-narcotics. There is no evidence that
Colombia is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information. While there
remains the possibility of terrorist activity, the evidence warrants partial application of AG
8(a). 
Similarly, AG ¶ 8(b) can mitigate concerns when “there is no conflict of interest,
either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” Applicant has deep and longstanding ties
to the United States. He is married to a Colombian woman who is a dual citizen. He has
his profession here in the United States. He is a naturalized citizen. Applicant’s
allegiance to the United States is such that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the United States. Foreign influence security concerns are mitigated
under AG ¶ 8(b)
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
 (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors. The
factors weighing towards approval of Applicant’s security clearance are noteworthy.
Applicant is a naturalized U.S. citizen. His mother and father are U.S. citizens. He has
lived in the United States for 28 of his 31 years. He is married to a dual U.S and
Colombian citizen. He was educated in the United States and received his doctorate in
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2014. He is employed but does not have a security clearance. He has traveled many
times to visit his wife’s family in Colombia during the past years. 
  A Guideline B decision concerning Colombia must take into consideration the
geopolitical situation and dangers there. See ISCR Case No. 04-02630 at 3 (App. Bd.
May 23, 2007). Colombia is a friendly country with the United States; however,
Colombia’s government has to contend with the combined terrorist activities of left-wing
guerillas, and drug cartels. Applicant’s mother-in-law, father-in-law and sisters live in
Colombia. They are citizens of Colombia. They are potential targets of terrorists who
may attempt to pressure or coerce Applicant by threatening his relatives living in
Colombia. I conclude that the possibility that terrorists in Colombia would coerce him into
providing classified information, or he would provide classified information through
affection for Colombia is minuscule.
Applicant, however has not surrendered his Colombian passport. His latest
response to the FORM notes that he is not willing to sacrifice the passport at this time so
that he can freely travel to visit his wife’s family.
Applicant has expressed his desire to live in the United States indefinitely and
notes that 28 of his 31 years have been spent in the United States. He loves his life and
work in the United States.
 I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518 (1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude foreign preference
concerns at this time are not mitigated. The Applicant has carried his burden to mitigate
the security concerns under the Guideline B for foreign influence. Eligibility for access to
classified information is denied.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B : FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-b: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C : AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not   
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied.
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge
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