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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 15-06171 
  )   
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Adrienne Driskill, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Jim Green, Esq. 
 
 
January 20, 2017 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
 
Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant has mitigated the concerns related to foreign preference and foreign influence 
raised by his previous possession of a Colombian passport (which has been destroyed) 
and his contacts in Colombia. His request for a security clearance is granted. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On May 19, 2016, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended 
(Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) 
alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guidelines B and C. The SOR further 
informed Applicant that based on information available to the Government, DoD 
adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR on June 28, 2016, and requested a hearing before 
an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on August 17, 2016. 
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on 
 
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August 24, 2016, scheduling the hearing for September 21, 2016. The hearing was 
convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2, which were 
admitted without objection, and Hearing Exhibits (HE) I and II. Applicant presented eight 
exhibits, marked Applicant Exhibit (AE) A through H, which were admitted without 
objection. He testified on his own behalf and called one witness. DOHA received the 
transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on September 30, 2016. 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 At the hearing, the Government requested I take administrative notice of certain 
facts relating to Colombia. Department Counsel provided a five-page summary of the 
facts, supported by six Government documents pertaining to Colombia, identified as HE 
II. The documents provide elaboration and context for the summary. I take 
administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports. They are 
limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set 
out in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted to SOR allegations ¶¶ 1.a, 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c. After a thorough 
and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following 
findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 49-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has been 
employed with the defense contractor since 2003. He has had a security clearance 
since 2004. He earned a bachelor’s degree in from a U.S. college in 2002. He currently 
provides for his eldest niece, a natural-born citizen, who lives with Applicant in the 
United States. (GE 1; Tr. 21-22, 30-31.) 
  
 Applicant was born in Colombia. He lived in Colombia until he was 18 years old. 
He immigrated to the United States 31 years ago. He became a U.S. citizen in July 
1991. His mother and brother are citizens and residents of the United States. He 
testified that his loyalties lie solely with the United States. (AE F; Tr. 16-19, 29, 31.) 
 
 Applicant’s first trip to Colombia after immigrating to the United States was in 
1995. After that, he returned to Colombia approximately every two years. He notified his 
facility security officer (FSO) of each trip. Applicant was largely raised by his 
grandparents, who continued to reside in Colombia after he immigrated to the United 
States. They were ailing and Applicant wanted to support them. He traveled back to 
Colombia to see them frequently as their health declined. (Tr. 22-28, 38-39.) 
 
 In 2012 Applicant experienced difficulties with the Colombian authorities when 
entering Colombia, because they claimed he needed to use a Colombian passport to 
enter Colombia as a natural-born Colombian citizen, despite his naturalization as a U.S. 
citizen. He paid fines as a result. Upon his return to the United States, Applicant 
discussed his situation with his FSO. He presented documentation of the Colombian 
policy at the hearing (AE H.) His FSO at that time told Applicant that he could obtain a 
 
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Colombian passport as long as every time he was finished using it, he would surrender 
it to the security officer at the company for safekeeping. Applicant complied with this 
instruction, and only obtained a Colombian passport after his FSO gave him verbal 
authorization in September 2012. The passport was scheduled to expire in September 
2022. When he wanted to travel to Colombia, he would notify his FSO of impending 
travel to Colombia, the passport would be returned to him for his trip, and then re-
secured by the FSO after Applicant’s travel was completed. However, when that FSO 
left the company in 2013, the passport was returned to Applicant. Applicant offered to 
surrender it to the company’s new FSO, but the new FSO would not accept it. The new 
FSO refused to accept Applicant’s Colombian passport until Applicant’s attorney 
requested that the FSO destroy the passport. (GE 2; Tr. 23-27, 36-50.) 
 
 Applicant no longer has a Colombian passport. It was destroyed, as documented 
in a September 16, 2016 letter from his current FSO. He does not intend to get another 
Colombian passport. He has not returned to Colombia since his grandfather’s funeral in 
September 2014. He does not intend to travel to Colombia again. He does not own any 
property, nor have any business interests in Colombia. He is willing to renounce his dual 
citizenship with Colombia, but does not know how to do that. (GE 2; AE G; Tr. 26-29, 
38-41.) 
 
 Applicant’s grandparents are now deceased. His father, stepmother, half-brother, 
and half-sister, are all citizens and residents in Colombia. He communicates with them 
infrequently. Applicant “never talk[s] to [his] stepmother.” He speaks to his father every 
three-to-six months, and explained he “wasn’t very close to [his] parents growing up. So 
distance has made it just worse.” His father is 72 years old and works with heavy 
equipment doing freelance jobs. His step-mother is a homemaker. His half-brother 
works as a laborer for a telephone company. His half-sister is an accountant. He has 
not spoken to or seen his halfsiblings in three years. He also has extended family 
members in Colombia, and two childhood friends in Colombia that he communicates 
with infrequently, mainly through social media. None of his Colombian friends or 
relatives work for the Colombia government or know what Applicant does for a living. 
Applicant does not support any of his Colombian relatives or friends. (Tr. 20, 28-35, 42.) 
 
 Applicant owns three investment properties in another state, and his current 
residence. He estimated his net worth to be approximately $800,000. (Tr. 32, 42.) 
 
 Applicant’s direct supervisor, who works with Applicant on a daily basis, testified 
on Applicant’s behalf. He testified that Applicant is an excellent, honest employee that 
performs well above average. He was aware that Applicant checked in with the security 
team at their company regarding his travel issues. (Tr. 51-55.) Applicant also presented 
five character reference letters, which indicated Applicant is a dedicated employee and 
is involved in his community through soccer. (AE A; AE B; AE C; AE D; AE E.) He “is 
one truly outstanding Employee, he performs sensitive tasks flawlessly, and with the 
greatest of attitudes.” (AE B.) His chief operating officer noted in a letter that Applicant 
“closely follows our DoD compliant policies for declaring intent to travel overseas with 
the security officer and all security procedures.” (AE C.) 
 
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The Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the dangers of travel to 
Colombia. Dangers in Colombia include: potential for narco-terrorist violence in some 
rural areas and cities; the potential for violence by terrorists and other criminal elements 
in all parts of the country; terrorists and criminal organizations kidnap and hold persons 
of all nationalities; and human rights violations. Two Colombian organizations have 
been placed on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list maintained by the Secretary of 
State. (HE II.) 
  
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
 
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Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in 
AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Two are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. 
 
  Applicant’s father, step-mother, half-brother, half-sister, aunts, and uncle are all 
citizens and residents in Colombia. He also maintains contact with two childhood friends 
that are citizens and residents of Colombia. To be fully applicable, AG ¶ 7(a) requires 
substantial evidence of a heightened risk. The heightened risk required to raise one of 
these disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. Heightened risk denotes a 
risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a 
foreign government or substantial assets in a foreign nation. In this instance, a 
heightened risk is present because of the terrorists and criminal organizations at work in 
Colombia. The evidence is sufficient to raise this disqualifying condition. AG ¶ 7(b) also 
applies as potential conflicts are created by these connections.  
 
 
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 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.; and 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interests in favor of the U.S. interests.  
 
 Applicant’s ties to his family and friends in Colombia are not close. He has lived 
in the United States for all of his adult life. He was raised by his grandparents in his 
youth and had a strong bond to them. However, his ties to his father, step-mother, half-
brother, and half-sister, have dissipated over time and distance. He does not intend to 
return to Colombia to visit them. The nature of his relationships with his family and 
friends in Colombia, and their lack of any connection to government or terrorist 
organizations there, are unlikely to place Applicant in a position where he would have to 
choose between the interests of those foreign individuals and the interests of the U.S. 
Additionally, Applicant’s strong sense of loyalty to the United States indicates he would 
resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. He has built a life in the U.S. 
His brother and niece are here. He owns four properties in the U.S. and all of his net 
wealth is invested here. As a result, the above mitigating conditions were established. 
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference  
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Preference is set out in 
AG ¶ 9: 
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to 
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of 
the United States. 
 
 
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The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 10. The following is potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after 
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family 
member. This includes but is not limited to: 
 
(1) possession of a current foreign passport. 
 
  Applicant is a dual citizen of the United States and Colombia. He exercised his 
Colombian citizenship when he acquired the Colombian passport, despite that fact that 
he was a United States citizen at that time and had a U.S. passport. He used that 
passport to travel to Colombia on numerous occasions. The evidence is sufficient to 
raise the above disqualifying condition. 
 
Conditions that could mitigate foreign preference security concerns are described 
under AG ¶ 11. Two are potentially applicable: 
 
(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority; and 
 
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant 
security authority, or otherwise invalidated. 
 
 Applicant surrendered his Colombian passport to his facility security officer. It has 
been destroyed and he will not travel to Colombia in the future. Although his use of the 
Colombian passport while holding a security clearance is of concern, Applicant 
attempted to follow proper protocol, and did what he was advised by his FSO. He 
believed his FSO to be his cognizant security authority. His former FSO misunderstood 
the requirements about securing Applicant’s Colombian passport. Now that Applicant is 
aware of the concerns relating to holding a foreign passport, he has complied with the 
security requirements and surrendered it for destruction by his FSO. AG ¶¶ 11(d) and 
(e) provide mitigation with respect to this guideline. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
 
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for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under 
Guidelines B and C in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were 
addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.  
 
Applicant has a distinguished history of working in the defense industry and is 
respected by his witness and those who wrote letters of recommendation. He performs 
well at his job. While he was born Colombia, he is an American by choice. He has been 
residing in the United States for the past 31 years. His closest familial ties are with his 
brother and niece. They are American citizens and residents. His remaining contacts in 
Colombia are not close. He no longer has a Colombian passport and will not travel to 
Colombia again. He can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
United States due to his longstanding ties here.  
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant mitigated the Foreign Preference and Foreign Influence security 
concerns.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:    For Applicant 
 
Subparagraph 2.b:    For Applicant 
 
Subparagraph 2.c:    For Applicant 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge