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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 15-06526 
  )   
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
January 20, 2017 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
 
Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant has mitigated the concerns related to foreign influence raised by his one-third 
ownership interest in an apartment in Lebanon. He no longer has any bank accounts in 
Lebanon. His contacts with people in Lebanon, including his deceased father’s former 
business partners, his uncles, and his cousin, are minimal. His request for a security 
clearance is granted. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On May 19, 2016, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended 
(Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) 
alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guideline B. The SOR further informed 
Applicant that based on information available to the government, DoD adjudicators 
could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national 
interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. 
 
 
2 
 
Applicant answered the SOR on June 4, 2016, and requested a hearing before 
an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on July 25, 2016. The 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on August 
16, 2016, scheduling the hearing for September 12, 2016. The hearing was convened 
as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3, which were admitted 
after Applicant offered clarifications on those documents (Tr. 36-38.), and Hearing 
Exhibit (HE) I for Administrative Notice. Applicant testified on his own behalf and called 
one witness. The record was left open until October 12, 2016, for receipt of additional 
documentation. Applicant presented three documents, which I marked Applicant’s 
Exhibits (AE) A through C. Department Counsel objected to AE B, in part, as part of that 
document was in a foreign language. Applicant was given time to obtain a court-certified 
translation of his documents, but he elected not to exercise that option. Instead, he 
provided a narrative explaining AE B, which I identified and admitted as AE C. Only the 
English sections of AE B were considered as evidence. DOHA received the transcript of 
the hearing (Tr.) on September 21, 2016. 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 At the hearing, the Government requested I take administrative notice of certain 
facts relating to Lebanon. Department Counsel provided an 8-page summary of the 
facts, supported by 12 Government documents pertaining to Lebanon, identified as HE 
I. The documents provide elaboration and context for the summary. I take administrative 
notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports. They are limited to matters 
of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set out in the 
Findings of Fact. 
 
 Further, SOR ¶ 1.c was amended at hearing to conform to the evidence. 
Applicant and Department Counsel indicated they had no objection to the amendment 
and the amendment was made. (Tr. 81.) SOR ¶ 1.c, as amended, reads: 
 
 1.c. Your two uncles and one cousin are citizens and residents of Lebanon.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted to SOR allegations ¶¶ 1.a, and 1.b. He denied SOR allegation 
¶ 1.c. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I 
make the following findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 50-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has been 
employed with the defense contractor since 1996. He has had a security clearance 
since 2005. He has a master’s degree. He is married to a U.S. citizen, and has one 
child, age 11. (GE 1; Tr. 40-44.) 
  
 Applicant was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He is a Christian and was subject to an 
armed robbery that targeted Christian individuals while he was living in Lebanon in 
1983. He immigrated to the United States in 1986 to attend college and was naturalized 
as a U.S. citizen in 1995. (GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 40, 63-64.) 
 
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 Applicant’s parents are deceased. In 2012, when his mother passed away, 
Applicant inherited a one-fourth interest in the apartment his parents owned in Lebanon, 
shared jointly with his three brothers. However, one of his brothers passed away in 
2014, which left Applicant with a one-third share in the apartment. The unit is valued at 
approximately $100,000, and Applicant’s share is approximately $33,000. Applicant 
estimated this share is “less than 2% of [his] current financial worth.” (AE A.) It has been 
uninhabited since his parent’s deaths and fell into disrepair. Applicant and his brothers 
intend to sell the property once it is repaired. It is 90% rehabilitated. (GE 2; AE A; Tr. 
45.) 
 
 Applicant had two bank accounts in Lebanon, which were inherited from his 
parents. They were opened in 2012, to transfer his inheritance from his parent’s estate. 
One account was solely in Applicant’s name and had $190,000 in it. The other account 
was jointly held with one of Applicant’s brothers and had $6,000 in it. Applicant intended 
to keep the accounts open until the apartment was sold because he paid the electricity 
bill for the apartment from them. However, he presented documentation that shows he 
closed both of them, and all of the funds from those accounts have been transferred into 
accounts located in the United States. (GE 2; GE 3; AE A; AE B; AE C; Tr. 47-55, 70.) 
 
 In 2007 Applicant’s father, who was the chairman of a company in Lebanon, 
resigned and sold his shares in that company to one of his former business partners 
(P1). P1 is a citizen and resident in Lebanon. Applicant last saw him in 2012 when 
Applicant returned to Lebanon to manage his father’s estate. Applicant has had minimal 
communications with P1 since 2012, limited to two phone calls to express condolences 
after the deaths of relatives. He indicated in his post-hearing exhibits that “this contact 
will cease.” Applicant’s father’s second business partner (P2), is a resident and citizen 
of the United States. Applicant communicates with him every two-to-three months on a 
social basis. “He has no influence over [Applicant] or anything like that.” (Tr. 57.) Neither 
P1 or P2 is affiliated with the Lebanese military or government. (GE 2; Tr. 55-58, 71.) 
 
 Applicant has two uncles and one cousin who are citizens and residents of 
Lebanon. Both of his uncles were his mother’s brothers and both worked as 
accountants at banks. They are elderly and in frail health. Applicant last spoke to them 
two years ago when he called them at Christmas. His eldest uncle has a son, 
Applicant’s cousin. His cousin helped Applicant get contractors to repair his parent’s 
apartment, but Applicant has not spoken to him for “a couple years.” His uncles and 
cousin are not affiliated with the Lebanese military or government. Applicant has no 
other family members in Lebanon with whom he communicates. Applicant does not 
send anyone in Lebanon financial support. (GE 2; Tr. 58-61, 71.) 
 
 Applicant’s surviving brothers are both U.S. citizens and live in the same U.S. 
state as Applicant. He has extended family in Canada. (GE 2.) Applicant owns his 
home, a condominium, which is fully paid for and is valued at approximately $500,000. 
He testified he has approximately $120,000 in savings in U.S. banks, and other U.S. 
based assets valued at more than $650,000. He does not intend to travel to Lebanon in 
the future. (GE 2; Tr. 67-68.) 
 
 
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 Applicant’s supervisor testified on Applicant’s behalf. He indicated that Appellant 
is an honest, conscientious worker, with a high degree of integrity. He called Applicant a 
“true patriot” and spoke of Applicant’s dedication to the United States and his 
employer’s mission. Applicant preforms well at work and has received awards for his 
performance. The witness reported Applicant complies with all security requirements. 
(Tr. 83-92.) 
 
Notice 
 
 Lebanon experienced civil war from 1975 through 1990. Since 1990 it has 
experienced years of social and political instability. Lebanon boarders both Syria and 
Israel. The U.S. Department of State has issued a travel warning that urges U.S. 
citizens to avoid all travel to Lebanon because of ongoing safety concerns. (HE I.)  
 
 Numerous terrorist organizations are active within Lebanon. The Asad regime in 
Syria provides political support to a variety of terrorist groups that affect the stability in 
the region. The Lebanese Hizballah, a foreign terrorist organization operating in 
Lebanon, “is closely allied with Iran and the two often work together and is providing 
assistance to Syrian regime forces.” Terrorist groups including Hamas, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, Asbat-al-Ansar, Fatah al-Islam, 
Palestine Islamic Jihad, and several other groups, operate within the borders of 
Lebanon. (HE I.) 
 
 Human right abuses occur in Lebanon. The most significant human rights abuse 
include torture  and abuse by security forces, harsh prison and detention center 
conditions, and limitations on movement of refugees. Other human rights abuses 
include arbitrary arrests and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; violations of rights to 
privacy; restrictions of freedom of speech and press; and official corruption. (HE I.) 
  
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
 
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The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in 
AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
 
 
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The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation. 
 
  Applicant has contacts and connections in Lebanon including his deceased 
father’s former business partners, his uncles, and his cousin that could potentially 
create a conflict of interest between Applicant’s duties to protect classified information 
and those relationships. He also has a financial interest in an apartment in Lebanon, 
and formerly had two bank accounts there. To be fully applicable, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(e) 
require substantial evidence of a heightened risk. The heightened risk required to raise 
one of these disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. Heightened risk 
denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living 
under a foreign government or substantial assets in a foreign nation. In this instance, a 
heightened risk is present because of the terrorist forces at work in Lebanon and the 
human rights abuses present in Lebanon. The evidence is sufficient to raise this 
disqualifying condition.  
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interests in favor of the U.S. interests;  
 
 
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(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interest is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be 
used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
 
Applicant’s contacts with P1, P2, his uncles, and his cousin are infrequent and 
casual. He has not talked to his uncles or his cousin in more than two years. His 
conversations with P1 have been limited to expressing condolences after deaths of 
relatives. Further, Applicant has expressed his intent to discontinue further 
communications with P1. P2 is a U.S. citizen and resides in the same state as 
Applicant. It is highly unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position of having to choose 
between the interests of these foreign individuals and the interests of the U.S. Further, 
Applicant has established deep and longstanding relationships in the United States. He 
has established strong ties to his workplace and community. He has substantial 
investments located in the United States. His immediate family members are all U.S. 
citizens, with few ties to Lebanon. Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the United States. AG ¶¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c) apply. 
 
Applicant’s share of the property he inherited in Lebanon is estimated to be only 
2% of his net worth. The apartment will be sold as soon as the rehabilitation of the 
property is completed. He no longer has any bank accounts in Lebanon. Given 
Applicant’s significant assets in the United States, it is unlikely to result in a conflict and 
could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure Applicant. AG ¶ 8(f) 
is mitigating. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
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I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under 
Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were 
addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment.  
 
Applicant has a distinguished history of working in the defense industry and is 
respected by his witness. He performs well at his job. While he was born Lebanon, he is 
an American by choice. He has been residing in the United States for the past 31 years. 
His closest familial ties are with his wife, son, and brothers, all of whom are American 
citizens. His remaining contacts in Lebanon are infrequent. He will dispose of the 
property he inherited as soon as it is ready for sale, and it only represents a small 
amount of his net worth. He can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor 
of the United States due to his longstanding ties here.  
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant mitigated the Foreign Influence security concerns.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
 
Subparagraph 1.b:    For Applicant 
 
Subparagraph 1.c:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge