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                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
        DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
--------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 15-01071 
) 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esquire, Department Counsel 
 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
February 3, 2017 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: 
 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing 
(e-QIP) on June 28, 2014. (Government Exhibit 1.) On December 2, 2015, the 
Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline B 
(Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of 
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for 
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, effective within the 
Department of Defense after September 1, 2006. 
  
Applicant answered the SOR in writing (Answer) on December 17, 2015, and 
requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared 
 
 
 
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to proceed on February 4, 2016. The case was assigned to me on March 28, 2016. The 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on May 17, 
2016. I convened the hearing as scheduled on June 22, 2016. The Government offered 
Government Exhibits 1 and 2, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified 
on his own behalf. I granted Applicant’s request to leave the record open until July 29, 
2016, to permit him to submit additional evidence. On July 25, 2016, he submitted 
Applicant Exhibit A. Department Counsel had no objection, and the exhibit was admitted 
into the record, which closed as scheduled. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing 
(Tr.) on June 30, 2016. 
 
 
Procedural Ruling 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice of 
certain facts relating to the Republic of Korea (Korea). (Tr. 16-17.) The request and the 
referenced documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the record. 
The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
Applicant is a 46-year-old employee of a defense contractor, and is applying for a 
security clearance in connection with this employment. He has a bachelor’s degree. He is 
married to his third wife, who is a Korean national. He has two children from his prior 
marriages. His children are American citizens and live in the United States, as do his 
parents. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 18; Tr. 43-44.) 
 
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B – Foreign Influence) 
 
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for clearance 
because he has foreign connections that may show divided loyalties, or make him 
vulnerable to pressure or coercion. Applicant admitted all the factual allegations under 
this paragraph, with explanations. He supplied additional evidence to support his request 
for access to classified information. 
 
Applicant was born in 1970 in what was then West Germany. At that time his father 
was a senior non-commissioned officer in the United States Air Force (USAF). His mother 
was, and still is, a German national. Applicant served honorably in the United States Army 
from 1992 to 2000. He moved to Korea as a civilian employee of the USAF in 2008, and 
has lived there since that time. He began work for his defense contractor employer in 
2014. Applicant is well aware of his security responsibilities, given that he is the son of a 
military member and a former member of the armed forces himself. He has taken required 
security awareness training. (Government Exhibit 1 at Sections 1, 13A, 15; Tr. 42-43.) 
 
 
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Applicant met his current wife in about 2011. They were married in 2012. She is a 
Korean national. Applicant’s wife lived in the United States for many years when she was 
younger, while her father was stationed in the United States as a member of the Korean 
armed forces working with American forces. Her father retired in 2013 as a senior 
commissioned officer in the Korean armed forces. He currently works for a private 
company in Korea. Applicant’s mother-in-law is a housewife with a very limited 
understanding of English. Applicant is not close with either one of them, and his contacts 
with them are of a routine nature. Applicant’s sister-in-law, though a Korean national, 
resides in the United States and has for many years. None of them have asked Applicant 
about his job, or about any sensitive information. (Tr. 31-39, 45-46.) 
 
Applicant’s wife, as a Korean national, is entitled to medical and other benefits 
while living in Korea. She is not currently employed, but previously worked on the base 
where Applicant is employed. She has an account with a small balance in a Korean bank, 
which she uses to pay her bills. Applicant and his wife intend to move to the United States 
once his current contract ends. According to Applicant, her desire is to become an 
American citizen. (Tr. 27-30, 40-41, 48-49.)  
 
Applicant has no assets in Korea. He has about $45,000 in cash in an American 
bank. (Applicant Exhibit A at 11.)  
 
Mitigation 
 
 Letters of recommendation were submitted for Applicant from people who know 
him, personally and professionally. They include three senior civilian employees of the 
USAF, as well as two co-workers. The writers described Applicant as a “hard-working, 
conscientious person,” with “the highest integrity.” (Applicant Exhibit A at 6-10.) 
 
Administrative Notice 
 
 Applicant has contacts with Korea. Accordingly, it is appropriate to discuss the 
current situation in Korea.1 The United States and Korea have been allies since 1953, 
when a Mutual Defense Treaty was signed. This treaty, according to the State 
Department, is “the foundation for the comprehensive alliance that endures today.” In 
addition, “The United States and [Korea] share a long history of friendship and 
cooperation based on shared values and interests.” In the realm of defense, “A Combined 
Forces Command coordinates operations between U.S. units and R.O.K. [Korean] armed 
forces.”2 Korea also has a history of collecting protected United States Government 
                                                 
1All of the following statements in this paragraph are supported by the documents submitted by the 
Department Counsel in support of her request for administrative notice and its attachments, except as 
otherwise stated. 
2U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations With the 
Republic of Korea, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm (January 25, 2017.) See U.S. Department of 
Defense, From a White House News Release, Obama, South Korean President Reaffirm U.S.-South Korea 
Alliance, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/935222/obama-south-korean-president-reaffirm-us-  
south-korea-alliance. (September 16, 2016.) 
 
 
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information. This includes foreign economic collection and espionage. Korea generally 
respects the human rights of its citizens, but there are some issues that are of concern to 
the United States. 
 
 
Policies 
 
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. When evaluating an 
applicant=s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each 
guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions (DCs) and 
mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in evaluating an applicant=s eligibility for 
access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG & 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge=s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG && 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable 
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. 
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the 
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. In addition, 
the administrative judge may also rely on his or her own common sense, as well as 
knowledge of the law, human nature, and the ways of the world, in making a reasoned 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG & 2(b) 
requires that AAny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified 
information will be resolved in favor of the national security.@ In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the 
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded 
on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive & E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive & E3.1.15, AThe applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.@ Section 7 
of Executive Order 10865 provides: AAny determination under this order adverse to an 
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be 
a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.@ 
 
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a 
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
 
 
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Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B – Foreign Influence) 
 
The concern under Guideline B is styled as follows at AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations 
as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
 Applicant has family connections to Korea, specifically his wife and in-laws, which 
can be viewed under a heightened risk standard. The following Disqualifying Conditions 
apply to this case under AG ¶ 7:  
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign 
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, 
or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject 
the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation. 
 
 Applicant has provided compelling evidence to show that the following Mitigating 
Conditions under AG ¶ 8 also apply to this case, given his particular background:  
 
 
 
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(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be 
used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
 
 Applicant proved that he is a conscientious and patriotic citizen, and member of 
the defense industry. As a veteran, long-time civilian employee of the USAF, and now as 
a contractor, he is knowledgeable about security and understands his responsibilities. 
Applicant has substantial family in the United States, including his parents and children, 
and all of his assets are in American funds. Applicant’s wife has a minimal amount in her 
Korean bank account. Co-workers and senior civilian employees of the USAF vouch for 
his loyalty and ability to safeguard classified information. 
 
 Based on my analysis of the available information, Applicant has overcome the 
adverse inference arising from his wife and in-laws being Korean. The security 
significance of his father-in-law is seriously reduced by the fact the father-in-law is retired 
from the Korean military, which is an ally of the United States, and has expressed no 
interest in Applicant’s job. Guideline B is found for Applicant. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant=s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant=s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG & 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual=s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 
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 Under AG & 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.    
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I specifically considered the 
intelligence activities of Korea. I find that there is little or no “potential for pressure, 
coercion, exploitation, or duress” as set forth in AG ¶ 2(a)(8). Using the whole-person 
standard, Applicant has mitigated the security significance of his alleged foreign 
connections and is eligible for a security clearance.  
 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by & E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.h:  For Applicant 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant=s eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
                                                  
 
 
WILFORD H. ROSS 
Administrative Judge