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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
[Name Redacted] )  ISCR Case No. 15-08717 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Rhett Petcher, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HOGAN, Erin C., Administrative Judge: 
 
On August 15, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline K, Handling 
Protected Information. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense after 
September 1, 2006.  
  
 On August 26, 2016, Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on October 
14, 2016. The case was assigned to me on October 28, 2016.  On November 9, 2016, a 
Notice of Hearing was issued, scheduling the hearing for December 5, 2016. The 
hearing was held as scheduled. During the hearing, the Government offered four 
exhibits which were admitted as Government Exhibits (Gov) 1 – 4.  Applicant testified 
and called one witness, but offered no exhibits. The transcript (Tr.) was received on 
December 13, 2016. The record was held open until December 19, 2016, to allow 
Applicant to submit documents. Applicant submitted documents which were marked as 
 
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Applicant Exhibits (AE) A – H. Department Counsel had no objection to AE A – G, but 
objected to AE H as an exhibit, but does not object to AE H being considered as 
Applicant’s written closing argument. I sustain Department Counsel’s objection and 
admitted AE H for the limited purpose of Applicant’s written closing argument. Based 
upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified 
information is granted. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his response to the SOR, Applicant admits SOR ¶ 1.a(iii) and denies the 
allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a(i), 1.a(ii), and 1.b. In the interests of Applicant’s privacy, 
generic terms are used in the body of the decision. More specific details can be found in 
the record evidence. 
 
 Applicant is a 61-year-old employee of a DoD contractor seeking to maintain a 
security clearance. He has worked for his current employer since March 1987.  He has 
a Master’s Degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering. He has held a security 
clearance since 1985. He is married and has two adult children. (Tr. at 26-27; Gov 1)   
 
In September 2015, Applicant was found culpable of three security violations. 
The most serious violation occurred between November 2014 and May 2015.  In July 
2015, a government office notified Applicant’s employer classified information was 
discovered during a review of program material, which the employer was requesting 
approval for public release. The information involved an [advanced system] which was 
classified as confidential. The image sent to the government office for public release 
was a screen shot taken during a live demonstration for a foreign military. A government 
employee recognized that the company did not have proper licensing to display 
classified information to the foreign military and contacted Applicant’s employer to 
initiate an investigation into the disclosure issue. (Gov 4) 
 
In August 2014, Applicant served as a Chief Engineer and the liaison to a 
committee consisting of representatives of each U.S. military service (Committee). He 
initiated discussions with the Committee to gain approval to update the [advanced  
system’s] marketing material for a proposed briefing that would take place with foreign 
customers. Applicant wrote a technology control plan (TCP) which outlined what would 
be viewed by each foreign customer. The TCP prohibited the display of [certain 
confidential information].  (Gov 4 at 4) 
 
Applicant wrote two documents related to the marketing demonstration. The first 
was a power point presentation which provided an overview of the planned customer 
visits to the test site. The second was the TCP which was more detailed and outlined 
where the customers would be going and what they would and would not have access 
to. Applicant specifically stated in each document that the [confidential information] was 
not to be shown.” The TCP was provided to Mr. A, the program manager, who 
composed an invitation for a demonstration to take place on November 19, 2014, for 
 
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foreign government officials. Mr. A. requested all employees involved to review the TCP 
prior to the demonstration to understand the “run rules.” (Gov 4 at 4)   
 
Applicant attended four subsequent demonstrations with foreign nationals where 
the [confidential information] was displayed in violation of the TCP.  The demonstrations 
occurred on November 9, 2014, December 15, 2014;  April 15, 2015, and May 14, 2015. 
No one present at any of the demonstrations identified the issue of the [confidential 
information] being displayed. (Gov 4 at 4) 
 
Applicant and Mr. A., the program manager, were both interviewed by security 
after the security violation. Neither could recall that the [confidential information] was 
displayed during the demonstrations. Security also interviewed Mr. B., an engineer who 
was running the demonstration during each customer visit and who created the script of 
each presentation. Mr. B. said he kept in the [confidential information] because he 
believed it was unclassified based on his understanding of the [advanced system] 
classification guide and his 20 years experience as an [advanced system] engineer. He 
takes full responsibility for concluding the [confidential information] was unclassified and 
said that no one in the program forced his decision. He only glanced at the TCP and did 
not read the section discussing the [confidential information]. (Gov 4 at 4)   
 
During the investigation, it was discovered that two classified Committee memos 
were received by Applicant in September 2014. One was a draft and the other was the 
signed final copy. The draft copy was not accounted for by Document Control. Applicant 
was re-interviewed about the draft document. Applicant believes that he placed the draft 
copy in his classified working papers which were dropped off at Document Control to be 
destroyed. The Security Office concluded that document was lost because there was no 
proof that the document was destroyed by Applicant or the Accountable Information 
Management System. (Gov 4 at 5, 9-11) 
 
The investigation determined that three senior level employees failed to mitigate 
the release of classified information to foreign nationals, which violated the NISPOM 
and other security regulations.  Applicant was disciplined for two separate security 
violations and received one month’s suspension and no supplemental compensation for 
2015. Mr. A. was suspended for two weeks and his 2015 supplemental compensation 
was reduced by 50%.  Mr. B. received a two week suspension and his 2015 
supplemental compensation was reduced by two weeks. All three senior level 
employees were re-briefed on their responsibilities to protect classified information. 
Multiple team members were present during these demonstrations. They failed to 
identify the [confidential information] as well. They received counseling and training to 
avoid similar incidents in the future. (Gov 4 at 6)  
 
During the investigation, two other security incidents were discovered involving 
Applicant. One of the employees who was interviewed about the foreign visitors 
incident, volunteered that Applicant hosted an unclassified meeting on July 30, 2015, to 
meet the new Army representative to the Committee. At some point in the meeting, the 
Army representative asked a question. The only way to answer the question was to 
 
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provide a classified answer.  Applicant was asked if it was okay to provide the answer. 
Applicant gave permission to provide the classified answer even though the meeting 
was scheduled as an unclassified meeting. Applicant told security investigators that he 
gave permission to provide the classified answer because he believed the Army 
representative was cleared based on the fact that he had attended previous classified 
meetings with the Army representative.  Applicant was aware of the process to follow 
when conducting a classified meeting. He was aware of the requirement to properly 
verify clearances through security before a classified meeting. However, he knew the 
Army representative and did not think his security clearance was an issue. Later, the 
security office contacted the Army representative’s security office and his security 
clearance was verified. It was concluded the classified information was not vulnerable to 
disclosure because the Army representative had a current Top Secret security 
clearance and a need to know the information. (Gov 4 at 13-14) 
 
The second incident occurred before Applicant started his four-week suspension 
on September 28, 2015.  On September 24, 2015, an inventory was conducted on 
Applicant’s classified container in order to account for all of his classified documents 
before he left.  One secret document was missing. Applicant said he turned in this 
document to Document Control the day before (September 23, 2015) for destruction. 
Ms. M., a document control employee, recalls receiving documents from Applicant, but 
does not recall receiving the missing secret document as one of the items. Applicant 
said he informed Ms. M. about the document and asked if there were special 
procedures for its disposition. He was told there was not. He was not asked to complete 
a hand receipt for the document requesting that it be destroyed, which according to 
security was the standard process for turning accountable material into document 
control. (Gov 4 at 17-18)  
 
Ms. M. provided all classified material to her manager for destruction. He did not 
check the documents or CDs for accountability numbers because he assumed Ms. M. 
had already conducted a review. It could not be confirmed that the missing secret 
document was destroyed. The security office concludes a document is lost when this 
occurs. Applicant was found partially culpable because it was his responsibility to 
request a receipt when transferring accountable classified material. As a result of this 
incident, a new process was instituted in Document Control that required two 
employees to verify that every classified item being destroyed is thoroughly reviewed to 
ensure accountable information is not mixed with unaccountable working papers. (Gov 
4 at 18-19)  
 
The investigation concluded Ms. M. did not follow standard Document Control 
processes. She accepted classified material for destruction from Applicant without 
preparing a classified material hand receipt to document the transaction. Ms. M. 
received a one- week suspension without pay. This was her second security violation in 
a 12-month period regarding a missing classified document. In November 2014, she 
shared culpability with another employee, who believed he turned in a classified 
document to Document Control for destruction, but was not provided a hand receipt to 
document the transaction. (Gov 4 at 23) 
 
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The security office recommended that Applicant be terminated from employment 
because this was his fourth NISPOM violation and second lost classified document 
within a two month period. They contend Applicant has shown a pattern of negligent 
behavior and carelessness for handling classified information. (Gov 4 at 23) Prior to 
these incidents, Applicant had no previous security violations during his over 30 years of 
handling classified information. (Gov 4) 
 
Applicant’s Response to SOR Allegations: 
 
SOR ¶ 1.a(i): Applicant denies the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a(i). He claims that the 
[confidential information] was redacted from the demonstration during dry runs prior to 
the foreign customer demonstrations. He did not notice that the [confidential 
information] was displayed during the foreign customer demonstrations. Applicant said 
his role in the foreign customer demonstration was a support role. At the direction of the 
Committee, he provided a written TCP to the Program Manager for distribution and 
implementation by his team in preparation for the visits. Applicant had no part in 
creating or executing the actual test event. Applicant states that between 10 to 15 
people were present during each demonstration consisting of the foreign customers, 
fellow employees and technical representative from the U.S. government. No one else 
raised the issue of the [confidential information] being present during the foreign 
customer demonstrations. (Answer to SOR; Tr. 16-19, 27-34, 46, 49-50)  
 
There was a debate as to whether the [confidential information] in question was 
actually classified. It was not until the company was attempting to get a public release of 
the demonstration where a photograph taken of the display with a foreign general sitting 
in front of the display that someone raised the issue about the [confidential information] 
being classified as secret. It was later determined it was classified as confidential. (Tr. 
49-50) 
 
SOR ¶ 1.a(iii): Applicant admits that he demonstrated poor judgment when he 
vouched for the new US Army representative of the Committee during an unclassified 
meeting in July 2015 and allowed classified information to be provided during the 
meeting without going through proper channels to verify the US Army representative’s 
security clearance. Applicant had attended previous meetings with him and knew that 
he was cleared to the proper classification level. It was later confirmed that the US Army 
representative was cleared. Applicant admits he should have confirmed the new US 
Army representative had the clearance before he gave the information. (Tr. 14-16, 38-
40)  
 
SOR ¶ 1.a(ii): The SOR alleges Applicant lost a draft classified Committee 
Decision Memo that had been superseded by the final classified Decision Memo one 
week later. Applicant denies the allegation. Applicant believes he returned this draft 
document to the Document Control center for destruction with other working papers. 
The document was assigned a control number and was assigned to Applicant as a 
custodian. The working papers were not assigned control numbers. Applicant believes it 
 
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is most likely the accountable document was destroyed with the working papers. 
Applicant states that Document Control did not have a process for documenting the 
return of a controlled document for destruction. He was not given a receipt and cannot 
prove that the document was returned to Document Control for destruction. (Response 
to SOR, Tr. 20-22, 35-37, 42) 
 
SOR ¶ 1.b:  The SOR alleges in September 2015, it was discovered that 
Applicant lost another classified document during an inventory of Applicant’s security 
container the day before he began his 30-day suspension.  Applicant denies this 
allegation. The day before the inventory of his security container, Applicant had been 
notified that a particular program was terminated and if he wanted to retain a classified 
document that was in his safe, he would need to request permission to keep it or have it 
destroyed. Applicant indicated that he would have the document destroyed. He took the 
document to Document Control. He vividly remembers that he told Document Control 
personnel (specifically Ms. M.) that this document was from an expired program in case 
it needed to be handled with different record keeping. He was told that it did not. He 
denies Ms. M.’s contention that he did not tell her that the document was a special 
document. Applicant states that the system in place at the time provided no record or 
receipts for the document. You would be notified several weeks after you dropped off 
controlled documents that the documents were destroyed. In his security training, he 
was never told that it was his responsibility to get a receipt when he turns in controlled 
documents to Document Control for destruction.  He believes both documents were not 
lost, but destroyed without being accounted for as being destroyed. He tracked the 
document up to the time he provided the documents to Document Control. He relied on 
the subject matter expertise of Document Control personnel to provide guidance. 
(Response to SOR, Tr. 23-25, 42-46)   
 
Whole-Person Factors  
 
Mr. X. works with Applicant. His views are his own and do not represent the 
views of Applicant’s employer. Mr. X. is a security manager. He is a retired Chief 
Warrant Officer from the U.S. Coast Guard. During his service in the Coast Guard, he 
had extensive experience in handling security matters. He is a board certified security 
management specialist and a certified protection professional. He has extensive 
experience in protecting and handling classified information and the security clearance 
process. (Tr. 55-57) 
 
Mr. X. has worked with Applicant for over 10 years. He describes Applicant as a 
careful, thoughtful, very security conscious employee. He does not believe Applicant is 
a risk or threat to national security. Previous to Applicant’s security incidents, he had no 
prior history of mishandling classified information. He does not believe Applicant has 
lost the capacity to exercise good judgment and to protect classified information 
because of these incidents. He would not have testified on Applicant’s behalf if he 
believed otherwise. He discussed the incidents with Applicant. Applicant understands 
that he made procedural mistakes that could have put information at risk. (Tr. 59-62) 
 
 
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Mr. X. reviewed the reports on the four security incidents. He does not agree with 
the outcome of the two incidents where Applicant turned in documents for destruction. 
Document Control did not communicate to the general population that they must obtain 
receipts when turning in classified documents for destruction. Applicant would not have 
expected to receive a receipt because he had no knowledge of the procedure. He 
claims the likelihood of the loss of both documents is improbable.(Tr. 63-78) 
 
Mr. X. is not condoning Applicant’s actions in the other incidents. He discussed 
with Applicant what needs to be done and why. Applicant received refresher security 
training after the incidents. He has no concerns with Applicant handling classified 
information. (Tr. 80-81) 
 
Applicant provided copies of his performance evaluations for 2014 and 2015. (AE 
A; AE B) In 2014, Applicant was considered to have far exceeded requirements. In 
2015, Applicant was considered to have met requirements. The performance evaluation 
states:  
 
In closing, [Applicant] had a terrific year by most counts. The one count 
that tempers my enthusiasm for his accomplishments stems from a series 
of security/ITAR violations have occurred at [name of facility redacted] that 
had [Applicant’s] direct involvement, and for which [Applicant] was justly 
punished. I want to go on record of stating that [Applicant’s] response to 
his shortcomings have been nothing short of tremendous. Back in 
September 2015, I challenged [Applicant] to “serve this punishment 
professionally, think about how you are going to make overt and visible 
changes in your attention to detail in upholding security as priority one, 
and come back to the job you are doing with conviction and renewed 
purpose.” [Applicant] was suspended for one month, and his RBI for 
Performance Year 2015 was reduced to 0%. While painful for [Applicant] 
(and for me – because otherwise, [Applicant’s] year certainly ‘Exceeded” 
my expectations (and perhaps “Far Exceeded”). However, as is customary 
for severe security related infractions, [Applicant] is receiving a “M – Met 
Expectations” rating for 2015. I want to go on record stating that 
[Applicant] has been nothing but apologetic and regretful for these 
incidents, and in fact has become one of the most curious, insightful, and 
inquisitive Engineers on my staff so that he and our entire team 
understand the evolving EXIM requirements, the training we are taking, 
and the every day steps in our lives that each of us must take to ensure 
that we are saluting to those EXIM rules. I am quite proud of [Applicant’s] 
professional behavior despite the sting of this ruling – and I look forward to 
putting this behind us and seeing [Applicant] return to his strong year-to-
year performance like we’ve come to count on. Thank you [Applicant]. (AE 
B at 1)   
 
  On April 4, 2016, Applicant’s Director wrote a letter recommending that Applicant 
be promoted to the level of Principal Engineering Fellow. The Director worked closely 
 
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with Applicant over the last five years and is impressed by Applicant’s depth and 
breadth of his technical knowledge. He states that Applicant has been key to enabling 
[the company’s] success “by collaborating across the company, identifying performance 
gaps, developing solutions to fill those gaps and finding creative funding opportunities to 
make these concepts real.” He believes Applicant has demonstrated his qualifications to 
be promoted. (AE C) 
 
 On April 15, 2016, a Director, Export Policy, Office of Naval Research, also 
recommended Applicant for promotion. He states that Applicant’s efforts have resulted 
in “. . . successful government/industry relationship that is mutually respectful and 
achieves results that provide great benefit to the war fighter.” (AE D) 
 
Applicant has taken several courses on security and protecting classified 
information since these incidents happened to include: DoD Annual Security Refresher 
Briefing on May 18, 2015, Classified Information System User Briefing on June 28, 
2015, SAP/SCI Annual Security Refresher Briefing on May 18, 2015, CERT: 
SAP/Special Programs Annual Security Refresher Briefing on November 8, 2015. In 
2016: LO/CLO Technology and CPI in ITAR Authorizations on April 20, 2016, 
Coordination with the USG for Disclosure of LO/CLO Technology and COPI on April 20, 
2016; DoD Annual Security Refresher Briefing on April 20, 2016; SAP/SCI Annual 
Security Refresher Briefing on April 20, 2016, CERT: SAP Annual Security Refresher 
Briefing on November 2, 2016. (AE E; AE F; AE G) 
 
Shortly after the foreign representative demonstration incidents, security training 
was conducted regarding NISPOM and ITAR regulations through a stand-down 
provided by security.  For the July 30, 2015 violation, Applicant was re-educated on the 
responsibility and process for verifying security clearance information prior to disclosing 
classified information. (AE G at 2)  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered when 
determining an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
 
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The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
  
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information 
 
The security concern relating to the guideline for Handling Protected Information 
is set out in AG & 33:       
 
Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for 
protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an 
individual=s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability 
to safeguard such information, and is a security concern.   
 
The guideline notes several disqualifying conditions that could raise security 
concerns: 
 
AG ¶ 34(a): deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other 
protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to 
 
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personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at 
seminars, meetings, or conferences; 
 
AG ¶ 34(b): collecting or storing classified or other protected information at 
home or in any other unauthorized location; 
 
AG ¶ 34(c): loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or 
otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other information on any 
unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word 
processor, or computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, 
handheld, “palm” or pocket device or other adjunct equipment; 
 
AG ¶ 34(d): inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other 
protected information outside one’s need to know; 
 
AG ¶ 34(e):  copying classified or other protected information in a manner 
designed to conceal or remove classification or other document control 
markings: 
 
AG ¶ 34(f):  viewing or downloading information from a secure system 
when the information is beyond the individual’s need-to-know; 
 
AG ¶ 34(g): any failure to comply with the rules for the protection of 
classified or other sensitive information; 
 
AG ¶ 34(h): negligence or lax security habits that persist despite 
counseling by management; and  
 
AG ¶ 34(i): failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in 
damage to the National Security, regardless of whether it was deliberate 
or negligent.  
 
With respect to SOR ¶ 1.a(i) relating to the disclosure of the confidential 
information to uncleared foreign nationals during four separate demonstrations, I find 
that AG ¶ 34(a), AG ¶ 34(g), and AG ¶ 34(i) apply.  AG ¶ 34(a) applies because 
Applicant was in attendance at all four demonstrations, but failed to notice that the 
[confidential information] was shown during the demonstration. It is noted that 
apparently no one present at these demonstrations noticed the presence of the 
[confidential information] or if they noticed it, they did not stop the demonstration to raise 
a concern about its classification.  Applicant’s failure to notice the presence of the 
[confidential information] was negligent as opposed to deliberate. Regardless, it resulted 
in the compromise of classified information. AG ¶ 34(g) applies because Applicant failed 
to comply with the rules for protecting classified or other sensitive information. As the 
author of the TCP, he was aware that the [confidential information] was not to be 
displayed during the demonstrations. AG ¶ 34(i) applies for the same reasons. 
However, the damage to National Security is unknown. 
 
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With respect to SOR ¶ 1.a(iii), pertaining to the incident where Applicant vouched 
for the Army representative’s security clearance during an unclassified meeting, AG ¶ 
34(g) applies. During the classified meeting, the Army representative asked a question 
that required a classified answer. Applicant was asked by a subordinate whether they 
could answer the question. Instead of following the procedures in place to verify that the 
Army representative had the requisite clearance and the need to know, Applicant 
allowed the classified answer. Applicant attended previous classified meetings where 
the Army representative was present and vouched for his security clearance. It is noted 
that no compromise of classified information occurred during this meeting, because it 
was later confirmed the Army representative had the requisite security clearance and 
the need to know the information.    
 
With respect to Applicant being found partially responsible for the loss of 
classified documents on two occasions (SOR ¶ 1.a(ii) and SOR ¶ 1.b), I do not find 
Applicant culpable in either incident. Applicant’s testimony was credible when he 
explained that he turned in both documents to Document Control.  Both classified 
documents were likely destroyed, but were not documented by Document Control as a 
result of a systemic problem. Applicant did not receive a receipt for either document. He 
was not aware that he was required to obtain a receipt for controlled documents when 
turning them into Document Control. Although a rule was apparently in place, requiring 
employees to obtain a receipt when turning in controlled (classified) documents for 
destruction to Document Control, the new policy was not widely circulated. Mr. X. 
testified that Applicant would have not been aware of this additional procedure. 
Document Control encountered similar issues in the recent past regarding the failure to 
account for controlled documents before they were destroyed. There is nothing in the 
record evidence which indicates Applicant was properly trained on this procedure. I 
cannot find Applicant responsible for the loss of the two documents he turned into 
Document Control because he was not properly trained on the requirement to get a 
receipt for the controlled documents turned in for destruction.  
 
The Government’s substantial evidence and Applicant’s own admissions raise 
security concerns under Guideline K. The burden shifted to Applicant to produce 
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. (Directive 
¶E3.1.15) An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden 
of disproving it never shifts to the Government. (See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 
(App. Bd. Sept. 22, 2005))  
 
The guideline also includes examples of conditions that could mitigate security 
concerns arising from financial difficulties: 
 
AG ¶ 35(a): so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has 
happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
 
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AG ¶ 35(b): the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial 
security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the 
discharge of security responsibilities; and  
 
AG ¶ 35(c): the security violations were due to improper or inadequate 
training.  
 
 All three mitigating conditions apply. Prior to these security incidents, Applicant  
held a security clearance for over 30 years with no security violations. Applicant 
responded favorably to counseling and follow-up security training. Mr. X. testified that 
he talked extensively with Applicant about the incidents and what he needs to do in the 
future. Applicant’s supervisor, indicated in Applicant’s 2015 rating that his response to 
his security violations “have been nothing short of tremendous.” Applicant was 
“apologetic and regretful” over the incidents and has become the most proactive 
employee on his staff about educating himself and others about security requirements 
and making sure the requirements are met. While Applicant was involved in one serious 
security violation, involving disclosure of classified information to foreign nationals and 
several minor security incidents, his efforts to learn from his mistakes demonstrate that 
similar behavior in the future is unlikely to recur. His past mistakes do not cast doubt on 
his current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.  He responded favorably to 
subsequent security training.  If the two incidents involving the failure to obtain a receipt 
when turning in controlled documents for destruction are considered security violations, 
then AG ¶ 35(c) applies because Applicant was not given adequate training on the 
procedure for turning in controlled documents.   
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
        
 
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I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I considered Applicant’s 30-year 
history of favorable duty performance with his current employer. I considered that 
Applicant responded favorably after the security incidents. He served his thirty-day 
suspension, but returned to work with a positive attitude. He attended follow-up security 
training and discussed the incidents extensively with Mr. X., a security professional in 
his organization. He has learned a valuable lesson about the importance of following the 
rules to protect classified information. Security concerns under Handling Protected 
Information are mitigated.    
 
Formal Findings 
  
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline K:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.b:    For Applicant 
     
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is  
clearly consistent with the national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
                                                
_________________ 
ERIN C. HOGAN 
Administrative Judge