1 
                                                              
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE                                                  
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS                               
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 16-00526 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Caroline Heintzelman, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
  
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
DAM, Shari, Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his connections to India. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
History of Case 
 
On December 18, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaires for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On June 2, 2016, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The action was 
taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
Adjudicative Guidelines effective within the DoD for SORs issued after September 1, 
2006.   
 
 Applicant answered the SOR in writing on June 20, 2016, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. On September 8, 2016, the Defense Office of Hearings 
 
 
 
 
2 
and Appeals (DOHA) assigned the case to me. It issued a Notice of Hearing on November 
8, 2016, setting the hearing for November 30, 2016. On that date, Department Counsel 
introduced Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3 into evidence without objection. 
Applicant testified. He did not submit any exhibits. DOHA received the hearing transcript 
(Tr.) on December 9, 2016. The record remained open until January 6, 2017, to give 
Applicant an opportunity to submit documents. He timely submitted three exhibits that I 
marked as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through C, and admitted into the record without 
objection. 
 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to India. The request and attached documents pertinent to India 
are included in the record as Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1, along with 13 attachments. The 
documents were admitted without objection. (Tr. 13.) The facts administratively noticed 
are limited to matters of general knowledge pertinent to India, and not subject to 
reasonable dispute. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, 
below.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted all factual allegations contained in the SOR. Those admissions 
are incorporated into these findings of fact.   
 
 Applicant is 55 years old. He was born in India. He enlisted in the Indian Navy in 
May 1983. He graduated from an Indian university in 1990 with a master’s degree. In April 
1996, he took an early retirement from the Indian Navy and was honorably discharged as 
a lieutenant commander. He does not receive a pension for his previous military service.  
He held an Indian security clearance while serving. In May 1996, he immigrated to the 
United States to join his wife, who was attending graduate school at a U.S. university. (Tr. 
15-19, 36.) In February 2012, Applicant became a U.S. citizen. (GE 1.)  
 
 Applicant’s wife was born in India. In 1991, they married in India. In 1993, she 
immigrated to the United States to attend a university. Applicant and his wife have 17-
year-old twins, who were born in the United States. She is a citizen of India, and a 
permanent resident of the United States. She works as a professor at a U.S. university. 
(Tr. 15-16; GE 1.) She owns an apartment in India, which she purchased in 2011 for 
$50,000 and has a minimal mortgage on it. She maintains a bank account in India to 
cover expenses related to it. Applicant’s mother lives in the apartment. (Tr. 28-30, 39.) 
 
 Both of Applicant’s parents were born in India. His father is deceased. He was an 
engineer in India. (Tr. 17.) His mother is 79 years old and is a citizen and resident of India. 
She is a retired teacher. Applicant speaks to his mother two or three times a week. She 
has visited him in the United States eight or nine times, the last visit being in 2015. 
 
 
 
 
3 
Applicant has one sibling, who was born in India. She is an Indian citizen and resident of 
Malaysia since 1997. (Tr. 17, 21-22; GE 1.)  
 
 Applicant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law were born in India and reside there. 
His father-in-law is a retired civil servant and worked for the Indian government. His 
mother-in-law is a housewife. Applicant speaks to them once a week; his wife speaks to 
them more frequently. They have visited Applicant and his wife more than his parents 
have. Their last visit was in 2014. Applicant’s wife has one sibling, who is a citizen and 
resident of the United States. When Applicant’s in-laws come to the United States, they 
also visit their son. (Tr. 22-25.) 
 
 Applicant has three friends in India with whom he maintains contact two or three 
times a year by telephone or email. All of them served together in the Indian Armed 
Forces. Two of his friends are rear Admirals, and he saw both in July 2016, when he 
visited India. Another friend is a retired Army brigadier general. Applicant saw him during 
his July 2016 trip, but has not been in contact since then. (Tr. 33-37, 41; GE 2.) 
 
 Since arriving in the United States in 1996, Applicant has traveled to India between 
12 and 20 times, his last visit being in July 2016. He visits his family and in-laws when he 
returns. (Tr. 26-27.) He ceased using an Indian passport when he became a U.S. citizen 
in 2012 and received a U.S. passport. (Tr. 43; GE 2.)  
 
 Applicant and his wife purchased a home in the U.S. in 2015 for $650,000. He and 
his wife have financial investments in the United States. The estimated value of all 
accounts is between $700,000 and $800,000. Other than his mortgage, he has minimal 
liabilities. (Tr. 38-41.) He also has a joint account with his mother in India. He puts money 
into it, in the event she needs additional monies. It has about $3,000 to $4,000 in it. He 
said the last time she used some of the money was for his father’s hospitalization before 
he died in 2012. (Tr. 30, 32, 42.)   
 
 Since October 2014, Applicant has worked for a state research institute. Prior to 
this position, he has worked for private companies and institutions since 1998. (GE 1.) 
 
 Applicant submitted two character references. Applicant’s supervisor for the past 
two years recommends Applicant “as a highly professional, trustworthy individual.” (AE 
A.) He has found Applicant to be conscientious in handling sensitive information and 
aware of the pertinent rules and policies. (AE A.) Another supervisor has known him for 
a year. He noted that Applicant worked on a project involving sensitive (unclassified) 
information and was “respectful of privacy, confidentiality, rules and restrictions.” (AE B.) 
  
 At the hearing, Applicant sincerely expressed pride in his U.S. citizenship. He 
recognized that it is a privilege to have access to classified information. He understands 
the significance of working in the Armed Forces and responsibilities it brings. He said, 
“When I was in the Armed Forces of India, it was the Indian flag that I embraced. But now 
I’m a U.S. citizen and it is the Star Spangled Banner. So, I have a lot of respect for that.” 
(Tr. 44.) 
 
 
 
 
4 
India 
 
I take administrative notice of the following facts: According to its constitution, India 
is a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. It is a multiparty, federal, 
parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament and a population of approximately 
1.1 billion. The Indian government generally respects the rights of its citizens, but 
numerous serious problems remain. Police and security forces have engaged in 
extrajudicial killings of persons in custody, disappearances, torture, and rape. A lack of 
accountability permeated the government and security forces, creating an atmosphere in 
which human rights violations went unpunished. A number of violent attacks were 
committed in recent years by separatist and terrorist groups. In November 2008, terrorists 
coordinated an attack at a hotel in Mumbai frequented by westerners.    
 
The United States recognizes India as key to its strategic interests and has sought 
to strengthen diplomatic and economic relationships. The two countries are the world’s 
largest democracies, both committed to political freedom protected by representative 
government, and share common interests in the free flow of commerce, in fighting 
terrorism, and in creating a strategically stable Asia. However, differences over India’s 
nuclear weapons program and pace of economic reform exist. There are also concerns 
about India’s relations with Iran, including its increasing cooperation with the Iranian 
military. 
 
There have been cases involving the illegal export, or attempted illegal export, of 
U.S. restricted, dual–use technology to India, including technology and equipment that 
were determined to present an unacceptable risk of diversion to programs for the 
development of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Foreign 
government and private entities, including intelligence organizations and security 
services, have capitalized on private-sector acquisitions of U.S. technology. In March 
2008, an American businessman pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally export 
technology to entities in India.  
 
The United States views India as a growing world power with which it shares 
common strategic interests. There is a strong partnership between the two countries and 
they are expected to continue addressing differences and shaping a dynamic and 
collaborative future. The U.S. and India seek to elevate the strategic partnership further 
to include cooperation in counter-terrorism, defense, education, and joint democracy 
promotion.  
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶¶ 2(b) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of 
variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider 
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified 
information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the 
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded 
on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
According to Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to 
establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant 
is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as 
to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “[a]ny determination 
under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national 
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant 
concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information.) 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG & 6:       
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
 
 
 
 
6 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign county in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to such considerations 
as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 describes four conditions that could raise a security concern and be 
potentially disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign 
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;1  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;  
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, 
or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject 
the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation. 
Applicant’s mother and in-laws are citizens and residents of India. His wife is a 
citizen of India and permanent resident of the United States. Two friends are officers in 
the Indian Navy; one friend is a retired officer in the Indian Army. Applicant has a joint 
bank account with his mother in India. India is the world’s largest democracy, works 
closely with the United States on many matters, shares common strategic interests, and 
generally respects the rights of its citizens; but, it also continues to have human rights 
issues, has been victimized by terrorist attacks, and has a history of seeking restricted 
dual-use technology, which has been illegally exported to India from the United States. 
This creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, 
pressure, or coercion. It also creates a potential conflict of interest for Applicant. AG ¶¶ 
7(a), (b), (d), and (e) have been raised by the evidence. 
 
                                            
1The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, 
disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country and an applicant 
has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and 
could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. 
Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 After the Government produced substantial evidence of those disqualifying 
conditions, the burden shifted to Applicant to rebut their security significance or otherwise 
prove mitigation. Four mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable to the 
disqualifying conditions raised in this case: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;   
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;  
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; and 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be 
used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that Applicant and his 
family members are vulnerable to coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is 
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family 
member is associated with or dependent upon that government, the country is known to 
conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or there is a serious problem 
in the country with crime or terrorism. Although India has a close, friendly relationship with 
the United States, there is evidence that India illegally targets U.S. technology, which 
raises a security concern regarding Applicant’s relationships with citizens and residents 
of India. Applicant’s wife maintains Indian citizenship, and his mother, in-laws, and three 
friends are citizens and residents of India. His three friends have affiliations with the Indian 
military. Given the nature of these relationships, there is a possibility that Applicant could 
be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of India and the United 
States. Hence, AG ¶ 8(a) has limited application.   
 
AG ¶ 8(b) has application. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s 
“deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” Applicant has established 
deep connections to the United States. He has lived in the United States since 1996. He 
became a naturalized citizen in 2012. His two children were born in the United States. He 
owns property and has financial accounts in the United States. He has worked for U.S. 
institutions and companies since 1998. His current supervisors are confident of his ability 
 
 
 
 
8 
to protect classified information. He considers himself a citizen of the United States and 
no longer a citizen of India. Based on these significant connections to the United States, 
there is a strong indication that Applicant could be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interests. 
 
AG ¶ 8(c) does not have application to the security concerns raised because  
Applicant’s contacts with his mother and in-laws, residing in India, are sufficiently frequent 
and not casual. His communications with his friends have been less frequent. He has 
visited his family in India between 12 and 25 times since 1996, the most recent being in 
July 2016.  
  
The evidence establishes mitigation under AG ¶ 8(f), as to the allegation in SOR ¶ 
1.e. Applicant maintains money in a joint account in India with his mother to provide 
money for emergencies. Currently, there is between $3,000 and $4,000 in that account. 
His wife owns an apartment in India worth $50,000. Applicant and his wife have combined 
financial assets in the United States worth between $700,000 and $800,000, plus a home 
they purchased for $650,000. Those assets are more significant than their combined 
assets in India that total about $54,000.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for 
a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The Appeal Board requires 
the whole-person analysis address “evidence of an applicant’s personal loyalties; the 
nature and extent of an applicant’s family’s ties to the U.S. relative to his [or her] ties to a 
foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.; and many others raised by the facts 
of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).  
  
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Although this case pertains to Guideline 
 
 
 
 
9 
B, the security concerns do not arise from any questionable conduct by Applicant, but 
rather from circumstances that warrant further analysis. 
 
Applicant is a 55-year-old man, who was born in India and is a citizen and resident 
the United States. He now seeks a security clearance. Some facts weigh against granting 
Applicant a security clearance. Over the past 20 years, Applicant has maintained 
connections to his family in India. He communicates regularly with family members, in 
particular his mother, by phone and periodic visits. He maintains some, albeit limited, 
communications with three Indian military officers, two of whom are on active duty. While 
these contacts with his mother, in-laws, and old friends commendably demonstrate 
devotion and affection for them, those actions raise security concerns and potential 
conflicts of interest.  
 
      There are facts that weigh more heavily in favor of granting Applicant a security 
clearance. He has lived in the United States for 20 years and has been a citizen since 
2012. His wife is a permanent resident of the United States and teaches at a U.S. 
university. His brother-in-law is a citizen and resident of the United States. His children 
were born in the United States. He has worked for U.S. companies and institutions since 
1998. His supervisors recommend him for a security clearance. He has significant assets 
in the United States and not in India. He expressed sincere loyalty to the United States.  
 
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all pertinent facts 
and circumstances in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant mitigated the 
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. Overall, the record evidence leaves me 
without questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security 
clearance.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.e:            For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
                                                     
___________________ 
SHARI DAM 
 Administrative Judge