DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of: 
 
 
 
 
Applicant for Security Clearance 
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) ISCR Case No. 15-01074 
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Appearances 
 
For Government: Nicole A. Smith, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
March 28, 2017 
 
 
 
 
Decision 
 
 
 
 
LOKEY ANDERSON, Darlene D., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing 
(e-QIP), on January 6, 2014. (Government Exhibit 1). On December 6, 2015, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) pursuant to Executive Order 10865 (as amended), and 
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, issued a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant, which detailed the reasons why DOD 
could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the 
Applicant and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a 
clearance should be denied or revoked. 
 
Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on January 11, 2016, and elected to 
have the case determined on a written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel 
submitted the Government's File of Relevant Material (FORM) to Applicant on or about 
April 7, 2016. Applicant received the FORM on April 12, 2016. Applicant was instructed 
to submit information in rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation within 30 days of receipt. 
Applicant submitted no reply to the FORM.  This case was assigned to the undersigned 
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on January 26, 2017. Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for 
access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  NOTICE 
 
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts 
concerning the current political conditions in India. ( See, Government Exhibit 5.) There 
was no objection from Applicant, as Applicant submitted  no  Response to the  FORM. 
The request and the attached documents were not admitted into evidence but were 
included in the record. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of 
Fact, below. 
 
 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
The following Findings of Fact are based on Applicant's Answer to the SOR 
testimony and the exhibits. The Applicant is 42 years of age and married. He is 
employed as a Principal Software Engineer by a defense contractor and seeks to obtain 
a security clearance in connection with his employment in the defense industry. 
 
Paragraph   1  (Guideline   B  -  Foreign  Influence).   The  Government  alleges  in  
this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has foreign  
contacts that could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the 
compromise of classified information. 
 
Applicant admitted each of the allegations set forth under this guideline. He has 
been working for his current employer since December 2013. Applicant has held a 
public trust position in the past without incident. 
 
Applicant was born in India in 1974. He grew up in India, and attended college 
there, where he earned a Bachelor's degree in 1995 and a Master's degree in 1998. He 
immigrated to the United States in 2001. He was married in India in 2005. His spouse is 
an Indian citizen and a U.S. resident alien. He attended a University in the United States 
and obtained his MBA in 2008. In 2012, he became a United States citizen and obtained 
an American passport. At that time, he renounced his Indian citizenship and 
relinquished his Indian passport. Applicant has two minor children who were born in the 
United States. (See, Applicant's Answer to SOR.) 
 
Applicant's mother, father, sister, mother-in-law, and father-in-law are citizens and 
residents of India. Applicant claims that none of his family in India are affiliated with the 
government of India. His parents and in-laws are retired. His sister works for a private 
company and does not deal with the Indian government. 
 
Applicant supplements his father's income annually with about $3,000. In total he 
has already sent about $40,000 to support him.   He does not know when this will 
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discontinue, but the amount he sends is diminishing as time passes. Applicant's spouse 
maintains a small bank account in India to use for convenience purposes when they are 
visiting.  He states that he has no significant financial or property interest in India. 
 
Other than his extended family in India, Applicant maintains contact with three 
friends who are citizens of India. However, all of them reside in the United States. He 
speaks to them by phone or in person about once a month. None of them have any 
affiliation with the Indian government. 
 
I have considered the information provided by the Government on India. India is 
among the most active collectors of U.S. economic and proprietary information. There 
have been numerous, recent criminal cases concerning export enforcement, economic 
espionage, theft of trade secrets, and embargo-related criminal prosecutions involving 
both the government of India and private companies and individuals in India. In March 
2008, a Minnesota based company pleaded guilty to submitting false export licenses to 
the Commerce Department in connection with the shipment of nuclear testing equipment 
to an entity in India. That same year, the Department of Justice brought two cases 
against defendants charged with illegally exporting controlled products to Indian 
government entities involved in the development of ballistic missiles, as well as space 
launch vehicles and combat fighter jets. More recently, in January 2013, the former 
export control manager of a Pennsylvania based company pleaded guilty to the illegal, 
unlicensed export to India and China of over 57 microwave amplifiers, products that have 
military applications. There are other cases concerning illegal export, or attempted 
illegal export, of U.S. restricted, dual-use technology to India that have included: (1) 
military night vision components; (2) vibration amplifiers and cable assemblies, for use in 
both military and civilian aircraft; (3) manufacturing equipment related to improving the 
accuracy of strategic ballistic missiles, which the U.S. Government deemed to be an 
unacceptable risk of diversion to programs for the development of weapons of mass 
destruction or related delivery systems. There are a number of terrorist groups that 
operate in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, particularly along the Line of Control 
separating Indian and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. The State Department strongly 
recommends avoiding travel to the states of Jammu and Kashmir. 
 
 
POLICIES 
 
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. Accordingly, the 
Department of Defense, in Enclosure 2 of the 1992 Directive sets forth policy factors and 
conditions that could raise or mitigate a security concern; which must be given binding 
consideration in making security clearance determinations. These factors should be 
followed in every case according to the pertinent criterion. However, the conditions are 
neither automatically determinative of the decision in any case, nor can they supersede 
the Administrative Judge's reliance on her own common sense. Because each security 
clearance case presents its own unique facts and circumstances, it cannot be assumed 
that these factors exhaust the realm of human experience, or apply equally in every 
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case.  Based on the Findings of Fact set forth above, the factors most applicable to the 
evaluation of this case are: 
 
 
Foreign Influence 
 
6. The Concern. Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the 
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not 
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. 
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign 
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not 
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of 
terrorism. 
 
Conditions that could raise a security concern: 
 
7. (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, 
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact 
creates a heightened risks of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion; and 
 
7. (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create 
a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive 
information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or 
country by providing that information. 
 
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
8. (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country 
are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose 
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the 
interests of the U.S.; 
 
8. (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, 
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., 
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. 
interest; and 
 
8. (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent 
that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. 
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In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 18-19, in 
evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the Administrative Judge should 
consider the following general factors: 
 
a. The nature, extent and seriousness of the conduct; 
 
b. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; 
 
c. The frequency and recency of the conduct; 
 
d. The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; 
 
e. The extent to which participation is voluntary; 
 
f. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavior 
changes; 
 
g. The motivation for the conduct; 
 
h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress; and 
 
i. The likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
The eligibility criteria established in the DoD Directive identify personal 
characteristics and conduct, which are reasonably related to the ultimate question, posed 
in Section 2 of Executive Order 10865, of whether it is "clearly consistent with the 
national interest" to grant an Applicant's request for access to classified information. 
 
The DoD Directive states, "The adjudicative process is an examination of a 
sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is 
eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is 
predicated upon the individual meeting these  personnel security guidelines. The 
adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-
person concept. Available, reliable information about the  person,  past  and present, 
favorable and unfavorable should be considered  in reaching  a determination. The 
Administrative Judge can draw only those inferences or conclusions that have reasonable 
and logical basis in the evidence of record. The Judge cannot draw inferences or 
conclusions based on evidence which is speculative or conjectural  in nature. Finally, as 
emphasized by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865, "Any determination 
under this order . . . shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall 
in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the Applicant concerned." 
 
The Government must make out a case under Guideline B (foreign influence) that 
establishes doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.   While a 
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rational connection, or nexus, must be shown between Applicant's situation and her 
ability to effectively safeguard classified information, with respect to sufficiency of proof 
of a rational connection, objective or direct evidence is not required. 
 
Then, the Applicant must remove that doubt with substantial evidence in 
refutation, explanation, mitigation or extenuation, which demonstrates that the Applicant 
presently qualifies for a security clearance. 
 
An individual who has foreign connections may be prone to provide information or 
make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States. Foreign influence 
can raise questions as to whether the Applicant can be counted upon to place the 
interests of the United States paramount to that of another nation. The Government must 
be able to place a high degree of confidence in a security clearance holder to abide by 
all security rules and regulations, at all times and in all places. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Having considered the evidence of record in light of the appropriate legal 
standards and factors, and having assessed the Applicant's credibility based on the 
record, this Administrative Judge concludes that the Government has established its 
case as to all allegations in the SOR. 
 
Under Foreign Influence, Disqualifying Conditions 7.(a) contact with a foreign 
family member, business or professional  associate, friend, or other person who is a 
citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 7.(b) 
connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential 
conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or 
technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by 
providing that information apply. However, Mitigating Conditions 8.(a) the nature of the 
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the 
positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the 
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a 
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.; 8.(b) 
there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or 
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the 
individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that 
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. 
interest; and 8.(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or 
exploitation also apply. 
 
Applicant  has lived in the United States for the past fifteen years.  He immigrated 
to the United States; became a naturalized citizen; obtained a good job; and established 
his family and home here.   His parents and in-laws, who are residents and citizens of 
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India, in no way pose a security risk to the Applicant.  Applicant has limited contact with 
them. They have no affiliation with the Indian government that could create any risk. 
 
It is noted that the current political situation in India elevates the cause  for 
concern. In this case, the Applicant has  everything to lose and nothing to gain  by 
engaging in any improper foreign contact with India.  Although  the  Applicant  sends 
money to his parents in India to provide some financial support, his immediate family 
members reside in and are citizens of the United States. He has resided in the United 
States since 2001, is raising his family here, has strong ties here, his financial assets 
are here, and this evidence demonstrates that it is unlikely he will be placed in a position 
of choosing between foreign  interests and U.S. interests. Under the particular facts of 
this case, the possibility of foreign influence does not exist, nor could it  create  the 
potential for conduct resulting in the compromise of classified information. I find that the 
Applicant is not  vulnerable to foreign influence. Accordingly,  I find  for  the Applicant 
under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). 
 
I have also considered the "whole-person concept" in evaluating the Applicant's 
eligibility for access to classified information. Under the particular facts of this case, the 
totality of the Applicant's foreign connections set forth under all of the guidelines viewed 
as a whole, support a whole-person assessment of good judgement, trustworthiness, 
reliability, candor, a willingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other 
characteristics indicating that the person may properly safeguard classified information. 
Applicant has presented sufficient evidence in mitigation to demonstrate that he is not a 
security risk. 
 
Considering all the evidence, the Applicant has met the mitigating conditions of 
Guideline B of the adjudicative guidelines set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive. 
Accordingly, he has met his ultimate burden of persuasion under Guideline B. 
 
 
FORMAL FINDINGS 
 
Formal Findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as 
required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are: 
 
Paragraph 1: For the Applicant. 
Subpara. 1.a.: For the Applicant 
Subpara. 1.b.: For the Applicant 
Subpara. 1.c.: For the Applicant 
Subpara. 1.d.: For the Applicant 
Subpara.   1.e.:   For the Applicant 
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DECISION 
 
In light of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly 
consistent with the national interests to grant or continue a security clearance for the 
Applicant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Darlene Lokey Anderson  
 Administrative Judge