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         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE          
   DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: )
)
 ) ISCR Case No.16-00465 
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For the Government: Tovah Minster, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Gregory F. Greiner, Esq.  
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
Based on a review of the case file, hearing testimony, and the exhibits, I 
conclude that Applicant provided adequate information to mitigate the security concerns 
for foreign influence under Guideline B. Eligibility for access to classified information is 
granted. 
Statement of the Case 
On December 12, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to renew a security clearance for his employment with 
a defense contractor. Applicant was interviewed by a security investigator from the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in May 2015. After reviewing the results of the 
investigation, the Department of Defense (DOD) could not make the affirmative findings 
required to issue a security clearance. On June 14, 2016, DOD issued a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns for foreign influence under 
Guideline B. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the 
DOD on September 1, 2006. 
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Applicant answered the SOR on September 17, 2014. He admitted the five 
allegations that concerned relatives and friends who are citizens and residents of India. 
He admitted two allegations concerning interest in property and bank accounts in India. 
Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on August 24, 2016, and the case was 
assigned to me on December 2, 2016. DOD issued a notice of hearing on January 18, 
2017, scheduling a hearing for February 8, 2017. I convened the hearing as scheduled. 
The Government offered three exhibits that I marked and admitted into the record 
without objection as Government Exhibits (GX) 1, 2, and 3. Applicant and three 
witnesses testified. Applicant offered seven exhibits that I marked and admitted into the 
record without objection as Applicant Exhibits (AX) A through G. I received the transcript 
of the hearing (Tr.) on February 16, 2017. 
 
Procedural Issues 
 
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts 
concerning India, and provided relevant U.S. Department of State documents. (GX 3) I 
will take administrative notice of facts concerning India as noted in my Findings of Fact.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following findings of fact. Applicant is 63 years old. Applicant was born in India, and 
received a bachelor’s degree from a college in India. He came to the United States in 
May 1979 on a student visa to continue his education. He received both a master’s 
degree in chemical engineering and a master’s degree in industrial engineering from a 
United States university in 1982.  
 
 Applicant worked for a U.S. government agency from September 1982 until April 
1984. The agency had a clearance procedure for access to information but not a rigid 
security clearance procedure. He received a clearance from the agency. Applicant left 
the agency in April 1984, and worked for over 20 years until December 2004, as a 
systems engineer and technical staff member for a large U.S. telecommunications 
company. Since April 2005, he has worked for various government contractors as a 
senior network systems engineer on projects in support of the U.S. military. He received 
temporary eligibility for access to classified information in 2004, and permanent 
eligibility in 2006. His latest performance review shows that he is an excellent employee 
and engineer who is a vital support to his company’s mission in support of the U.S. 
military. 
 
 Applicant married his wife, who was a citizen of India at the time, in November 
1983. She came to the United States after being granted resident alien as his spouse in 
December 1984. Applicant became a United States citizen in October 1989, and his 
wife became a United States citizen in 1993. They have two grown children who were 
born in the United States and are United States citizens. His son graduated from a U.S. 
university and was designated a prestigious scholar who attended and received a 
doctorate from a world-class university. He is completing his fourth year of medical 
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school at a United States medical school. His daughter is completing her second year at 
a United States medical school. (Tr. 38-43; GX 1, e-QIP, dated December 12, 2014; GX 
2, PSI, dated May 6, 2015; AX C; Degree Certificates,  dated April 1981 and 1982; AX 
E, Performance Award, June 25, 2010)  
 
 Applicant came to the United States for the opportunity to think and work as an 
engineer. He knew he would have the freedom to work and design as an engineer. He 
knew the United States was a great place to be innovative. He had a brother who was a 
doctor living in the United States that sponsored him and eased his transition to the U.S. 
culture. He left India at age 24 and has been in the United States for 38 years. Since 
becoming a citizen, he has voted in every election except one. He owns property in two 
states valued at over $1,000,000, and a condominium with his wife and son. He 
believes his net value in the United States is over $2,000,000. His performance reviews 
show that he is a valued and excellent employee in support of the U.S. military. (Tr. 43-
44, 62-66; AX D, Deeds, various dates; AX E, Performance Review, dated December 
31, 2016) 
 
 Applicant’s parents were residents of both the United States and India. His 
parents when alive had United States resident alien status. Applicant has eight siblings. 
Two brothers are citizens and residents of the United States. One is a doctor and the 
other an engineer. Applicant has family members in India. The SOR alleges, and 
Applicant admits, he has four brothers (SOR 1.a) and three sisters (SOR 1.b) who are 
citizens and residents of India. Two brothers in India are self-employed doctors, another 
is a self-employed farmer, and the fourth brother is an accountant for the India postal 
system, a government agency. His sisters are homemakers. There is no indication that 
any of his siblings are considered prominent citizens of India. The evidence indicates 
that they are ordinary citizens working in critical but ordinary jobs, like doctors 
accountants, farmers, and homemakers.  
 
 Applicant used to have periodic phone or e-mail contact with his brothers. He 
never had much phone or e-mail contact with his sisters. He has stopped contact with 
all his siblings, and has no telephone or email contact with them except for the brother 
employed by the postal system. He has electronic contact with him about once a 
quarter. He has stopped contacting his siblings so as to mitigate the risks of foreign 
influence caused by his siblings in India. Applicant enjoys his work and does not want to 
risk his eligibility or access to classified information. Applicant sees his siblings when he 
visits India. He visited India for a few weeks in June/July 2009, October/November 
2012, and December 2014/January 2015. Only one brother and his wife have visited 
Applicant and his family in the United States, and that was for their daughter’s wedding 
in July 2015. Applicant has not had an Indian passport since the early 1980s, and is not 
a dual citizen with India. (Tr. 45-48, 67-68: GX 2, PSI, May 6, 2015)  
 
 Applicant admits he has a brother-in-law (SOR 1.c), two sisters-in-law (SOR 1.d), 
and a friend (SOR 1.e) who are citizens and residents of India. Applicant’s brother-in-
law is a self-employed doctor. He used to have contact with him by phone or e-mail 
once a month. Applicant has no contact with him now. (Tr. 47-48) He had limited 
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contact by phone or e-mail with his sisters–in-law, who are homemakers. He has 
stopped all communications with both of them. He sees them when he visits India. They 
have no information about Applicant’s work and do not know he is seeking a security 
clearance. (Tr. 48-49, 60-61)  
 
 Applicant admits he has contact with a friend from college who is an electrical 
engineer for an oil company and a citizen and resident of India. They used to have 
contact by phone or e-mail once or twice a month. However, they now have no contact. 
(Tr. 49-51)  
 
 Applicant admits that he has an interest in a house in India he inherited along 
with his brothers from his father in 1999. (SOR 1.f). The house is valued at 
approximately $100,000, and Applicant’s value in the house is approximately $15,000. 
In 2006, he signed an Indian legal document to have his name removed from the deed. 
In 2016, he signed an affidavit releasing any share he may still have in the property to 
his brother who lives on the property. (Tr. 51-53; AX A, Affidavit, dated October 18, 
2016)  
 
 Applicant admits that he has some interest in two bank accounts in India (SOR 
1.g). One account belongs to his wife as the primary account holder and he is the 
secondary account holder. For many years, her father deposited funds in the account 
for her use. The balance of the account is approximately $15,000. In 2012, when her 
father was sick, his wife had her father’s name removed from the account and made it a 
joint account with Applicant. In their 2014 visit to India to celebrate the passing of 
Applicant’s father-in-law, they did not consider closing the account. They learned later 
that bank accounts could not be closed unless the account holders were present in 
India. The second account was started by his father, who had started accounts for all of 
his children. Applicant would like to close both accounts to mitigate the security 
concerns, but he does not want to return to India. (Tr. 53-59, 62-65) 
 
 One of Applicant’s supervisors, a retired U.S. Army officer, testified that Applicant 
was one of his key engineers on a project to support the Army’s battlefield 
communications. Applicant was a critical part of the project. Applicant discovered and 
resolved an issue that enabled the program to work supporting worldwide military 
battlefield communications. The witness does not have a concern with Applicant having 
access to classified information. (Tr. 16-23) 
 
 The facility security officer for Applicant’s employer testified that he has known 
and worked closely with Applicant for approximately 10 years. He has no concerns 
about Applicant’s access to classified information. Applicant is trustworthy and honest. 
He cooperated fully with the security clearance process. He is extremely loyal to the 
United States. (Tr. 23-27) 
 
 Applicant’s brother testified that he came to the United States in 1967 on a 
student visa. He attended medical school and became a general surgeon. He is now 
retired. He assisted his brother in coming to the United States to continue his studies. 
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He and his brothers, including Applicant, inherited property from their father worth 
approximately $100,000. Applicant’s share of the property is worth approximately 
$15,000. He knows that Applicant has relinquished his share of the property to another 
brother. The witness sponsored Applicant and his wife for their entry and citizenship in 
the United States. He has never had any question about Applicant’s or his family 
members loyalty to the United States. (Tr. 30-34)  
 
 India is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy with a population of approximately 
1.2 billion people. The U.S. and India share common values including the rule of law, 
respect for diversity, and democratic government. The U.S. Department of State 
reported in 2012 that bilateral defense and counterterrorism cooperation between the 
U.S. and India had grown to reach unprecedented levels, In 2009, the U.S. and India 
launched the U.S.-India Strategic dialogue which is a bilateral forum focused on 
strengthening cooperation between the two countries in several area, including energy, 
climate change, trade, education, and counterterrorism. The U.S. supports a reformed 
United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member. The U.S. 
is one of India’s largest trade and investment partners. In January 2015, President 
Obama and Indian Prime Minister Modi lauded the close and growing ties between the 
United Stead and India.  
 
 The 2008 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial Espionage identified India, along with seven other countries, as being involved 
in criminal espionage of U.S. trade secrets. There were export control enforcement 
cases in 2008 against India or Indian businesses. There have been recent criminal 
cases In the U.S. concerning export enforcement, economic espionage, theft of trade 
secrets, and embargo-related criminal prosecutions involving both the government of 
India and private companies and individuals in India.  
 
 India and Pakistan have been locked in a tense rivalry since the partition of the 
subcontinent following independence from Great Britain in 1947. India continues to 
experience terrorist and insurgent activities that may affect U.S. citizens. Anti-Western 
terrorist groups, some on the U.S. Government’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, 
are active in India. India remains subject to violent terrorists attacks and continues to be 
one of the most persistently targeted countries by transnational and domestic terrorist 
groups.  
 
 According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2013 Human Rights Report, the 
most significant human rights problems in India were police and security forces abuses, 
including extra judicial killings, torture, rape, and widespread corruption at all level of 
government. The United States and India share a number of security perspectives, 
including, those on China, and the Asian balance of power, terrorism, Afghanistan, 
maritime issues, and weapons of mass destruction. India also has a long-standing 
military supply relationships with the Soviet Union, and Russia remains India’s largest 
supplier of military systems and spare parts. India has remained reticent to discuss its 
nuclear security measures or allow inspections. India has also refused to accede to the 
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nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty despite U. S. policy supporting its universality. (GX 3, 
Request for Administrative notice and Supporting Documents) 
 
Policies 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. 
interest, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which 
the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such 
consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)  
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States. Even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with 
the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national 
security. Friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, 
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. The nature of a nation’s 
government and its relationship with the United States are relevant in assessing the 
likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. 
The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country 
has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent 
upon the government or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against 
the United States. In considering the nature of the government, an administrative judge 
must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue. 
 
 The SOR alleges, and Applicant admits, that his four brothers, three sisters, 
brother-in-law, two sisters-in-law, and a friend are citizens and residents of India. He 
also admits to having financial and property interests in India. Applicant’s family 
members who are citizens or residents of India and his property interest in India are a 
foreign influence security concern.  
 
 Three disqualifying conditions are relevant to the security concerns raised in the 
SOR under AG ¶ 7: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
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protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; 
 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and  
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation.   
 
 The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise 
the above disqualifying conditions. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(d), and 7(e) requires substantial 
evidence of a “heightened risk.” The “heightened risk” required to raise one of these 
disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes a risk 
greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member or contacts living under 
a foreign government. The nature of Applicant’s contacts and relationships must be 
examined to determine whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. The Government has established that 
Applicant’s family in India may be under a “heightened risk” of security concern because 
of the potential for criminal espionage targeted at the United States, terrorist activities 
and threats, targeted intelligence activities, and human rights violations in India. An 
applicant with foreign family or friendship ties to a country that presents a heightened 
risk has a heavy burden of persuasion to show that neither he nor the family members 
are subject to influence by that country. The totality of an applicant’s family and friends 
ties to a foreign country as well as the tie to the country for each individual person must 
be considered.  
 
 Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns arising from his family 
members in India. I have considered the following Foreign Influence Mitigating 
Conditions under AG ¶ 8: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
 
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(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
 In evaluating the potential conflict of interest because Applicant’s family members 
are citizens and residents of India I considered that India is a strong ally of the United 
States with mutual defense and strategic interests, that India is a substantial trading 
partner of the United States, and that India cooperates with the United States on many 
military matters. A friendly relationship is not determinative, but it makes it less likely 
that a foreign government would attempt to exploit a United States citizen through 
relatives or associates in that country. Even friendly countries may engage in espionage 
against the United States’ economic, scientific, or technical interest. I have also 
considered the on-going situation in India with extensive terrorist activities and human 
rights issues. Even though India is not a hostile country and its interests are not inimical 
to the United States, it is reasonable to consider that the terrorist situation and groups in 
India could take an action that may jeopardize their friendly position with the United 
States. There are indications that elements in India could seek sensitive information 
from their citizens who have family in the United States.  
 
 I have considered Applicant’s relationship with his siblings and family who are 
citizens or residents of India. Applicant has been open and candid about his foreign 
contacts. There is a rebuttable presumption that contacts with an immediate family 
member in a foreign country are not casual. Factors such as an applicant’s relatives’ 
obscurity or the failure of foreign authorities to contact them in the past do not provide a 
meaningful measure of whether an applicant’s family circumstances post a security 
concern. Applicant has minimal contact with his siblings in India. He had talked to his 
siblings a few times a year, but he has curtailed his contact with them. He only 
occasionally contacts one brother by phone or e-mail. He travels to India about every 
other year and sees his siblings when he visits India. One sibling and spouse attend 
Applicant’s daughter’s recent wedding. Even though the contacts with his siblings are 
minimal, Applicant has not rebutted the presumption that the contacts and 
communications with his siblings are not casual. The communications and contacts 
between Applicant and his family members are not considered casual or infrequent for 
security clearance purposes. His family members could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. Because of the terrorist activity in India, Applicant may likely be 
placed in a position of having to choose between his family members and the U.S. 
interests. AG ¶ 8 (a) and (c) do not apply.  
 
 Applicant has strong ties to the United States. He came to the United States to 
complete his education and to be free to pursue with freedom his profession as an 
engineer. He followed two of his siblings to the United States. Applicant and his wife 
became U.S. citizens at the first opportunity. Their children are U.S. native born citizens 
and contributing to U.S. society and values. Applicant owns property and has the 
majority of his financial assets in the United States. He relinquished his interests in 
property he inherited in India and is trying to close bank accounts in India that opened 
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by others in his or his wife’s name. He has firm ties to the United States and considers it 
home. He embraced the culture, history, and life style of the United States. 
 
 Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is unquestioned. He has family members 
who have been citizens and residents of the United States for many years. His 
immediate family, wife and children, are U. S. citizens and residents. Applicant has 
established that it is unlikely that he could be placed in a position to choose between 
any sense of loyalty or obligation to his family members in India and his sense of loyalty 
or obligation to the United States. In balancing all of the factors mentioned and 
considered above, I am satisfied Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is such that he 
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States interest. 
There is no risk to the national interest if Applicant has access to classified information. 
The mitigating conditions in AG ¶¶ 8(b) apply. Applicant has met his heavy burden to 
show that his family members who are citizens and residents of India do not cause a 
security concern. I conclude that Applicant has mitigated security concerns for foreign 
influence.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for access to 
sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I considered the information about 
Applicant’s job performance and his contributions to work performed for the U.S. 
military. The whole-person concept requires consideration of all available information 
about Applicant, not single items in isolation, to reach a determination concerning 
Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.  
 
Applicant has contact with family members and financial interests in India. 
However, Applicant established that he has such strong relationships and loyalties in 
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and to the United States that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in 
favor of the United States. While access to classified information is not based on a 
finding of loyalty to the United States, Applicant established his deep and abiding 
commitment to the protection of United States interests. Applicant and his wife and 
children are residents of the United States and solely United States citizens. He has 
performed quality work as an engineer for the U.S. military. These facts leave me 
without questions and doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for access to 
classified information. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has met the heavy 
burden of mitigating potential security concerns arising from family members in India. 
Applicant mitigated security concerns arising from foreign influence and access to 
classified information is granted. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:  FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.g:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for access to 
classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge