1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ADP Case No. 16-01251 ) Applicant for Public Trust Position ) Appearances For Government: Adrienne Driskill, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se __________ Decision __________ HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: Applicant did not present sufficient evidence of her efforts to resolve nine delinquent statement of reasons (SOR) debts totaling $25,481. Financial considerations trustworthiness concerns are not mitigated, and eligibility to occupy a public trust position is denied. Statement of the Case On May 6, 2015, Applicant signed an Electronic Questionnaire for National Security Position (SF 86). (Government Exhibit (GE) 1) On July 20, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued an SOR to Applicant, pursuant to DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended, and modified; DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program, dated January 1987, as amended (Regulation); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG), which became effective on September 1, 2006. The SOR alleges trustworthiness concerns under Guideline F (financial considerations). (Hearing Exhibit (HE) 2) The SOR detailed reasons why the DOD CAF was unable to find that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant or continue Applicant’s eligibility to occupy a public trust position, which entails 2 access to sensitive information. (HE 2)1 The DOD CAF recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether her access to sensitive information should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. (HE 2) Applicant provided an undated response to the SOR allegations, and she requested a hearing. (HE 3) On September 20, 2016, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On October 13, 2016, the case was assigned to me. On December 21, 2016, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals issued a hearing notice setting the hearing for January 17, 2017. (HE 1) The hearing was held as scheduled. At the hearing, the Government provided five exhibits; Applicant offered three exhibits; and all exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection. (Tr. 16-18; GE 1-5; Applicant Exhibits (AE) A-C) On January 24, 2017, I received a transcript of the hearing (Tr.). Findings of Fact2 Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1.f, 1.h, 1.k, 1.l, 1.m, 1.n, and 1.o. She also provided explanations and mitigating information. (HE 2) Her admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following additional findings of fact. Applicant is a 31-year-old employee of a contractor, and she has been employed by the same contractor in health care services for 10 years. (Tr. 5, 7-8, 19; GE 1) In 2003, she graduated from high school. (Tr. 6) She attended a vocational college for 18 months. (Tr. 6) In 2007, she married, and in 2016, her divorce was final. (Tr. 6-7) Her child is seven years old. (Tr. 7) She has not served in the U.S. Armed Forces. (Tr. 7) There is no evidence that she violated trustworthiness rules, committed any crimes, abused alcohol, or used illegal drugs. Financial Considerations Applicant’s delinquent debts are documented in her credit reports, SCA, OPM PSI, and SOR response. The status of the 17 delinquent debts alleged in the SOR is as follows. SOR ¶ 1.a alleges a debt arising from a repossessed vehicle for $11,196. Applicant admitted her responsibility for this debt. (Tr. 21-23; SOR response) Applicant was unsure when the vehicle was purchased and when it was repossessed. (Tr. 21-23) SOR ¶ 1.b alleges a student loan debt for $7,192 delinquent in the amount of $296. Applicant has one student loan. (Tr. 25-28) On January 16, 2017, the creditor indicated Applicant applied for forbearance on her student loan. (Tr. 25-28; AE C) 1The amount “$1,1565” in SOR ¶ 1.m was amended without objection to read “$1,156.” (Tr. 13- 14) 2The facts in this decision do not specifically describe employment, names of witnesses, names of other groups, or locations in order to protect Applicant and her family’s privacy. The cited sources contain more specific information. 3 SOR ¶ 1.c alleges a charged-off debt arising from a repossessed vehicle for $5,818. Applicant admitted her responsibility for this debt. (Tr. 28-29; SOR response) In 2016, the vehicle was voluntarily repossessed because she was behind on her payments. (Tr. 29) SOR ¶ 1.d alleges a collection debt for $4,807. Applicant denied responsibility for this debt. She did not see the debt on the report from the credit repair company, and she did not research the debt. (Tr. 30-31) The debt is not listed on her September 20, 2016 Equifax credit report. (GE 5) SOR ¶ 1.e alleges a utility collection debt for $918. Applicant did not believe the debt was valid because she did not have an account with the utility company. (Tr. 31) The debt is not listed on her September 20, 2016 Equifax credit report. (GE 5) SOR ¶ 1.f alleges a charged-off debt for $490. Applicant purchased items from a catalog for her home. (Tr. 32) She admitted responsibility for this debt. (Tr. 32; SOR response) She said she believed her husband was helping to pay for this debt. (Tr. 32) SOR ¶ 1.g alleges a collection debt for $420. Applicant said she did not know the basis for the debt. (Tr. 32-33) The debt is listed on her September 20, 2016 Equifax credit report. (GE 5) SOR ¶ 1.h alleges a charged-off debt for $258. Applicant purchased items from a catalog for her home. (Tr. 33) She admitted responsibility for the debt. (Tr. 33) She said she believed her husband was helping to pay for this debt. (Tr. 33) SOR ¶ 1.i alleges a telecommunications-collection debt for $128. Applicant said she had an account with the telecommunications company; however, she did not believe it went to collections. (Tr. 34) She has not contacted the creditor. (Tr. 34) SOR ¶ 1.j alleges a collection debt for $77. She admitted responsibility for this debt; however, she has not paid it. (Tr. 35) SOR ¶¶ 1.k, 1.l, and 1.m, allege three student loans placed for collection for $995, $3,010, and $1,156. Applicant said the student loans were combined and transferred. (Tr. 35-36) SOR ¶ 1.b is a duplication of these three debts. (Tr. 36) SOR ¶ 1.n alleges an apartment-collection debt for $4,457. Applicant said her husband stayed in the apartment after she left “and just let it go.” (Tr. 37) Her husband was living there without paying rent. (Tr. 37) She said her credit repair was able to get the account removed from her credit report. (Tr. 37) She did not explain why she believed she was not liable or responsible for the debt. (Tr. 37) SOR ¶ 1.o alleges a collection debt for $2,547. Applicant borrowed $2,600 to enable her husband to purchase a vehicle. (Tr. 38) He sold the vehicle and did not pay the loan. (Tr. 38) 4 SOR ¶¶ 1.p and 1.q allege two insurance-collection debts owed to the same creditor for $59 and $60. Applicant denied responsibility for these two debts because she was unfamiliar with the insurance company collecting the debt. (Tr. 39) These two debts are not listed on her September 20, 2016 Equifax credit report. (GE 5) Applicant did not take any action to contact the creditors on the SOR or resolve the SOR debts before February 2016. (Tr. 41) In February 2016, Applicant hired a credit repair company. (Tr. 40) Applicant wanted to wait to see if credit repair was successful at having the debts removed or had “fallen off” of her credit report. (Tr. 23, 34; AE A) If the debts were verified, she intends to arrange payment plans and pay them. (Tr. 24, 39) She checks with the credit repair company every six months for the status of her accounts and credit. (Tr. 24) She wanted to wait and see which debts were left on her credit report after one year. (Tr. 34) She did not make any payments to any SOR creditors. (Tr. 48) In a few months, she plans to start making payments to any SOR creditors that remain on her credit report. (Tr. 47) Applicant’s accounts became delinquent after her separation in 2011 or 2012 and divorce from her husband. (Tr. 41, 46) She and her husband separated and reconciled several times before their divorce was final. (Tr. 46) Applicant’s divorce documentation did not allocate responsibility for the family debts. (Tr. 20) She was unable to obtain child support from her former husband because he is unemployed. (Tr. 49) She did not receive financial counseling. (Tr. 41-42) She plans to marry in April 2017. (Tr. 42) She is current on one credit card. (Tr. 45) She has $43,000 in her 401(k) account. (Tr. 46) She received some performance and attendance awards from her employer. (Tr. 50) Overall she has received good performance evaluations. (Tr. 50-51) Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a [public trust position].” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). The Government’s authority to restrict access to classified information applies similarly in the protection of sensitive, unclassified information. As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security or other sensitive information and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information. See Id. at 527. Positions designated as ADP I and ADP II are classified as “sensitive positions.” Regulation ¶¶ C3.1.2.1.1.7, C3.1.2.2, and C3.1.2.1.2.3. “The standard that must be met for . . . assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the person’s loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that . . . assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” Regulation ¶ C6.1.1.1. Department of Defense contractor personnel are afforded the right to the procedures contained in the Directive before any final unfavorable access determination may be made. See Regulation ¶ C8.2.1. 5 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a public trust position, an administrative judge must consider the disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. A person who seeks access to sensitive information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to sensitive information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard sensitive information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of sensitive information. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant which may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to sensitive information. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s suitability for a public trust position. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his or her access to sensitive information].” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). The protection of national security and sensitive records is paramount. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to [sensitive] information will be resolved in favor of national security.” Analysis Financial Considerations AG ¶ 18 articulates the trustworthiness concern relating to financial problems: Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 6 unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect [sensitive] information. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. The Appeal Board explained the scope and rationale for the financial considerations trustworthiness concern as follows: This concern is broader than the possibility that an applicant might knowingly compromise classified information in order to raise money in satisfaction of his or her debts. Rather, it requires a Judge to examine the totality of an applicant’s financial history and circumstances. The Judge must consider pertinent evidence regarding the applicant’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting the national secrets as well as the vulnerabilities inherent in the circumstances. The Directive presumes a nexus between proven conduct under any of the Guidelines and an applicant’s [eligibility for a public trust position]. ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012) (citation omitted). AG ¶ 19 provides two disqualifying conditions that raise a trustworthiness concern and may be disqualifying in this case: “(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;” and “(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations.” Applicant’s SOR response, SCA, credit reports, and hearing record establish the disqualifying conditions in AG ¶¶ 19(a) and 19(c) requiring additional inquiry about the possible applicability of mitigating conditions. Five mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 20 are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; (c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; (d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and 7 (e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue. The Appeal Board concisely explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving the applicability of mitigating conditions as follows: Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s eligibility [for a public trust position], there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a [public trust position]. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government presents evidence raising [trustworthiness] concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The standard applicable in [public trust position] decisions is that articulated in Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to [sensitive] information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b). ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013). No mitigating conditions fully apply; however, Applicant presented some positive financial information. Her separation and divorce are circumstances beyond her control that adversely affected her finances. Applicant is credited with mitigating the debts in SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.k, 1.l, and 1.m because she contacted the student loan creditor and asked for a forbearance. She is credited with mitigating SOR ¶¶ 1.d, 1.e, 1.p, and 1.q because she denied responsibility for those four debts, and they are not listed on the most recent credit report of record, her September 20, 2016 Equifax credit report. Applicant did not establish her good faith in the resolution of her SOR debts.3 Applicant relied on a credit repair company to dispute the negative entries on her credit report. The Appeal Board’s position is “that some debts have dropped off his credit report is not meaningful evidence of debt resolution.” ISCR Case No. 14-05803 at 3 (App. Bd. July 7, 2016) (citing ISCR Case No. 14-03612 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 25, 2015)). Applicant admitted responsibility for nine delinquent SOR debts and having them 3The Appeal Board has previously explained what constitutes a “good faith” effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts: In order to qualify for application of [the “good faith” mitigating condition], an applicant must present evidence showing either a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or some other good-faith action aimed at resolving the applicant’s debts. The Directive does not define the term “good-faith.” However, the Board has indicated that the concept of good-faith “requires a showing that a person acts in a way that shows reasonableness, prudence, honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation.” Accordingly, an applicant must do more than merely show that he or she relied on a legally available option (such as bankruptcy) in order to claim the benefit of [the “good faith” mitigating condition]. (internal citation and footnote omitted) ISCR Case No. 02-30304 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2004) (quoting ISCR Case No. 99-9020 at 5-6 (App. Bd. June 4, 2001)). 8 dropped from her credit report through the actions of a credit repair company does not mitigate those debts under Guideline F. There is no documentary evidence that Applicant paid, arranged to pay, settled, compromised, or otherwise resolved several delinquent SOR accounts. She did not describe financial counseling or present a budget. The record lacks corroborating or substantiating documentation and detailed explanations of the causes for her financial problems and other mitigating information. There is insufficient evidence about why Applicant was unable to make greater documented progress resolving nine SOR debts. She did not make a sufficient effort to settle or investigate the status of nine SOR debts. There is not enough assurance that her financial problems are being resolved, are under control, and will not recur in the future. Under all the circumstances, she failed to establish that financial considerations trustworthiness concerns are mitigated. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a public trust position by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. The ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a public trust position must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. AG ¶ 2(c). I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under Guideline F, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is a 31-year-old employee of a contractor, and she has been employed by the same contractor in health care services for 10 years. She attended a vocational college for 18 months. In 2007, she married, and in 2016, her divorce was final. Her child is seven years old. There is no evidence that she violated trustworthiness rules, committed any crimes, abused alcohol, or used illegal drugs. Applicant presented some positive financial information. Her separation and divorce are circumstances beyond her control that adversely affected her finances. She mitigated the debts in SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.d, 1.e, 1.k, 1.l, 1.m, 1.p, and 1.q. 9 The negative financial information is more significant. The primary problem here is that Applicant owes nine delinquent SOR debts totaling $25,481. She did not remain in contact with the nine creditors. She received notice of the trustworthiness concerns when she received the SOR and should have contacted the creditors to obtain a definitive status of the debts and possibly take action to settle them. She did not provide any evidence that she contacted these SOR creditors. She did not provide enough evidence of efforts to clarify the status, resolve, settle, or mitigate nine SOR debts. It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s eligibility for a public trust position, there is a strong presumption against the grant or renewal of access to sensitive information. See Dorfmont, 913 F. 2d at 1401. Financial considerations trustworthiness concerns are not mitigated at this time. This decision should not be construed as a determination that Applicant cannot or will not attain the state of reform necessary for award of a public trust position in the future. With a track record of behavior consistent with her obligations, she may well be able to demonstrate persuasive evidence of her worthiness for a public trust position. I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Financial considerations trustworthiness concerns are not mitigated. Formal Findings Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant Subparagraphs 1.d and 1.e: For Applicant Subparagraphs 1.f through 1.j: Against Applicant Subparagraphs 1.k, 1.l, and 1.m: For Applicant Subparagraphs 1.n and 1.o: Against Applicant Subparagraphs 1.p and 1.q: For Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a public trust position. Eligibility for access to sensitive information is denied. _________________________ Mark Harvey Administrative Judge