1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-01295 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Nicole A. Smith, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se __________ Decision __________ HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: Applicant served honorably as a linguist in a dangerous environment for five years in support of U.S. Armed Forces. Three of his siblings are citizens and residents of Afghanistan, and they have applied to emigrate from Afghanistan to the United States. Applicant’s mother emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States in 2016. Applicant has substantial connections to the United States. Foreign influence security concerns are mitigated, and eligibility for access to classified information is granted. Statement of the Case On May 28, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86) or security clearance application (SCA). (Government Exhibit (GE) 1) On June 30, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued a statement of reasons (SOR) to Applicant, pursuant to Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended; and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG), which became effective on September 1, 2006. 2 The SOR alleged security concerns under Guideline B (foreign influence). The SOR recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether Applicant’s clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. (HE 2) On July 22, 2016, Applicant responded to the SOR. (HE 3) On October 13, 2016, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On November 17, 2016, the case was assigned to another administrative judge, and on January 10, 2017, the case was assigned to me. On January 24, 2017, Applicant requested an expedited hearing. (HE 6) On February 10, 2017, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing for February 13, 2017. Applicant waived his right to 15 days of notice of the date, time, and location of his hearing. (Tr. 14) Applicant’s hearing was held as scheduled. Department Counsel offered three exhibits and a request for administrative notice with supporting documents; Applicant offered six exhibits; and all exhibits were admitted without objection. (Tr. 17-21; GE 1-3; HE 5; AE A-F) On February 21, 2017, DOHA received the transcript. Procedural Ruling Department Counsel offered six exhibits for administrative notice concerning foreign influence security concerns raised by Applicant’s connections to Afghanistan. (HE 5; I-VI) Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n. 1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004) and McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1986)). Usually administrative notice at ISCR proceedings is accorded to facts that are either well known or from government reports. See Stein, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). Applicant did not object to me taking administrative notice of the proffered documents, and Department Counsel’s request is granted. The first three paragraphs and the last paragraph of the Afghanistan section are taken from U.S. State Department Background Notes, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/ sca/ci/af/. The other paragraphs are quoted from Department Counsel’s administrative notice request (bullet symbols and internal footnotes are omitted). (Tr. 44) Findings of Fact1 Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.e, and he provided explanations and mitigating information. (HE 3) His admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings of fact. Applicant is a 30-year-old linguist employed by a government contractor in Afghanistan. (Tr. 6) In 1986, he was born in Afghanistan, and in 2005, he graduated 1 The facts in this decision do not specifically describe employment, names of witnesses, names of other groups, or locations in order to protect Applicant and his family’s privacy. The cited sources contain more specific information. 3 from high school. (Tr. 7-8) From 2000 to 2009, he lived in Pakistan. (Tr. 8) In 2009, he returned to Afghanistan. (Tr. 8) In 2012, he emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States. (Tr. 8) When he first came to the United States, he was supported by his grandfather, who had lived in the United States since 1968, and his uncle, who has lived in the United States since 1996. (Tr. 25-26) Applicant attended college for two years, and he does not have a degree. (Tr. 7) In August 2013, he joined the Army National Guard. (Tr. 26) In 2014, he was naturalized as a U.S. citizen. (Tr. 8) He is in the Army Reserve. (Tr. 27) In April 2014, he returned to his linguist duties in Afghanistan. (Tr. 28) Applicant is engaged to be married, and his fiancée is a native-born U.S. citizen. (Tr. 22) When they met, she was serving as a linguist in Afghanistan. (Tr. 29) She is not a dual citizen, and none of her immediate family members live in foreign countries. (Tr. 22) SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.c allege Applicant’s mother, two sisters, and one brother are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. In March 2016, his mother emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States. (Tr. 29) His mother is a U.S. permanent resident, and she has a U.S. Social Security card. (Tr. 29-30; AE B) His mother inherited Applicant’s grandfather’s U.S. company and home. (Tr. 30) His sisters continue to live in Afghanistan; they do not work outside their homes; they are not married; and Applicant has contact with them about four times a year. (Tr. 31-32) His brother attends school in Afghanistan. (Tr. 34) When Applicant is in Afghanistan working as a linguist, he does not communicate with his family living in Afghanistan. (Tr. 33) His mother provides financial support for his sisters living in Afghanistan. (Tr. 32, 37) His three siblings have applied to emigrate from Afghanistan to the United States. (Tr. 41) SOR ¶¶ 1.d and 1.e allege Applicant sends funds monthly to family members in Afghanistan. From 2014 to February 2016, Applicant sent his mother and siblings in Afghanistan about $900 monthly. (Tr. 32-34; SOR response) SOR ¶ 1.f alleges he sent $20,000 to his mother in Afghanistan. Applicant purchased some land in Afghanistan. (SOR response) In 2012, he sold the land, and he gave his mother the $20,000 he received from the sale. (Tr. 35; SOR response) Applicant and his mother own a home together in the United States. (Tr. 39) Applicant has $25,000 in his U.S. savings account. (Tr. 39) He has about $50,000 invested in his uncle’s U.S. business. (Tr. 40) Applicant does not have any assets in Afghanistan. (Tr. 40) Applicant intends to live in the United States when he is not performing linguist duties in Afghanistan. (Tr. 40) Applicant served in support of U.S. Armed Forces for five years in Afghanistan mostly in field locations as a linguist. (Tr. 23) He took leave from Afghanistan to appear at his hearing, and he returned to Afghanistan shortly after his hearing. (HE 6) He served under dangerous combat conditions, and on one occasion, an improvised explosive device (IED) damaged his truck and injured an occupant. (Tr. 24) Militants, the Taliban, and terrorists have not threatened his family living in Afghanistan. (Tr. 25) Applicant has one misdemeanor charge of selling alcohol to a minor. There is no other evidence that Applicant has engaged in criminal activity, abused alcohol or illegal drugs, or committed any security violations. 4 Character Evidence An Army Special Forces captain lauded Applicant’s contributions to mission accomplishment in Afghanistan as a lead interpreter. (AE C) He recommended approval of Applicant’s security clearance. (AE C) Afghanistan Afghanistan is a country in Southwestern Asia that is approximately the size of Texas (249,935 square miles). Pakistan borders it on the east and the south. Iran borders it on the west and Russia to the north. It is a rugged and mountainous country which has been fought over by powerful nations for centuries. In 2009, the population was about 28 million people with about 3,000,000 Afghans living outside Afghanistan. Afghanistan is presently an Islamic Republic with a democratically elected president. Afghanistan has had a turbulent political history, including an invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979. After an accord was reached in 1989, and the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, fighting continued among the various ethnic, clan, and religious militias. By the end of 1998, the Taliban rose to power and controlled 90% of the country, imposing aggressive and repressive policies. In October 2001, U.S. forces and coalition partners led military operations in the country, forcing the Taliban out of power by November 2001. The new democratic government took power in 2004 after a popular election. A U.S. State Department Travel Warning remains in effect. The State Department warns U.S. citizens against travel to Afghanistan because of continued instability and threats by terrorist organizations against U.S. citizens. Travel to all areas of Afghanistan remains unsafe due to the ongoing risk of kidnapping, hostage-taking, military combat operations, landmines, banditry, armed rivalry between political and tribal groups, militant attacks, direct and indirect fire, suicide bombings and insurgent attacks, including attacks using vehicle-borne or other improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Attacks may also target official Afghan and U.S. governmental convoys and compounds, foreign embassies, military installations, and other public areas. Extremists associated with various Taliban networks, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan Province (ISKP) and members of other armed opposition groups are active throughout the country. ISKP has shown its operational capability, having attacked both Afghan and foreign government facilities. The Taliban and its affiliates routinely attack Afghan, Coalition, and U.S. targets with little regard for civilian casualties. Due to security concerns, unofficial travel to Afghanistan by U.S. government employees and their family members is restricted and requires prior approval from the State Department. 5 According to the State Department’s 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism, Afghanistan continued to experience aggressive and coordinated attacks by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network and other insurgent and terrorist groups. The Haqqani Network continued to plan and conduct high profile attacks and assassinations against U.S., Coalition and Afghan interests, particularly in Kabul and other key government centers. According to the State Department, the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan remains a safe haven for terrorists. It is an under-governed area that terrorists exploit to conduct attacks in both countries. Terrorist groups active in Afghanistan, such as al-Qa’ida (AQ), the Haqqani Network and others, operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K) is largely based in Afghanistan, but its support network also reaches into Pakistan's tribal areas along the border. The Afghan government has struggled to assert control over this remote terrain where the population is largely detached from national institutions. According to the U.S. Defense Department's June 2016 report on Afghanistan, although al-Qa’ida’s core leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region has been degraded, elements continue to seek safe haven on both sides of the border to regenerate and conduct attack planning. The continued development of an al-Qa’ida affiliate in the region (al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)), highlights the dynamic nature of the terrorist and militant landscape of the region, posing risks to the mission and to U.S. interests. The situation in Afghanistan remains precarious, and in July 2016, President Obama announced that he would keep 8,400 U.S. service members in Afghanistan through the end of his term, in January 2017. In its annual Human Rights Report for 2015, the U.S. Department of State reported that the most significant human rights problems in Afghanistan during the year were widespread violence, armed insurgent groups' attacks on civilians and killing of persons affiliated with government, torture and abuse of detainees by government forces; widespread disregard for the rule of law, and little accountability for those who conduct human rights abuses, as well as targeted violence and societal discrimination against women and girls. The United States’ extraordinary commitment to Afghanistan is balanced against the inherent dangers of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan to its citizens and residents and Afghan Government problems developing and complying with the rule of law. A top national security goal of the United States is to establish relationships, cooperation, training, and support of the Afghanistan Government and military in the ongoing war against terrorism. Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security 6 emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. See also Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), § 3.1. Thus, nothing in this Decision should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 7 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). Analysis Foreign Influence AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” stating: [I]f the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, [he or she] may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. AG ¶ 7 has three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case: (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and (d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Applicant has frequent contact2 with his siblings, who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. His frequent contacts are a manifestation of his care and concern for his relatives living in Afghanistan. Applicant lives with his mother when he is not deployed to Afghanistan, and she is a citizen of Afghanistan. His mother recently moved to the United States, and she a permanent resident of the United States. 2 The Appeal Board has concluded that contact every two months or more frequently constitutes “frequent contact” under AG ¶¶ 7 and 8. ISCR Case No. 14-05986 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Oct. 14, 2016). See also ISCR Case No. 04-09541 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Sep. 26, 2006) (finding contacts with applicant’s siblings once every four or five months not casual and infrequent). 8 There are widely documented safety issues for residents of Afghanistan because of terrorists and insurgents. Applicant has voluntarily shared in those dangers on behalf of the DOD for about five years, and he is willing to do so in the future. Numerous Afghan linguists, supporting U.S. forces, have family living in Afghanistan. Thousands of United States and coalition armed forces and civilian contractors serving in Afghanistan are targets of terrorists or the Taliban, along with Afghan civilians who support the Afghan Government and cooperate with coalition forces. The mere possession of close family ties with one or more family members living in Afghanistan is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B; however, if an applicant has a close relationship with even one relative living in a foreign country, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See Generally ISCR Case No. 03- 02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). There is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, their immediate family members. See generally ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 94 at *8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002). Applicant has ties of affection and obligation to his mother and siblings, and his siblings are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. His mother has connections to Afghanistan as three of her children reside in Afghanistan, and she is a citizen of Afghanistan. The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human-rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, the government ignores the rule of law including widely accepted civil liberties, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the government is engaged is counterinsurgency, terrorists cause a substantial amount of death or property damage, or the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against the United States. The relationship of Afghanistan with the United States, places a significant, but not insurmountable burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships with his family members living in Afghanistan do not pose a security risk. Applicant should not be placed into a position where he might be forced to choose between loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist a family member living in Afghanistan. Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). 9 While there is no evidence that intelligence operatives or terrorists from Afghanistan seek or have sought classified or economic information from or through Applicant or his family, nevertheless, it is not possible to rule out such a possibility in the future. International terrorist groups are known to conduct intelligence activities as effectively as capable state intelligence services, and Afghanistan has an enormous problem with terrorism. Applicant’s relationships with relatives living in Afghanistan create a potential conflict of interest because terrorists or the Taliban could place pressure on his family living in Afghanistan in an effort to cause Applicant to compromise classified information. When Applicant is not deployed to Afghanistan, he lives with his mother, who is an Afghan citizen. These relationships create “a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion” under AG ¶ 7(d). Department Counsel produced substantial evidence of Applicant’s contacts with family in Afghanistan and has raised the issue of potential foreign pressure or attempted exploitation. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(d) apply, and further inquiry is necessary about potential application of any mitigating conditions. AG ¶ 8 lists six conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns including: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation; (d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the cognizant security authority; (e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and (f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 10 AG ¶ 8(b) applies. Applicant has frequent contact with his siblings, who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s “deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” Applicant immigrated to the United States in 2012, and he became a U.S. citizen in 2014. His mother lives with Applicant in the United States. His fiancée lives in the United States, and she is a native-born U.S. citizen. Applicant’s years of support to the DOD in Afghanistan as a linguist and cultural advisor, including the dangers that service entailed, weigh heavily towards mitigating security concerns. Applicant is currently serving in Afghanistan providing critical assistance to U.S. Armed Forces in a dangerous combat environment. He has offered to continue to risk his life to support the United States’ goals in Afghanistan. He has shown his patriotism, loyalty, and fidelity to the United States during his five years of support to DOD while serving in Afghanistan. Applicant’s relationship with the United States must be weighed against the potential conflict of interest created by his relationships with relatives who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. Applicant’s siblings currently living in Afghanistan, like every other resident of Afghanistan, are at risk from terrorists and the Taliban. It is important to be mindful of the United States’ huge investment of manpower and money in Afghanistan, and Applicant has supported U.S. goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Applicant and his relatives living in Afghanistan are potential targets of terrorists and the Taliban, and Applicant’s potential access to classified information could theoretically add risk to his relatives living in Afghanistan from lawless elements in Afghanistan. In sum, Applicant’s connections to his relatives living in Afghanistan are less significant than his connections to the United States. His employment in support of the U.S. Government, family living in the United States, investments in the United States, performance of linguist duties in a combat zone, and U.S. citizenship are important factors weighing towards mitigation of security concerns. His connections to the United States taken together are sufficient to fully overcome the foreign influence security concerns under Guideline B. Foreign influence concerns under Guideline B are mitigated. Even if security concerns are not mitigated under Guideline B, they are mitigated under the whole-person concept, infra. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 11 individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant has frequent contact with his siblings, who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. His frequent contacts are a manifestation of his care and concern for his relatives living in Afghanistan. He provided some financial support to his siblings before his mother moved to the United States and assumed the role of providing financial support to them. Those relationships raise important foreign influence security concerns, and they must be balanced against his connections to the United States. His closest relative, his mother, lives with him in the United States. His fiancée is a native- born citizen and resident of the United States. His siblings have applied to emigrate from Afghanistan to the United States. Applicant immigrated to the United States in 2012, and he became a U.S. citizen as soon as eligible in 2014. When he became a U.S. citizen, he took an oath of allegiance to the United States. There is no evidence that Applicant has engaged in criminal activity, abused alcohol or illegal drugs, or committed any security violations, except for a misdemeanor charge of selling alcohol to a minor. Applicant served as a linguist, translator, linguist consultant, or cultural advisor for five years in Afghanistan. He worked for U.S. government contractors. Applicant provided a character reference from an Army Special Forces captain, who served closely with Applicant under combat conditions and dangerous circumstances. He positively described Applicant’s service in Afghanistan. He served in a U.S. designated combat zone, and he made contributions to the U.S. military at personal risk. He is willing to continue to serve in Afghanistan in support of U.S. Armed Forces as a linguist, risking his life as part of his duties on behalf of the U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan. He is fully aware of the risks to himself. All these circumstances increase the probability that Applicant will recognize, resist, and report any attempts by a foreign power, terrorist group, or insurgent group to coerce or exploit him. See ISCR Case No. 07-00034 at 2 (App. Bd. Feb. 5, 2008). His past honorable service as a linguist weighs heavily towards approval of his security clearance. A Guideline B decision concerning Afghanistan must take into consideration the geopolitical situation and dangers there.3 Afghanistan is a dangerous place because of violence from the Taliban and terrorists. The Taliban and terrorists continue to threaten 3 See ISCR Case No. 04-02630 at 3 (App. Bd. May 23, 2007) (remanding because of insufficient discussion of geopolitical situation and suggesting expansion of whole-person discussion). 12 the Afghan Government, the interests of the United States, U.S. Armed Forces, and those who cooperate and assist the United States. The Afghan Government does not fully comply with the rule of law or protect civil liberties in many instances. The United States and Afghan Governments are allies in the war on terrorism. I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude foreign influence concerns are mitigated, and eligibility for access to classified information is granted. Formal Findings Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.f: For Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. ____________________________ Mark Harvey Administrative Judge