1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-01486 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Robert J. Kilmartin, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se ___________ Decision ___________ Tuider, Robert J., Administrative Judge: Applicant failed to mitigate Guidelines E (personal conduct) and F (financial considerations) security concerns. Clearance is denied. History of the Case On February 17, 2015, Applicant completed a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86). On July 2, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) issued a statement of reasons (SOR) to Applicant pursuant to Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG), which became effective on September 1, 2006. The SOR detailed reasons why the DOD CAF did not find under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for him, and recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. Specifically, the SOR set forth security concerns arising under Guidelines E and F. On July 18, 2016, Applicant responded to the SOR. On August 15, 2016, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On September 26, 2016, the case was assigned to me. On November 7, 2016, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 2 (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing, setting the hearing for November 17, 2016. Applicant’s hearing was held as scheduled. During the hearing, Department Counsel offered 7 exhibits; Applicant offered 12 exhibits; and all exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection. (Transcript (Tr.) 12-14; GE 1-7; Applicant Exhibits (AE) A-L) On November 29, 2016, DOHA received a copy of the transcript of the hearing. Findings of Fact In Applicant’s SOR response, he admitted the SOR allegations in ¶¶ 1.b through 1.w. He also provided extenuating and mitigating information. Applicant’s admissions are accepted as findings of fact. Applicant is a 53-year-old employee of a defense contractor, who has worked as a field engineer for his current employer since October 2016. (Tr. 14-16; GE 1) In 1981, Applicant graduated from high school. (Tr. 6) In 1983, he received an associate’s degree in computer technology. (AE B) He has worked on an Air Force Base for various DOD contractors and held a security clearance for 28 years. (Tr. 15-16) In 1983, Applicant married, and in 1993, he divorced. (Tr. 17) In 1998, he married, and in 2010, he divorced. (Tr. 17) He has been living with a partner for the last three or four years. (Tr. 18) He has a 28-year-old daughter. (Tr. 18) He never served in the U.S. Armed Forces. (Tr. 19) Personal Conduct Applicant acknowledged that he committed the traffic violations and criminal offenses alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.b through 1.w as further described below. (SOR response) He said he timely paid his fines. (SOR response) SOR ¶ 1.a alleges Applicant was arrested in January 1982 and charged with felony grand theft. The charge was nolle prosequi and the case was dismissed. Applicant had no recollection of the facts relating to this arrest. (Tr. 40) SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.c, 1.k, and 1.o allege Applicant was cited for speeding in May 1994, July 1994, December 1996, and December 1999. SOR ¶ 1.d alleges Applicant was charged with battery and resist or obstruct officer without violence in October 1994. (GE 4) The case was nolle prosequi, and he received pretrial diversion. (GE 4) Applicant had a dispute with his domestic partner. (Tr. 42) He denied that he committed a battery. (Tr. 43) The SOR alleges Applicant was cited for the following traffic violations: ¶ 1.e for failure to stop/yield at intersection in February 1995; ¶ 1.f for a seatbelt violation in July 1995; ¶ 1.g for unlawful speed and careless driving in January 1996; ¶ 1.h for seatbelt violation and careless driving in March 1996; ¶ 1.j for improper parking-ridge, tunnel, 3 crosswalk in June 1996; ¶ 1.l for careless driving, financial responsibility violation, and misrepresentation of insurance; ¶ 1.m for careless driving in April 1997; ¶ 1.p for running a stop sign in May 2000; ¶ 1.r for an unspecified traffic infraction in July 2004; ¶ 1.u for unlawful speed and expired registration 1st offense in January 2011; . SOR ¶ 1.i alleges Applicant was charged with and found guilty of battery. Adjudication was withheld pending completion of court-ordered conditions. Applicant denied that he committed battery on his domestic partner. (Tr. 43) He completed anger- management counseling, and the charge was dismissed. (Tr. 43-44) SOR ¶ 1.n alleges Applicant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) and reckless driving. The DUI charge was nolle prosequi and adjudication was withheld on the reckless driving charge. (Tr. 44, 58) Applicant was in an accident and he said, “somebody had to be charged.” (Tr. 44) SOR ¶ 1.q alleges Applicant was charged with DUI, impeding traffic, failure to maintain lane, and reckless driving in July 2001. All of the charges were nolle prosequi, except he pleaded guilty to reckless driving in December 2005. (Tr. 45, 58) SOR ¶ 1.s alleges Applicant was charged with boating under the influence 1st offense, and restricted area violation in August 2006. He was convicted of reckless operation of a vessel in November 2006. (Tr. 45-46, 58) SOR ¶ 1.t alleges Applicant was convicted of DUI 1st Offense in November 2008. Applicant was drinking alcohol before driving his motorcycle; however, he believed there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt. (Tr. 47-48, 59) He contested the charge; however, he was convicted of DUI. (Tr. 47-48) SOR ¶ 1.v alleges Applicant was charged with reckless driving, DUI 2nd offense, DUI damage to property or person, and .015 or higher 1st offense in March 2014. (Tr. 49- 50) In October 2013, Applicant had an accident on his motorcycle, and he was injured. (Tr. 49-51, 59) Applicant was convicted of DUI 2nd Offense and reckless driving in December 2014. He received 20 hours of alcohol classes; he attended alcohol counseling; he paid his fine; and he successfully completed one year of probation. (Tr. 52-53, 66) In 2016, he received a business-purpose driver’s license. (Tr. 54) SOR ¶ 1.w alleges Applicant was convicted of driving while license suspended 1st offense in May 2014. (Tr. 60) Applicant had five alcohol-related interactions with the police. (Tr. 56-60) He has two alcohol-related convictions, both DUIs. He attends alcohol-related counseling once a month and Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or other substance abuse meetings once a week. (Tr. 62-63) He stated that he has not consumed alcohol since October 2013. (Tr. 55, 60) He has an alcohol-interlock device installed in his vehicle. (Tr. 62) He said he is a more responsible driver now. (Tr. 61) 4 Financial Considerations SOR ¶ 2.a alleges a charged-off home-equity bank debt for $50,513. (Tr. 23) The debt was charged off in 2012. (SOR response) Applicant received a loan modification on his mortgage in January 2015 under the Home Affordable Modification Program or HAMP. (Tr. 21, 24, 26) The delinquent interest and home equity loan were added into the principal of the loan. (Tr. 21, 24) His new mortgage is $275,000 and the new monthly payment is $400 less than before the loan modification. (Tr. 21) SOR ¶ 2.b alleges a bank-collection debt for $46,846. Applicant admitted the debt, and said he did not pay it. (Tr. 27) This debt was charged off in 2009. (SOR response) The debt was based on a line of credit, and was charged off and then dropped from his credit report. (Tr. 27, 33) SOR ¶¶ 2.c and 2.f allege two delinquent medical debts for $14,051 and $390. Applicant disputed his responsibility for the medical debts. (Tr. 20) The $14,051 debt resulted from a motorcycle accident. (Tr. 27) An insurance company may have paid the $14,051 medical debt, or it could have been charged off and dropped from his credit report. (Tr. 22, 27-28) The $390 debt is unresolved; however, Applicant is communicating with the creditor and his medical insurance company. (Tr. 30) SOR ¶¶ 2.d and 2.e allege two charged-off bank debts for $12,163 and $12,119 owed to the same bank. The creditor charged off the two debts in 2010. (SOR response) Applicant did not pay the two debts. (Tr. 29) The two debts no longer appear on Applicant’s credit report. (Tr. 28-29) SOR ¶ 2.g alleges a bank-collection debt for $10,452. In 2012, the debt was charged off. (Tr. 31; SOR response) Around August 2009, his divorce began, and in September 2010, his divorce was final. (Tr. 20) His financial problems began in August 2009. (Tr. 25) When Applicant realized he could not afford to keep the SOR debts in current status, he contacted the creditors and requested payment plans. (Tr. 19; SOR response) In 2011, Applicant took a two-week vacation to Europe. (Tr. 69) In 2014, Applicant received a civil settlement from an accident in December 2010. (GE 2 at 10) It is unclear how much of the civil settlement was required to resolve medical bills from the accident. All of the SOR creditors refused to renegotiate payments while the debts were current. (Tr. 19) His rental property went to foreclosure. (Tr. 20, 38) He was not aware of whether there was a deficiency on the foreclosure; however, he believed there was sufficient equity for the mortgage company to recover the mortgage. (Tr. 39) Applicant employed a financial attorney to resolve his debts. (Tr. 32) He could not explain what the attorney did to resolve his debts. (Tr. 36) He ended his relationship with the financial attorney around March 2015. (Tr. 38) He said all of his non-SOR debts are current. (Tr. 20) He provided a budget. (Tr. 21) He has a positive monthly remainder of $311. (AE E) His budget did not include any of the SOR debts in his list of debts. (AE E) 5 His credit score ranges from 717 to 793, which is good to excellent. (Tr. 22; AE C) He has paid all of his federal taxes, and he is a resident of a state with no income tax. (Tr. 56) Applicant’s employee performance evaluations showed excellent work, professionalism, and contributions to the mission of his employer. (AE F-AE J) In 2014, his employer lauded Applicant’s 25 years of experience working at the Air Force base and described him as an “integral part of the team” and a “key participant” in the mission. (AE L) Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, nothing should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 6 “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his or her security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). Analysis Personal Conduct AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. Two personal conduct disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 16 are potentially applicable. Those two disqualifying conditions provide: (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes but is not limited to consideration of: . . . (3) a pattern of . . . or rule violations; and (e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing. . . . AG ¶¶ 16(d) and 16(e) apply. Applicant violated rules when he committed more than 20 traffic offenses from 1982 to 2014. Two traffic offenses were misdemeanor DUIs. 7 Five offenses involving the police were alcohol related. When Applicant committed criminal offenses, he engaged in conduct which adversely affects his personal, professional, and community standing. Further analysis concerning applicability of mitigating conditions is required. Four mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17 are potentially applicable: (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; and (f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability. In ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013), the Appeal Board concisely explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving the applicability of mitigating conditions as follows: Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b). AG ¶ 17(e) provides some mitigation because Applicant has fully disclosed his offenses. Law enforcement, the courts, and security officials are well aware of his offenses, and he is not vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, or duress because of his offenses. Applicant is credited with mitigating SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.d. He denied the conduct alleged; he did not enter a guilty plea or no contest plea; and he was not found guilty or the charge was dismissed. None of the mitigating conditions fully apply. He has more than 20 traffic violations. In some instances, the police cited him for multiple violations in a single traffic stop. See 8 e.g., SOR ¶ 1.l. Some traffic offenses are minor, and some are serious. He has two DUI convictions. Each time he exceeded the speed limit, did not wear his seatbelt, drove recklessly, or violated driver’s license restrictions, and committed a DUI, he engaged in rule violations under the personal conduct guidelines. Those rule violations show Applicant’s questionable judgment, is untrustworthy and unreliable, and may not properly safeguard protected information. Personal conduct security concerns are not mitigated. Financial Considerations AG ¶ 18 articulates the security concern for financial problems: Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. The Appeal Board explained the scope and rationale for the financial considerations security concern as follows: This concern is broader than the possibility that an applicant might knowingly compromise classified information in order to raise money in satisfaction of his or her debts. Rather, it requires a Judge to examine the totality of an applicant’s financial history and circumstances. The Judge must consider pertinent evidence regarding the applicant’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting the national secrets as well as the vulnerabilities inherent in the circumstances. The Directive presumes a nexus between proven conduct under any of the Guidelines and an applicant’s security eligibility. ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012) (citation omitted). AG ¶ 19 provides two disqualifying conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case: “(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;” and “(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations.” Applicant’s history of delinquent debt is documented in his credit reports, SOR response, and hearing record. The Government established the disqualifying conditions in AG ¶¶ 19(a) and 19(c) requiring additional inquiry about the possible applicability of mitigating conditions. Five mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 20 are potentially applicable: 9 (a) the behavior happened so long ago,1 was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; (c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; (d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts;2 and (e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue. Applicant presented some important mitigating information. His divorce damaged his finances and constituted a circumstance beyond his control. He did not provide enough specifics about how these circumstances adversely affected his finances, and he did not show that he acted responsibly to address his delinquent SOR debts during the previous four years. Applicant currently has very good to excellent credit scores. He is credited with mitigating the debt in SOR ¶ 1.a for $50,513. This debt, including his delinquent interest, was included in his HAMP refinanced mortgage. 1A debt that became delinquent several years ago is still considered recent because “an applicant’s ongoing, unpaid debts evidence a continuing course of conduct and, therefore, can be viewed as recent for purposes of the Guideline F mitigating conditions.” ISCR Case No. 15-06532 at 3 (App. Bd. February 16, 2017) (citing ISCR Case No. 15-01690 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 13, 2016)). 2The Appeal Board has previously explained what constitutes a “good faith” effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts: In order to qualify for application of [the “good faith” mitigating condition], an applicant must present evidence showing either a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or some other good-faith action aimed at resolving the applicant’s debts. The Directive does not define the term “good-faith.” However, the Board has indicated that the concept of good-faith “requires a showing that a person acts in a way that shows reasonableness, prudence, honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation.” Accordingly, an applicant must do more than merely show that he or she relied on a legally available option (such as bankruptcy) in order to claim the benefit of [the “good faith” mitigating condition]. (internal citation and footnote omitted) ISCR Case No. 02-30304 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2004) (quoting ISCR Case No. 99-9020 at 5-6 (App. Bd. June 4, 2001)). 10 Applicant relies upon the absence of delinquent debts from his current credit report to mitigate security concerns. “[T]hat some debts have dropped off his credit report is not meaningful evidence of debt resolution.” ISCR Case No. 14-05803 at 3 (App. Bd. July 7, 2016) (citing ISCR Case No. 14-03612 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 25, 2015)). The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires removal of most negative financial items from a credit report seven years from the first date of delinquency or the debt becoming collection barred because of a state statute of limitations, whichever is longer.3 Debts may be dropped from a credit report upon dispute when creditors believe the debt is not going to be paid or when the debt has been charged off. Applicant did not provide enough details about what he did to address his SOR debts over the last five years. He did not provide sufficient documentation relating to six of his SOR debts: (1) proof of payments, such as checking account statements, photocopies of checks, or a letter from the creditor proving that he paid or made any payments to the creditors; (2) correspondence to or from the creditors to establish maintenance of contact;4 (3) credible debt disputes indicating he did not believe he was responsible for the debts and why he held such a belief; (4) more evidence of attempts to negotiate payment plans, such as settlement offers or agreements to show that he was attempting to resolve these debts; or (5) other evidence of progress or resolution. Applicant failed to establish mitigation under AG ¶ 20(e) because he did not provide documented proof to substantiate the existence, basis, or the result of any debt disputes. In sum, Applicant is not credited with mitigating six SOR debts totaling $96,021. The six SOR debts are not resolved because he did not provide sufficient documentation showing progress paying the debts, a reasonable dispute of any debts, or an inability to make monthly payments on address any of the six SOR debts. There is insufficient assurance that his financial problems are being resolved, are under control, and will not recur in the future. Under all the circumstances, he failed to establish mitigation of financial considerations security concerns. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 3Title 15 U.S.C. § 1681c. See Federal Trade Commission website, Summary of Fair Credit Reporting Act Updates at Section 605, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0111-fair-credit-reporting- act.pdf. 4“Even if Applicant’s financial difficulties initially arose, in whole or in part, due to circumstances outside his [or her] control, the Judge could still consider whether Applicant has since acted in a reasonable manner when dealing with those financial difficulties.” ISCR Case No. 05-11366 at 4 n.9 (App. Bd. Jan. 12, 2007) (citing ISCR Case No. 99-0462 at 4 (App. Bd. May 25, 2000); ISCR Case No. 99-0012 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 1, 1999); ISCR Case No. 03-13096 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 29, 2005)). A component is whether he or she maintained contact with creditors and attempted to negotiate partial payments to keep debts current. 11 (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines E and F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is a 53-year-old employee of a defense contractor, who has worked as a field engineer for his current employer since October 2016. In 1983, he received an associate’s degree in computer technology. He has worked on an Air Force Base for various DOD contractors and held a security clearance for 28 years. There is no evidence of security violations. Applicant’s employee performance evaluations showed excellent work, professionalism, and contributions to the mission of his employer. In 2014, his employer lauded Applicant’s 25 years of experience working at the Air Force base and described him as an “integral part of the team” and a “key participant” in the mission. Applicant provided some important positive financial information. His divorce in 2010 adversely affected his finances. His divorce is a circumstance beyond his control. He received financial assistance from an attorney, and he generated a budget. His current credit score is very good to excellent. The negative financial information is more persuasive. Applicant provided insufficient corroborating or substantiating documentary evidence of payments and established payment plans for his SOR debts. After crediting Applicant with mitigating the debt in SOR ¶ 1.a through HAMP refinancing, six delinquent debts totaling $96,021 remain to be resolved. He did not provide any evidence of any payments to address the six SOR debts. His actions show lack of financial responsibility and judgment and raise unmitigated questions about Applicant’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. See AG ¶ 18. More information about inability to pay debts, financial history, and especially documented financial progress is necessary to mitigate security concerns. The personal conduct factors weighing against continuation of his security clearance are more substantial than the mitigating circumstances. From 1982 to 2014, Applicant committed more than 20 traffic offenses, including two DUIs, which are misdemeanor-level criminal offenses. Although he completed alcohol-related classes and counseling, he still has an alcohol-interlock device on his vehicle. 12 It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or renewal of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990). Unmitigated security concerns lead me to conclude that grant of a security clearance to Applicant is not warranted at this time. This decision should not be construed as a determination that Applicant cannot or will not attain the state of reform necessary for award of a security clearance in the future. With a track record of behavior consistent with his obligations, he may well be able to demonstrate persuasive evidence of his security clearance worthiness. I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Personal conduct and financial considerations security concerns are not mitigated. It is not clearly consistent with the national interest to reinstate Applicant’s security clearance eligibility at this time. Formal Findings Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c: Against Applicant Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant Subparagraphs 1.e through 1.h: Against Applicant Subparagraph 1.i: For Applicant Subparagraphs 1.j through 1.w: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant Subparagraphs 2.b through 2.g: Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. _________________________ Robert J. Tuider Administrative Judge