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                            DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE                                                  
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS                               
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 16-01733 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se  
 
 
 
 
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Decision 
______________ 
 
 
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising from his family 
connections in Iraq. Based upon a review of the record as a whole, eligibility for access 
to classified information is denied. 
 
History of Case 
 
On April 21, 2015, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On May 27, 2016, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The 
action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, 
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as 
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines effective within the DoD for SORs 
issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 
 
 
 
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 Applicant answered the SOR in writing on September 18, 2016, and requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge. An attorney from the Edmunds Law Firm 
represented Applicant in connection with the preparation and submission of his Answer, 
but was not retained to represent him during the hearing. (Answer; Tr. 5-7.) The 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) assigned the case to me on 
November 17, 2016. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on November 17, 2016, setting 
the hearing for December 7, 2016. On that date, Department Counsel offered 
Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2 into evidence. Applicant testified and offered Exhibits 
(AE) A through L into evidence. All exhibits were admitted without objection. I also took 
administrative notice of the facts set forth in the Government’s Request for 
Administrative Notice, which was marked AN I and included in the record. DOHA 
received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on December 20, 2016.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted, in whole or in part, the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.f, 
and denied the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.g because he had not received the Government’s 
file that supported that allegation. (Answer.) During the hearing, he testified that he and 
his family were threatened multiple times due to his work as a translator with the U.S. 
military in Iraq, as alleged in SOR ¶ 1.g, but he thought that fact should be favorable to 
him rather than a basis for security concerns. (Tr. 56-66.) Applicant’s admissions are 
incorporated in the findings below.  
 
 Applicant is 45 years old. He was born in Iraq. He attended high school and 
college there. He served in the Iraqi army from December 1990 to May 1995, according 
to his certified disclosures in GE 1 and GE 2. He testified that his service was 
compulsory and ended in May 1994, rather than 1995. (Tr. 67-69.) From May 2003 to 
September 2005, Applicant worked as a local-hire linguist supporting U.S. Army 
operations in Iraq. He earned an Army Achievement Medal for his service, and was 
wounded by shrapnel during one operation. He left that job after receiving threats 
against his family, and worked as a district sales manager for an Iraqi 
telecommunications company until July 2007, when he received new death threats as a 
result of his previous work as a linguist. He then fled to Jordan with his wife and 
children, and was granted refugee status to enter the United States in January 2008. He 
became a naturalized U.S. citizen in February 2013. (GE 1; GE 2; Answer; Tr. 56-61.) 
 
 Applicant’s wife was born in Iraq. She is also a naturalized U.S. citizen. They 
were married in Iraq in 2003. They have two children, ages 11 and 9, who were born in 
Iraq and are naturalized U.S. citizens. Applicant, his wife, and their children also 
maintain their dual Iraqi citizenships. (GE 1; GE 2; Answer; Tr. 70-71.)  
  
 Both of Applicant’s parents, his brother, and his father-in-law are citizens and 
residents of Iraq. All four of them were career employees of civilian branches of the Iraqi 
national government, and are now retired and receiving pensions. His father was a 
director of a ministry when he retired. Applicant and his family traveled to Iraq to visit his 
parents in 2014, and they maintain contact on a monthly basis. Applicant also traveled 
 
 
 
 
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to Iraq for five days in 2016 when his father was hospitalized. Applicant’s mother-in-law 
passed away in 2013. (GE 1; GE 2; Answer; Tr. 71-75, 79-80.) 
 
 Applicant has two brothers-in-law, who were soldiers in the Iraqi army as recently 
as 2015. One of them has since left the army to complete his academic studies. The 
other remains in the army. Although he reported having contact with both of them and 
his father-in-law every six to eight months in 2015, he said in his Answer that he had not 
communicated with them since 2007. Applicant testified that, as a result of a family 
issue that arose before he left Iraq, he no longer spoke with his father-in-law or 
brothers-in-law. However, his wife remains in contact with her family. (GE 2; Answer; Tr. 
74-75, 77-78.)  
 
 Since Applicant’s parents were both working full time during his childhood, he 
was mainly raised in his grandmother’s home together with an uncle who was just two 
years older. (Tr. 75-76.) That uncle is currently an officer serving on active duty in the 
Iraqi army. In April 2015, Applicant reported having contact with this uncle every four to 
five months. (GE 2.) In his Answer, Applicant explained that his uncle was recognized 
for bravery in combat operations with U.S. forces, but said that he had chosen to cut off 
all contact with the uncle when he began working as a linguist in 2003. (Answer at 3 and 
Exh. C.) During hearing testimony, Applicant said that he had stopped regular 
communications with his uncle when he came to the United States in 2008, but was in 
contact every five or six months to check on his grandmother who is almost 90 years 
old. (Tr. 75-77.) 
 
 Since arriving in the United States, Applicant has held various employment 
positions, in addition to experiencing periods of unemployment. He has worked as a 
cashier, a contracted role player and language instructor conducting training for U.S. 
Army personnel, and a security officer. He tried to enlist in the U.S. Army through a 
special translator/interpreter program several times from 2009 through 2013, but was 
unsuccessful.  Most recently, he was employed as a contract linguist supporting a U.S. 
Army training unit in Jordan from March 2015 to October 2016, when he resigned for 
personal reasons. (Answer; GE 1; GE 2; AE A through AE L; Tr. 80-81.)  
  
 Applicant submitted numerous awards, recommendation letters, and certificates 
of appreciation, attesting to his capabilities and contributions as an interpreter and 
translator. Several officers with whom he has served stated that Applicant’s language 
skills, and his knowledge of Iraq and its culture, were an invaluable asset to their 
mission accomplishment. These officers consider him responsible and trustworthy. 
(Answer; AE B through AE L.)   
 
Iraq 
I have taken administrative notice of facts contained in U.S. Government 
pronouncements concerning the state of Iraq, as outlined in AN I, including the 
following: Iraq faces many challenges fueled by sectarian and ethnic divisions. 
Numerous terrorist groups are increasingly active throughout Iraq. The Islamic State of 
 
 
 
 
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Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Islamic State) control some of the country’s territory. 
Threats of kidnapping and violence are high, and the Department of State warns U.S. 
citizens that all but essential travel to Iraq should be avoided. Additionally, human-rights 
related problems including disappearances, torture, denial of fair public trial, and limits 
on freedom of speech and expression have been noted. (AN I.) 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶¶ 
2(b) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
According to Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to 
establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an 
“applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, 
extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, 
and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance 
decision.”  
 
A person who applies for access to classified information seeks to enter into a 
fiduciary relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
 
 
 
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Section 7 of EO 10865 provides, “Any determination under this order adverse to 
an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no 
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 
12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive 
information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
The security concerns relating to the guideline for foreign influence are set out in 
AG & 6:       
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign county in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 describes three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or duress. 
 
The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, 
as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in 
a foreign country and an applicant has contacts with that relative, that factor alone is 
sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the 
 
 
 
 
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compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 
15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
Applicant has ongoing, close, and commendable familial connections with his 
mother, father, and brother, who are residents and citizens of Iraq. His in-laws are also 
citizens and residents of Iraq, and his wife maintains family connections with them. 
Applicant’s uncle, with whom he was raised, is an officer in the Iraqi army and they 
maintain contact in connection with Applicant’s continuing affinity for the elderly 
grandmother who raised them. These relationships create a heightened risk of foreign 
pressure or attempted exploitation because terrorists in Iraq have already threatened 
Applicant and his family on numerous occasions, and may seek intelligence or engage 
in behaviors that are hostile to the United States’ interests. Applicant’s relationship with 
his relatives also creates a potential conflict of interest between Applicant’s “obligation 
to protect sensitive information or technology and [his] desire to help” family members 
living in Iraq. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.  
  
  After the Government produced substantial evidence of those disqualifying 
conditions, the burden shifted to Applicant to rebut and prove mitigation. Three 
mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable to the disqualifying 
conditions based on the facts: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.;   
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
Applicant and his wife have ongoing family relationships with their parents and 
siblings, his grandmother, and his uncle in Iraq, all of whom are current or retired 
employees of the Iraqi national government. Without disclosing unnecessary details, 
Applicant and his family have been threatened in the past due to his activities 
supporting U.S. interests, and he was forced to flee the country in 2007 with his wife 
and children due to renewed threats. Although Applicant provided brave and honorable 
support for U.S. operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2005, he chose to terminate that 
service due to threats and remains concerned for his family members’ safety should his 
 
 
 
 
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renewed cooperation with U.S. forces become known. He is a loyal and dedicated U.S. 
citizen, but the heightened risk and potential for conflict of interest situations created by 
his family circumstances remain unmitigated under any of these conditions.   
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The Guideline B security concerns do 
not arise from any questionable conduct by Applicant, but rather circumstances that are 
normal and commendable results of his family situation. First, there are significant risks 
of terrorism and various human rights abuses in Iraq, as personally experienced by 
Applicant and his family. More importantly for security purposes, terrorists in Iraq are 
hostile to the United States and actively seek classified information. Terrorists, and even 
allied actors, could attempt to use Applicant’s family to obtain such information. Second, 
Applicant had numerous connections to Iraq before he immigrated to the United States 
in 2008. Following his birth, he spent his formative years there, amongst family and 
friends, including his uncle and grandmother. Third, he and his wife maintain regular 
contact with family members in Iraq.  
 
There is mitigating evidence weighing in favor of granting Applicant a security 
clearance. Applicant is a mature person, who has lived in the United States for eight 
years, and has been a naturalized citizen since 2013. His spouse is a naturalized U.S. 
citizen, as are his two children. In his recent employment, and from 2003 to 2005, he 
provided vital and direct support to the U.S. armed forces as a linguist. There is no 
evidence that he has ever taken any action that could cause potential harm to the 
United States. He takes his loyalty to the United States seriously. His former 
supervisors assess him as loyal, trustworthy, and responsible. There is no derogatory 
information about him in the record.  
 
 
 
 
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After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all facts and 
circumstances in the context of the whole-person, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate 
the significant security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. Overall, the record 
evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability 
for a security clearance. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access 
to classified information must be resolved in favor of the national security.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.g:   Against Applicant 
   
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a 
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
                                        
         
 
DAVID M. WHITE 
Administrative Judge