KEYWORD: Guideline G; Guideline E; Guideline F
DIGEST: Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the
Judge did not correctly weigh the evidence. Applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that the
Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 15-02659.a1
DATE: 04/28/2017
DATE: April 28, 2017
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 15-02659
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense(DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On
January 15, 2016, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision—security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption), Guideline E
(Personal Conduct), and Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of Defense Directive
5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On February 14,
2017, after the hearing, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge
Edward W. Loughran denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed
pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.1
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision is
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge
did not correctly weigh the evidence.  Specifically, he argues that he is not alcohol dependent
because he has had no alcohol-related incidents for over seven years.  He also argues that the Judge
did not give him sufficient credit for the fact that he has served his country for over 17 years in the
aerospace industry, has never been late for work, has never been reprimanded for misconduct, and
has never showed any form of inability to perform his duties.  Appeal Brief at 1.  Applicant’s
arguments do not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. 
The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a
favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as
a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice
versa. A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for
a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 14-01918 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 8, 2015).
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a long history of excessive alcohol
consumption that included three driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) convictions between
1999 and 2009.  Some of the incidents involved associated charges such as driving on a suspended
license or hit-and-run.  Applicant received alcohol treatment in 2007 and 2008, and was diagnosed
as alcohol dependent.  Decision at 2.  In reaching his adverse decision, the Judge considered
Applicant’s evidence “attesting to his strong moral character, excellent job performance, expertise,
work ethic, responsibility, and trustworthiness” and the fact that “his last DUI was more than 9 years
ago.”  Id. at 3 and 5.  However, he noted that Applicant had “exhibited extremely poor judgment on
multiple occasions” and that he “currently drinks about two to three beers, four nights a week, and
about six to eight beers on the weekend” despite a prior alcohol-dependence diagnosis. Id. at 5.  As
a result he concluded that Applicant’s alcohol-related conduct “continued to cast doubt on his
reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment” and that there were “no mitigating conditions
sufficiently applicable to dispel security concerns about Applicant’s alcohol use.”  Id.
 
In light of the foregoing, the Judge could reasonably conclude that Applicant’s history of
alcohol abuse still presented a security concern and that Applicant had not met his burden of
persuasion as to mitigation.   See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 09-02566 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Nov. 12, 2010). 
The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the length and seriousness
of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant conditions and
factors. Decision at 4-7.  He found in favor of Applicant under Guideline F and as to several of the
SOR factual allegations under Guidelines G and E.  However, he reasonably explained why the
mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns.  Id.  The
1The Judge’s favorable finding under Guideline F is not at issue on appeal.
Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the
Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision.  “The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  See also
Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b): “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.”  Therefore, the Judge’s
unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan               
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy                        
James F. Duffy
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields                    
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board