DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX )       ISCR Case No.14-02792
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Jr., Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  Applicant’s clearance is granted.1
On 28 July 2014, the Department of Defense (DoD) sent Applicant a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) raising security concerns under Guideline C, Foreign Preference,
and Guideline B, Foreign Influence.  Applicant timely answered the SOR, requesting a2
Consisting of the FORM, Items 1-5 and Official Notice (ON) items I-VIII. Sua sponte, I took official notice of1
the 2016 State Department Fact Sheet on U.S. Relations with Hong Kong (ON IX) and the 2016 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices–Hong Kong (ON X), as well as Chinese and British citizenship laws in
effect during the dates encompassed by this case.
DoD acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20,2
1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD on
1 September 2006. On 10 December 2016, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) signed Security
Executive Agent Directive 4, implementing new AG, effective with any decision issued on or after 8 June 2017.
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decision without hearing by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). The
record in this case closed 30 July 2016, when Applicant’s response to the FORM was
due. Applicant provided no additional documents. DOHA assigned the case to me 1
June 2017.
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the Guideline C allegations. She admitted the Guideline B
allegations, except for SOR 2.f. She is a 55-year-old engineering technician employed
by a defense contractor since October 1988. She has not previously held a security
clearance.
Applicant’s father was born in February 1918, and her mother born in November
1920, in the Republic of China (ROC)(1912-1949). Their oldest son was born in the
ROC in January 1943. They had a second son, born in November 1949, just after the
formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)(October 1949). A third son was born
in the PRC in 1953. Sometime between November 1953 and January 1955, Applicant’s
parents moved to Hong Kong, then a Crown colony of the United Kingdom. Their first
daughter was born in January 1955, in Hong Kong. Applicant was born in Hong Kong in
February 1961. 
Applicant and her sister were born subjects of the British Crown, which conferred
Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) status. Both held this status until
January 1983, when a new British nationality act reclassified them as British Dependent
Territory Citizens (BTDC). Applicant immigrated to the United States (U.S.) in
December 1985, along with her husband, whom she had married in Hong Kong in
October 1984. Hong Kong, however, had become a Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of the PRC in July 1997. Applicant listed herself as a dual citizen of Hong Kong in
her October 2013 clearance application, reported that she had a Hong Kong passport,3
and she disclosed that she retained a Hong Kong identification card (Item 4).
Nevertheless, it is unclear if she retains her U.K. citizenship.
Applicant and her husband immigrated to the U.S. in December 1985, when she
was 24 years old. As required by U.S. immigration law, she retained a valid Hong Kong
passport until her naturalization as a U.S. citizen in May 2010.  She obtained her U.S.4
passport at the same time. Applicant and her husband have two U.S.-born children: a
Because Applicant listed her foreign passport on her clearance application as being from Hong Kong, I will3
refer to it as such for convenience. However, the actual documents in play are not clear. When Applicant
immigrated to the U.S. in December 1985, she would have done so on U.K.-issued documents. Any required
renewals of those documents would have been U.K.-issued documents. After July 1997, unless she had taken
steps to preserve any U.K. citizenship rights she possessed, any required renewals would have been issued
by the Government of Hong Kong, technically a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK-SAR)
passport. Presumably, this is what she renewed in Februay 2012.
Presumably, her husband did the same, although his naturalization date does not appear in the record.4
2
daughter born in May 1987 and a son born in September 1992. She and her husband
live in a house they have owned since November 1988.
Applicant’s parents are both deceased.  Applicant’s next older brother lives with5
her permanently in the U.S. Her two oldest brothers are retired and live in the PRC. In
1993, she tried to sponsor them to immigrate to the U.S., but was unsuccessful. Her
sister lives in Hong Kong. Applicant has contact with her siblings about twice a year.
Applicant has no financial or business interests in the PRC or Hong Kong.
After Applicant obtained U.S. citizenship, she was no longer required to maintain
her Hong Kong passport and identity card, which were due to expire. However, she
renewed both in February 2012 (SOR 1.a) to take advantage of a Hong Kong
Government incentive program for renewing her Hong Kong passport, which paid her
about $773 in July 2012 (SOR 1.b)(Item 5).  She spent that money on a December6
2012-January 2013 trip to Hong Kong. She used her U.S. passport to travel to Hong
Kong, but used her Hong Kong identity documents to enter Hong Kong because the
immigration line for Hong Kong citizens was much shorter than the immigration line for
foreign nationals.
During her subject interview, Applicant expressed a willingness to renounce her
Hong Kong citizenship to preserve her job and obtain her clearance. She similarly
expressed a willingness to surrender her Hong Kong passport and identity card to keep
her job.
The PRC
The PRC is a large and economically powerful country, with a population of over
a billion people. The PRC has an authoritarian government, dominated by the Chinese
Communist Party. The PRC has a poor record with respect to human rights, suppresses
political dissent, and its practices include arbitrary arrest and detention, forced
confessions, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners. The PRC engages in espionage
against the United States and is one of the two most active collectors of U.S. economic
intelligence and technology. The PRC’s intelligence services, as well as private
companies and other entities, frequently seek to exploit Chinese citizens or persons
with family ties to China who can use their insider access to corporate networks to steal
state secrets.
Applicant’s mother had died by the time of Applicant’s August 2014 Answer to the SOR (Item 2). She had5
Alzheimer’s Disease. At the time of her death, Applicant had been sending her $200-300 per year in financial
support.
Although Applicant’s December 2013 personal subject interview described this transaction in terms of6
renewing her Hong Kong citizenship, there is nothing in the record that indicates that renewing her passport
was necessary for her to retain her Hong Kong citizenship. Certainly, she maintained her dual citizenship,
which is not prohibited by U.S. law, and renewing her passport and identity card are exercises of dual
citizenship.
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Hong Kong
Hong Kong has been a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC since 1
July 1997, ending over 150 years of British colonial rule. Hong Kong has a high degree
of autonomy, except in the areas of defense and foreign policy, which are the
responsibility of the PRC. The Hong Kong SAR is headed by a Chief Executive voted on
by an Election Committee made up of approximately 800 Hong Kong residents from
four constituency groups, including the PRC’s National People’s Congress. While Hong
Kong remains a free and open society where human rights are respected, courts are
independent, and there is a well-established respect for the rule of law, concerns
include the limited ability of residents to change their government, limitations on
freedom of the press and expression, academic freedom, arbitrary arrest and detention,
aggressive police tactics hampering freedom of assembly, trafficking in persons, and
societal prejudice against certain ethnic minorities.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors to be used to evaluate an applicant’s
suitability for a security clearance. Administrative judges must assess both disqualifying
and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and circumstances
presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense
consideration of the factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). The presence or absence of a
disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself, conclusive. However, specific
adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case can be measured against
them, as they represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guidelines are Guideline C (Foreign Preference) and Guideline
B (Foreign Influence).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does,
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgment,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the Government.7
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).7
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Analysis
The Government failed to established a case for disqualification under Guideline
C. The conduct which justified invocation of the September 2006 guidelines has been
overtaken by the June 2017 guidelines. The focus of the new Guideline C is foreign
involvement that raises concerns about an individual’s judgment, reliability, and
trustworthiness when it conflicts with national interests or when an individual tries to
conceal it.8
By itself, the fact that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of
another country is not disqualifying without an objective
showing of such conflict or attempt at concealment. The
same is true for a U.S. citizens exercise of any right or
privilege of foreign citizenship and any action to acquire or
obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship.9
Applicant’s conduct implicates none of the new disqualifying conditions. She did
not apply for or acquire a foreign citizenship.  She fully disclosed her possession of a10
foreign passport and identity card, both on her clearance application and during her
personal subject interview.  She also reported all her foreign family connections. She11
used her U.S. passport when exiting and entering the U.S.  She did not assume or12
attempt to assume any formal position with the Hong Kong Government, nor did she
otherwise act to serve any foreign interests in a way that conflicts with national security
interests.  She did not use her foreign citizenship to protect financial or business13
interests in another country in violation of U.S. law.   Finally, she has committed no act14
of expatriation from the U.S.,15
However, the mitigating conditions still provide support for Applicant. Several
conditions would not apply. Her foreign citizenship potentially conflicts with national
security interests, given the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and the PRC,16
AG ¶ 9.8
AG ¶ 9.9
AG ¶ 10(a).10
AG ¶ 10(b).11
AG ¶ 10©.12
AG ¶ 10(d).13
AG ¶ 10(e).14
AG ¶ 10(f).15
AG ¶ 11(a).16
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and her exercise of her foreign citizenship occurred after she became a U.S. citizen.17
Moreover, the foreign country involved does not pose a low national security risk.18
Nevertheless, her dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship and her
birth in a foreign country, and the actions taken—renewal of her foreign passport and
identity card to claim a token incentive payment—do not evince a foreign preference,
particularly given her more than 30-year residence in the U.S. and her nearly-30-year
employment with the same employer.  Furthermore, she has stated a willingness to19
renounce her foreign citizenship.  Finally, the exercise of the entitlements or benefits of20
foreign citizenship do not present a national security concern.  The two remaining21
mitigating conditions are inapplicable on their face. I resolve Guideline C for Applicant.
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected22
information requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and
ability to target protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to
obtain that information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative
or positive. More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or
other foreign entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion.  In addition, security concerns may be raised by a substantial business,23
financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-
operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign
influence or exploitation.24
AG ¶ 11(d).17
AG ¶ 11(f).18
AG ¶ 11(b).19
AG ¶ 11(c).20
AG ¶ 11(e).21
AG, ¶6.22
AG, ¶ 7(a).23
AG, ¶ 7(e).24
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In this case, the Government established that Applicant’s contacts with her family
in the PRC and Hong Kong created a potential heightened risk of exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Although the U.S. and the PRC are
global competitors, and the PRC is an active collector of protected U.S. information and
commercial information, Applicant is not situated in a position where she is likely to be
pressured. Given that Hong Kong generally respects the human rights of its citizens, the
risk that it might seek protected information—or succeed in obtaining such
information—from Applicant is low, if not non-existent.
The Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline B by
demonstrating that her two retired brothers are resident citizens of the PRC (SOR 2.c,)
and her sister is a resident citizen of Hong Kong, which also puts her within the reach of
the PRC. However, Applicant mitigated the security concerns.
Applicant’s husband is a resident citizen of the U.S., beyond the reach of the
PRC notwithstanding his dual citizenship (SOR 2.a). Similarly, Applicant’s next older
brother is permanently resident in the U.S. (SOR1.d), also beyond the reach of the
PRC. Applicant’s mother died before Applicant answered the SOR (SOR 2.b). There is
nothing in Applicant’s 1993 sponsorship of her two oldest brothers—nearly 25 years
ago—to raise any security concerns (SOR 2.f). What remains are Applicant’s infrequent
contacts with her siblings in the PRC and Hong Kong.
Examining Applicant’s circumstances, the Government’s evidence that there was
a potential heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion because of Applicant’s contacts with family in the PRC and Hong Kong has
been overwhelmed by Applicant’s connections to the U.S. Applicant has resided in the
U.S. more than 30 years—more than half of her life—including all of her professional
life. She has no financial interests in the PRC or Hong Kong. She has worked for the
same company nearly 30 years, and has lived in the same home nearly 30 years. She
has two adult children who possess only U.S. citizenship. Her financial interests are all
in the U.S. She reported all her foreign connections as required. Her contacts with her
siblings are routine, and infrequent. There is nothing in the circumstances of their being
in the PRC or Hong Kong, or in Applicant’s contacts with them, to heighten the risk that
she could be impelled or compelled to provide protected information to the PRC or
Hong Kong.  I find Guideline B for Applicant.25
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-b: For Applicant
AG, ¶ 8(a), 8(b), 8(e)25
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Paragraph 2. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-f: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted. 
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge
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