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                                                             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE                                                        
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No.15-06107 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
Appearances 
 
For the Government: Alison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Eric Eisen, Esq.  
______________ 
 
 
Decision 
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CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
 Based on a review of the case file, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant provided adequate information to mitigate the security concerns for foreign 
influence under Guideline B. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On August 25, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to obtain a security clearance for her employment 
with a defense contractor. The Department of Defense (DOD) could not make the 
affirmative findings required to issue a security clearance. On March 26, 2016, DOD 
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under 
foreign influence under Guideline B and foreign preference under Guideline C. The 
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information 
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense 
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as 
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the DOD on 
September 1, 2006. 
 
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Applicant answered the SOR on May 1, 2016. She denied the allegation of 
possessing a foreign passport under SOR 1.a since the passport was destroyed.1 She 
denied SOR allegation 2.a concerning her mother being a resident and citizen of India 
since her mother had passed away.2 She admitted the other four allegations under 
Guideline B. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on August 12, 2016. The 
case was assigned to another administrative judge on February 13, 2017. DOD issued 
a notice of hearing on March 2, 2017, for a hearing on March 29, 2017. The other 
administrative judge was not available to hear the case as scheduled, and I was 
assigned the case on March 28, 2017. I convened the case as originally scheduled. The 
Government offered two exhibits that I marked and admitted into the record without 
objection as Government Exhibits (GX) 1 and 2. Applicant testified and offered two 
exhibits that I marked and admitted into the record without objection as Applicant 
Exhibits (AX) A and B. AX B consisted of six letters of recommendation. I received the 
transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on April 7, 2017. 
 
Procedural Issues 
 
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts 
concerning India, and provided relevant U.S. Department of State documents. (GX 2) I 
will take administrative notice of facts concerning India as noted in my Findings of Fact.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following findings of fact. Applicant is 43 years old, and a software developer for a 
defense contractor. Applicant was born in India, and received a bachelor’s degree in 
architecture in 1999 from a college in India. She worked in India as an architect from 
1999 to 2000. Applicant’s husband was born and raised in India, but was a United 
States citizen living and working in the United States when they married in India in April 
2000. Applicant moved to the United States to live with her husband after they married. 
They have two young boys who were born in the United States and are United States 
citizens. She studied at a United States university and received a master’s degree in 
information systems in 2003. Applicant became a United States citizen in April 2009. 
(Tr. 14-16; GX 1, e-QIP, dated August 25, 2014) 
 
 Applicant worked as a software developer for various United States businesses 
from 2003 until 2011. During this time, she took time to have and care for her children. 
Applicant’s husband had business interests in both the United States and India and he 
traveled back and forth between the two countries. They maintain their permanent home 
in the United States (Tr. 14-22) 
 
 The SOR alleges and Applicant admits that her father, sister, and mother-in-law 
are residents and citizens of India. (SOR 1.b, 1.c, and 1.d) Applicant also admits that 
                                                          
1 Department Counsel withdrew allegation SOR 1.a. (Tr. 8) 
 
2 Department Counsel withdrew allegation SOR 2.a. (Tr. 10) 
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her husband has business assets in India. The SOR alleges that Applicant’s husband’s 
financial interests in India are valued at $744.000. A detailed list of his assets shows the 
present value is substantially less at approximately $149,000. Applicant and her 
husband’s joint assets in the United States are valued at approximately $660,000. (AX 
A, Spreadsheet) 
 
 Applicant has two sisters. One is a citizen and resident of the United States 
employed as a project manager. Her other sister is a homemaker who is a citizen and 
resident of India. She also tutors high school students. Her sister’s husband is a college 
professor. Applicant talks to this sister approximately twice a week by phone. (Tr. 28-29) 
 
 Applicant’s father is a retired car manufacturing engineer. He spends half of his 
time in India and half of his time in the United States staying with Applicant or her sister 
and visiting his grandchildren. Applicant speaks to him weekly when he is in India or 
visiting her sister. He receives a pension from his former employer. (Tr. 29-30) 
 
 Applicant’s mother–in-law is a homemaker and a citizen and resident of India. 
Applicant talks to her about four times a year by telephone. Her financial support is from 
her late husband’s assets and retirement. (Tr. 30-31)  
 
 Applicant’s father-in-law operated an irrigation equipment company in India. He 
died in 2012. When Applicant’s husband visited India before his father died, he helped 
run the company. After his father died, Applicant’s husband and his mother each 
inherited half of the business. They shut the business down and are in the process of 
disposing of the assets. The business was valued at approximately $135,000. Her 
mother-in-law is self-sufficient receiving assets from her late husband’s business. (Tr. 
24-25, 35-37) 
 
 Applicant and her two sons returned to live in India in 2011 to care for her 
mother. Since her husband was traveling to India periodically for business, Applicant’s 
family kept their home in the United States and rented it out. Her oldest son was an 
elementary school student, but he did not do well in the India school system. When her 
mother passed away in 2014, Applicant and her family returned to the United States 
and moved back into their home. Her son is now doing well in his education in the 
United States. Applicant participates in community activities, and in activities at her 
sons’ school. The family enjoys traveling in the United States and celebrating American 
holidays. Applicant only returned to India for two weeks in 2015 to commemorate the 
traditional one-year anniversary of her mother’s death. (Tr. 20-28, 32-33)  
 
 Applicant’s husband’s principal employment is with a United States quasi-
government organization. He also had interests in two businesses that operated in India 
and the United States. One business manufactured and installed solar panels in the 
United States. The company started in the United States but had supply chain problems 
so the manufacturing moved to India. The company did not thrive and dissolved in 
2016/2017. All assets were sold and her husband lost his investment in the company. 
(Tr. 22-23) 
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 The second company is an investment partnership in a computer data mining 
company. The company started in India and then moved its headquarters to the United 
States since its principal client is a United Stated business. The company employs 
about 100 people. Some of the work is done in India and some is done in the United 
States. Applicant’s husband does not receive any income from the business but his 
investment is valued at approximately $34,000. Applicant’s husband’s business 
interests in India are decreasing and are now valued at less than $200,000. (Tr. 39-42) 
 
 Applicant presented letters of recommendation. The president of the company 
she works for has known her for over ten years. He sees her daily. She demonstrates 
allegiance to the United States. She is careful to obey all rules and regulations, and 
diligently safeguards all information. She is a true professional with integrity and is 
highly regarded by her co-workers. He recommends that she be granted eligibility for 
access to classified information.  
 
 A number of Applicant’s co-workers, neighbors, and friends wrote that she is a 
responsible person and citizen. She participates in community activities and volunteers 
at her children’s school. She is a “straight shooter”, dependable, with integrity. The 
writers of the letters note that Applicant is the embodiment of American values. She 
loves and respects the United States and its values. She take pride in calling herself an 
American citizen.  
 
 India is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy with a population of approximately 
1.2 billion people. The United States and India share common values including the rule 
of law, respect for diversity, and democratic government. The United States Department 
of State reported in 2012 that bilateral defense and counterterrorism cooperation 
between the United States and India had grown to reach unprecedented levels, In 2009, 
the United States and India launched the United States-India Strategic dialogue which is 
a bilateral forum focused on strengthening cooperation between the two countries in 
several area, including energy, climate change, trade, education, and counterterrorism. 
The United States supports a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes 
India as a permanent member. The United States is one of India’s largest trade and 
investment partners. In January 2015, President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Modi 
lauded the close and growing ties between the United States and India.  
 
 The 2008 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial Espionage identified India, along with seven other countries, as being involved 
in criminal espionage of United States trade secrets. There were export control 
enforcement cases in 2008 against India or Indian businesses. There have been recent 
criminal cases In the United States concerning export enforcement, economic 
espionage, theft of trade secrets, and embargo-related criminal prosecutions involving 
both the government of India and private companies and individuals in India.  
 
 India and Pakistan have been locked in a tense rivalry since the partition of the 
subcontinent following independence from Great Britain in 1947. India continues to 
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experience terrorist and insurgent activities that may affect U.S. citizens. Anti-Western 
terrorist groups, some on the United States Government’s list of foreign terrorist 
organizations, are active in India. India remains subject to violent terrorists attacks and 
continues to be one of the most persistently targeted countries by transnational and 
domestic terrorist groups.  
 
 According to the United States Department of State’s 2015 Human Rights 
Report, the most significant human rights problems in India were police and security 
forces abuses, including extra judicial killings, torture, rape, and widespread corruption 
at all level of government. The United States and India share a number of security 
perspectives, including, those on China, and the Asian balance of power, terrorism, 
Afghanistan, maritime issues, and weapons of mass destruction. India also has a long-
standing military supply relationships with Russia, and Russia remains India’s largest 
supplier of military systems and spare parts. India has remained reticent to discuss its 
nuclear security measures or allow inspections. India has also refused to accede to the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty despite United States policy supporting its universality. 
(GX 3, Request for Administrative notice and Supporting Documents) 
 
Policies 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
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A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Analysis 
 
Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the United 
Staes interest, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. 
Adjudication under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign 
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not 
limited to, such consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of 
terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)  
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States. Even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with 
the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national 
security. Friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, 
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. The nature of a nation’s 
government and its relationship with the United States are relevant in assessing the 
likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. 
The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country 
has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent 
upon the government or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against 
the United States. In considering the nature of the government, an administrative judge 
must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue. 
 
 The SOR alleges, and Applicant admits, that her father, sister, and mother-in-law 
are citizens and residents of India. She also admits that her husband has financial 
interests in India. Applicant’s family members who are citizens and residents of India as 
well as her husband’s financial interest in India are a foreign influence security concern.  
 
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 Four disqualifying conditions are relevant to the security concerns raised in the 
SOR under AG ¶ 7: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; 
 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and  
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation.   
 
 The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise 
the above disqualifying conditions. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(d), and 7(e) requires substantial 
evidence of a “heightened risk.” The “heightened risk” required to raise one of these 
disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. It denotes a risk greater than the 
normal risk inherent in having a family member or contacts living under a foreign 
government. The nature of Applicant’s contacts and relationships must be examined to 
determine whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, 
manipulation, pressure, or coercion. The Government has established that Applicant’s 
family in India may be under a “heightened risk” of security concern because of the 
potential for criminal espionage targeted at the United States, terrorist activities and 
threats, targeted intelligence activities, and human rights violations in India. An applicant 
with foreign family or friendship ties to a country that presents a heightened risk has a 
heavy burden of persuasion to show that neither she nor the family members are 
subject to influence by that country. The totality of an applicant’s family and friends ties 
to a foreign country as well as the tie to the country for each individual person must be 
considered.  
 
 Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns arising from her family 
members in India. I have considered the following Foreign Influence Mitigating 
Conditions under AG ¶ 8: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
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placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.;  
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;  
 
c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent 
that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence 
or exploitation; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they ae unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
 
 In evaluating the potential conflict of interest because Applicant’s has financial 
interests in India and her family members are citizens and residents of India, I 
considered that India is a strong ally of the United States with mutual defense and 
strategic interests; that India is a substantial trading partner of the United States; and 
that India cooperates with the United States on many military matters. A friendly 
relationship is not determinative, but it makes it less likely that a foreign government 
would attempt to exploit a United States citizen through relatives or associates in that 
country. Even friendly countries may engage in espionage against the United States’ 
economic, scientific, or technical interest. I have also considered the on-going situation 
in India with extensive terrorist activities and human rights issues. Even though India is 
not a hostile country and its interests are not inimical to the United States, it is 
reasonable to consider that the terrorist situation and groups in India could take an 
action that may jeopardize their friendly position with the United States. There are 
indications that elements in India could seek sensitive information from their citizens 
who have family in the United States.  
 
 I have considered Applicant’s relationship with her father, sister, and mother-in-
law, who are citizens or residents of India. Applicant has been open and candid about 
her foreign relatives. There is a rebuttable presumption that contacts with an immediate 
family member in a foreign country are not casual. Factors such as an applicant’s 
relatives’ obscurity or the failure of foreign authorities to contact them in the past do not 
provide a meaningful measure of whether an applicant’s family circumstances post a 
security concern.  
 
 Applicant’s contacts with her family members in India are close and frequent. 
Applicant has substantial contact with her sister in India. She talks to her almost daily. 
She talks to her father every few days when he is not visiting the United States. She 
talks to her mother-n-law a few times a year. Applicant has not rebutted the 
presumption that the contacts and communications with her family members are not 
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casual. The communications and contacts between Applicant and her family members 
are frequent and substantial. Her family members could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. Because of the terrorist activity in India, Applicant may likely be 
placed in a position of having to choose between her family members and the U.S. 
interests. AG ¶ 8 (a) and (c) do not apply.  
 
 Applicant has strong ties to the United States. She came to the United States 
and became a U.S. citizen at the first opportunity. Her children are U.S. native-born 
citizens. She and her family are contributing members of the community where they 
reside. She embraces the culture, values, history, and lifestyle of the United States. 
Applicant’s has substantial property and financial assets in the United States. She has 
firm ties to the United States and considers it home.  
 
 The nature of Applicant’s financial interests in India do not subject her to a 
heightened risk of foreign influence. The property interests are her husband’s business 
interests that are decreasing in value. One business is family-owned and is the process 
of being liquidated. Another is a business that did business in both India and the United 
States but has been dissolved. The principal client for the third business which is still 
operating is a corporation in the United States. These are normal routine business 
interests with commercial ties to the United States. Because of the business ties to the 
United States, it is unlikely that the business interests will result in a conflict or could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure Applicant’s husband, and 
thereby Applicant. Disqualifying condition AG ¶ 8(f) applies. 
 
 Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is unquestioned. She has immediate 
family members who are citizens and residents of the United States. Her immediate 
family, husband and children, are U. S. citizens and residents. Her sister and her family 
are citizens and residents of the United States. Her father spends considerable time 
each year living in the United States. Applicant has established that it is unlikely that 
she could be placed in a position to choose between any sense of loyalty or obligation 
to her family members in India and her sense of loyalty or obligation to the United 
States. In balancing all of the factors mentioned and considered above, I am satisfied 
Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is such that she can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the United States interest. There is no risk to the national 
interest if Applicant has access to classified information. The mitigating conditions in AG 
¶¶ 8(b) apply.  
 
 Applicant has met her heavy burden to show that her family members who are 
citizens and residents of India do not cause a security concern. I conclude that 
Applicant has mitigated security concerns for foreign influence.  
 
 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
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 Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for 
access to sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon 
careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I considered the information about 
Applicant’s reputation in the company for hard work, honesty, loyalty, job performance, 
and contributions to her company’s mission. The whole-person concept requires 
consideration of all available information about Applicant, not single items in isolation, to 
reach a determination concerning Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified 
information.  
 
Applicant has contact with family members and financial interests in India. 
However, Applicant established that she has such strong relationships and loyalties in 
and to the United States that she can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in 
favor of the United States. While access to classified information is not based on a 
finding of loyalty to the United States, Applicant established her deep and abiding 
commitment to the protection of United States interests. Applicant, her husband, and 
her children are residents of the United States and solely United States citizens. These 
facts leave me without questions and doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability 
for access to classified information. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has met 
the heavy burden of mitigating potential security concerns arising from family members 
and financial interests in India. Applicant mitigated foreign influence security concerns 
and access to classified information is granted. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT (WITHDRAWN) 
 
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Paragraph 2, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT  
 
Subparagraph 2.a:   Withdrawn 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.b – 2.e:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for access to 
classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge