1 
      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
) ISCR Case No. 16-01115 
) 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Andrew Henderson, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
June 20, 2017 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant has mitigated the foreign influence and foreign preference concerns raised by 
his Greek citizenship, property in Greece, and contacts in both Greece and the Republic 
of Korea (South Korea). His request for a security clearance is granted. 
Statement of the Case 
On August 4, 2016, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended 
(Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) 
alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guidelines B and C.1 The SOR further 
informed Applicant that, based on information available to the Government, DoD 
adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. 
1 I considered the previous Adjudicative Guidelines, effective September 1, 2006, as well as the new 
Adjudicative Guidelines, effective June 8, 2017. My decision would be the same if the case was 
considered under the previous Adjudicative Guidelines, effective September 1, 2006.  
 
2 
 
Applicant answered the SOR on August 12, 2016, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on September 
12, 2016. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of 
hearing on October 13, 2016, scheduling the hearing for December 20, 2016. The 
hearing was convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2, 
which were admitted (Tr. 12-14.), and Hearing Exhibit (HE) I for Administrative Notice. 
Applicant testified on his own behalf. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) 
on December 29, 2016. 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 At the hearing, the Government requested I take administrative notice of certain 
facts relating to South Korea. Department Counsel provided a six-page summary of the 
facts, supported by 14 U.S. Government reports pertaining to South Korea, identified as 
HE I. The reports provide elaboration and context for the summary. I take administrative 
notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports. They are limited to matters 
of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set out in the 
Findings of Fact. 
 
 On December 10, 2016, the Security Executive Agent issued Directive 4 (SEAD-
4), establishing a “single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered individuals who 
require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to 
hold a sensitive position.”2 The National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (hereinafter 
“adjudicative guidelines” or “AG”), which are found at Appendix A to SEAD-4, are to be 
used in security clearance determinations made on or after June 8, 2017.3 In light of this 
explicit direction and absent lawful authority to the contrary, I have applied the 
adjudicative guidelines. ISCR Case No. 02-00305 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 12, 2003) 
(security clearance decisions must be based on current DoD policy and standards).4 
Those AG make relevant the national security risks involved in all foreign countries, not 
just those presenting a heightened risk.  
 
 During the hearing, neither Applicant nor Department Counsel presented any 
documentation on Greece for Administrative Notice. On June 12, 2017, in order to 
conduct a proper analysis under the current AG, I sent an email to both parties with a 
copy of the effective guidelines and a proposal to take Administrative Notice of a U.S. 
Department of State fact sheet on Greece, marked HE II, dated October 17, 2016. 
Neither party had an objection to HE II. The facts set out in HE II are limited to matters 
of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set out in the 
Findings of Fact, below. 
 
                                                          
2 SEAD-4, ¶ B, PURPOSE.  
 
3 SEAD-4, ¶¶ C, APPLICABILITY; E (at 1 and 8), POLICY; and F, EFFECTIVE DATE. 
 
4 See also ISCR Case No. 07-00029 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2007) (when the guidelines were last revised, 
the Board stated the following, “Quasi-judicial adjudications must be made within the bounds of applicable 
law and agency policy, not without regard to them.”) 
 
 
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Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted to all of the allegations in the SOR. After a thorough and 
careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of 
fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 46-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has been 
employed with his current defense contractor since 2006. He is married to a U.S. 
natural-born citizen, and has one minor son. (GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 19.) 
 
 Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens and residents of South 
Korea. They visit Applicant and his wife in the United States annually. Applicant and his 
wife also visit his parents-in-law in South Korea annually. His father-in-law is a professor 
at the community-college level. He also “holds a Chair” at a more prestigious South 
Korean university. Applicant’s mother-in-law is a homemaker. He has monthly 
telephonic contact with his parents-in-law. Applicant only discusses matters pertaining 
to his immediate family with his in-laws.5 (GE 2; Tr. 22-25, 33, 36.)  
 
 Applicant’s father, the chairman of a research lab at a prestigious U.S. university, 
is a dual citizen of Greece and the United States, and resides in the United States. He 
owned property in Greece and wanted to transfer it to his son. Greek citizenship is 
required to own property “[i]n a bordering territory.” Applicant explained that “the island 
that [he] grew up traveling to all [his] life is a bordering island where [he] can see Turkey 
on a good day. So it’s considered a border.” His father retained an attorney and applied 
for Applicant to be recognized as a Greek citizen in the 1990’s, based on Applicant’s 
patriarchal lineage. Applicant’s Greek citizenship was granted in 2006. Applicant’s 
father transferred the property in Greece to Applicant shortly after Applicant obtained 
Greek citizenship. It is held solely by Applicant. In addition, Applicant is currently 
constructing a summer home on that property that will be valued at approximately 
$750,000 when construction is complete. Applicant intends to maintain his dual 
citizenship with Greece. He does not have a Greek passport. (Tr. 25-34.) 
  
 Applicant grew up traveling around the world. His family “has a lot of friends in a 
lot of places.” His uncle has served the United States Government around the world in 
high-level civilian posts, including with an intelligence agency. Applicant testified that 
while in a foreign country, he was targeted as a political act against his uncle. He 
followed protocol in reporting the incident to the proper U.S. authorities.6 Despite his 
international contacts, Applicant explained that his “first loyalty is to the country, to make 
sure that it is protected for things like [his] son, [his] family and other people’s families.” 
(Tr. 17-19.) 
  
                                                          
5 Applicant testified that his wife’s uncle was formerly a high-level political leader in Korea. The SOR did 
not allege this relationship. Applicant testified he did not talk to this relative the two occasions they were 
in the same place and “couldn’t even pick him out of a line up if you asked me.” (Tr. 34.) 
 
6 This incident has nothing to do with either of the two countries alleged. 
 
4 
 
 Applicant owns a home in the United States valued at approximately two million 
dollars. (Tr. 35.) Applicant does not feel any allegiance or obligation to Greece or South 
Korea. (GE 2.) 
 
 South Korea is a constitutional democracy governed by a president and a 
unicameral legislature. It has a history of collecting protected U.S. information. The 
United States restricts the export of sensitive, dual use technologies to South Korea. In 
2000, South Korea was ranked as one of seven countries actively engaging in targeting 
the United States for foreign economic collection and industrial espionage. The United 
States actively prosecutes theft of U.S. trade secrets by South Korean companies. (HE 
I.) 
 
 Greece is an important partner of the United States on many policy priorities. It is 
an ally in engagement and dialogue with the Muslim world. U.S. assistance fosters 
strong bilateral military-to-military relations and contributes toward the interoperability of 
Greek forces. Greece is a member of the European Union. Greece and the United 
States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United 
Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World 
Trade Organization. Greece also is a permanent observer to the Organization of 
American States. (HE II.) 
  
Policies 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the 
evidence contained in the record.  
 
 
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Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall 
be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the 
loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference  
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Preference is set out in 
AG ¶ 9: 
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may provide 
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the 
United States. Foreign involvement raises concerns about an individual's 
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness when it is in conflict with U.S. 
national interests or when the individual acts to conceal it. By itself; the 
fact that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of another country is not 
disqualifying without an objective showing of such conflict or attempt at 
concealment. The same is true for a U.S. citizen's exercise of any right or 
privilege of foreign citizenship and any action to acquire or obtain 
recognition of a foreign citizenship. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 10. The following is potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country. 
 
 
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  Applicant is a dual citizen of the United States and Greece. He became a Greek 
citizen in 2006. He acquired Greek citizenship so that he could own property in Greece. 
The evidence is sufficient to raise the above disqualifying condition. 
 
Conditions that could mitigate foreign preference security concerns are described 
under AG ¶ 11. Four are potentially applicable: 
 
(a) the foreign citizenship is not in conflict with U.S. national security interests; 
 
(b) dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship or birth in a foreign 
country, and there is no evidence of foreign preference; 
 
(e) the exercise of the entitlements or benefits of foreign citizenship do not 
present a national security concern; and 
 
(f) the foreign preference, if detected, involves a foreign country, entity, or 
association that poses a low national security risk. 
 
Greece is a NATO ally and strong partner with the United States. Applicant’s 
Greek citizenship and property in Greece are not in conflict with U.S. national security 
interests. His acquisition and exercise of Greek citizenship to permit him to own family 
property in Greece do not present a national security concern and represent a low 
national security risk. Further, his Greek citizenship was based solely on his father’s 
citizenship and there is no evidence that Applicant has preference for Greece over the 
United States. The above conditions offer mitigation with respect to this guideline. 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in 
AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Four are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
 
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(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology; 
 
(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, 
or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject 
the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or 
personal conflict of interest.  
 
  Applicant and his wife have contact with his parents-in-law, who are citizens and 
residents of South Korea. South Korea is a known collector of economic espionage and 
targets the United States for industrial information, which creates a heightened risk that 
Applicant could be subject to foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
The evidence is sufficient to raise the disqualifying conditions set out in AG ¶¶ 7(a), 
7(b), and 7(e).  
 
  Applicant’s connections to Greece, through his father and through Applicant’s 
property in Greece, also raise a concern under AG ¶ 7(b). It is possible that his father’s 
Greek citizenship and/or Applicant’s property in Greece could create a potential conflict 
between U.S. and Greek interests. The Government failed to present documentation 
showing any heightened risk associated with Greece, and as a result, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 
7(e) are inapplicable to Applicant’s Greek contacts. 
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; 
 
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements 
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, 
groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and 
 
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(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
 
 Applicant’s testimony demonstrated a strong commitment to the United States. 
He was born and raised in the United States. His wife is a natural-born U.S. citizen, as 
is his son. He owns property valued at two million dollars in the United States. He has 
minimal ties to South Korea. He has sentimental ties to Greece, but his deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States show he would resolve any 
conflicts in favor of the U.S. interest. In fact, when placed in a compromising situation in 
the past, due to his uncle’s service to the United States, Applicant followed proper 
protocol and complied with reporting requirements. Further, the routine nature of his 
property in Greece makes a conflict unlikely, and it could not be used effectively to 
influence, manipulate, or pressure Applicant. The above mitigating conditions are 
established by the evidence in this case. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments 
under Guidelines B and C in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 
2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.  
 
Applicant’s closest familial ties are with his wife and son, who are American 
citizens. He owns property valued at two million dollars in the United States. He is a 
loyal American and would resolve any conflicts in favor of the United States, as he has 
done in the past. His contacts with his parents-in-law in South Korea are limited to 
family matters. He maintains Greek citizenship and a property in Greece, but they do 
 
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not raise a current national security risk. Due to his longstanding ties here, Applicant 
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States.  
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant mitigated the Foreign Preference and Foreign Influence security 
concerns.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:    For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraph 2.a:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 2.b:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 2.c:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 2.d:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge