1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) [Redacted] ) ISCR Case No. 16-01833 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Nicole A. Smith, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se ______________ Decision ______________ FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines F (Financial Considerations), G (Alcohol Consumption), and E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application on March 4, 2015. On November 15, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines F, G, and E. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.1 1 Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (SEAD 4), was issued on December 10, 2016, revising the 2006 adjudicative guidelines. The SEAD 4 guidelines apply to all adjudicative decisions issued on or after June 2 Applicant answered the SOR on January 3, 2017, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on January 31, 2017, and the case was assigned to me on March 2, 2017. On March 3, 2017, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled for March 22, 2017. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 6 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified but did not present the testimony of any other witnesses or submit any documentary evidence. I kept the record open until April 7, 2017, to enable him to submit documentary evidence, but he did not submit anything further. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on April 4, 2017. Findings of Fact2 In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the allegations. His admissions in his answer and at the hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 39-year-old electronics technician employed by a defense contractor. He served on active duty in the U.S. Navy from December 1998 to September 2012 and received a general discharge under honorable conditions. He held a security clearance in the Navy and while employed by a defense contractor, but it was suspended when he received the SOR. (Tr. 8.) While on active duty, Appellant attended college part time and received an associate’s degree in June 2008. After his discharge from the Navy, he received a bachelor’s degree in November 2014. He married in August 1982 and divorced in November 2008. He married his current spouse in June 2011 and separated in December 2011. He has a 14-year-old son from his first marriage, for whom he pays child support of about $225 per month. His child-support payments are current. (Tr. 29.) He and his second wife have not divorced because they cannot afford it. (GX 7.) In June 2012, Applicant was arrested by civilian authorities for driving under the influence after he was involved in an accident. He had been drinking at a bar from 6:00 p.m. to about 2:00 a.m. During a personal subject interview in November 2015, he told an investigator that he could not recall how much he drank, but he knew he was intoxicated. He failed the field sobriety tests and the breathalyzer reflected that his blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was over the legal limit. He was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sentenced to 90 days in jail (suspended). His driver’s license was restricted, and he was required to complete an alcohol-education program and install an interlock device in his car. (GX 2 at 9.) He also was required to attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and he attended them twice a week for about a year. (Tr. 47.) In August 2012, he received nonjudicial punishment from his military 8, 2017. My decision is based on the guidelines in SEAD 4, referred to in this decision as “AG.” The changes resulting from issuance of SEAD 4 did not affect my decision in this case. 2 Applicant’s personal information is extracted from his security clearance application (GX 1) unless otherwise indicated by a parenthetical citation to the record. 3 commander for the same DWI, and he was reduced in rank from petty officer first class (E-6) to petty officer second class (E-5) and restricted to his ship for two weeks. (GX 1 at 29; GX 2 at 7; GX 3.) As a result of being reduced in rank, he was precluded from continuing his Navy service under the “high year tenure” rules. (Tr. 58.) Applicant was unemployed from the date of his discharge from the Navy until December 2012. He worked seasonally for a professional tax preparer from December 2012 to March 2013, was unemployed from March to September 2013, worked as a systems analyst from September 2013 to March 2014, was unemployed from March to December 2014, and worked for a professional tax preparer from December 2014 until he began his current job in March 2015. Applicant testified that he abstained from alcohol from November 2012 until 2014, when he resumed drinking to cope with depression. (Tr. 47.) On a date he could not recall, he was detained for public intoxication, held overnight in the “drunk tank” and then released. He testified that he was never charged or required to appear in court for this incident. (Tr. 54.) Applicant was charged with a second DWI in October 2015 after he struck a parked truck. (Tr. 48-49.) He testified that he had been drinking at a bar with a friend. He could not remember how much he drank, but it was “quite a bit.” He consumed enough alcohol to register a BAC over the legal limit at about 2:00 p.m. on the following day. (Tr. 49.) He was convicted in May 2016, and he was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with 355 days suspended and fined $500. He served ten days in jail. He was placed on unsupervised probation for thirty-six months and was still on probation at the time of the hearing. He was again required to attend an alcohol education course and participate in AA. He stopped attending AA meetings after about four months because of his busy work schedule. Applicant testified that he has totally abstained from alcohol since July 2016. (GX 3; GX 4; Tr. 52-53.) He has never been diagnosed with alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse. (Tr. 60.) He testified that he stopped consuming alcohol because he was cautioned by medical authorities about the dangers of combining alcohol with the antidepressant and sleep medications he is taking. He admitted that he still finds himself wishing he could have a drink. He testified that he continues to suffer from depression, but he has not received any further therapy after he completed a four-month program in November 2016. (Tr. 61-62.) He submitted no documentation of his AA participation or his treatment for depression. Applicant was interviewed by a security investigator in November 2015. He did not tell the investigator that he had been arrested for DWI in October and was awaiting trial. (GX 2 at 7.) He testified that the investigator told him he was only interested in events that occurred before August 2015. He admitted that the investigator asked him if he had been involved in any other DWI incidents and he answered “No” (Tr. 56-57.) 4 Applicant’s credit bureau reports (CBRs) from March 2015 and March 2016 reflected the 12 delinquent debts alleged in the SOR. (GX 5; GX 6.) The evidence concerning these debts is summarized below. SOR ¶ 1.a: car loan past due for about $1,013 with a balance of about $19,031. This debt is included in the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.g. SOR ¶ 1.b: unsecured loan placed for collection of about $6,980. Applicant testified that he obtained this loan for legal fees, bail bonds, and related expenses due to his second wife’s multiple incidents with law enforcement officials, including a DWI arrest, multiple speeding tickets, and a traffic accident. (Tr. 26, 37.) While he was on active duty, the payments on the loans were deducted from his military pay, but the automatic payments stopped when he was discharged and he could not afford to continue making them. (Tr. 35.) SOR ¶ 1.c: credit-card account charged off for $1,260. Applicant testified that he made one or two payments on this debt and then stopped because he could not afford any more payments. SOR ¶ 1.d: line of credit charged off for $1,145. At the hearing, Applicant speculated that this debt may have been for a credit card, but he was not sure. (Tr. 39.) SOR ¶¶ 1.e, 1.i, and 1.k: delinquent medical bills for $964, $1,367, and $209. Applicant testified that these debts were incurred for treatment of injuries to his knees and gastro-intestinal problems that began while he was on active duty. The debts were incurred at a time when he did not have medical insurance. He testified that he has taken no action to resolve them. (Tr. 40.) SOR ¶ 1.f: overdraft on a checking account placed for collection of $469. Applicant testified that he was making monthly payments of $40 on this debt until he was discharged and could no longer afford the payments. SOR ¶ 1.g: car loan charged off for $22,478. This debt arose from the DWI incident in August 2012, in which Applicant wrecked his car and it was a total loss. (Tr. 31.) He testified that he had documentation that the debt was a “write off,” but he did not submit it. However, his March 2016 CBR reflects that the debt was settled for less than full amount. (GX 6 at 2.) SOR ¶ 1.h: telecommunications bill charged off for $459. Applicant testified that this debt was incurred when the provider cut off service without notice and he was unable to contact a customer-service representation. He has made no attempt to pay this debt. (Tr. 40.) SOR ¶ 1.j: cellphone bill placed for collection of $1,318. Applicant testified that he could not afford to pay the monthly bills for this service after he was discharged. He has taken no action to resolve it. (Tr. 41.) 5 SOR ¶ 1.l: telecommunications bill placed for collection of $146. Applicant testified that he is attempting to restore service with this provider and that he intended to pay the past-due amount and the next monthly payment. He provided no documentary evidence that this debt is resolved. (Tr. 41.) Applicant currently earns about $47,500 per year, and he has been receiving $976 per month in disability compensation since March 2015. (Tr. 28, 44.) He estimates that he has a monthly net remainder of about $1,000 after paying his bills and living expenses. At the hearing, Applicant testified that he had hired a debt-resolution company to assist him April 2015, and he is paying the company $89 per month. He testified that the company is challenging the validity of some of his debts. He did not know how much of the $89 was applied to paying his debts. (Tr. 26, 43.) His reaction to his financial problems has been passive, and he does not have a good grasp of his financial situation. He testified that he has taken no action to resolve any of his delinquent debts because he is relying on the debt-resolution company to do so. (Tr. 45.) Even though he was given additional time after the hearing to provide documentation showing the status of the debts being handled by the debt-resolution company, he provided nothing. Policies “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 6 Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). Analysis Guideline F, Financial Considerations The SOR alleges 12 delinquent debts totaling about $37,000. The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18: Failure to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be caused or exacerbated by, and thus can be a possible indicator of, other issues of personnel security concern such as excessive gambling, mental health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol abuse or dependence. An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. 7 This concern is broader than the possibility that a person might knowingly compromise classified information to raise money. It encompasses concerns about a person’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting classified information. A person who is financially irresponsible may also be irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified information. See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). The evidence reflects that the debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.g are duplicates. When the same conduct is alleged twice in the SOR under the same guideline, one of the duplicative allegations should be resolved in Applicant=s favor. See ISCR Case No. 03-04704 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2005) at 3 (same debt alleged twice). Accordingly, I have resolved SOR ¶ 1.a in Applicant’s favor. Applicant’s admissions and the documentary evidence submitted at the hearing establish two disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG 19(a) (“inability to satisfy debts”) and AG ¶ 19(c) (“a history of not meeting financial obligations”). The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 19(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 19(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; AG ¶ 19(c): the individual has received or is receiving financial counseling for the problem from a legitimate and credible source, such as a non-profit credit counseling service, and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; and AG ¶ 19(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts. AG ¶ 19(a) is not established. Applicant’s delinquent debts are numerous, recent, and were not incurred under circumstances making them unlikely to recur. AG ¶ 19(b) is not fully established. Applicant’s marital breakup, his wife’s criminal conduct, and his medical expenses for knee injuries and gastro-intestinal problems were conditions beyond his control. However, his periods of unemployment were the product of his misconduct that led to his premature discharge from the Navy. Except for the delinquent auto loan alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b, he has made little effort to resolve his other debts. His debt-management company appears to be focused on challenging the validity of debts reflected in his CBR rather than negotiating settlement 8 of the debts. He did not begin working with the debt-management company until April 2015. At the hearing, he was unfamiliar with the details of several debts and unaware of the steps taken by the debt-management company to resolve them. AG ¶ 19(c) is not established. Applicant’s debt-management company is not providing the financial counseling contemplated by this mitigating condition. AG ¶ 19(d) is established for the auto loan alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.g, but not for the other debts alleged in the SOR. Applicant submitted no evidence of personal efforts or efforts by the debt management company on his behalf to resolve any of the debts alleged in the SOR. Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption The SOR alleges two DWI incidents in October 2015 and June 2012 (SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b). The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 21: “Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.” Applicant’s admissions and the evidence submitted at the hearing establish the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 22(a): alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of the frequency of the individual's alcohol use or whether the individual has been diagnosed with alcohol use disorder; and AG ¶ 22(c): habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed with alcohol use disorder. Applicant’s two DWI incidents establish AG ¶ 22(a). The evidence also establishes binge consumption within the meaning of AG ¶ 22(c) on both occasions. The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism defines “binge drinking” as “a pattern of drinking that brings a person’s BAC to 0.08 percent or above,” which typically occurs when a man has five or more drinks or a woman has four or more drinks within a two-hour period. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fact Sheets – Binge Drinking, www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/binge-drinking.htm. Even though there is no specific evidence of the amount of alcohol Applicant consumed, it was sufficient to produce a BAC over the legal limit in both instances. The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant: AG ¶ 23(a): so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does 9 not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment; and AG ¶ 23(b): the individual acknowledges his or her pattern of maladaptive alcohol use, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations. AG ¶ 23(a) is not established. At the time of the hearing, Applicant had abstained from alcohol for less than a year. He stopped attending AA meetings after about four months. He admitted that he still has the desire to drink alcohol. His alcohol consumption was frequent and did not occur under unusual circumstances. AG ¶ 23(b) is not fully established. Applicant has acknowledged his excessive alcohol consumption, but he produced no evidence of treatment for alcohol abuse. He attributed his drinking to depression. He admitted that he still suffers from depression, but he provided no evidence of his diagnosis and treatment for depression. Guideline E, Personal Conduct The SOR cross-alleges the two DWI incidents under this guideline (SOR ¶ 3.a) and alleges that Applicant falsified material facts during the PSI by failing to disclose his arrest for DWI in October 2015. The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. . . . Applicant admitted that he intentionally did not disclose the October 2015 DWI arrest in response to the investigator’s question whether he had been involved in any other DWI incidents. His intentionally false answer establishes the disqualifying condition in AG ¶ 16(b): [D]eliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other official government representative. 10 Applicant’s two DWI incidents establish the following disqualifying conditions: AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information; and AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes . . . engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing. The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant: AG ¶ 17(a): the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and AG ¶ 17(e): the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. AG ¶ 17(a) is not established. Applicant made no effort correct his false statement in the PSI until he was confronted with the SOR and asked about false answer at the hearing. AG ¶ 17(c) is not established. Intentionally false statements to an investigator are not “minor,” because they undermine the integrity of the security clearance process. Applicant’s false statement was recent because it pertains to the current ongoing security clearance process. His excessive alcohol consumption was recent, because he did not stop drinking until less than a year ago. None of the acts alleged in the SOR occurred under unusual circumstances. 11 AG ¶ 17(d) is not fully established. Applicant has acknowledged his excessive alcohol consumption and admitted his falsification, but insufficient time has passed to establish that recurrence is unlikely. AG ¶ 17(e) is established for the alcohol-related conduct, because Applicant is currently abstaining from alcohol. It is established for the falsification, because Applicant admitted the full extent of his alcohol problems during an open hearing. Whole-Person Concept Under AG ¶¶ 2(a), 2(c), and 2(d), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines F, G, and E, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not carried his burden of mitigating the security concerns raised by his delinquent debts, alcohol consumption, and personal conduct. Formal Findings I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Paragraph 1, Guideline F (Financial Considerations): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant Subparagraphs 1.b-1.f: Against Applicant Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant Subparagraphs 1.h-1.l: Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 2.a-2.b: Against Applicant Paragraph 3, Guideline E (Personal Conduct): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 3.a-3.b: Against Applicant 12 Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge